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I have spent many nights sleeping in the plazas of Buenos Aires
with a bottle of wine, trying toforget... I am afraidto be alone

with my thoughts.
Argentine Captain Adolfo Scilingo,
confessing to having thrown thirty
people from a navy helicopter during
the "dirty war."'
Publicly coming forward to give such testimony is a way of
returningto a horriblepast that we are trying to forget.
Argentine President Carlos Sai6l
Menem, responding to Scilingo's
public confession.'
[The struggle of man againstpower is the struggle of memory
againstforgetting.
Milan Kundera
INTRODUCTION

All societies have founding myths, explaining where we come
from, defining what we stand for.4 These are often commemorated
in the form of "monumental didactics," public recountings of the
founders' heroic deeds as a national epic. Some societies also have
myths of refounding, marking a period of decisive break from their
own pasts, celebrating the courage and imagination of those who
effected this rupture. Myths of founding and refounding often
center on legal proceedings or the drafting of legal documents: the
Magna Carta (for Britain),5 the trial and execution of King Louis

' Quoted in Calvin Sims, Argentine Tells of Dumping 'Dirty War' Captives into Sea,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1995, at Al, A8. Sergeant Victor Armando Ibifiez made similar
confessions. See Confessions of a Dirty Warrior, HARPER'S MAG., July 1995, at 15
(translating and reprinting an interview published in the April 24, 1995 issue of La
Prensa).
2 Quoted in Calvin Sims, NationalNightmareReturns to Argentine Consciousness,N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 5, 1995, at Al, A6; see also Argentina: The Unspoken Past,N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
21, 1995, at A20 (noting that "authorities have actively discouraged public discussion
of what went on").
3 MILAN KUNDERA, THE BOOK OF LAUGHTER AND FORGETTING 3 (Michael H. Heim
trans., 1980).
4 See MIRCEA ELIADE, MYTH AND REALrFY 4-5, 30-38 (Ruth N. Anshen ed., Willard

R. Trask trans., 1963) (examining the purpose of "foundation myths" in society).
' On the many and conflicting invocations of the Magna Carta in subsequent
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XVI (for France), 6 and the Declaration of Independence7 and the
Constitutional Convention (for the United States).' "Our country's
birthday," reminds Mary Ann Glendon, "commemorates the formal
signing of a legal document-a bill of grievances in which rebellious
but fussily legalistic colonists recited their complaints, [and] claimed
that they had been denied 'the rights of Englishmen.'" 9
Such legally induced transformations of collective identity are
not confined to the distant past. In Australia, the white population
has recently come to refocus its national identity around a "discovery" or rehabilitation of the country's aboriginal population. 10 At
the same time, aborigines themselves have increasingly come to
refocus their relations with the white majority population around
several highly successful legal interactions with it: a well-publicized
lawsuit vindicating indigenous claims to traditional lands and a law
consolidating these claims.1 Both legal events have, in turn, come
12
to be celebrated in indigenous ceremony and popular song.
English political history, by both the left and the right, see ANNE PALLISTER, MAGNA
CARTA: THE HERITAGE OF LIBERTY 32-38, 51-62, 73, 89 (1971).
6 See generally SUSAN DUNN, THE DEATHS OF LOUIS XVI: REGICIDE AND THE
FRENCH POLITICAL IMAGINATION (1994) (examining the shifting place of this event in
French memory).
7 On how American memory of the Declaration of Independence has changed
several times, in light of shifting political contexts, see MICHAEL KAMMEN, A SEASON
OF YOUTH: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION 55-65
(1978).
8 On the place of the U.S. Constitution in the collective memory and popular
culture of Americans, see MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF:
THE CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1986).
9 MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: HOW THE CRISIS IN THE
LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY 259 (1994). The act of
founding often becomes the focal point for later disputes about its meaning and
bearing, if any, on contemporary disputes that find their way into courtrooms. As
Milner Ball observes, "[t]he courts are the paradigmatic spaces where the dramatic
narrative of our beginning is recurred to and augmented." MILNER S. BALL, THE
PROMISE OF AMERICAN LAW: A THEOLOGICAL, HUMANISTIC VIEW OF LEGAL PROCESS

62 (1981).
" See Paula Hamilton, The Knife Edge: Debates About Memory and History, in
MEMORY AND HISTORY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AUSTRALIA 9, 13-14 (Kate DarianSmith & Paula Hamilton eds., 1994).
" See Mabo v. Queensland, 175 C.L.R. 1, 2 (Austl. 1992) (holding that "the
Meriam people are entitled as against the whole world to possession, occupation, use
and enjoyment of the lands of the Murray Islands"); Native Title Act, No. 110 (1993)
(Austl.) (setting forth Parliament's objectives of providing for the recognition and
protection of native title).
12 Two such songs, composed and performed by an interracial rock group, have
become best-selling hits on the Australian pop music charts. The group's name is
Yothu Yindi. The songs are entitled Mabu and Treaty. The first of these appears on
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In short, acts that assert and recognize legal rights have often
become a focal point for the collective memory of whole nations.
Secular rituals of commemoration consolidate such shared memories with increasing deliberateness and sophistication. 3 These
events are both "real" and "staged," to the point of problematizing
14
the distinction between true and false representations of reality.
In this way, law-related activities can and do contribute to the kind
of social solidarity that is enhanced by shared historical memory.
In the last half century, criminal law has increasingly been used in
several societies with a view to teaching a particular interpretation
of the country's history, one expected to have a salubrious impact
on its solidarity.
Many have thought, in particular, that the best way to prevent recurrence of genocide, and other forms of state-sponsored
mass brutality, is to cultivate a shared and enduring memory of
its horrors-and to employ the law self-consciously toward this

end. To do this effectively has increasingly been recognized to
require some measure of son et lumixre, smoke and mirrors, that is,
some self-conscious

dramaturgy by prosecutors

and judges, I

contend. For instance, western Allies in postwar war crimes trials
deliberately strove "to dramatize the implacable contradiction
between the methods of totalitarianism and the ways of civilized
humanity through a worldwide demonstration of fair judicial
procedure." 5
This Article examines six recurring problems that have arisen
from efforts to employ criminal prosecution to influence a nation's
collective memory of state-sponsored mass murder. 16 Some of

the album FREEDOM (Hollywood Records 1993), the second on TRIBAL VOICE
(Hollywood Records 1992).

is See DANIEL DAYAN & ELIHU KATZ, MEDIA EVENTS: THE LIVE BROADCASTING OF
HISTORY 211-13 (1992) (examining official efforts to influence collective memory

through television broadcasts of major public events); see also Ana Maria Alonso, The
Effects of Truth: Re-Presentationsof the Past and the Imagining of Community, 1 J. HIST.
Soc. 33, 40 (1988) ("Social groups form images of themselves in relation to a set of
founding events and re-enact this shared link to a collective past in public ceremony
....
[Hence, s]ocial memory is integral to the creation of social meaning.").

See JEAN BAUDRILLARD, SIMULATIONS 5-6 (Paul Foss et al. trans., 1983).
"sPeterJ. Fliess, 78 AM.J. INT'L L. 256, 256 (1984) (reviewing RICHARD L. LAEL,
THE YAMASHITA PRECEDENT: WAR CRIMES AND COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY (1982))
14

(emphasis added).
16 I focus primarily on the legal response to the Argentine dirty war, in which
between 10,000 and 30,000 citizens were murdered by the country's officer corps.
Over 500 officers were indicted, and some two dozen convicted (including six junta
members and individual torturers), before military uprisings forced an end to further
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these suggest the task's impossibility; others, its undesirability.
First, such efforts can easily sacrifice the rights of defendants on the
altar of social solidarity. Second, they can unwittingly distort
historical understanding of the nation's recent past. Third, they
may foster delusions of purity and grandeur by encouraging faulty
analogies between past and future controversies, readings of the
precedent that are often too broad, sometimes too narrow.
Fourth, they may fail by requiring more extensive admissions of
guilt, and more repentance, than most nations are prepared to
undertake; this is because efforts at employing law to instill shared
memories sometimes require substantial segments of a society to
accept responsibility for colossal wrongs and to break completely
with cherished aspects of its past. Fifth, legal efforts to influence
collective memory may fail because such memory-almost by
nature-arises only incidentally; it cannot be constructed intentionally. Sixth, even if collective memory can be created deliberately,
perhaps it can be done only dishonestly, that is, by concealing this
very deliberateness from the intended audience.
These obstacles establish the moral and empirical limits
within which any liberal account of law's contribution to collective
memory must maneuver.17 I discuss each obstacle in turn, drawing
trials. On this history, see MARTIN E. ANDERSEN, DOSSIER SECRETO: ARGENTINA'S
DESAPARECIDOS AND THE MYrH OF THE "DIRTY WAR" (1993); ALISON BRYSK, THE
POLmIcs OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA: PROTEST, CHANGE, AND DEMOCRATIZATION (1994); Ronald Dworkin, Introduction to COMISI6N NACIONAL SOBRE LA
DESAPARICI6N DE PERSONAS, NUNCA MAs: THE REPORT OF THE ARGENTINE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON THE DISAPPEARED at xi (1986) [hereinafter NUNCA MAS].

" Several of these obstacles would also present problems for any effort to
influence collective memory, by whatever means (that is, other than by legal
proceedings). The relative efficacy of the law in this regard, compared with
alternative methods of shaping memory (such as the news media, educational
institutions, cinema, and so forth) will not be examined here. But see HEIDE
FEHRENBACH, CINEMA IN DEMOCRATIZING GERMANY: RECONSTRUCTING NATIONAL
IDENTITY AFTER HITLER 148-68 (1995). I here examine only the law's potential

contribution, largely in isolation from the rest. By "the law," I shall primarily refer
to criminal prosecution, including strategic decisions by counsel on both sides and by
the court. I will also allude occasionally to legislation and executive orders, although
these will be of decidedly secondary concern. Still another crucial use of law to
influence collective memory has involved litigation aimed at creating or increasing
access (by historians andjournalists) to government records documenting administrative massacres in the past. Such litigation has recently become particularly important
in societies undergoing transition from nondemocratic to democratic rule, including
the former Eastern Bloc states. Important as well has been the statutory provision
in many criminal codes making "disparagement of the memory of the dead" an
offense. See Eric Stein, Histoy Against Free Speech: The New German Law Against the
"Auschwitz"-and Other-"Lies", 85 MICH. L. REV. 277, 294 (1986). In West Germany,
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on the now considerable experiences of Germany, Japan, France,

Israel, and Argentina.18 My primary aim is to clarify the nature of
these six problems and to illustrate the ways in which they arise.
In hopes of fostering their wider recognition and consideration, I
offer only the most confessedly provisional suggestions for their
resolution.
Administrative massacre, as I shall use the term, entails largescale violation of basic human rights to life and liberty by the
central state in a systematic and organized fashion, often against its
own citizens, generally in a climate of war-civil or international,
real or imagined. Mass murder is the most extreme of a broader
class of harms inflicted during such episodes; these episodes
routinely involve massive numbers of other war crimes and crimes
against humanity, such as enslavement of labor (for example, of

Korean "comfort women" by the Japanese army and of Jews by the
Nazis). My premise is that state criminality of this nature, on this
scale, poses special problems-in its immediate aftermath-for new
democratic rulers seeking to reconstruct some measure of trust,
social solidarity, and collective memory of the recent past. I assess

the extent to which criminal law may effectively address these
problems.
such a provision was employed, for instance, to prosecute individuals and publications
that had denied the occurrence of the Holocaust. See STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB]
§ 189 (F.R.G.) (prohibiting the disparagement of the memory of the deceased); see
also Stein, supra, at 294-95 (relating the prosecution of a teacher who had denied the
existence of concentration camps and thatJews had been killed in the Third Reich).
More recently, several western societies, including Germany, Belgium, France, Austria,
Sweden, and the Netherlands, have enacted criminal provisions specifically
prohibiting "Holocaust denial." See DEBORAH E. LIPSTADT, DENYING THE HOLOcAUST:
THE GROWING ASSAULT ON TRUTH AND MEMORY 219-22 (1993). These statutes are
oftenjustified expressly in terms of a societal interest in preserving collective memory
of that event. See Stein, supra, at 316-18.
Is For Germany, I discuss the Nuremberg prosecution of German leaders before
the International Military Tribunal; forJapan, the Tokyo War Crimes trial; for France,
the prosecutions of Klaus Barbie and Paul Touvier; for Israel, the trial of Adolph
Eichmann; for Argentina, the trial of the military juntas convicted of ordering the
deaths of many citizens during the dirty war of the mid- to late-1970s. In each case
the conduct judged by the courts involved large-scale official brutality against large
numbers of victims, perpetrated by thousands of military and police officers,
occupying several bureaucratic levels, over a long period of time, enjoying
considerable collaboration by civilians. Notwithstanding the considerable differences
between these several historical experiences, I shall treat them for present conceptual
purposes as examples of what Hannah Arendt described as "administrative
massacres." See HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE
BANALrrY OF EVIL 288-91 (Penguin Books, rev. & enlarged ed. 1977) (1963).
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These problems take various shape in differing circumstances.
For this reason, occasional forays are necessary into a wide range of
historical experience .and efforts by social theorists, of competing
persuasions, to make sense of it. The strengths and weaknesses of
liberal philosophy, in guiding the law's response to administrative
massacre and in influencing memory of it, are a central concern in
this regard. The criminal law is widely and correctly thought to
embody assumptions about human nature and society that are
primarily liberal. 9 It follows that a sophisticated critique of
criminal law, of its response to a given problem, issues very quickly
into an indictment of liberalism itself. For this reason, the most
influential recent criticisms of liberalism, by communitarians and
postmodernists, will recurrently arise; my aim will be to see how
much light such critics can shed on the law's limits and possibilities
in this area.
The qualified defense of liberal law that ultimately emerges, of
its conceptual resources for coping with these six problems,
operates by way of a comparative history, not a conceptual analysis
or metatheoretical speculation. I examine the historical experience
of administrative massacre in light of what alternative theories have
to say about the law's capacity to grapple with it. Conversely, I
assess the theories themselves in terms of the practical successes and
failures revealed by the comparative history of efforts to bring the
20
perpetrators of administrative massacre to justice.
But first it is necessary to ask: What is at stake here? How
would the obstacles just mentioned, if insurmountable, limit the
capacity of liberal law to respond adequately to state-sponsored
mass brutality? What would be lost if these obstacles prevented the
law from effectively fostering a shared memory of such events?
19 By "liberal" I mean a theorybased on the moral autonomy and rational capacity

of individual persons and their corresponding rights to equal concern and respect by
fellow citizens and the state. Both critics and defenders of criminal law, as a response
to social deviance, routinely, characterize it as based on such liberal premises. See
GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW at xix (1978); H.L.A. HART,
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW at preface
(1968); ALAN W. NORRIE, LAW, IDEOLOGY, AND PUNISHMENT: RETRIEVAL AND

CRITIQUE OF THE LIBERAL IDEAL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE at xiii (1991); Michael S.
Moore, The Moral and Metaphysical Sources of the CriminalLaw, in CRIMINALJUSTICE:

NOMOS XXVII, at 11, 14 (. Roland Pennock &John W. Chapman eds., 1985).
21 In developing this approach, I have relied upon NEILJ. SMELSER, COMPARATIVE
METHODS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 72-150 (1976). For an application, see Mark J.
Osiel, Lawyers As Monopolists, Aristocrats,and Entrepreneurs,103 HARV. L. REV. 2009,
2065 (1990).
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How might the criminal law, by cultivating shared memory of
administrative massacre through prosecution of its perpetrators,
contribute significantly to social solidarity? For that matter, what is
the proper place of such solidarity-law-induced or otherwise-within
a liberal society?
I. How PROSECUTION ASSISTS COLLECTIVE MEMORY AND
How MEMORY FURTHERS SOCIAL SOLIDARITY

Kundera's epigram,2 like the work of recent historians,
suggests that in political struggle we often "use memory as a tool of
power."22 The link between power and storytelling is hard-wired at
the level of language, for the words "author" and "authority" have
a common etymology."
"The state of being an originator or
author itself authorizes, gives one authority," one anthropologist
observes.2 4 But it is also true that we turn to memory as a political
weapon primarily when we lack more potent and effective ones.
"When Lincoln referred in his first inaugural to the 'mystic chords
of memory' that bound the nation together," one historian notes, "it
must have struck most Americans-northern and southern alike-as
a folly. This was a 'nation' getting ready to war with itself."2 5

21 See supra text

accompanying note 3.

2 PATRICK J. GEARY, PHANTOMS OF REMEMBRANCE: MEMORY AND OBLIVION AT
THE END OF THE FIRST MILLENNIUM 26 (1994); see also WILLIAM ROWE & VIVIAN
SCHELLING, MEMORY AND MODERNITY: POPULAR CULTURE IN LATIN AMERICA 228

(1991) (arguing that "the destruction of memory [is] a prime means of domination,"

and that "the Argentinean dictatorship produced an effect of public amnesia, which
depended on the eradication of the normal spaces in which memory is exercised and
sedimented"); Alonso, supra note 13, at 50 (arguing that "[plower and memory are
most intimately embraced in the representations of official histories which are central
to the
production and reproduction of hegemony").
2
3 See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 797-98 (2d ed. 1989) (tracing both words to
the Latin auctor). Georg W.F. Hegel observed one apparent consequence of this
connection in THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 61-62 (J. Sibree trans., 1900) ("Only in
a State cognizant of Laws, can distinct transactions take place, accompanied by such
a clear consciousness of them as supplies the ability and suggests the necessity of an
enduring record."). As Hayden White parses the passage, "we cannot but be struck
by the frequency with which narrativity, whether of the fictional or the factual sort,
presupposes the existence of a legal system against which or on behalf of which the
typical agents of a narrative account militate." HAYDEN WHITE, THE CONTENT OF THE
FORM: NARRATIVE DISCOURSE AND HISTORICAL REPRESENTATION 13 (1987). Another
pertinent etymological connection is that between "amnesty" and "amnesia." The law
of amnesty has sometimes been consciously employed in an effort to induce
"forgetting" of such national traumas as administrative massacre.
24 ELIZABETH TONKIN, NARRATING OUR PASTS:

ORAL HISTORY 39 (1992).
25 Kenneth

THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF

Cmiel, "A Broad FluidLanguageof Democracy " Discoveringthe American
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Here, invocation of collective memory was the last hope in the face
of political impotence, testimony to social solidarity's imminent
collapse.
Extravagant terms are often invoked to describe the contribution
that prosecution for administrative massacre can make to such
solidarity, that is, beyond the conventional objectives of criminal law
(deterrence and retribution).
The trial of Klaus Barbie, for
instance, would provide France with "'an enormous national
psychodrama, psychotherapy on a nationwide scale,'" proclaimed
historian Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie. 26 The prosecution of Paul
Touvier became "the subject of enormous media attention ... and
...
the vehicle for a debate on the legitimacy and activities of the
Vichy Regime, becoming popularly identified as a trial of the Vichy
27
government."
Similarly, prosecuting the Argentine military juntas would
"provide a deeply divided society with a cathartic theater,"
2
announced one legal scholar in the trials' immediate aftermath. 1
Concurred another,
[a]ll the media gave ample coverage to an event that was discussed
in squares and cafes, by poor and rich alike. Through this
discussion, a public space was reappropriated, a voice rediscovered
.... It seemed as though common people would be able at last
to come to terms with their own experiences of fear, silence, and
29
death.

Idiom, 79J. AM. HIST. 913, 931 (1992). Mystery writer K.C. Constantine allows one
of his characters to make the point in earthier form: "[T]he surest way you know
something's dead was when somebody started talking about preserving its memory."
K.C. CONSTANTINE, BOTTOM LINER BLUES 3 (1993).
26 HENRY Rousso, THE VICHY SYNDROME:

HISTORY AND MEMORY IN FRANCE

SINCE 1944, at 210 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 1991).
2 Leila S. Wexler, Reflections on the Trial of Vichy CollaboratorPaul Touvierfor
Crimes Against Humanity in France, 20 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 191, 191 (1995). For
further discussion of the effect of Touvier's trial on the memory politics of France,
see Nancy Wood, Crimes or Misdemeanours? Memory on Trial in Contemporary France,
5 FRENCH CULTURAL STUD. 1 (1994). Touvier was police chief of Lyon during the
Occupation.
28 Paula K. Speck, The Trial of the Argentinejuntas, 18 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV.
491, 533 (1987). The trial awakened enormous curiosity among Argentines. An ad
hoc periodical consisting of edited trial transcripts averaged over 200,000 in street
sales per week. See Interview with Emilio Mignone, Director of the Centro de Estudios
Legales y Sociales, in Buenos Aires, Argentina (July 1985).
' Carina Perelli, Memoria de Sangre: Fear,Hope, and Disenchantmentin Argentina,
in REMAPPING MEMORY: THE POLrIcS OF TIMESPACE 39,49-50 (Jonathan Boyarin ed.,
1994).
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The official reports of so-called "truth commissions," however
desirable, are less potent means to this end, adds Carlos Nino, top
legal advisor to Argentine President Raul Alfonsin. This is because
the public presentation of the truth is much more dramatic when
done through a trial, with the accused contributing to the
development of the story. Furthermore, the quality of narration
in an adversarial trial can not be fully replicated by other means.
Even when an amnesty or pardons are issued at the end of a trial,
they do not counteract the initial effect of such emphatic public
30
disclosure.
Nino also notes a trial's effect on the public: "The drama of a trial,
with the victims and perpetrators under the public light, with
accusations and defenses, with witnesses from all social sectors, and
with the terrifying prospect of punishment, inevitably attracts great
public attention and may even provoke 'dummy' trials in the streets
or around dinner tables.""' Given these features, "trials for human
rights violations may be much closer to what Ackerman labels
'constitutional moments' than many attempts at formal or informal
constitutional reforms." 2
Such attempts at reform, in Latin
America, are "viewed by many people as either too technical [an]
33
affair or the result of politicians' . . . corrupt self-interests."
Analogous observations were made of the trial of Adolf
Eichmann. By focusing on excruciating personal experiences of the
victims, stories calculated "to shock the heart,"3 4 the prosecutor,
Gideon Hausner, "sought to design a national saga that would echo
through the generations,"35 helping to construct Israeli national
identity in the process. By highlighting Jewish resistance to the

30 CARLOS S. NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL (forthcoming 1996). I am grateful to
Owen Fiss, Nino's literary executor, for allowing me to quote from this manuscript.
31 Id.
12 Id. (footnote omitted).
33 id.
3

4

TOM SEGEV, THE SEVENTH MILLION: THE ISRAELIS AND THE HOLOCAUST 338

(1993); see also Pnina Lahav, The Eichmann Tria theJewish Question, and the AmericanJewish Intelligentsia, 72 B.U. L. REV. 555, 558-59 (1992) (describing the use, in the
Eichmann trial, of "the agonizing picture of the Jews descending into hell" and
"[w]itnesses collaps[ing] on the stand").
s5 SEGEV, supra note 34, at 336; see also id. at 328 (noting Ben-Gurion's belief that
"[s]omething was required to unite Israeli society-some collective experience, one
that would be gripping, purifying, . . . a national catharsis"); Michael Keren, BenGurion's Theory of Sovereignty: The Trial of Adolf Eichmann, in DAVID BEN-GURION:
POITICS AND LEADERSHIP IN ISRAEL 38, 38 (Ronald W. Zweig ed., 1991) (examining
Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's view of the Eichmann trial first and foremost as
a legal act of a sovereign state).
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Holocaust, he aimed to help young Israelis overcome their "'repugnance for the nation's past,'" a repugnance based on their impression that their grandparents had "'allow[ed] themselves to be led
like lambs to the slaughter. ' " To serve these narrative purposes,
Eichmann's trial would fill the "'"need [for] a massive living recreation of this national and human disaster."' 37 The trial, one
Israeli scholar reports, "compelled an entire nation to undergo a
process of self-reckoning and overwhelmed it with a painful search
for its identity."" Thus, "the trial served as a sort of national
39

group therapy."
Although painful, this process was also "poetic," in the way
justice can sometimes be. One poet, who was among the several
hundred thousand Israelis listening in on radio, ably captures this
dimension: "'The placing of Eichmann before a Jewish court was
destined to fill a chaotic, inhuman void that was hidden somewhere
in the experience of the Jewish people, its trials and tribulations,
from the commencement of its exile until today.'"4" Metaphorically, the trial captured "the duality of our existence," Gouri adds, "the
Jews as a murdered people and the story of Israel as a nation sitting
in judgment."4 '
Such trials resemble what anthropologist Victor Turner has
called "social dramas":
cultural performances involving the
wholesale disruption, self-examination, and reconciliation of a
society by means of legal or other ritual procedures. These are
designed to enhance the group's ability
to scrutinize, portray, understand, and then act on itself... As
heroes in our own dramas, we are made self aware, conscious of
our consciousness.
...
Since social dramas suspend normal everyday roleplaying,
they interrupt the flow of social life and force a group to take
cognizance of its own behavior in relation to its ... own values,

SECEV, supra note 34, at 338 (quoting Gideon Hausner). Hausner and BenGurion organized the trial so that it "would emphasize both the inability of the Jews
to resist their murderers and their attempts to rebel. Hausner would almost
completely ignore the Judenrats," that is, the Jewish Councils who sometimes
collaborated in deportations. Id. at 348.
s 7Id. (quoting Gideon Hausner).
s Haim Gouri, Facingthe Glass Booth, in HOLOCAUST REMEMBRANCE: THE SHAPES
OF MEMORY 153, 155 (Geoffrey H. Hartman ed., 1994).
39 SEGEV, supra note 34, at 351.
" Gouri, supra note 38, at 153 (quoting Natan Alterman).
41 Id. at 155.
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even to question ... the value of those values. In other words,
[such] dramas induce and contain reflexive processes and generate
42
cultural frames in which reflexivity can find a legitimate place.

Alongside such Promethean aspirations, the traditional purposes
of criminal law-deterrence and retribution of culpable wrongdoing-are likely to seem quite pedestrian. Moreover, those committed
to keeping such concerns at the center of judicial attention-that is,
professionally scrupulous lawyers-are likely to come off as plodding
dullards, distracted by doctrinal trivia from the issues of truly
"historic" importance before them. This was, in fact, precisely the
verdict reached on Hausner by Hannah Arendt.43 Hausner himself
had aimed to become "the impresario of a national-historic
production." 44 But for Arendt, Eichmann's trial failed as drama,
4
due to the studied mediocrity of its principal protagonist. 1
The real question, however, is not whether the prosecutor made
a compelling hero. The question is whether it is right to seek such
operatic virtuosity from proceedings of this sort in the first place,
as Arendt apparently did.46 As an aim for criminal law, the
cultivation of collective memory resembles deterrence in that it is
directed toward the future, where enhanced solidarity is sought.
But like retribution, it looks to the past, to provide the narrative
content of what is to be shared in memory. Stated most modestly,
its purpose is, as Thomas Scanlon puts it, "to achiev[e] a general
42

75, 92 (1982). Although Turner
lists the Dreyfus trial among the episodes exemplified by his concept of social drama,
see id. at 70, his theory confessedly stresses how legal procedures at such times
"maintain[] the status quo," id. at 10, and "reassert and reanimate the overarching
values shared by all." Id. at 75. But while this is sometimes the case, more common
in the episodes examined in this Article (as in the Dreyfus trial itself) has been the
intention, often partly successful, of permanently altering the institutional status quo
and transforming existing values. Turner's account of trials as social dramas is heavily
Durkheimian in theoretical inspiration. Hence the present account will seek to show
the limits of Durkheim's sociology in grappling with the impact of the criminal
proceedings examined here. Turner views the agonistic strife aroused by such trials
as leading necessarily either to reconciliation among warring parties or to secession
by one of them. As we shall see, however, there is a third possibility: the reconstruction of social solidarity through public deliberation over continuing disagreement, a
process by which rules constrain conflict within nonlethal bounds and often inspire
increasing mutual respect among adversaries.
VICTOR TURNER, FROM RITUAL TO THEATRE

4s See ARENDT, supra note 18, at 5, 8, 124-25, 276-79.
44 SEGEV, supra note 34, at 338.
4- See ARENDT, supra note 18, at 9, 287.

46 On Arendt's aestheticized conception of politics as performance, long noted by
scholars, see LISAJ. DISCH, HANNAH ARENDT AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 21, 8384, 161 (1994).
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state of mind in the country in which the unacceptability of these
acts is generally recognized, so that the perpetrators become
pariahs,... hav[ing] done something that cannot be sustained and
47
accepted."
Collective memory, as I shall use the term, 48 consists of the
stories a society tells about momentous events in its history, the
events that most profoundly affect the lives of its members and most
arouse their passions for long periods. This category of events
prominently includes wars, revolutions, economic depressions, largescale strikes and riots, and genocides-as well as the legal proceedings often arising from such upheavals.4 9 These events are also
47 Tape of Human Rights and Deliberative Democracy: A Conference in Honor
of Carlos Santiago Nino, Presented at Yale Law School (Sept. 23-24, 1994)
[hereinafter Nino Conference] (currently available on videotape from the Shell Center
for Human Rights).
48 Collective memory consists of past reminiscences that link given groups of
people for whom the remembered events are important, that is, the events remain
significant to them later on. The memory is later invoked to help define what such
people have in common and to guide their collective action. As the events in
question recede further into the past and those who experienced them directly no
longer remain alive, the "memory" becomes, more precisely, a memory of memory,
that is, a memory of what others have told future generations about their pasts. On
this temporal distinction, see Amos Funkenstein, Collective Memory and Historical
Consciousness, 1 HIST. & MEMORY 5, 9 (1989). Once survivors are no longer available
to offer individualized accounts of their personal and sometimes idiosyncratic
experiences, the "mass production of memory" by the state and its legal institutions
increasingly becomes a realistic possibility and, for some, a terrible danger. See, e.g.,
Michael Geyer & Miriam Hansen, German-JewishMemory and National Consciousness,
in HOLOCAUST REMEMBRANCE, supra note 38, at 175, 178 (noting that younger
Germans remember the Nazi years only by way of their subsequent representations
in cinema and official ceremonies and concluding that "[w]hat we have witnessed over
the past two decades is the creation of a public through these collective rituals and
representations of remembering").
Collective memory is a woolly concept, often used casually as a metaphor, albeit
an evocative one, for other things. An analytical philosopher would have no difficulty
distinguishing at least ten different usages of the term in current social thought. See

IAN HACKING, REWRITING THE SOUL: MULTIPLE PERSONALITY AND THE SCIENCES OF

MEMORY 3 (1995) (noting the recent profusion of uses of collective memory and that
this abundance reflects, in itself, a phenomenon of considerable interest). Discussion
could profit from conceptual clarification of the term collective memory. But that is
not the aim of this Article. My concerns are primarily pragmatic. I shall here employ
the concept as an ideal type, for its heuristic value alone, in hopes of assessing just
what this value might be.
" This list is decidedly focused on the "great events" of modern societies. The
collective memory of peasant societies, by contrast, has often remained centered on
seasonal events and hence dependent on a cyclical conception of time. See, e.g.,
FRANCoISE ZONABEND, THE ENDURING MEMORY: TIME AND HISTORY IN A FRENCH
VILLAGE 139 (Anthony Forster trans., 1984) ("The present ... is reconstituted by

reference to the past-a stable, lasting and well-ordered period, a time outside the
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distinguished by the tendency for recollection of them to "hover
over" subsequent events, providing compelling analogies with later
controversies of the most diverse variety. When a society's members
interpret such an event in common fashion, they derive common
lessons from it for the future.
When the event-like the Dreyfus
trial in France-has been deeply divisive for a society, however, its
memory will later evoke the same disagreements and consolidate the
same social divisions that it involved.
There is yet a third scenario. Sometimes the memory of a major
legal event will initially unify the nation that experienced it, but
later be interpreted so differently by contending factions that its
memory becomes divisive. American memory of the Declaration of
Independence suffered this fate, for instance, in the last decades of
the eighteenth century. "By the end of John Adams's administration," writes a historian,
partisan politics had grown so nasty that ideological opponents
could not disentangle their sense of the present from their
remembrance of the past. Unable to celebrate the Fourth ofJuly
together, they held separate processions, separate dinners, and
heard separate orations-a situation that continued until the
Federalist party died out .... 51
Collective memory-both the divisive and solidifying sorts-plays
a much greater role in the political discourse of some societies than

reach of Time."). In such traditional societies, the content of shared memory-as
recounted in social gatherings and interviews with anthropologists-remains
remarkably uninfluenced by even the largest catastrophes suffered by the nation-state
in which peasants reside. See, e.g., JAMES FENTRESS & CHRIS WICKHAM, SOCIAL
MEMORY 96 (1992) (noting that peasants "tend to stress their social identity through
images of resistance to the state, which are peculiarly unlikely to get into Great Events
history").
50 The idea of collective memory need not imply that the collectivity-the nation,
the class, or the ethnic group-possess memories independent of those held by its
members, although the concept has sometimes been interpreted in this way. See F.C.
BARTLETT, REMEMBERING: A STUDY IN EXPERIMENTAL AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 296-

98 (1932) ("[I1t is not theoretically impossible that the organization of individuals into
a group should literally produce a new mental unit which perhaps feels, knows and
remembers in its own right."). There is both an individual and a social component
to many memories. Large-scale sociopolitical events like an administrative massacre,
for instance, are experienced and hence remembered differently, in certain respects,
by each of the surviving individuals affected. But many other aspects of their
experiences, and the sentiments evoked, will have been shared by fellow citizens and
will be recognized as such. This is the sense in which I shall speak here of collective
memory. For a useful discussion of these issues, see TONKIN, supra note 24, at
104-06.
51 KAMMEN, supra note 7, at 40.
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others. It plays considerably more of a role in Europe, it is often
observed, than in our own society.52 Anthropologists have long
noted that in premodern societies authoritative stories about the
past often serve as "the legal charter of the community," functioning
to "integrate[] and weld[] together the historical tradition, the legal
principles, and the various customs," thereby providing "for
cohesion, for local patriotism, for a feeling of union." 3 But this
insight into the role of the past in non-Western societies was
derived from the early legal history of the West itself.54 This
suggests that the way our law uses memory of the past-whether
burying or unearthing it-may not be altogether unique or culturally
idiosyncratic and that the anthropological study of collective
memory may now shed some important light on law in Western
society.
There are two very different ways in which the law in general,
and criminal prosecution of administrative massacre in particular,
might contribute to social solidarity. The first views legal proceedings as drawing upon an already-existing consensus within a country
regarding its first principles and as employing that consensus to
infuse a single, shared interpretation of its recent past. Solidarity
results from the awareness of a common history judged by common
standards, a history from which unequivocal lessons for future
conduct will be learned by all.
52 In this regard, the United States resembles other frontier and immigrant
societies, whose members often retain stronger memories of their disparate lands of
origin than of their common, new-found home. The shallowness of historical
memory in the United States is a central theme of Michael Kammen's recent work.

See MICHAEL KAMMEN, MYSTIC CHORDS OF MEMORY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
TRADITION IN AMERICAN CULTURE 9-10 (1991) [hereinafter KAMMEN, MYSTIC

CHORDS]; KAMMEN, supra note 8, at 13. In the 19th century, many European political
theorists, novelists, and psychologists viewed social and political disorder as reflecting
a loss of shared memory. See RICHARD TERDIMAN, PRESENT PAST: MODERNITY AND

THE MEMORY CRISIS (1993). But it is a misconception, partially perpetuated by recent
communitarianism, that people in preliterate societies have better developed
memories and more detailed recall-presumably because they cannot turn to
documents as a mnemonic crutch-than those in modern, literate societies. See Ulric
Neisser, Literacy and Memory, in MEMORY OBSERVED:

REMEMBERING IN NATURAL

CONTExTS 241, 241-42 (1982) (rejecting the notion that "illiterate people have
particularly good memories to compensate for being unable to write things down").
53 BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, MAGIC, SCIENCE, AND RELIGION 116-17 (1954).

' See Peter Burke, History as Social Memory, in MEMORY: HISTORY, CULTURE AND
THE MIND 97, 109 (Thomas Butler ed., 1989); see also M.T. CLANCHY, FROM MEMORY
TO WRITfEN RECORD: ENGLAND 1066-1307, at 146-48, 297 (Blackwell Publishers, 2d
ed. 1993) (1979) (discussing the place of such charters in early British society); P.H.
SAWYER, ANGLO-SAXON CHARTERS: AN ANNOTATED LIST AND BIBLIOGRAPHY (1968).
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The second view does not expect legal proceedings to draw
upon, nor even necessarily to produce any society-wide consensus
on such matters. Legal proceedings produce a different kind of
solidarity, founded on a different basis. The proceedings are
founded on civil dissensus and produce the kind of solidarity
embodied in the increasingly respectful way that citizens can come
to acknowledge the differing views of their fellows. I will sketch
each of these two accounts of law's service to solidarity before
examining how the six problems mentioned above may undercut
each of them. I conclude that criminal prosecution of administrative massacre can only contribute significantly to social solidarity of
the second sort and that this is precisely the kind of solidarity to
which a liberal society should aspire.
A. Crime, Consensus, and Solidarity
Upon being recounted, the stories that constitute collective
memory cant contribute to social solidarity by evoking in citizens the
55
common values that Durkheim called the collective conscience.
"For Durkheim," writes Garland,
the rituals of criminal justice-the court-room trial, the passing of
sentence, the execution of punishment-are, in effect, the formalized embodiment of the conscience collective. In doing justice, and
in prosecuting criminals, these procedures are also giving formal
expression to the feelings of the community-and by being
expressed in this way those feelings are both strengthened and
gratified. 6
Garland continues, "[punishment] is a social occasion which simultaneously structures individual sentiment and gives it cathartic

55 See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 79 (George Simpson

trans., 1964) (defining the collective conscience as "[t]he totality of beliefs and
sentiments common to average citizens of the same society"). The normative
implications of Durkheim's criminology have been partially developed by Jean
Hampton, who argues "that the moral education which punishment effects is at least
part of punishment's justification." Jean Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of
Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 208, 208 (1984); see also JOEL FEINBERG, The
Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY
OF RESPONSIBILITY 95, 98 (1970) (arguing that "punishment is a conventional device

for the expression of attitudes of resentment and indignation, and ofjudgments of
disapproval and reprobation").
56 DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY:

THEORY 67 (1990).

A STUDY IN SOCIAL
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release." 7
process.

Criminal prosecutions play a special role in

this

[T]he conscience collective is protected by a strict code of penal law,
which-unlike most law in modern society-does evoke deep-seated
emotions and a sense of the sacred. Thus in a world of secular
diversity, punishment continues to protect a residual sphere of
sacred values, and draws its force and significance from this
58
fact.

Indeed,
[h]anded down by our leading institutions with an aura of gravitas
and moral seriousness, these decisions set the tone for the public's
response at the very moment that they claim to express it....
[Such judicial decisions] prefigure popular sentiment and give it
a degree of definition which it would otherwise lack. As James
Fitzjames Stephen once put the point: "... the sentence of law is

to the moral sentiment of the public in relation to any offence
59
what a seal is to hot wax."

Modern societies are held together not only by common values,
of course. More important is the functional interdependence and
convergent interests created by a division of labor between members
of various occupational groups.6" Law's purpose is now primarily
"restitutive," as reflected in the growth of private litigation in
contract and tort.61 An astringent version of liberalism is therefore
prepared to reject as romantic sentimentality the notion that
modern social order rests, in any significant measure, on shared
62
values, that is, on what Durkheim labels mechanical solidarity.
57

Id. at 68.

5
Id.
59

at 57.

1Id. at 58 (citation omitted).

60 See DURKHEIM, supra note 55, at 147 (contending that "the ties which bind us
to society and which come from the community of beliefs and sentiments are much
less numerous than those which result from the division of labor" and that "cooperative law express[es] ... the links which the division of labor brings about").
61 See id. at 112, 133-43, 147.
62 The leading exponent of this view is Niklas Luhmann. See generally NIKLAS
LUHMANN, THE DIFFERENTIATION OF SOCIETY (Stephen Holmes & Charles Larmore

trans., 1982) (arguing that modern industrial society consists of separate institutional
spheres, each governed by different principles, lacking any single normative order
encompassing them all and that the purpose of law is to regulate the interaction
between these spheres, not to subject them and their differing logics to any single
coherent moral vision); see also ERNEST GELLNER, CONDITIONS OF LIBERTY: CIVIL
SOCIETY AND ITS RIVALs 96 (1994) ("Social co-operation, loyalty, and solidarity do not
now presuppose a shared faith. They may, in fact, presuppose the absence of a
wholly shared and seriously, unambiguously upheld conviction. They may require a
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In this view, social solidarity-as mutual recognition of our interdependence-is better served by suppressing our deeper disagreements
of moral principle and "forgetting" the political conflagrations to
63
which they may historically have given rise.
This view spurns Durkheim's confidence in law's capacity to
evoke a collective conscience. But it resembles Durkheim's position,
paradoxically, in assuming that dissensus on central normative
questions is necessarily at odds with any kind of social solidarity-that if agreement cannot be reached here, solidarity must be found
elsewhere (that is, in the division of labor). The range of policy
choice, in the aftermath of administrative massacre, is thus reduced
to one between different forms of consensus: to remember (in the
same way) or to forget. "Forgetting" becomes a metaphor for a
political truce, a modus vivendi. "'The French never really forgot,'"
as historian Robert Paxton notes of Vichy collaboration; rather,
64
"'[t]here was a tacit agreement not to tear one another apart.'"
Once the issue is framed this narrowly, the question becomes simply
whether solidarity is better served by consensus in memory or
consensus in oblivion.
To be sure, there remains the metaquestion of how much
mechanical solidarity-how much common commitment to substantive moral principles-remains necessary in a modern, pluralistic,
industrial society. But virtually all versions of liberalism acknowledge that general commitment to a core of shared principles is
necessary if modern society is "not to disintegrate," as one theorist
summarizes, "into a heap of mutually antagonistic and self-seeking
individuals."65 These moral principles may derive historically from
religion, but are now most strongly embodied in criminal law,
shared doubt.").
65Stephen Holmes is the most vigorous contemporary exponent of this reading
of liberalism. See generally Stephen Holmes, Gag Rules or the Politics of Omission, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 1 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988)
(arguing that liberal society must sometimes suppress controversial topics to avoid
conflict). He applies this approach to recent Eastern European developments in The
End of Decommunization, E. EUR. CONsT. REV., Summer-Fall 1994, at 33 (praising the
decision of most new Eastern European democracies to dispense with criminal trials
or massive purges of former communist elites). See also BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE
FUTURE OF LIBERAL REVOLUTION 84 (1992) (arguing that Eastern European states
should burn their files on domestic informers and members of the secret police).
"JUDITH MILLER, ONE, BY ONE, BY ONE:

FACING THE HOLOCAUST 141 (1990)

(emphasis added).
65 LEWIS A. COSER, MASTERS OF SOCIOLOGICAL THOUGHT: IDEAS IN HISTORICAL
AND SOCIAL CONTEXT 132 (2d ed. 1977).
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according to Durkheim.6
Once principles and stories are widely
shared, they become what Durkheim called "social facts," which can
be as genuine in their consequences as material facts.6"
We know very little, however, about how moral ideas sometimes
come to be widely adopted as societal ideals. Surely, clearer
concepts and better normative theories are neither necessary nor
sufficient for social progress of this sort. Durkheim's followers have
hinted at one promising approach: the ritual elevation of attempted
"turning points" in a nation's history. At such times, "morality is
formed in emotionalized collective states in which actors are
attracted by ideals and lifted beyond themselves.... [Such]
moments of collective effervescence transform or create social
structures and interpersonal bonds.""
If social rituals generally evoke shared values that endure, one
might ask, then how could "turning points" in a society's history-when existing values are reconsidered and revised-ever serve
as the focal point of ritual commemoration? The short answer
(argued at greater length herein) is: When the need for a new
beginning is widely felt, the very process of critical reassessment-to
which the dramatic power of liberal show trials can contribute-may
itself be symbolically treated (and later commemorated) as a decisive
moment of collective refounding. As one scholar notes of this
process:
The choice of a single event clearly provides a better opportunity
for ritualized remembrance than a gradual process of transition
does. The master commemorative narrative thus presents these
events as turning points that changed the course of the group's
historical development ....
In turn, selection of certain events as
turning points highlights the ideological principles underlying the
master commemorative narrative by dramatizing the transitions
between periods.
..
[Such events] not only reflect the social and political needs
of the group ... but also become active agents in molding the
69
group's needs.
r1See DURKHEIM, supra note 55, at 80-82, 109.
67

See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE RuLES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD 1-13 (George E.G.
Catlin ed., Sarah A. Solovay & John H. Mueller trans., 8th ed. 1966). For a recent
discussion, see MARGARET GILBERT, ON SOCIAL FACTS 237-54 (1989).
' Stephen P. Turner, Introduction: Reconnecting the Sociologist to the Moralist, in
EMILE DURKHEIM: SOCIOLOGIST AND MORALIST 1, 19 (Stephen P. Turner ed., 1993)

(parsing Durkheim's sociological theory of religious ritual).
9

6 YAEL ZERUBAVEL, RECOVERED ROOTS: COLLECTIVE MEMORY AND THE MAKING

OF ISRAEL NATIONAL TRADITION 9 (1995) (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).
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Some disagreement always exists over what the shared principles
are and how far they reach. Do they extend, for instance, only to
mutual recognition of one another's basic moral rights, or also into
conceptions of the good life and attendant ideals of virtuous
character? In any event, it is clear (indeed, almost tautological) that
in a liberal society these common principles must be primarily
liberal ones. Foremost among them is respect for fundamental
liberties of the individual against encroachment by others, whether
public or private." Individualism, in this sense, provides modern
71
society with "the basis of our moral catechism."
The individualism of those within modern Western society is
not presocial in origin, derived from a state of nature (any more
than it is antisocial or antiegalitarian in normative thrust). Rather,
the modern individualism that Durkheim revered is itself the
product of societal differentiation and complexity. It results from
the social process by which persons come to differ from one
another through membership in multiple groups and organizations,
voluntary and involuntary. The overlapping and cross-cutting
nature of such allegiances generates conflicting demands on the
person, conflicts that each must manage and resolve to her own
satisfaction, in pursuit of psychological stability and personal
72
integrity.
Violence against individuals violates their moral rights to life
and to physical integrity. Administrative massacre involves violent
acts on a massive scale. Acts of violence evoke in citizens strong
feelings of resentment and indignation toward the wrongdoer.
Prosecuting wrongdoers also evokes-more important to Durkheimians-an awareness of sharingthese sentiments with others, that
7o

See Steven Lukes, Durkheim's 'Individualismand the Intellectuals',17 POL. STUD.

14, 14 (1969). Contemporary "Durkheimians" often reject his conclusion here,
contending that collective conscience and social solidarity rest entirely on the residue
of non-liberal values and practices. See Robert N. Bellah, The Idea of Practices in
Habits: A Response, in COMMUNITY IN AMERICA: THE CHALLENGE OF HABITS OF THE

HEART 269, 271 (Charles H. Reynolds & Ralph V. Norman eds., 1988). Much closer
to Durkheim's spirit in this regard, however, is the interpretation offered by MARK
S. CLADIS, A COMMUNITARIAN DEFENSE OF LIBERALISM:
CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY 9 (1992).

EMILE DURKHEIM AND

71 Lukes, supra note 70, at 21; see also DURKHEIM, supra note 55, at 172 ("As all the
other beliefs and... practices [in modern society become] less and less religious, the
individual becomes the object of a sort of religion. We erect a cult in behalf of

personal dignity. ..

").

This conception of individualism was developed by George H. Mead. See
GEORGE H. MEAD, MIND, SELF & SOCIETY 149-292 (Charles W. Morris ed., 1934).
7
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is, of belonging to a community whose members are united by this
very convergence and periodic reinvigoration of moral sentiment. 3
In criminal trials, prosecutors-as spokesmen for "the people"-tell
the stories through which such sentiments are elicited and such
membership consolidated.
In affirming criminal convictions,
appellate courts draw upon "the ritual attitude of sacred respect"
74
for themselves and for the moral traditions they invoke.
In the Argentine military trials President Raul Alfonsin's legal
advisors, highly literate in social theory, hoped to put Durkheim's
undoubted insights to work. They even invoked his theoretical
terminology. Nino wrote, 75 for instance, that prosecution of the
juntas "is required in order to inculcate in the collective conscience
and in the consciences of the groups concerned that no sector of
the population stands above the law." 76 Prosecution, in other
words, was not necessary primarily for retribution (in which Nino
did not believe)"7 nor for deterrence (which lies beyond the reach
of the law when the criminals control the state).
The trial of the military juntas would tell a liberal story, hoped
prosecutors and presidential aids, one that would strengthen public
commitment to principles of liberal morality, embodied in criminal
law and egregiously violated in the dirty war. The trial, in other
words, was in substantial part a self-conscious attempt to "apply"
Durkheimian social theory. Argentine liberals understood the
application of Durkheim's ideas not so much to entail strapping the
patient down for emergency transfusions of liberal fluids, as laying
78
the groundwork for concurrent reforms in political institutions.
73 See DURKHEIM, supra note 55, at 102 (arguing that "[c]rime brings together
upright consciences and concentrates them"). In other words, "[e]ach time the
community moves to censure some act of deviation, then, and convenes a formal
ceremony to deal with the responsible offender, it sharpens the authority of the
violated norm and restates where the boundaries of the group are located." KAI T.
ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURrrANS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 13 (1966).
74 DOMINICK LACAPRA, EMILE DURKHEIM:

SOCIOLOGIST AND PHILOSOPHER

289

(1972). LaCapra observes of Durkheim in this regard that "[t]he vision of a society
based upon truth and justice and able to reconcile reason and the ritual attitude of
sacred respect was vital to Durkheim's idea of structural reform in modern society."

Id.
s Nino was also a professor of legal philosophy and criminal law.
Carlos S. Nino, Transitionto Democracy, Corporatismand ConstitutionalReform in

71

Latin America, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 129, 136 (1989).
7 See Carlos S. Nino, A Consensual Theory of Punishment, 12 PHIL. &PUB. AFF. 289,
300 (1983).

78 On several of these proposed reforms, see Carlos S. Nino, The Debate over
Constitutional Reform in Latin America, 16 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 635, 636-37, 646-49
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As Alfonsin would announce (in a speech drafted by Nino), "[t]he
full and free exercise of democratic citizenship, individual liberties
and social solidarity, must now provide the foundation for con" 9
structing a modern society. 7
Editorial sympathizers with the Alfonsfn government adopted a
similar idiom in defending the proceedings. One wrote of the
televised proceedings, for instance, that
[t]he victims, as witnesses, appeal not only to the judges but
implicitly to the community at large. Each victim, finally rescued from oblivion, seeks recognition of the essential humanity
that was denied him. For this reason, the trial, as an event in the
life of the entire community, not only furthers legal justice but
also, at the same time, helps to reconstruct the nation's ethical
foundations."
Nino, would later strike a similarly Durkheimian chord in reflecting
on what the junta trial had accomplished. "The moral consciousness of society seems to have been deeply affected by these
trials.... [T]he months of testimony regarding the atrocities made
a perceptible impact in the minds of the people.""1 "[I]n its sober
and thorough decisions, [the court] set forth principles conducive
to the reestablishment of the rule of law ....
82 The trial had
3
served to "awaken the dormant legal consciousness."
Even Alfonsfn's critics, like his defenders, sometimes cribbed
their arguments from the same tradition of social theory. Argued
one such critic: "If the trials contributed to collective memory and
social solidarity, then the subsequent retreat-the amnesties and the
pardons-fostered collective 'forgetting' and weakened the social
84
solidarity that criminal punishment provides."

(Michael E. Roll trans., 1993).
" Raul Alfonsin, Speech Before Delegates of the National Committee of the Unidn
Civica Radical (Jan. 12, 1985), in ALFONSfN: DiScuRsos SOBRE EL DiscuRSo 11, 14
(Luis Aznar et al. eds., 1986) (translation by author).
o Hugo Vezzetti, ElJuicio: Un Ritual de la Memoria Colectiva, 7 PUNTO DE VISTA
3, 5 (1985) (translation by author).
81 NINO, supra note 30.
82 Id.

' Id. Nino here refers favorably to, and extrapolates from, Judith N. Shklar's
defense of the Nuremberg trials, in her book LEGALISM 112-200 (1964).
'Roberto Bergalli, El Olvido Como Ideologia del Discurso Juridico-Penal, 11
DOcTRINA PENAL 427, 430 (1988) [hereinafter Bergalli, El Olvido] (translation by
author). Bergalli also develops his views on this subject in Roberto Bergalli, Memoria
Colectivay DerechosHumanos, 27 ANALES DE LA CATEDRA FRANcIsco SuAREz 83 (1987).
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Thus, wrote Roberto Bergalli-a formerjudge, military detainee,
and exiled law professor that punishment signals the greater or
lesser presence of collective memory in a society, for in reproaching
those whose acts violate our most sacred beliefs and sentiments, we
ensure that we remember what these are. Hence, by examining how
the criminal law is interpreted and applied in a given social
formation we can discern the extent to which fundamental human
rights are part of that society's collective conscience. as President
Menem's later pardons of military officers, Bergalli continued,
revealed that Argentines were willing to compromise even such
limited mechanical solidarity as they precariously enjoyed, that
resting upon shared commitment to the morality embodied in their
criminal law."6 Such accounts of law's potential service to social
solidarity expect too much, as the comparative histories that follow
will suggest.
Three aspects of Durkheim's account, moreover, make it
immediately untrustworthy as a guide for democratic leaders trying
to reconstruct social solidarity on liberal foundations after an
episode of administrative massacre. First, the salubrious impact of
criminal law is to be found only in the arousal of shared sentiment
or moral passion. Reason plays no role. Public articulation and
defense of the moral principles underlying legal rules are treated as
sociologically insignificant.8 "
But in a liberal society (or a society aspiring to liberalize), it is
axiomatic that courts must give good reasons for depriving anyone
of her liberties. Such public reasons are often important, as well,
for establishing some measure of societal agreement about the
defensibility of the sanction, where agreement cannot be presumed."8 For Durkheim, by contrast, the purpose of criminal
' See Bergalli, El Olvido, supra note 84, at 430-36.

86 See id.
"' For this reason, Durkheim's theory of the solidarity-enhancing impact of
criminal trials applies as readily to a fundamentalist theocracy, secular totalitarian
state, or neolithic tribe. On the crucial role of public justification within liberal
thought, by contrast, see STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE,
AND COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM

39-77 (1990).

' Especially troublesome in this regard, for present purposes, is the fact that
Allied tribunals trying Japanese officers for war crimes did not generally deliver
opinions accompanying their verdicts, offering no explanation for their conclusions.
See PHILIP R. PICCIGALLO, THEJAPANESE ON TRIAL: ALLIED WAR CRIMES OPERATIONS
IN THE EAST, 1945-1951, at 39 (1979). This failure was partly due to judicial reliance
on the rule of "command responsibility." Id. at 84-87. That doctrine requires no
finding that the defendant actually knew of, or could have prevented, the wrongful
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courts in society was simply to serve as authorized "interpreters of
its collective sentiments."89
For this reason, he "was curiously
blind to the sociologically explanatory significance of how law is
organized-that is, formulated, interpreted and applied."9"
It is especially odd that judicial reason-giving should play no
part in a criminology stressing the role of courts in mori1 education,
that is, in inculcating in citizens an appreciation (and, presumably,
an understanding) of the moral principles said to unite them.
Rather than stimulating discussion of such principles, of their
meaning and proper scope, legal judgment is designed to cut it off.
On this account, social solidarity can result only from moral
consensus, and consensus can follow only upon closure of debate,
upon ending disagreement over anything important. 91 Prosecution
of administrative massacre, however, has rarely succeeded in
producing any such measure of agreement, either at the time or for
posterity, as we shall see.
Second and closely related, Durkheim's approach leaves no
room for dissenting (or even concurring) opinions, that is, for
disagreement among both judges and citizens that endures at the
end of the day. For legal judgment to foster social solidarity, it is
insufficient that the better argument prevail in open contention
with its rivals. Its superiority must be taken for granted. Only when
its truth is self-evidently presumed can we adopt a properly reverential attitude toward it and its spokesmen. Whether the law is to
help celebrate or repent from particular events in the country's past,
it is essential to this conception of solidarity that no one of
genuinely good faith may differ in her moral judgment on these
events. If one could, then the past could never truly be shared, its
memory never truly collective.

acts of his subordinates. See id. at 84.
89 DURKHEIM AND THE LAw 45 (Steven Lukes & Andrew Scull eds., 1983).
90 Id. at 7-8.
" To be sure, sometimes judicial opinions are also capable of inspiring strong
sentiment in those whose collective conscience they articulate. The opinions of liberal
courts, at their best, entail a felicitous fusion of reason and appeal to communal
sentiment. But public education, more often than law, is generally seen as the crucial
institution for transmission of the shared memories necessary to social order. See,
e.g., Sidney Hook, Education in Defense of a Free Society, 78 COMMENTARY 17, 21-22
(1984) ("[The issue is] whether we possess the basic social cohesion and solidarity
today to survive.... [N]o institutional changes of themselves will develop that bond
of community we need to sustain our nation.., without a prolonged schooling in the
history of our free society, its martyrology, and its national tradition.").
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Criminal judgment serves its social purpose, in Durkheim's view,
by vigorously expressing the uniform sentiment of righteous
indignation aroused among all conscientious citizens by the
defendant's acts.92 Where judges differ in any significant way over
whether the defendant's conduct was wrongful or culpable, this
function is seriously compromised. Yet judicial dissents are likely
to arise where, as at both the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, the law
must be extended or applied in new ways if the prosecution is to
prevail. The possibility that competentjudges-and members of the
society they represent-might reasonably disagree over the suitability
of punishing those who killed vast numbers of people is virtually a
conceptual impossibility within Durkheim's theoretical schema. (It
is also a reminder that his was a more innocent era.)
In short, Durkheim's criminology does not sufficiently confront
the moral complexity present in much wrongdoing, even wrongdoing on a massive scale, complexity that criminal law-especially on
mens rea, justification, and excuse-seeks to acknowledge and
accommodate. If a criminal trial, for Durkheim, is a dramatic ritual,
it is chiefly a melodrama, a traditional morality play, in which the
forces of unequivocal evil are defeated by those of unequivocal
good. Defendants in these cases, however, often find it relatively
easy to displace so simple a tale with one of considerably greater
complexity,9 3 thereby disabling the mechanisms of solidarityenhancement that Durkheim attributed to their prosecution.
Third, Durkheim saw criminal prosecution as serving the
periodic need to reawaken and strengthen the public's feelings of
moral indignation, when such feelings would otherwise remain
dormant. But public disclosure of large-scale administrative
massacre often arouses, even inflames, such righteous anger all too
spontaneously. Outcries for massive and undisciplined vengeance
will often be ubiquitous, and are in no need of official stimula9 See DURKHEIM, supra note 55, at 152 ("[States of collective conscience] ... are
uniform molds into which we all, in the same manner, couch our ideas and our
actions. The consensus is then as perfect as possible; all consciences vibrate in
unison."); id. at 102-03 ("[T]he sentiments thus in question derive all their force from
the fact that they are common to everybody. They are strong because they are
uncontested.... [T]hey are universally respected.... Crime thus damages this
unanimity which is the source of their authority."). An anthropologist observes, "[a]
successful communal event must, by definition, be able to enhance a Durkheimian
collective effervescence and a sense of unity, not disagreements, within the
community." Lisa Yoneyama, Tamingthe Memoyscape: Hiroshima'sUrbanRenewal, in
REMAPPING MEMORY, supra note 29, at 99, 119.
" For examples, see infra text accompanying notes 263-268, 342-55.
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tion.94 Even in more tranquil times, after all, a central purpose of

criminal law was to dampen passions for rough justice that could
otherwise issue into vigilantism, as James Fitzjames Stephen noted
long ago.95 Those who prosecute and judge administrative massacre
often must strike a difficult balance between the public's powerful
desire for immediate retribution, on one hand, and other imperatives, such as preservation of public order and respect for the
defendants' procedural protections, on the other. Durkheim saw
only the first half of this complex picture, and consequently missed
its dilemmatic features.
Durkheim's reflections on a particular criminal trial (that of
Alfred Dreyfus) led him ultimately to appreciate how the law and its
rituals might become decisive for creating and consolidating the
very specific sort of collective conscience required by a modern
liberal society. During that episode, "[m]any who thought they had
little in common joined in intellectual and moral communion as
they felt the 'horror' of the trespass against Dreyfus's rights."9 6
Simply put, mechanical solidarity is possible through the felt sharing
of liberal principle.
It is ironic, however, that the Dreyfus trial would lead Durkheim
to realize how liberalism could supplant religion as the collective
conscience of a modern society, fostering the sort of mechanical
solidarity it required. For although that famous trial fostered
considerable solidarity among Dreyfus's supporters (the liberals) and
among his opponents (the antiliberals), it engendered only the
deepest divisions between supporters and opponents, divisions that
97
were to endure and infect French politics for decades.

' On France in 1945, see ROUSSO, supra note 26, at 8 (discussing how spontaneous acts of revenge against presumed collaborators caused more than 10,000 deaths
in the first weeks after the expulsion of the Nazis). Michel Foucault once praised
such vigilantism as superior in many ways to the later concessions and compromises
of "bourgeois legality" under the reestablished republic. See Michel Foucault, On
Popular Justice: A Discussion with Maoists, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE:
SELECTED
INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 1972-1977, at 1, 1-9, 13-14 (Colin Gordon ed.,
1980).
95

See JAMES F. STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALrrY, FRATERNITY 152 (R.J. White ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1967) (1874).
9 CLADIS, supranote 70, at 22 (interpreting Durkheim's reflections on the period).
97 On the divisions introduced or exacerbated by the Dreyfus trial, see H.R.
KEDWARD, THE DREYFUS AFFAIR: CATALYST FOR TENSIONS IN FRENCH SOCIETY 2, 9,

13 (1965). On the trial's enduring legacy for French politics, see FRANCOIS FURET, IN
THE WORKSHOP OF HISTORY 220 (Jonathan Mandelbaum trans., 1984) (arguing that
the French right saw in the country's 1940 defeat "an opportunity for taking longawaited revenge on the Republic" and "availed itself of the national debacle to take
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For these three reasons, as well as others examined herein,
Durkheim offers only the most uncertain help in understanding
criminal law's potential contribution to social solidarity in times of
deep political division and societal trauma. But the solidarity that
can result from a shared code of substantive morality, periodically
reinvigorated by punishing those agreed to have violated its first
principles, is not the only sort. Solidarity is a concept that admits
98
of several conceptions.
B. Solidarity Through Civil Dissensus

Durkheim's conception of mechanical solidarity pertains only
when virtually all members of society share a particular view of
justice: their fundamental ideas about how other members should
be treated, ideas quintessentially embodied in their criminal law.
This condition is conspicuously absent in many societies, particularly in societies just emerging from experiences of large-scale
administrative massacre. Thus, prosecution of its perpetrators
cannot hope to establish collective memory upon shared moral
intuitions already deeply felt and culturally encoded, requiring only
an occasion for their easy evocation. 9 As ritual expressions of
collective conscience, trials for administrative massacre have
decidedly not been, as we shall see, simple and unmediated
reflections of moral sentiments universally felt within society toward
the accused-the frequent assumption of foreign observers to this
effect notwithstanding.
Episodes of large-scale administrative massacre, like the
Holocaust and the Argentine dirty war, do disrupt social solidarity
in decisive ways. This is amply recognized by many citizenssurviving victims, passive bystanders, and (at least low-level)
perpetrators alike-who find themselves asking one another in the
wake of such traumatizing events: What sort of place is this that
such things could happen? What trust can we ever again place in
its revenge for... the Dreyfus affair").
" On the distinction between concepts and conceptions, central to the
jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin, see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 71-72 (1986)
[hereinafter DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE]; RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIcHTS SERIOUSLY
134-36 (1977) [hereinafter DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY].

' This is, in fact, more generally true of other trials. See Sally F. Moore,
Explaining the Present: Theoretical Dilemmas in Processual Ethnography, 14 AM.
ETHNOLOGIST 727, 729 (1987) ("[A legal] event is not necessarily best understood as
the exemplification of an extant symbolic or social order.... Events may show a
multiplicity of social contestations and the voicing of competing cultural claims.").
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fellow citizens and political leaders who allowed such horrors to
occur? Given the pervasiveness with which our society's official
norms were betrayed by so many, why should we ever put confidence in anyone but our most intimate kith and kin? Julian
Barnes's fictional prosecutor reflects, for instance, that "one part of
his job, every day now, on television, was to help expunge that fear
[of repression], to reassure people that they would never have to
give in to it again." '°0 The Argentine lawyers who prosecuted the
military juntas described their professional tasks and self-under0
standing in similar terms.' '
Citizens of former Soviet Bloc societies, for instance, now
concern themselves with such questions as: "[H]ow is basic trust to
be established when memories persist of neighbors informing on
neighbors, friends on friends and husbands on wives?"'0 ° When
such questions become both inescapable and unanswerable, social
solidarity of any but the most crudely economistic sort threatens to
collapse entirely. That threat of collapse is no mere sociological
abstraction; it begins to haunt the most minor, daily interactions in
profound and perplexing ways, as memoirs of these periods
reflect.1 0 3 People watch one another, in even the most private
settings, with hair-trigger sensitivity to the possibility of betrayal.
The fragile tissue of social life wears precariously thin.
One strand of neo-Durkheimian criminology recognizes the
limits of legal rituals for restoring fractured solidarity in societies
torn by internal conflict. Such rituals do not "express" emotions
inertly, as Garland observes.

BARNES, THE PORCUPINE 74 (1992).
See Interview with Luis Moreno Ocampo, Assistant Prosecutor, in Buenos Aires,

"JUIAN
1o1

Argentina (Aug. 1987).
102 Michael T. Kaufman, LurchingTowardDemocracy, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1995, § 7
(Book Reviews), at 8.
105See CARLOS NINO, UN PAS AL MARGEN DE LA LEY 54-55, 131-34,270-71 (1990);
Juan Corradi, The Culture of Fear in Civil Society, in FROM MILITARY RULE TO LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY IN ARGENTINA 113, 119-28 (Monica Peralta-Ramos & Carlos Waisman
eds., 1987); Ernest Gellner, Trus4 Cohesion, and the Social Order, in TRUST: MAKING
AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 142, 142 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988); see also
JAIME MALAMUD-GOTI, GAME WITHOUT END: TERROR,JUSTICE AND THE DEMOCRATIC
TRANSITION IN ARGENTINA (forthcoming 1996) (manuscript at 142-62, 175-85, on file
with author) (describing how a pervasive distrust and fear of betrayal by government
informers infected all but Malamud-Goti's most intimate familial relations during the
military dictatorship and followingyears); Perelli, supra note 29, at 45 (observing how
the climate of fear tended "to curb the impulse to provide assistance and comfort to
one's neighbors, coworkers, or fellow students; to forego caring or sharing for the
sake of staying alive").
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[T]hey arouse them and organize their content; they provide a
kind of didactic theatre through which the onlooker is taught what
to feel, how to react, which sentiments are called for ....
Rituals-including the rituals of criminal justice-are ceremonies
which, through the manipulation of emotion, prompt particular
value commitments on the part of the participants and the
audience and thus act as a kind of sentimental education ... .'04
He concludes, "[l]ike all rituals of power, punishments must be
carefully staged and publicized if they are to have their intended
social reality by
results." °5 Like other rituals, they can "modify
10 6
modifying the agents' representation of it."
A traumatized society that is deeply divided about its recent past
can greatly benefit from collective representations of that past, created and cultivated by a process of prosecution and judgment,
accompanied by public discussion about the trial and its result.
Thus, the internal dynamics of this process, especially the political
implications of the choices it entails for all parties, are very significant. Durkheim grasped none of this. Yet it is this constructive
process rather than any finished judicial product or authoritative
pronouncement0 7 that is most important in understanding the
contribution of criminal prosecution to social solidarity at such
times. Hence, Tullia Zevi, president of Italy's Jewish communities,
remarks concerning the imminent war crimes trial of Erich Priebke:
What is important is
"'The verdict is in some ways irrelevant ....
the trial.'" '
In trials involving administrative massacre, at least, we should
start by conceding that the criminal courtroom will inevitably be
viewed as providing a forum in which competing historical accounts
104GARLAND,

'0 5 Id. at 80.

supra note 56, at 67 (emphasis added).

106 PIERRE BOURDIEU, LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLIC POWER

added).

128 (1991) (emphasis

7
'o See Laura Nader & Harry F. Todd,Jr., Introduction to THE DISPUTING PROCESS:
LAW IN TEN SOCIETIES 1, 22 (Laura Nader & Harry F. Todd, Jr. eds., 1978) ("People
who write about the judicial process and the judicial decision as if the outcome were
solely the product of a third party, a judge, miss the sociological relevance of the
courtroom as an interactive arena."). In postmodernist parlance, when assessing the
sociological significance of the legal process, we should not subordinate its
"performative" aspects to the written or "textual" elements.
" Celestine Bohlen, Italy Opens Trial in Wartime Massacre in Rome, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 8, 1995, at A4. Priebke is a former SS captain accused of the 1944 killing of 335
people outside Rome. The event is considered the worst atrocity that occurred in
Italy during World War II. Zevi adds, "'What do I care if Priebke ends up under
house arrest, or in prison for life?'" Id.
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of recent catastrophes will be promoted. These accounts search for

authoritative recognition, and judgments likely will be viewed as
endorsing one or another version of collective memory. To ignore
this fact is to become entranced and deceived by our own (otherwise
defensible) abstractions: professional, doctrinal, and jurisprudential. Better to face facts, to learn to live with the reality that such

trials will necessarily be read for their "larger lessons," as monumental didactics. Let us turn this admittedly unsettling circumstance
into an opportunity for liberal legality, for fostering solidarity of a
liberal sort. 9
Simmel offered the first hints of how certain kinds of disputes
might foster solidarity. He observed, as one commentator notes:
The very act of entering into conflict with an antagonist establishes
relations where none may have existed before. ... Once relations
have been established through conflict, other types of relations
are likely to follow.... Conflict, for Simmel, just as crime
for Durkheim, brings out the need for application of rules that,
had no conflict occurred, might remain dormant and forgotten
....

Those who engage

in

antagonistic behavior bring into

consciousness basic norms governing rights and duties of citizens.
Conflict thus intensifies participation in social life. This very
consciousness of the need for rules governing their behavior
makes the contenders aware that they belong to the same moral
universe."10

See Robert Hariman, Introductionto POPULAR TRIALS: RHETORIC, MASS MEDIA,

AND THE LAw 1, 8 (Robert Hariman ed., 1990) ("[R]ather than seeing popular trials
as odd or embarrassing moments in legal practice, we should recognize how they
provide opportunities to articulate ideas important to our larger understandings of
legal interpretation and the role of law in society.").
10 LEWIS A. COSER, THE FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL CONFLICT 121, 123-24, 127 (1956)
(parsing GEORG SIMMEL, CONFLICT AND THE WEB OF GROUP AFFILIATIONS 26 (Kurt

H. Wolff trans., 1955) and then offering examples from legal disputes over property
and contract, as well as the law of war). Albert Hirschman recently argued, to similar
effect, that "the community spirit that is normally needed in a democratic market
society tends to be spontaneously generated through the experience of tending the
conflicts that are typical of that society." Albert 0. Hirschman, Social Conflicts As
Pillarsof Democratic Market Society, 22 POL. THEORY 203, 216 (1994). Not all such
conflicts are functional, of course. Neither Simmel nor Coser, however, offer much
guidance in distinguishing functional from dysfunctional conflict, ex ante or even ex
post. Their simple point, moreover, should not be subsumed under some grand
Hegelian process whereby devastating conflict becomes indispensable to social
progress, through the cunning dialectic of history. It is nevertheless true, as
Lawrence Whitehead famously observed, that sometimes "the major advances in
civilization are processes which all but wreck the societies in which they occur." Id.
at 210.

ADMINISTRATIVE MASSACRE

This argument about the unifying effects of conflict applies even
in Durkheim's citadel of consensus: the criminal courtroom. The
court becomes a privileged site for conflicting accounts of recent
history and the memories of it that citizens should preserve. At
such times, the "circumstances of politics" are the following: people
differ radically on their judgments of recent history (that is, on what
went wrong and who is responsible), and yet share the view that
some resolution of this interpretive disagreement must be reached
among themselves for the country to set itself back on track."'
If they do not reach some resolution, the social solidarity that they
all seek cannot be restored. Each is thus obliged-by circumstance,
not shared morality-to engage the other in hopes of persuading a
more general public, and perhaps even an immediate opponent, of
the superiority of a favored historical account. To be persuasive to
anyone, one must display a measure of civility, even toward those
one would prefer, in ideal circumstances, simply to kill or sup12
press."
Deliberative Democratization
Rules of criminal procedure and professional responsibility seek
to ensure, among other things, a measure of civility in the courtroom, a civility achieved even in the midst of heated conflict. Such
civility is not a matter of decorum or politeness, but of compliance
with rules requiring parties to treat one another with respect, as
equal participants in a common task of truth-seeking. Through such
"rules of engagement," 13 each party comes to learn, at the very
least, what its opponent actually thinks and most deeply cares about.
Through this process, dangerous misconceptions about "the other"
can be overcome.
The adversary system, although roundly condemned by many
today for stirring needless bitterness and antagonism, is nevertheless
highly functional where conflict between parties has already reached
. I here employ Waldron's recent discussion. See Jeremy Waldron, The Circumstances of Politics (Sept. 2, 1994) (paper presented at the American Political
Science Association Conference).
11 On the role of civility in liberal discourse, see MARK KINGWELL, A CIIL
TONGUE: JUSTICE, DIALOGUE, AND THE POLITICS OF PLURALISM (1995).

"' On how other legal rules, such as the law of defamation, similarly aim to foster
civility as a norm of public discourse and seek to make such civility a feature of
national identity, see Robert Post, ManagingDeliberation: The Quandary of Democratic
Dialogue, 103 ETHICS 654 (1993).
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a point of deep mutual incomprehension. At such times, the
adversary system is indispensable, in Lon Fuller's words, as "a means
by which the capacities of the individual may be lifted to the point
where he gains the power to view reality through eyes other than his
own."" 4 Fuller further notes that
[a]n effective consensus cannot be reached unless each party
understands fully the position of the others.... At the same time,

since an effective consensus requires an understanding and willing
cooperation of all concerned, no party should so abandon himself
in advocacy that he loses the power to comprehend sympathetically the views of those with different interests.... This implies not
only tolerance for opposing viewpoints, but tolerance for a
partisan presentation of those viewpoints, since without that
presentation they may easily be lost from sight." 5
At the very least, through adversarial exchanges, when constrained by civility rules, we achieve a sense of lived experience that
is mutual. With better luck, we gain some appreciation of how
someone could, sincerely and in good faith, come to think so
6
differently from us about something so fundamental to us both."
The experience of disagreement itself, although often unpleasant and divisive in many ways, nonetheless creates a kind of joint
understanding: that we have both faced the issues dividing us, that
we are united in caring deeply about them and about what the other
thinks of them. The phenomenology of this interpersonal experience nowhere has adequately been captured in social or political

"" Lon L. Fuller, The Adversayy System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAw: A SERIES OF
BROADCASTS TO FOREIGN AUDIENCES BY MEMBERS OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL
FACULTY 34, 47 (HaroldJ. Berman ed., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1971) (1961).

"'Id.at 46.
This appreciation can, in turn, produce agreement on questions of constitutional structure among those retaining radically different comprehensive doctrines of the
good. On how this happens, see John Rawls, The Domain of the Political and
OverlappingConsensus, in THE IDEA OF DEMOCRACY 245, 255 (David Copp et al. eds.,
1993).
On how procedural protections of dignified exchange foster a significant
measure of satisfaction among civil litigants, even when they do not prevail, see E.
Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder Tort Litigants' Evaluation of Their
Experiences in the CivilJusticeSystem, 24 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 953, 971-73, 981 (1990).
See also W. LANCE BENNETr & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALrrY IN THE
COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE 171 (1981) ("When

people say that trials are objective and impartial means of producing legaljudgments,
what they really mean is that trials rely on a standardized means of packaging and
analyzing information: the story.... [In the litigants' view,] protection of thejustice
process only holds if all parties in an adjudication have the same capacity to present
and judge stories.").

ADMINISTRATIVE MASSACRE

theory. But who among us can deny having had it, and having
found it not altogether unpleasant?
So long as we follow the rules of civility that govern the
discursive enterprise, we are (in an underappreciated sense) united
by it, drawn willy-nilly into a form of solidarity-albeit not the
7
mushier sort favored by Durkheim and current communitarians.1
A measure of social unity is achieved, not "on the mystical model of
fusion," with its political romanticism, but "on the legal model of
the contract,"" 8 the classic solution of liberal political theory.
We form attachments to our adversaries not only through
procedures establishing agreement on how to disagree, but through
the actual human experience of the resulting exchanges, provided
they conform to these civility rules. Through such exchanges,
we need not transcend our differences on matters of ultimate
concern. We need not come to love our adversaries in Aristotelian
friendship. We may continue to view them much as we view our
appendix, as an object without which we could very easily go on
living and that only imperils us with the prospect of its eruption.
Solidarity of this sort, then, does not claim to provide any recipe for
societal happiness. Through the debate on which it is predicated,
however, we may reluctantly come to acknowledge that there is a
legitimate place in ongoing public discussion for the views, and
hence their spokesmen, that we initially regarded as odious and
contemptible.
A study of the "Waldheim affair" in Austria, concerning the
former President's participation in wartime atrocities, observes just
such a change. At first, "[t]he confrontational nature of this vehicle
of memory made people shun the past, rather than explore it.""'
As the affair developed, however, "'[w]hat began as a vitriolic
confrontation had evolved into a positive debate.'"1 2 ' In such
debates, we often expect to remain profoundly at odds over our
attributions of blame for recent national horrors and about what
should be done to prevent their recurrence. But we are united in
the hope of ultimately achieving a measure of agreement on certain
issues-if not now, then at some future point. As seasoned partici...
On the many affinities (and some important disaffinities) between Durkheim
and contemporary communitarians, see CLADIS, supra note 70, at 170-75, 276-79.
118
ALAIN FINKIELKRAUT, THE DEFEAT OF THE MIND 72 (1995).
"9 MILLER, supra note 64, at 286.
20
' Id. at 86 (quoting Leon Zelman, a Polish Jew who survived three and a half
years at Mauthausen, Auschwitz, and other camps).
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pants report, this process of solidarity through dissensus happens
12
routinely in democratic politics. 1
This solidarity can happen, as well, in the courtroom, or through
a process of discussion initiated there but continued elsewhere. It
can occur even if the discussion begins only under duress: because
one party to the debate, the defendants, are forced to justify
themselves, in response to prosecutorial accusation. 122 "Democracy begins in conversation," John Dewey said. 123 The act of conversation presupposes a measure of respect for the rational and
deliberative capacities of one's interlocutor, as Jfirgen Habermas
contends. 124 Such respect need not always be a precondition for
dialogue, however; it can also be its result. This must be our
response to those who assume that a criminal trial can only
reinforce existing attitudes of respect for human rights, attitudes
that must already be effectively in place for the punishment to have
125
this confirmatory effect.
Unlike an "ideal speech situation," 26 in which debate must be
entirely unconstrained, a real discussion between non-hypothetical
antagonists requires the restraint of civility rules. 12' These rules
M

Consider, for instance, the considerable mutual respect and appreciation-

indeed friendship-that developed between Senators Edward Kennedy and Orrin
Hatch through their many years of work on the SenateJudiciary Committee. See Neil
A. Lewis, OrrinHatch'sJourney: Strict Conservative to Compromise Seeker, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 2, 1990, at A12.
"2 Whether this process of social learning is successfully set in motion depends
on many factors unrelated to law itself, such as how the mass media report the trial,
the degree of forbearance opposing counsel show'toward each other's adversarial
excesses, the structure of the political system, and many other contingent circumstances. Much depends, as well, on the degree of "obligation one feels to the
THE
IWONA IRWIN-ZARECKA, FRAMES OF REMEMBRANCE:
contested memory."
DYNAMICS OF COLLECTIVE MEMORY 81 (1994).
123DIALOGUE ON JOHN DEWEY 58 (Corliss Lamont ed., 1959) (quoting James T.

Farrell's recollections of Dewey's remarks).
'

24

See 2JORCEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 46, 86,187,

262-66 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1981).
" This view has been proposed by Thomas Scanlon. See Nino Conference, supra
note 47.
126 JORGEN HABERMAS,JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION: REMARKS ON DISCOURSE

ETHICS 56-59 (1993).
127On such rules, see Robert C. Post, Between Democracy and Community: The Legal
Constitution of Social Form, in DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY: NOMOS XXXV, at 163,
168-69 (John W. Chapman & Ian Shapiro eds., 1993). Several readers of this
manuscript have observed a resemblance here between the civility rules explicitly
governing legal process and those tacitly governing faculty meetings at many
American law schools. In the latter settings, even those who radically disagree on
substantive questions nevertheless implicitly agree, when debating our differences, to
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(of evidence, procedure, and professional ethics) serve as "enabling
constraints." 128 By permitting an orderly sequence of exchanges,
they enable a discussion to occur that would otherwise never take
place. Without such rules, the parties would refuse to sit down
together, or when they did, would quickly descend to vitriolic namecalling, theological incantation, or outright violence.
A criminal trial is one useful way to begin a discussion with an
initially unwilling interlocutor. It also formulates the discussion in
the favored terms of liberal morality, as this is the moral theory
underpinning most of our criminal law.1 29 At very least, this is a
hypothesis worth considering.'
Let us call this the "discursive"
conception of how criminal prosecution might strengthen social
solidarity.'' It is more consistent with what we currently know
about the formation of collective memory, I shall contend, for that
process proves to be "more like an endless conversation than a
13 2
simple vote on a proposition," as one historian puts it.

eschew ad hominems, to appeal to normative standards that we profess to share, to
refrain from escalating the terms of a localized dispute into a decisive battle in "the
culture wars," and to engage respectfully the arguments of those whose views, in
more intimate settings, we would confess to finding loathsome. But for these
unstated discursive conventions, many of which we import from our experience in
legal practice, faculty meetings at many American law schools would quickly
degenerate into fratricidal conflagrations, as they routinely do in the humanities and
social sciences.
12 This definition is employed by Bernard Yack, to describe a distinctive feature
of liberal theory developed by Benjamin Constant and Niklas Luhmann. See Bernard
Yack, Toward a Free Marketplace of Social Institutions: Roberto Unger's "Super-Liberal"
Theory of Emancipation, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1961, 1967 & n.12 (1988).
' See supra note 19.
's It is somewhat unclear what would count as convincing evidence that this type
of solidarity had become established in a given society, beyond the fact that its
members were no longer slaughtering one another. But this methodological problem
is shared with the Durkheimian-communitarian conception of solidarity. The present
Article therefore limits itself to examining the extent to which each of these types of
solidarity would be impaired by the six obstacles discussed.
. Several influential theorists currently stress the importance of public discourse
and the legal rules protecting it, as the basis for any legitimate authority in a modern
democracy. See CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH

(1993); Seyla Benhabib, DeliberativeRationality and Models of DemocraticLegitimacy, 1
CONSTELLATIONS 26, 26 (1994) (arguing that "legitimacy in complex modern
democratic societies must be thought to result from the free and unconstrained
public deliberation of all about matters of common concern"). On how legal rules
settling procedures for public discourse also tacitly shape national identity, see Bruce
Ackerman, ConstitutionalPolitics/ConstitutionalLaw, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 477 (1989);
Post, supra note 113, at 678. On the contribution of open public debate to social
solidarity, see Jfirgen Habermas,Justiceand Solidarity, in THE MORAL DOMAIN 224,
244-45 (Thomas Wren ed., 1990).
' 2John Thelen, Memory and American History, 75J. AM. HIST. 1117, 1127 (1992);
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Writing just before his early death, Nino would describe the
aims and achievements of the Argentine military trials in similar
terms:
[T]he trials promote public deliberationin a unique manner. Public
deliberation counteracts the authoritarian tendencies which had
led, and continue to lead, to a weakening of the democratic system
and massive human rights violations. All public deliberation has
this effect, but even more so when the subject of the public
discussion is those very authoritarian tendencies. The disclosure
of the truth through the trials feeds public discussion and
generates a collective consciousness and process of self-examination. Questions like, "Where were you, Dad, when these things
were going on?" become part of daily discourse. The contrast
between the legality of the trials and the way the defendants acted
is prominently noticed in public discussion and further contributes
to the collective appreciation of the rule of law. Public discussion
also serves as an escape valve for the victims' emotions and
promotes public solidarity which, in turn, contributes to the
victims recovering their self-respect ....

Nino continues that
this type of value-searching deliberation was evident in the debates
surrounding the trials in Argentina. The accusations, the defenses,
judicial decisions, and arguments taking place among society were
precisely about the role of the military and other groups in a
democratic society, the moral limits for the achievement of certain
goals (quite often society cited the legal manner in which terrorism
was fought in European countries as a counterexample), the rule
of law (the most common conciliatory argument was that the
military could have achieved the same ends through summary
trials and open death sentences under appropriate laws which
sanctioned such actions), and the advantages of a division of
power to protect human rights (it was often said that, even in the
degraded democracy of Isabel Peron, there were fewer violations
of human rights than under the military). 4

Nino here displays an unsullied optimism about the role of
universal reason in politics. This optimism is equally conspicuous
in his more philosophical writing and draws vigorous criticism from

see also id. at 1119 (observing that collective memory "is not made in isolation but in
conversations with others that occur in the contexts of community, broader politics,
and social dynamics").
133NINO, supra note 30.
'S

Id.
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leading theorists on that account." 5 The "solidarity" of which
Nino speaks in this passage expressly rests upon the achievement of
agreement throughout Argentine society about how to judge the
military's conduct in the dirty war. Nino assumes that unconstrained discussion and public deliberation could lead to no other
result. He may well be correct that "reason prevailed" in most of
the discussions, public and private, to which he alludes. But it did
not prevail in all of them, by any means, nor in all of the most
important ones, that is, among citizens with power to influence
6
13

future events.

The solidarity that I propose, in contrast, presumes no such
agreement, but merely civil engagement in disagreements by way of
procedures entailing display of respect for one's adversary, respect
that may be entirely procedural (and a matter of rule-following) at
the outset but that often tends to grow into something more
substantive-if not between the most unreconstructed of antagonists,
then among the larger numbers of their more moderate sympathizers. There is a kind of solidarity, in other words, in continuing
exchanges that result in the mutual recognition that agreement on
a question of common concern is strongly desirable and ultimately
possible, even if only at some uncertain point in the future.
Every form of social solidarity has its privileged institutional
locus, Durkheim implied. Mechanical solidarity finds its favored
locale in the church, especially a legally "established" one, where
core values can be evoked and authoritatively interpreted with a
maximum of symbolic resonance throughout the furthest reaches of
a society.13 7 The economy offers the institutional center for
organic solidarity."' The division of labor involved in a modern
economy makes far-flung sectors of the population and their diverse
productive activities increasingly dependent upon one another-and
1' See Nino Conference, supra note 47 (particularly the remarks of Bernard
Williams).
136 On hostile reaction to the trials among military and conservative circles,
including (initially) many elite newspapers, see HORACIO VERBITSKY, CIvILzs Y
MILrTARES: MEMORIA SECRETA DE LA TRANSICION 95-108, 171-94, 371-82 (2d ed.

1987).

137 See DURKHEIM, supra note 55, at 75-76,
159-73. Mechanical solidarity "comes
from a certain number of states of conscience which are common to all the members
of the same society." Id. at 109. "It is a product of the most essential social
likenesses .... " Id. at 106. Such solidarity "can be strong only if the ideas and
tendencies common to all the members of the society are greater in number and
intensity than those which pertain personally to each member." Id. at 129.
138 See id. at 131.
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increasingly aware of such interdependence, partly due to periodic
disruption in the ever-lengthening chain of commercial exchange.
The result is an awareness of attachment to and a fate shared
with others who are and will remain anonymous, but whose
differing activities are meaningfully related to one's own, Durkheim
inferred."i 9 The law remains essential to such attachments, not by
codifying a consensus on fundamental morality, but simply by
providing a key symbolic code through which complexity is reduced,
agreements reached, and attachments formed. 4
But it is the polity, especially the freedoms of press and speech
integral to democratic politics, that constitute the institutional
foundation of discursive solidarity. Such solidarity arises from, and
consists of, the attachments formed (often unintentionally and
unwittingly) through the vigorous exercise of these rights that a
liberal society will most prominently display-and to which its
adherents should aspire."' It is the memory of our discursive
engagements themselves, no less than our memory of the events we
discuss, that establishes such solidarity between us. Engagements of
this sort can occur as much around a dinner table, and on neighborhood street corners, as on the stage of "high" politics.
Discursive solidarity is not the third act in some social-evolutionary drama. Like the other two varieties, it is best viewed as an ideal
type, a conceptual construct not expected to provide the sufficient
conditions of solidarity in any actual society.142 We may expect all
three varieties to be instantiated within a given country, in different
degree, at a particular point in time. All three, moreover, may be
necessary and desirable in the modern world, in relations both
within and between national societies, if the omnipresent wolf of the
Hobbesian war (all against all) is to be kept at bay.
139
See id. at 55-56, 61-62.
140 See LUHMANN, supra note 62, at 122-37; Talcott Parsons, Law As an Intellectual
Stepchild, in SOCIAL SYSTEM AND LEGAL PROCESS 11, 12 (Harry M.Johnson ed., 1978).
141See

BERNARD CRICK, IN DEFENSE OF POLrCS 24 (1962):
[D]iverse groups hold together ... because they practise politics-not
because they agree about 'fundamentals', or some such concept too vague,
too personal, or too divine ever to do the job of politics for it. The moral
consensus of a free state is not something mysteriously prior to or above
politics: it is the activity (the civilising activity) of politics itself.

Id.
1' For a discussion of this method, see MAX WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 90 (Edward A. Shils & Henry A. Finch eds., trans., 1949).
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The three types of solidarity vary as well in the significance they
ascribe to the differences between individuals, and between various
groups, within a society. Mechanical solidarity requires a denial,
even an active suppression, of differences between individuals and
subgroups in order to preserve the sharing of a single normative
order among them.14 Organic solidarity requires a preservation
and cultivation of differences between individuals and subgroups in
order to preserve and enhance efficiency and productivity. 144
Discursive solidarity, by contrast to both, requires neither the
permanent denial nor affirmation of difference. It involves simply
a recognition that a society's members often disagree radically
regarding their conceptions of justice and the good and that they
nevertheless recognize a need-arising from their interdependenceto settle upon a common scheme of association and cooperation.
Rules requiring civility in the management of disagreements provide
a useful device for reaching this end.
Narrative Conflict in a Liberal Voice
Postmodernist accounts of narrative view the cacophony of
alternative tales about the same large-scale event, and the resulting
conflict between them, as valuable in themselves. The proliferation
of "little narratives," each by performative utterance, ensures that
no single "grand meta-narrative" will ever consolidate itself as the
collective memory of an event. 145 Such a consolidation would
entail, on this view, an effective "end to narration, by revealing the
meaning of narratives."146 The force of narratives, however, is not
"synonymous with the meaning that may be found in them." 147
Narratives are valuable regardless of their persuasiveness, because
they involve "argumentation whose purpose is to bring to light and
provoke contestation over implicit rules that constrain the production of new ideas and determine the boundaries of political
"
communities. "B
4

1 3

144

See DURKHEIM, supra note 55, at 129-31.
See id. at 131-32.

45

LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION:
A REPORT ON
KNOWLEDGE at xi, 27-33, 60 (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., 1984);
Jochen Mecke, Dialoguein Narration(the NarrativePrinciple),in THE INTERPRETATION
OF DIALOGUE 195, 213 (T. Maranhfo ed., 1990).
146 BILL READINGS, INTRODUCING LYOTARD: ART AND POLITICS 63 (1991).
1 JEAN-FRANCOIs

147

Id.

DiSCH, supra note 46, at 9 (parsing LYOTARD, supra note 145, at xxiv). Several
commentators have noted the anarchistic sensibility that such a normative ideal
148
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In brief, postmodernism seeks to sever the link that liberalism
seeks between moral argument and conflict reduction, between
political deliberation and agreement production.1 49 On this view,
the law should not seek to banish all ambiguity, even regarding the
wrongfulness of genocidal conduct or the culpability of its perpetrators, because the inescapability of cognitive and moral ambiguity is
the very essence of the postmodern condition-hence the doubts
and disagreement to which law perpetually gives rise.
In this view, it is therefore wrong to endow anyone's story about
a collective event with authoritative status, for the same reason that
it is wrong to endow political power with moral legitimacy: the
worst abuses of power are always committed by those most
convinced of the moral superiority of their cause, their civilization,
or their theory of history.'s5 Jacques Vergbs, defense counsel for
Klaus Barbie, subtly appealed to this pervasive preoccupation,
fostered by postmodernism, turning it to his client's advantage.
Vergbs's public rhetoric about the prosecution sought to equate the
serene confidence of the criminal law, in its judgment against his
client, with that of French colonialism, now recognized to have
perpetrated grave injustices in the name of lofty principles, those of
Western civilization. 151
The same principles of French culture invoked against his client,
Vergbs suggested, had been invoked against the Algerians and other
victims of French power. 5
As this incident amply reveals, the

entails. For a current leading defense of postmodernist politics, so conceived, see
BONNIE HONIG, POLITICAL THEORY AND THE DISPLACEMENT OF POLITICS 2 (1992)
(decrying the preoccupation of political theory with "the juridical, administrative,
[and] regulative tasks of stabilizing moral and political subjects, building consensus,
maintaining agreements, or consolidating communities and identities"). Roberto
Unger's views on such issues are similar. See ROBERTO UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY: ITS
SITUATION AND ITS TASK 22 (1987).
149 See HONIG, supra note 148, at 2-5, 14-15; DEENA WEINSTEIN & MICHAEL A.
WEINSTEIN, POSTMODERN(IZED) SIMMEL 115-29 (1993); see also WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY,
IDENTITY\DIFFERENCE:

DEMOCRATIC NEGOTIATIONS OF POLITICAL PARADOX at x

(1991) (Democracy, properly understood, should not "equate concern for human
dignity with a quest for rational consensus. It opens political spaces for agnostic
relations of adversarial respect.").
'-' Many have hence identified strains of anarchism in the postmodernist
sensibility.

See TODD MAY, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF POSTSTRUCTURALIST

ANARCHISM 3 (1994); Michael Walzer, The Politics of Michel Foucault, in FOUCAULT:
A CRITICAL READER 51, 61 (David Hoy ed., 1986).
51

1 See ALAIN FINKIELKRAUT, REMEMBERING IN VAIN:

THE KLAUS BARBIE TRIAL

AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 32-36 (Roxanne Lapidus & Sima Godfrey trans.,

1992).

152 See id.

1995]

ADMINISTRATIVE MASSACRE

logic of the postmodernist celebration of contested memory applies
no less to the "disruptive" narratives of Nazi war criminals than to
those of ethnic minorities or battered wives. After all, the only
"counter-hegemonic narrative" publicly offered in Argentina, in
opposition to that of Alfonsin and his liberal courts, was that of the
officer corps, a story about military victory in a just war against
53
foreign-inspired subversion.
In contrast, by valuing civil dissension as a means for developing
some solidarity in a deeply divided society, the liberal account
defended here occupies a midpoint on the continuum between the
postmodernist celebration of permanent disruption, as an end in
itself," and the Durkheimian veneration of settled consensus over
moral fundamentals, with its denial of the possibility of continuing
disagreement among reasonable people at the end of the day. On
the present account, the contested character of collective memory
is cause neither for celebration nor despair, but a challenge to
liberal solidarity and an opportunity for its conscious cultivation by
dramaturgical design.
Official correction of collective memory by criminal law remains
subject to an intensely practical constraint: those with an interest
in collective forgetting must not get their way.155 In analyzing
these trials, there is a danger of over-subtlety that must be resisted.
The point of such proceedings is not so much to make people
remember what they have repressed and would prefer to forget-the
psychoanalytical angle' 56-but rather to confront those with
something to hide with evidence they have tried to keep from
coming to light.'5 7 But one should not infer from this fact that
5

" s See EJERCITO ARGENTINO, EL DERECHO A LA LIBERTAD
CAMPS, EL PODER EN LA SOMBRA:

(1980); RAMON J.A.

EL AFFAIRE GRAIVER (1983); Interviews with

Argentine Military Officers, in Buenos Aires, Argentina (June-Aug. 1985).
'-" Postmodernists generally think that political institutions should help bring to
the surface conflicts that presently lie dormant, conflicts that are merely "suppressed,"
in their view. See HONIG, supra note 148, at 2-17. The liberal perspective adopted
here, by contrast, assumes that existing Western democracies already succeed in
raising social conflicts to the surface of political life in ample abundance, without the
need to incite these conflicts any further; political institutions, in this view, need only
provide a receptive forum for deliberative discussion and resolution of such conflicts.
155 This point is made with particular cogency by one Argentine who lost several
family members during the dirty war. See Noga Tarnopolsky, MurderingMemory in
Argentina, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1994, at A19.
'" Several have examined West Germany's postwar self-scrutiny-particularly the
limits on that process-in psychoanalytic terms. See DOMINICK LACAPRA, REPRESENTING THE HOLOCAUST:
HISTORY, THEORY, TRAUMA (1994); ERIC L. SANTNER,
STRANDED OBJECTS: MOURNING, MEMORY, AND FILM IN POSTWAR GERMANY (1990).
1571 am grateful to Jeffrey Herf for this observation. For much the same point,
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the way in which such confrontations are orchestrated and symbolized is irrelevant to their political efficacy. As Clifford Geertz
contends, "[t]he real is as imagined as the imaginary."'
"[T]his
prejudice ... that the dramaturgy of power is external to its
159
workings, must be put aside."
During periods of democratization, political conflict often
extends to the question of how the prior regime and those who
served it should be remembered, and how the law should be
employed to that end. Sometimes, as in the recent murder
prosecution of East German border guards, this conflict finds its
way into the criminal courts. 160 It has been especially apparent in
the former Soviet Bloc in recent years. 161 The recovery of a more
accurate past, the correction of collective memory, is an integral
aspect of democratization. "Indeed, there is a striking correlation,"
observes Timothy Garton Ash, comparing the recent history of
Central European states, "between the degree of facing up to the
past, however clumsily, and the state of progress from dictatorship
to democracy. Which is cause and which effect is a moot point:
they go together." 162 Describing this process in the former Soviet
Union, David Remnick notes, with only slight exaggeration, that
"[t]he return of history to the intellectual and political life of the
people of the Soviet Union was the foundation of the great changes
ahead."

163

see Saul Friedlander, Some GermanStruggles with Memory, in BrrBURG IN

MORAL AND
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 27, 29 (Geoffrey H. Hartman ed., 1986).
'58 CLIFFORD GEERTZ, NECARA: THE THEATRE STATE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
BALI 136 (1980).
"9 Id.; see also Umberto Eco, Semiotics of TheatricalPerformance,DRAMA REV., Mar.

1977, at 107, 113 ("It is not theatre that is able to imitate life; it is social life that is
designed as a continuous performance and, because of this, there is a link between
theatre and life.").
160 See TINA ROSENBERG, THE HAUNTED LAND: FACING EUROPE'S GHOSTS AFTER
COMMUNISM 261-305 (1995); Kif A. Adams, What IsJust?: The Rule of Law and Natural
Law in the Trials of FormerEast German Border Guards, 29 STAN. J. INT'L L. 271, 295300 (1993).
161The Hungarian novelist and sociologist Gy6rgy Konrad observes, for instance:
"'Today only the dissenters [that is, those who opposed Communist oppression]
conserve the sentiment of continuity. The others must eliminate remembrances; they
cannot permit themselves to keep the memory.... Most people have an interest in
losing memory.'" CICILE WAJSBROT & StBASTIEN REICHMANN, EUROPE CENTRALE 84
(1991) (translation by author).
. Timothy G. Ash, Central Europe: The Present Past, N.Y. REV. BOORS, July 13,
1995, at 21, 22.
163 DAVID REMNICK, LENIN'S TOMB: THE LAST DAYS OF THE SOVIET EMPIRE 41
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Thus, changes in collective memory, through official efforts to
revise historical understanding (by executive order, legislation, or
litigation), can have monumental consequences for social and
political structure. What, then, are the foreseeable obstacles to
efforts at employing the law toward this end?
II. LEGAL SHAPING OF COLLECTIVE MEMORY:
SIX OBSTACLES

A. Defendants' Rights, NationalNarrative,
and Liberal Memory
Is liberal jurisprudence inherently at odds with any effort to
orchestrate prosecution as public spectacle and for social didactics?
What is the proper place within an avowedly liberal legal theory for
such dramaturgical concerns about reaching a desired audience?
None, many liberals would say. They would agree, of course,
that a gripping story is to be preferred to a wearisome one, ceteris
paribus. But unfortunately-many liberals hasten to add-other
things rarely turn out, on careful inspection, to be truly equal after
all. What makes for a good "morality play" does not necessarily
make for a fair trial."' And if it is the simplifications of melodrama that are needed to influence collective memory, then the
production had best be staged somewhere other than in a court of
law.165 A call for monumental didactics is all too likely to be
mistaken as an invitation for histrionic bellicosity and sanctimonious
grandstanding-vices to which certain members of our profession
1 66
are not altogether immune.

(1993); see also MISHA GLENNY, THE REBIRTH OF HISTORY: EASTERN EUROPE IN THE
ACE OF DEMOCRACY (1990).
e The Nuremberg proceedings were condemned in precisely these terms by
contemporary commentators. Their views are summarized in WILLIAM J. BOSCH,
JUDGMENT ON NUREMBERG: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE MAJOR GERMAN WAR-

CRMES TRIALS 36-39, 51, 110-11, 153, 236 (1970).

1" Buruma offers a typical statement of this view:
Just as belief belongs in church, surely history education belongs in school.

When the court of law is used for history lessons, then the risk of show
trials cannot be far off. It may be that show trials can be good politics...
[b]ut good politics don't necessarily serve the truth.
IAN BURUMA, THE WAGES OF GUILT: MEMORIES OF WAR IN GERMANY AND JAPAN 142

(1994). Furthermore, "[p]olitical trials produce politicized histories." Id. at 166.
'"'Julian Barnes warns of this danger. The prosecutor, returning home from a
day of particularly dramatic but underhanded point-scoring against the deposed
dictator in the dock, is greeted by his wife, who pronounces his performance
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Even so, there is nothing especially pernicious, in principle,
about efforts to shape the dynamics of criminal proceedings for
maximal dramaturgical effect. Theatrics of this sort are, after all,
part of the standard repertoire of any effective courtroom lawyer. 16 7 Theatrics are not, however, thought to be a legitimate part
of the judicial repertoire of courts, even when rendering judgment
against violations of basic human rights. There is reason to wonder
whether justice to the defendant, however heinous his wrongs, has
been compromised when it can be said, as does one Israeli historian, that "[t]he trial was only a medium, and Eichmann's role was
simply to be there, in the glass booth; the real purpose of the trial
was to give voice to the Jewish people, for whom Israel claimed to
speak. " 16 8 Another Israeli scholar adds that "Eichmann rather
swiftly became peripheral to his own trial, which was deliberately
designed to.focus more comprehensively on the Nazi crimes against
the Jews."' 6 9 Those initially willing to testify in his defense were
deterred from so doing by threat of prosecution for their own
wartime activities; 70 surely, they would have sought to tell a
different tale.
In the trial of Klaus Barbie, "[p]ent-up feelings were vented as
those who had suffered took revenge on history."' 7 ' Although the
prosecutor and court relied almost entirely on documentary

"[w]orthy of American television." She adds: "It was vulgar and dishonest,
contemptuous of the law, and you behaved like a pimp." BARNES, supra note 100, at
111-12.
167 Moreover, some historians contend that the professional pleader of the 13th
century was in origin a "remembrancer [who used] the poetic technique of the singer
of tales to recall the forms of his 'tales' or pleadings." M.T. Clanchy, Remembering the
Past andthe Good Old Law, 55 HISTORY 165, 175 (1970). Other historians have traced
the origins of such "memory officials," and the courts' reliance on them, to ancient
Greece. SeeJAcQUES LE GOFF, HISTORY AND MEMORY 63 (Steven Rendall & Elizabeth
Claman trans., 1992).
168 SEGEV, supra note 34, at 358. Segev writes that "[Israeli Prime Minister David]
Ben-Gurion often emphasized that the man Adolf Eichmann was of no interest to
him; he was concerned only with the historic importance of the trial itself." Id. at
327. One of Ben-Gurion's principal goals in holding the trial "was to remind the
countries of the world that the Holocaust obligated them to support the onlyJewish
state on earth." Id.; see also ARENDT, supra note 18, at 4-5 (describing the courtroom
architecture as "not a bad place for the show trial David Ben-Gurion... had in mind"
and Ben-Gurion as "the invisible stage manager of the proceedings").
169 Moshe Halbertal, The Seventh Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust, NEW
REPUBLIC, Oct. 18, 1993, at 40, 43 (book review).
17

0

See ROBERT K. WOETZEL, THE NUREMBERG TRIALS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH

A POSTLUDE ON THE EICHMANN CASE 249 (2d impression rev. 1962).
171 ROUSSO, supra note 26, at 214.
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evidence in developing their legal arguments, the trial was orchestrated to highlight very different evidence for the mass audience:
"The witnesses ...

were the heroes of the trial because they gave,

symbolically, faces to the dead, who were on everyone's mind."'7 2
Such observations suggest the first of six reasons for skepticismnamely, the risk of sacrificing the defendants' rights on the altar of
social solidarity-about what law might do for collective memory of
administrative massacre.
The primary limit that liberalism imposes on storytelling in
criminal trials is the principle of personal culpability: the requirement that no defendant be held responsible for the wrongs of
others beyond his contemplation or control.1 7 ' This entails a
judicial duty to focus on a very small piece of what most observers
will inevitably view as a much larger puzzle, to delimit judicial
attention to that restricted place and period within which the
defendant willfully acted. Episodes of administrative massacre,
however, characteristically involve many people acting in coordinated ways over considerable space and time, impeding adherence
to this stricture.
Moreover, to tell a compelling story, one that will persuade its
intended audience that it is not unfairly singling out a serviceable
scapegoat, the state (in the person of the prosecutor) must be able
to paint the larger tableaux. Hence the recurrent tension, of which
trial participants have often been well aware, between the needs of
persuasive storytelling and the normative requirements of liberal
judgment.

174

This tension has manifested itself in diverse ways during various
prosecutions for administrative massacre. In prosecuting Eichmann,
Ben-Gurion wanted, above all else, to retell the story told at
Nuremberg in an entirely different way.'7 5 This retelling would
conceive the offense as a "crime against the Jewish people," rather
than against "humanity"-the latter concept an invention of the
secular Enlightenment. Ben-Gurion's retelling was "ideologically
rooted in the Zionist disappointment with liberalism," as an Israeli
17

Id.

171See FLETCHER, supra note

19, at 459-63, 492-95, 509-11.

174The Israeli trial court, for instance, repeatedly reproached the prosecutor for

seeking to expand the narrative frame with evidence of Nazi wrongs that could not
be traced to Eichmann's acts. See Attorney-Gen. of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5,
18-197 5 (Isr. Dist. Ct. 1961).
' See Lahav, supra note 34, at 559-61.
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legal scholar observes.' 76 It was designed to reflect the Zionist
view that liberalism, with its aim of moral universalism, had misled
the Jews into seeking assimilation within gentile societies, rather
than reestablishing their own. 177
What better way to dramatize the link that Zionism asserted
between assimilation's failure and the occurrence of the Holocaust
than by a story about how Eichmann's actions assaulted the flesh of
the Jewish people, as opposed to merely assaulting the liberal
morality of the assimilated? For Israelis, this made for a powerful
and persuasive story. Yet the narrative was willfully and unabashedly antiliberal, not merely in violating nulla poena sine lege, but in
its very definition of the offense as one committed against a
particular ethnoreligious community. In myriad ways, Ben-Gurion
sought to frame the courtroom narrative in expressly communitarian terms, as a tale about the Jewish community's collective victimization, suffering, resistance, resurrection (from the ashes of failed
assimilation), and, finally, redemption as a powerful nation-state.
Whereas Eichmann's seeming "banality" became the absorbing
focus for Hannah Arendt and later generations of non-Israeli
intellectuals, 17 for Israelis themselves (and many other observers)
his pedestrian, non-demoniac character simply made him boring. 179 It became that much easier to concentrate their attention
upon the very different and more compelling drama told by his
victims-the survivor-witnesses (whose narratives Arendt found
entirely beside the point, leaving her largely unmoved).'
That
the Nuremberg judgment appears in virtually every casebook and
treatise on international law, while the Eichmannjudgment appears
in virtually none, would not have troubled Ben-Gurion in the least,
one suspects. He was playing to a different audience, and he chose
18
his theatrical techniques accordingly.'
17

6 Id. at 560.

177See id. at 559-68.
178 See, e.g., David Luban et al., Moral Responsibility in the Age of Bureaucracy, 90
MICH. L. REv. 2348, 2359-60 (1992) (discussing reactions of non-Israeli intellectuals
to the defendants in the Nuremberg trials).
179See Alex Ross, Watchingfor aJudgment of Real Evil, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 12, 1995,
§ 2, at 37,40 (noting that Eichmann's courtroom persona was "lackluster," due to his
"evasive pedantry").
" Virtually all Israeli studies of the Eichmann trial, and of its legacy for that
nation, focus upon this. See SEGEV, supra note 34, at 345-66; Gouri, supra note 38, at
155.
' In this regard, Arendt was right to note "the almost universal hostility in Israel
to the mere mention of an international court which would have indicted Eichmann,
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In the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, illiberalism took another
form. Defendants complained that the narrative of the courtroom
was being framed too broadly. The Charter for the Tokyo trial, for
instance, provided that "'[t]he tribunal shall not be bound by
technical rules of evidence... and shall admit any evidence that it
deems to have probative value.'" 182 Apart from the unchecked
discretion this approach granted the courts, its effect may have
been, as Justice Pal argued in dissent, to "operate practically against
the defense only."183
The breadth of relevant evidence followed from the breadth of
the conspiracy charge, covering over a decade. As legal historian
David Cohen contends:
[T]he court's discussion of the case is largely a historical narrative
of the unfolding of this conspiracy rather than an examination of
each defendant's conduct. The problem ... is that a narrative
structure built around a conspiracy theory inevitably emphasizes
the actions of the "conspirators" as an abstract collectivity, and
operates to obscure the precise connection of specific individuals
to particular events.'84
Cohen continues, "[t]he basic strategy, then, ...
was not to
delineate clearly the culpable conduct of each defendant, considered
as an individual, but rather to establish participatory linkage
between each defendant and a historical flow of collective activity.... [T]his was done without specifying the criteria which would
render such participation culpable." 185
In short, the court's
narrative framing successfully simplified some highly complicated
events into an intelligible, coherent, and evocative story. But in so
doing, it failed to adhere to liberalism's requirement that criminal
liability be conditioned on a showing of individual culpability.

not for crimes 'against theJewish people,' but for crimes against mankind committed
on the body of the Jewish people." ARENDT, supra note 18, at 7.
18 TOKYO CHARTER, art. 13, cited in RICHARD H. MINEAR, VICTORS'JUSTICE: THE
TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL 118 (1971). A similar provision appeared in the London
Charter for the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. See MINEAR, supra, at

118.
183 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 2613, TRIAL OF JAPANESE WAR CRIMINALS 12,

39, 42

(1946) (Pal, J., dissenting). American tribunals employed similarly relaxed
evidentiary rules, allowing hearsay, unsworn statements, and "facts of common
knowledge" in all postwar proceedings againstJapanese defendants. See PICCIGALLO,
supra note 88, at 38.
1' David Cohen, Beyond Nuremberg Individual Responsibilityfor War Crimes, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN TRANSITIONS (Robert Post & Carla Hesse eds., forthcoming 1996).
185 Id.
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By contrast, in the Buenos Aires trials, military defendants complained that the law's narrative framing of their conduct was far too
narrow to judge it fairly. Defense counsel sought to situate the
military's conduct in a wider context of the collapse of public order
during the last years. of Peronist rule. On this account, the
military's victims were actually perpetrators and aggressors in the
larger conflict, which entailed a virtual state of war by leftist

guerrillas, supported in key ways by a web of sympathizers.186 On
this framing of the tale, the military's conduct represented only the
self-defense of Argentine society, a response proportionate to the
serious threat that this society had faced. The court employed
traditional rules of evidence, however, to prevent this contextualizing effort, to the considerable detriment of the defendants'
case, many believed."'
A key question, then, is whether collective memory may be
purchased only at the exorbitant price of fairness to individual
defendants. An affirmative answer is suggested by the fact that
those most enamored of harnessing the law to the construction of
collective memory are generally those most hostile to liberal
morality."' Any talk of monumental didactics" evokes the fear of
Stalinist "show trials," those degradation rituals8 9 in which every
invocation by defendants of procedural protections is rechar" Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Horacio Dominguez offers an elaborate legal

argument to this effect in LA NUEvA

GUERRA Y EL NuEvo DERECHO: ENSAYO PARA
UNA ESTRATEGIAJURfDICA CONTRASUBVERSIVA (1980).

...
On how criminal law permits alternative temporal framings of a defendant's
act, allowing admission or exclusion of exculpatory evidence, see Mark Kelman,
InterpretiveConstruction in the Substantive CriminalLaw, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591, 616-20
(1981). For a sociological perspective on this problem, see ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME
ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF EXPERIENCE (1974).
183 I refer to cultural anthropologists and Durkheimian sociologists, who are
decidedly communitarian in their ethical theory. On the philosophical dependence
of criminal law, by contrast, on liberal conceptions of morality, see supra note 19.
89
' See Harold Garfinkel, Conditionsof Successful DegradationCeremonies, 61 AM.J.
SoC. 420, 420 (1956). On Stalin's purge trials, especially on prosecutorial vituperation of defendants and their legal "'evaluation from the point of view of class
expediency,'" see ALEKSANDR I. SOLZHENITSYN, THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO 1918-1956,
at 308 (Thomas P. Whitney trans., 1973) (quoting N.V. Krylenko, Stalin's Prosecutor
General). See also Lon L. Fuller, Pashukanisand Vyshinsky: A Study in the Development
of Marxian Legal Theoty, 47 MICH. L. REV. 1157, 1161-62 (1949) (defining show trials
as "[s]ham legal proceedings, repeatedly used in the USSR and other communist
countries ... designed to dramatize specific political campaigns and/or eliminate
prominent individuals"). For the standard, entirely pejorative connotation of the
term "show trial," based on the Soviet experience, see A DICTIONARY OF POLITICS
454-55 (Walter Laqueur ed., 1971).
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acterized by the court as further evidence of their seditious
character as "enemies of the people." Milner Ball states the
conventional wisdom: "Insofar as it is made a platform for
moralizing or a forum for educating, a trial is not a trial. Trials may
indeed have an educative effect, but they have this effect when,
instead of deliberately undertaking to teach, they treat the parties
190
as individuals."
In Defense of Liberal Show Trials
Liberal legal theorists will thus be tempted quickly to reject the
cultivation of collective memory as a defensible objective when
prosecuting those responsible for administrative massacre. But that
conclusion would be premature and unfounded. The orchestration
of criminal trials for pedagogic purposes-such as the transformation
of a society's collective memory-is not inherently misguided or
morally indefensible. The defensibility of the practice depends on
the defensibility of the lessons being taught-that is, on the liberal
nature of the stories being told. Whether show trials are defensible
depends on what the State intends to show and how it will show it.
Liberal show trials are ones self-consciously designed to show the
merits of liberal morality and to do so in ways consistent with its
very requirements.
"What is the cost for the individual and for society," asks one
anthropologist, "when there is no meaningful framework for
publicly exploring traumatic memories of political violence?""'1
That question sounds no less powerful in a liberal society than in
any other. A liberal society, to be sure, cannot officially endorse
any full-bodied conception of the good.' 92 Hence its law, as an
expression of state power, cannot aspire to provide its members a
fully coherent way of life. In other words, individual rights establish
side-constraints that the state must respect.
Liberalism is a theory neither about "the meaning of life,"'
nor about the ends in service of which these rights must be
190 BALL,

supra note 9, at 56; see also Hariman, supra note 109, at 3 (arguing that

"the more a trial appears to be a scene or product of public controverry and
rhetorical artistry, the less legitimate it appears").

"9 Rubie S. Watson, Memoty, Histoty, and Opposition Under State Socialism: An
Introduction, in MEMORY, HISTORY, AND OPPOSITION UNDER STATE SOCIALIsM 1, 13
(Rubie
S. Watson ed., 1994).
1
92 See JOHN RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 395-411, 446-49 (1971).
9
' ' See CHARLES E. LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY 69-90 (1987).

512

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 144:463

exercised. The legal storytelling in which courts necessarily engage,
reproaching some and commending others, cannot seek to teach
citizens how to exercise their moral autonomy, other than to respect
the like autonomy of others. In this sense, the lessons taught by a
liberal society and its law are necessarily and deliberately incomplete. The common culture of a liberal society can be only "loosely
94
coherent." 1
Even so, a liberal state may employ a "show trial" for administrative massacre to display the horrific consequences of the illiberal
vices and so to foster among its citizens the liberal virtues (including
respect for basic individual rights, deliberative capacity, and
toleration). "There is no reason to think that liberal citizens come
195 As Macedo contends, "We need to avoid
about naturally ....
making the mistake of assuming that liberal citizens-self-restrained,
moderate, and reasonable-spring full-blown from the soil of private
196
freedom."
A criminal trial is a congenial public opportunity for collective
mourning of the victims of administrative massacre. It provides a
ritual that is helpful for family members and a sympathetic public
in coming to terms with melancholia in even the most traumatic
cases.'9 7 Just because a liberal state cannot dictate the terms on
which the victims' lives could be lived does not preclude the state
from providing an occasion that serves, inter alia, for mourning
their wrongful taking. The liberal state can thus provide an
institutional mechanism for mourning not only the deprivation of
a victim's abstract moral rights, but the fully-developed life she
might have lived in exercising those rights. In so doing, criminal
law contributes significantly to the social solidarity that is based on
149 (1983). I later develop this
point regarding the relationship between official narratives, sanctioned by criminal
law, and "private" memories of personal experiences, which are often the basis for
civil damage suits. See infra text accompanying notes 733-52.
194

STUART HAMPSHIRE, MORALITY AND CONFLICT

9 Stephen Macedo, Transformative Constitutionalism and the Case of Religion:
Defending the ModerateHegemony of Liberal ConstitutionalValues, in CONSTITUTIONAL
POLITICS AND CONSTITUTIONAL STUDIES (Sotirios Barber & Robert George eds.,
forthcoming 1996).
" Id. Joseph Raz adopts a similar view in THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 196-97
(1986).
197 See PETER HOMANS, THE ABILITY TO MOURN: DISILLUSIONMENT AND THE
SOCIAL ORIGINS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 261-348 (1989). As a ritual, mourning involves
a condition of grief that is repeated and expressed in a "reduced, normatively
controlled, and socially supported form." LACAPRA, supra note 156, at 199.

ADMINISTRATIVE MASSACRE

shared commitment to liberal principles of mutual respect and
concern among individuals.
This communal mourning is one important role that collective
memory may legitimately play in a liberal society, or within a society
aspiring to liberalize itself. With this provisional answer in mind,
we can begin to assess how the law might properly contribute to the
formation of such memory, particularly of national catastrophes like
the Argentine dirty war. I shall speak of law's legitimate tasks in
this regard as those of liberal memory. Is it possible, when prosecuting perpetrators of administrative massacre, to craft evidence
and legal argument in a way that stimulates public discussion of the
underlying issues, influencing the ensuing debate so as to foster
liberal morality and solidarity? That is our central question.
Liberal stories are ones that, in treatment of their characters,
reward the liberal virtues and condemn illiberal vices. Cruelty is the
cardinal vice in this regard;19 respect for individual life and
liberty, the cardinal virtue. 9 All else is commentary. 200 Liberal
virtues are those dispositions of character that a liberal society must
cultivate in its members in order to function effectively and to keep
social conflict within tolerable bounds. First and foremost, a liberal
society must inculcate the disposition to respect the moral rights of
others, that is, the rights that liberal morality accords to all persons.
The stories that criminal courts tell must celebrate this virtue and
chastise the correlative vice. The law accomplishes this only when
courts and juries themselves respect the law, that is, when they
adhere to legal rules reflecting liberal principles of procedural
fairness and personal culpability as conditions of criminal liability.
The most gripping of legal yarns must be classified as a failure if its
capacity for public enthrallment is purchased at the price of
violating such strictures.
But within these principled constraints, liberals have plenty of
good stories to tell. As Yack observes:
[I]f man is, as MacIntyre insists, "... . a story-telling being[,]" ...

then we should expect men and women to turn theories, even
195

SeeJUDITH N. SHKLAR, ORDINARY VICES 44 (1984).
' Recent efforts to find a place for virtue within liberalism include MACEDO,
supra
note 87, at 131-62, and WILIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES 237 (1991).
2
' There is more to most contemporary versions of liberal theory than individual
rights against others or to civic and political participation, of course. But whether a
liberal society also requires social provision of "primary goods" or essential social
"capabilities" is tangential t6 present purposes.
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liberal theories which insist on impersonal and antitraditional
criteria, into the basis for new stories.... The French turned
liberty from tradition into a female figure, symbolic of the
Republic's virtues and energy. American colonists turned Lockean
liberal principles into didactic stories with which to educate their
children.... Similarly, the Kantian categorical imperative has
generated stories that celebrate moral courage, while social
contract theories have encouraged stories that celebrate the virtues
20
associated with self-reliance. 1
If nothing else, liberalism is very much engaged in telling the story
of liberalism, the "origin" stories of Locke, Jefferson, and Madison,

as well as the "horror" stories about communal intolerance-large
(Stalin and Hitler) or small (tribes and towns).20 2 In a liberal
society, prosecutors (in their closing arguments) and courts (in their
opinions) tell stories about individual rights and the myriad forms
of the human flourishing that the exercise of such rights permits
and that their violation wrongly forecloses. Liberal courts thus tell
a story in which men are portrayed as autonomous subjects,
choosing to conduct themselves in this way or that.

The Value of Liberal Fictions
There is an irreducibly "fictive" element here: the legal fiction
that men, in obeying or breaking the law, are exercising an
inalienable capacity for autonomous choice. By representing men
as autonomous choosers, liberal law seeks to make them so-

recognizing all the while that this entails forcing freedom upon
some who would prefer to surrender it (to priests, parents, marital
partners, or military superiors). Liberal stories in criminal cases
thus always involve "side-shadowing";2..

that is, they allude to

202Bernard Yack, Liberalism and Its Communitarian Critics: Does Liberal Practice
"Live Down" to Liberal Theoy?, in COMMUNITY IN AMERICA, supra note 70, at 147, 151-

52. Yack's reference to liberty as a female figure alludes to an early effort of liberal
iconography to translate republican ideas into pictorial imagery with which citizens
could readily identify.

On. this effort, see MAURICE AGULHON, MARIANNE INTO

BATTLE: REPUBLICAN IMAGERY AND SYMBOLISM IN FRANCE, 1789-1880 (Janet Lloyd

trans., 1981).
202 I owe this observation to Michael Schudson.
2

03 See MICHAEL A. BERNSTEIN, FOREGONE CONCLUSIONS: AGAINST APOCALYPTIC

HISTORY 7-8 (1994). As Bernstein notes:

To concentrate on the sideshadowed ideas and events, on what did not
happen, does not cast doubt on the historicity of what occurred but views
it as one among a range of possibilities, a number of which might, with
equal plausibility, have taken place instead .... To keep the claims of both

1995]

ADMINISTRATIVE MASSACRE

unrealized possibilities more appealing and more defensible than
what transpired. The story always runs: the defendant was not
fated to perform his dastardly deeds; he was free to do otherwise,
and should have.
But liberal courts do not merely apply first principles set in
stone. While they seek to preserve the normative "integrity" of
their community over time, judicial stories also involve a continual
effort to rework legal rules and principles "in their best light"-to
clarify and refine extant norms in the course of applying them to
disputes regarding their scope and meaning. 0 4 The story of the
litigants and their immediate dispute is thereby woven into a larger
story about the community, its history, and its evolving normative
commitments. The story of what the parties did to one another is
subsumed within a broader tale about what communal norms
required of them and how these norms got to be the way they are.
In recounting the tale of the crimes the juntas had ordered, the
obedience of their underlings, and the suffering of their victims, the
military trials in Argentina told such liberal stories. But notice that
a liberal story, on Yack's representative account, does no more than
illustrate principles, the validity of which do not derive from the
story itself or from the character-virtues of those enacting it.
Stories allow the listener to intuit directly the moral lessons
embedded in them. Rather than being required to "act on
principle," that is, in conscious awareness of moral duties discerned
from the story's proper interpretation, stories allow us to apprehend
these lessons in an unmediated way: from the very vivacity of their
immediate impact on the listeners' sentiments." 5 "Ideally, a story
20 6
should be self-explanatory," Gallie notes.
the event and its unrealized alternatives in mind may be more perplexing
as a theoretical formulation than as an ongoing act ....

Id.
m This formulation follows Dworkin's account of how judges resemble the
authors of a "chain novel." See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 98, at 228-38.
It is modeled on Rawls' account of the "constructive" process of "reflective
equilibrium" by which we bring our principles into harmony with our settled moral
judgments,
and vice versa. See RAWLS, supra note 192, at 46-53.
205
See ADAM Z. NEWTON, NARRATIVE ETHIcs 13 (1995) ("[By eliminating] the
mediatory role of reason, narrative situations create an immediacy and force, framing
relations ... that bind narrator and listener.... [T]hese relations will often precede
... understanding, with consciousness arriving late, after the assumption or
imposition of intersubjective ties.").
206 W.B. GALUE, PHILOSOPHY AND THE HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING 23 (1964).
Gallie further states that: "It is only when things become complicated and difficultwhen in fact it is no longer possible to follow them-that we require an explicit
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Still, stories are primarily a crutch, on the liberal account, for
those who cannot yet reason abstractly, who must emulate the
concrete lives of "role models" because they have not yet learned to
formulate their aspirations at any level of generality, their moral
ideals in more universalistic terms. Just as we rely increasingly on
pictures for assisting memories as we age, 207 so we initially learn
(in childhood) our society's moral principles by way of stories, not
moral argument.208 It is thus scarcely surprising that, in seeking
direction or instructing our children, most of us turn more readily
to biblical parables than to Kant's Prolegomena.
Compelling stories about the country's past-legal and otherwise-aid our remembrance not only of the events themselves, but
also of the moral judgments we ultimately reached about them,
often through discussions of these events with friends and fellow
citizens. The principles on which we based these judgments are
thus kept firmly in mind. In this way, memory of the events
themselves also comes to be influenced by memory of subsequent
debate about how to judge their perpetrators and accomplices.
This view of storytelling, as merely a mnemonic device, enables
us-the listeners-to maintain the proper measure of critical distance
from the teller. It helps us to ask such questions as: Was that really
his motive? Did he accurately understand the motives of other
characters? Did he correctly grasp the situation he faced and what
it required of him? The best of modern drama does not encourage
complete identification with its characters. Far from it. Bertolt
Brecht's influential idea of the "alienation effect" involves precisely
such a self-conscious effort by the dramatist to encourage a measure
of impartial detachment by the audience from even the most
appealing characters. 219 It is a theatrical device for inducing the
audience to confront the dramatic character and his social
world-and that of the audience itself-in a critical and self-critical
fashion. The objective is a form of "acting where the transforma-

explanation of what the characters are doing and why. But the more skilful [sic] the
story-teller,
the rarer will be the intrusion of such explicit explanations." Id. at 22-23.
20 7
See MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI & EUGENE ROCHBERG-HALTON, THE MEANING
OF THINGS: DOMESTIC SYMBOLS AND THE SELF 63-69, 112 (1981).
m On the salience of storytelling in the moral education of young children, see
GALLIE, supra note 206, at 24-25; Paul Harris, Developmental Aspects of Children's
Memory, in ASPECTS OF MEMORY 132, 143-50 (Michael M. Gruneberg & Peter Morris
eds., 1978).
29
' See Bertolt Brecht, AlienationEffects in ChineseActing, in THE MODERN THEATRE:
READINGS AND DOCUMENTS 276, 277-78 (Daniel Seltzer ed., 1967).
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tion of consciousness"-of the viewer into the mind and situation
of the character-"is not only intentionally incomplete but also
revealed as such to the spectators, who delight in the unresolved
dialectic."210

By contrast, when a legal author today tells us that her narrative
can communicate "the inexpressible, the inexplicable" 21 1 (that is,
inexplicable in strictly normative or analytical terms), we often find
her smuggling in "the indefensible" as well. As we are called upon
to enter empathetically into her imaginative universe, we are tacitly

asked to leave our critical faculties at the door.

Such authors

resemble the Zambian tribe whose members insist, even when

testifying in court, on relating events uninterrupted, for fear that
the spell cast by the storyteller will be broken. "Beware the judge

who asks a witness to clarify a point!" reports one Africanist. "The
212
witness will go back to the beginning of the tale and start over."
No doubt, my seeming depreciation of stories vis-a-vis reasoned
argument will strike some as ungenerous. So be it. Liberalism
rightly rejects the uncritical celebration of storytelling, so fashion-

able in current legal scholarship, 213 as no substitute for rational
assessment of evidence and argument-and as often no more than
self-display. 214 The resulting "meditations" less often resemble the
soliloquies of Hamlet than the solipsism of Narcissus. The very
people who uphold anecdotes about their personal experience as
significant to legal and policy debates are often the first to decry the
use of complacent anecdotes aimed at countering statistical
210

RICHARD SCHECHNER, BETWEEN THEATER AND ANTHROPOLOGY 9 (1985).

211JAMES B. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION: STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF LEGAL

THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION 863 (1973).

212Jennifer A. Widner, Building the Rule of Law: What Commonwealth Africa
Tells Us About Constructing Judicial Independence 67 (July 1995) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
233 The literature here is enormous. Seegenerally Kathryn Abrams, Hearingthe Call
of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971 (1991); Symposium, Legal Stoiytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2073 (1989).
214See, e.g., Larry Alexander, What We Do, and Why We Do It, 45 STAN. L. REV.
1885, 1895 (1993) (noting that "critical race theory typically consists of narratives
purporting to reveal how it feels to be the oppressed[,] ... [cloupled with ... an
implicit claim that these experiences are self-certifying"). For further critique, see
Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories out of School: An Essay on Legal
Narratives,45 STAN. L. REV. 807, 854 (1993) (concluding that while legal storytelling
"can play a useful role in legal scholarship," it is a method weak in truthfulness and
typicality, as well as reason and analysis).
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arguments about deteriorating socioeconomic conditions. "'For
example,' is no proof," goes a Yiddish proverb.215
In contrast to liberal memory, communitarian and conservative
accounts of didactic storytelling view narratives as constituting the
teaching, not merely illustrating it. The factual details are seen as
valuable in themselves, apart from the more general principles that
they may reflect. It is in the emotional savoring and shared
experiencing of these resonant details that the historical continuity
of a genuine community is thought to consist.2 16 Shared stories
themselves define the nature and boundaries of the group to whom
the stories belong.
In liberal stories, by contrast, the characters generally are not
large groups, let alone entire societies. As Halbwachs observes:
"Ordinarily, however, the nation is too remote from the individual
for him to consider the history of his country as anything else but
a very large framework with which his own history makes contact at
only a few points." 217 But there are certain events, he acknowledged, that "alter group life." 218 These are of such moral magnitude that they become "imbued with the concerns, interests, and
passions of a nation."219 Such transformative events may involve
triumphs or catastrophes.
Administrative massacre decidedly
exemplifies the latter. In our century it has become the quintessential catastrophe for the collective memory of many societies. "An
experience like that undergone by Argentina in the last decade,"
writes historian Halperin,
turns terror into one of the basic dimensions of collective life.
This necessarily redefines the horizon on which the experience of
215 YIDDISH PROVERBS 21 (HananJ. Ayalti ed., 1949).

216 This conception of communal narrative defines the "premodern" condition,
according to Lyotard: "[A] collectivity that takes narrative as its key form of
competence," he contends, "finds the raw material for its social bond not only in the
meaning of the narratives it recounts, but also in the act of reciting them." LYOTARD,
supra note 145, at 22. For a defense of the continuing relevance of this conception
of communal narrative, see ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART:
INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 153 (1985) (arguing that "[i]n

order not to forget [its] past, a community is involved in retelling its story, its
constitutive narrative").
2'7 MAURICE HALBWACHS, THE COLLECTIVE MEMORY 77 (Francis J. Ditter, Jr.

&

Vida Y. Ditter trans., 1992). Collective memory of such events "differs from history
in... [that] it retains from the past only what still lives or is capable of living in the
consciousness of the groups keeping the memory alive." Id. at 80. Halbwachs was
greatly influenced by Durkheim. See Mary Douglas, Introduction to id. at 1, 6-9.
218 HALBWACHS, supra note 217, at 58.
219 Id.
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every Argentine is played out. His relation to his country, to his
city, to his street cannot remain untouched after having come to
see them as places where death always lurks. 2
When a society suffers trauma on this scale, its members will
often seek to reconstruct its institutions on the basis of a shared
understanding of what went wrong. To that end, they conduct
surveys, write monographs, compose memoirs, and draft legislation.
But mostly, they tell stories. Gottsegen writes that the "telling and
retelling" of a people's central stories constitute its collective
identity. 21 "The story's heroes, and the principles for which they
stand, will become exemplary, and in every age youths will be
exhorted to be like them."22 2 It was a dramaturgical decision on
Alfonsfn's part to conduct the trial of the military juntas, for
instance, in a single oral proceeding, susceptible to television
coverage. 23 (In Argentina, legal proceedings are normally conducted largely on paper, and witnesses are examined at various
times, rather than sequentially, as the investigating magistrate must
pursue several proceedings simultaneously.)224
This aspect of Alfonsin's approach to the junta trial, for
instance, greatly enhanced its persuasive power, as its intellectual
architects intended. It is almost impossible to imagine any way in
which this procedural reorganization could have compromised the
legal protections of the accused. Adoption of an uninterrupted oral
procedure made for a more compelling public spectacle, in short,
without making for any less justice. This sensitivity on the part of
its legal planners to dramatic didactics in no way reduced the junta
225
prosecution to a Stalinist "show trial."

220 Tulio Halperin Donghi, El PresenteTransformael Pasado: El Impacto del Reciente

Terroren la Imagen de la Historia Argentina, in FICCI6N Y POLITICA: LA NARRATivA
ARGENTINA DURANTE EL PROCESO MIL1TAR 71, 72 (Ren6 Jara & Hernin Vidal eds.,
1987) (translation by author). After stating this view, which he describes as widely
held in Argentina, Halperin argues that it can easily distort the historiography of
earlier periods. See id.
21 See MICHAEL G. GOTTSEGEN, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF HANNAH ARENDT

100-01 (1994). Gottsegen is parsing Hannah Arendt in this passage, describing part
of her argument in HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 200-14 (1963). The
indispensability of shared stories and storytelling for a society's self-preservation is a
common theme in literary forays into social analysis. See MARIO VARGAS LLOSA, THE
STORYTELLER (Helen Lane trans., 1989).
2 GOTTSEGEN, supra note 221, at 100-01.
' See Interview with Presidential Legal Advisors, in Buenos Aires, Argentina (July
20, 1985).
'4 Historically, this was standard practice throughout the civil law world. SeeJOHN
H. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY 67 (1977).

' On "show trials," see THE GREAT PURGE TRIAL (Robert C. Tucker & Stephen
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The liberal requirement of procedural fairness to the p erpetrators of administrative massacre is a greater problem for the
Durkheimian account of law's contribution to solidarity than for the
discursive. 22' The discursive conception, after all, finds nothing
threatening to social solidarity in zealous advocacy by defense
counsel, that is, in its attempt to offer an alternative narrative. That
counternarrative is directed not at eliciting retributive moral
sentiments (universally shared by the community), but at questioning whether the defendants can be punished in a manner consistent
with the community's law.
More dramatically, the counternarrative will often suggest that
the defendants' cause was just, however much at odds with positive
law, or that their acts should be viewed in a "larger historical
context" which is extenuating. Such a counternarrative would not
seek merely to introduce reasonable doubt concerning the elements
of the prosecution's story, but rather to tell a different one
altogether, one that is more compelling in moral and historical
terms. That brings us to the second problem.
B. Losing Perspective, DistortingHistory
If the law is to influence collective memory, it must tell stories
that are engaging and compelling, stories that linger in the mind
because they are responsive to the public's central concerns. This
proves difficult. The central concerns of criminal courts, when
trying cases of administrative massacre, are often decidedly at odds
with the public's interest in a thorough, wide-ranging exploration of
what caused such events and whose misconduct contributed to
them. Courts can easily distort such public understanding either by
excessive narrowness ("legalistic" blinders) or by excessive breadth
(straying beyond their professional competence). A frequent form
of distortion combines the worst of both: It presents a professionally correct conclusion, perfectly suitable for traditional legal
purposes, as something much more, that is, as an "official history"
of the entire conflagration.
The trial court in the Eichmann case is well aware of these
dangers. It expressly disavows such historiographic or didactic aims

F. Cohen eds., 1965) (discussing the series of show trials during Stalin's Great Purge
of the Communist Party during 1936-1938); ARKADY VAKSBERG, STALIN'S PROSECUTOR:2 26 THE LIFE OF ANDREI VYSHINSKY (Jan Butler trans., 1991).
Seesupra text accompanying notes 55-74, 87-98 (introducing Durkheim's view);
supra text accompanying notes 99-144 (introducing the discursive conception).
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as beyond its ken. The first paragraph of its opinion thus struck a
tone of professional modesty, observing that:
The desire was felt-readily understandable in itself-to give, within
the limits of this trial, a comprehensive and exhaustive historical
account of the events of the catastrophe, and, in so doing, to
emphasize also the signal feats of heroism of the Ghetto-fighters
....

Others again sought to regard this trial as a forum to clarify

questions of great import ....
*.. [But] the Court... must not allow itself to be enticed to
stray into provinces which are outside its sphere. The judicial
process has ways of its own.., whatever the subject-matter of the
trial. Were it not so, ... the trial would otherwise resemble a
rudderless ship tossed about on the waves.
...

The Court does not possess the facilities required for

investigating general questions of the kind referred to above. For
example, to describe the historical background of the catastrophe,
a great mass of documents and evidence has been submitted to us,
collected most painstakingly and certainly out of a genuine desire
to delineate as complete a picture as possible. Even so, all this
material is but a tiny fraction of the extant sources on the
subject.... As for questions of principle which are outside the
realm of law, no one has made us judges of them and therefore
our opinion on them carries no greater weight than that of any
22 7
person who has devoted study and thought to these questions.
The court here admirably identifies a genuine problem: that
many citizens look to the court, and to the evidence it will gather
and assess, to help answer large questions that have recently become
the center of public concern (and private anguish), questions over

'"Attorney-Gen. of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 18-19 (Isr. Dist. Ct. 1961).

The court had offered these questions:
How could this happen in the full light of day, and why was it just the
German people from whom this great evil sprang? Could the Nazis have
carried out their evil designs without the help given them by other peoples
in whose midst the Jews dwelt? Would it have been possible to avert the
catastrophe, at least in part, if the Allies had displayed a greater will to assist
the persecuted Jews? ... What is the lesson which the Jews and other
nations, as well as every man in his relationship to others, must learn from
all this?

Id. at 18.
Similarly, the London Charter for the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg avowed the desire of its drafters to influence historical memory, in
seeking to "make available for all mankind to study in future years an authentic
record of Nazi crimes and criminality." U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 3080, REPORT
OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL

CONFERENCE ON MILrrARY TRIALs 6 (1945).
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which it can claim no monopoly of expertise. Yet even as the court
seeks to delimit its professional tasks, to reject any role as history
teacher or scholar, it cannot quite contain itself from proclaiming
228
the trial's "educational significance" and "educational value."
The court remains Delphically silent about what this educational
significance consists of and about how to resolve possible tensions
between the trial's positive educational effect and the other, more
conventional aims of a criminal proceeding.
At the very least, the judges are acutely aware that their
judgment will inevitably be viewed as making history and that their
judgment will itself be subject to historiographical scrutiny. Justice
Jackson's opening statement at Nuremberg acknowledged this
explicitly: "[T]he record on which we judge these defendants today
is the record on which history will judge us tomorrow." 22 9 Even
after Julius and Ethel Rosenberg had been executed, Felix Frankfurter penned a dissent to the Supreme Court's denial of a stay. He
acknowledged that to dissent "after the curtain has been rung down
upon them has the appearance of pathetic futility." 2 ° Even so, he
added, "history also has its claims." 21 It is those claims to which
judges feel obliged to respond in the cases discussed here. The only
problem-characteristic of these cases-is that Frankfurter almost
certainly got those claims largely wrong, as recent historiography on
23 2
the Rosenberg case suggests.
The Eichmann court's vague claim about the trial's educational
value is very modest compared to the more extravagant proclama228Both statements appear in Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. at 19. Recognizing the apparent
tension between its claims, the court then seeks to clarify how it views its educational
function, asserting that although the record "will certainly provide valuable material
for the research worker and the historian .... as far as this Court is concerned all
these things are merely a by-product of the trial." Id.
2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY

TRIBUNAL 101 (1947).

220 Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273, 310 (1953) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
2-1Id. Frankfurter's dissent inevitably focused almost entirely on procedural
defects in the trial, but he concluded that such defects undermined confidence in the
result.
22 See Ronald Radosh, The Venona Files,NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 7, 1995, at 25,25-27
(summarizing the famous Venona intercepts between Soviet and American
Communist Party officials, decoded by the Army Signal Intelligence Service and
recently declassified, clearly establishing thatJulius Rosenberg, although not his wife,

spied for the Soviets). In this Article the term "historiography" refers broadly to all
scholarship by professional historians rather than (as in some current discussion)
more narrowly to historians' writings about the nature of historical writing.
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tions of national "catharsis" and "collective psychoanalysis" by the
intellectuals mentioned above."' Even so, many historians have
concluded that at such times the law unwittingly provides more
miseducation than accurate historical instruction." 4 The concept
of historical distortion is itself somewhat problematic, to be sure,
and must be scrutinized before employable in assessing judicial
forays into telling a national story. As Schudson warns:
The notion that memory can be "distorted" assumes that there is
a standard by which we can judge or measure what a veridical
memory must be. If this is difficult with individual memory, it is
even more complex with collective memory where the past event
or experience remembered was truly a different event or experience for its different participants. Moreover, where we can accept
with little question that biography or the lifetime is the appropriate or "natural" frame for individual memory, there is no such
evident frame for cultural memories. Neither national boundaries
nor linguistic ones are as self-evidently the right containers for
collective memory as the person is for individual memory....
Memory is distortion since memory is invariably and inevitably
selective. A way of seeing is a way of
not seeing, a way of
23 5
remembering is a way of forgetting, too.
Still, we should not abandon the concept of distortion altogether. 2 6 Rather, we should apply it reflexively, in both directions.
What will be viewed as a distortion from the perspective of either
profession may be entirely legitimate in light of the distinct
purposes of the other. Inevitably, the law will often treat past
events in ways that will constitute distortion from the standpoint of
historiography. But if courts distort history, so too historians can
21- See supra notes 26, 28 and accompanying text (citing Henry Rousso and Paula
Speck).
' See, e.g., Browning, infra note 282; Strauss, infra note 333.
211 Michael Schudson, Dynamics of Distortion in Collective Memory, in MEMORY
DISTORTION: How MINDS, BRAINS, AND SOCIETIES RECONSTRUCT THE PAST (Daniel

L. Schachter ed., forthcoming 1995) (emphasis added). Examining postwar memory

of WWII in Japan, one scholar ofJapanese history makes a similar point: "No single
... chronology can be produced by a summary of the infinite series of differently
remembered personal pasts. There are too many variants of the way the 'little
history' of individuals connects with the 'big history' of the nation-state." Carol
Gluck, The Past in the Present, in POSTWARJAPAN AS HISTORY 64, 78 (Andrew Gordon
ed., 1993). On the reciprocal influence of individual experience on collective
memory, and vice versa, over time, see Nathan Wachtel, Remember and Never Forget,
in BETWEEN MEMORYAND HISTORY 307, 334 (Marie-Notlle Bourguet et al. eds., 1986).
2
" Schudson agrees. See MICHAEL SCHUDSON, WATERGATE IN AMERICAN MEMORY:
How WE REMEMBER, FORGET, AND RECONSTRUCT THE PAST 206 (1992).
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distort the law-often in ways that make lawyers howl or cringe. The
most notorious example among historical treatments of administrative massacre is surely the conclusion, reached by Ernst Nolte, that
Hitler was entitled to treat the Jews as his enemy since leading
Zionist Chaim Weitzmann-in a late 1939 speech after the outbreak
of war-had expressly declared war on the Third Reich by announcing that Jews would support Britain in the imminent conflict.3
The second source of skepticism about law's potential contribution to collective memory is the converse of the first. Just as we
properly wonder whether liberal morality will be sacrificed in the
interests of historical storytelling, we may also suspect that judgeswhen faithful to liberal law and professional ethics-may make poor
To be sure, Western legal
historians and lousy storytellers.
scholarship and historiography initially set out, in the Middle Ages,
on surprisingly parallel tracks, employing similar methods, seeking
similar objectives.1 8 But their professional paths have long since
diverged in many ways.
To influence collective memory through legal proceedings, it is
helpful for prosecutors to be familiar with accepted genres of
storytelling. In other words, prosecutors must discover how to
couch the trial's doctrinal narrative within "genre conventions"
already in place within the particular society. 239 These conventions are by no means universal and will often require some rather
fine-grained "local knowledge." For instance, a prosecution of
Emperor Hirohito could easily have been staged-without distortion
of brute facts240to draw upon the dramatic conventions of
Kabuki, within which the "death of kings" is a recurrent and
evocative theme.2 41 Attentiveness to cultural particularities of this
2
-1

See Ernst Nolte, Between HistoricalLegend and Revisionism? The Third Reich in
the Perspectiveof 1980, in FOREVER IN THE SHADOW OF HITLER? 1, 8 (James Knowlton
& Truett Cates trans., 1993).
" See Donald R. Kelley, Clio and the Lawyers: Formsof HistoricalConsciousnessin
MedievalJurisprudence,5 MEDIEVALIA ET HUMANISTICA 25, 26-28 (1974).
211 See Bernard S.Jackson, Narrative Theories and Legal Discourse, in NARRATIVE IN
CULTURE 23, 30 (Cristopher Nash ed., 1990) ("Every society.., has its own stock of
substantive narratives, which represent typical human behavior patterns known and
understood .... This is the form in which social knowledge is acquired and stored,
and which provides the framework for understanding particular stories presented to
us in discourse.").
21 John Searle coined the term "brute facts." Such facts exist independently of
human observation. SeeJOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 2-3
(1995).
241 See Masao Yamaguchi, Kingship, Theatricality,andMarginalReality inJapan,in
TEXT AND CONTEXT:

THE SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY OF TRADITION 151, 169-75
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sort, however, is a virtue to which liberal legal and political theory-with its longings for Enlightenment universalism-have not always
evinced sufficient respect. But Occupation authorities in Japan
proved quite savvy in formulating their other policies, even the most
transformative, in indigenous terms.2 42
The promise of liberal storytelling will quickly founder if it turns
out that the very things that make the story liberal-its moral

universalism or impartial detachment, for instance-deprive its
characters of the concreteness and particularity that make a good
story, a vivid yarn. It is the vivid particularity of characters and
events in good literature that makes it singularly apt as a setting for
Aristotelian ethics, that is, for its teaching and analytical development. 243 In contrast, liberal theory has rarely placed comparable
emphasis on the particularities of historical context or individual
character. Kant, for instance, viewed "examples" and the stories in
which they were necessarily formulated as devices useful only for
instructing us in how to apply moral principles and motivating such
244
compliance.
The common law method of Anglo-American courts, of course,
has always prized judicial "situation sensitivity" to the infinite factual
245
variation in the configurations presented by particular disputes.
But the sensitivity of liberal jurisprudence to particularity is driven
by concerns with being fair and just, not with being spellbinding.
The two aims may well be at odds, as many have long supposed.Justice requires predictability, as through like treatment of like cases;
a compelling story, by contrast, requires an ever-present element of
surprise, to keep the listener on edge. As Gallie observes:

(Ravindra K. Jain ed., 1977).
242Japanese historian Ienaga Sabura reports, for instance, that for scholars like
himself "'[c]ooperation with the Occupation's policy for reforming the teaching of
history was an unexpected opportunity to put previously held beliefs into practice.'"
Arthur E. Tiedemann,Japan Sheds Dictatorship,in FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY: COPING WITH THE LEGACIES OF AUTHORITARIANISM AND TOTALITARIANISM 179,
194 (John H. Herz ed., 1982). Conversely, Tiedemann adds: "For almost every
proposed reform there was found a Japanese who long before the occupation had
developed
a commitment to the concept involved." Id.
24
3 See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND

LrrERATURE 148-67 (1990).

244 Kant's view differed, between his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and
his Critique of Pure Reason, over whether examples could accomplish merely the
second or also the first of these two tasks. See LARMORE, supra note 193, at 2-3.
245 On the judicial virtue of "situation sense," see KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE
COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 60-61 (1960).

526

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 144: 463

[T]he conclusion of a good story-a conclusion which we wait for
eagerly-is not something that could have been or should have
been foreseen.
...[W]e can imagine almost any good story being presented,
and probably ruined, as either a cautionary tale or as the illustration of a moral homily.... In the homily the persons and early
incidents of the story will be introduced somewhat in the manner
of instantial or factual premisses from which, in conjunction with
appropriate wise saws and moral principles, the conclusion of the
story-the exemplification of the appropriate moral lesson-can be
deduced. But in this process the conclusion will, of course, have
lost all its virtue as the conclusion of a story. Inevitably it will have
become a foregone conclusion, possibly to be assimilated with
moral profit, but certainly not to be awaited with eagerness and
246
excitement.
The solution to this problem would be simple if we could accept
Durkheim's account of how criminal trials contribute to social
solidarity. What sustains public attentiveness to such trials, on his
account, is not any uncertainty about their likely result (or even
morbid curiosity about their grisly details). In fact, any great
uncertainty of this kind could easily vitiate the retributive sentiments of resentment and indignation against the accused that such
proceedings are to evoke among the public. In support of
Durkheim's view, it might be observed that there is little evidence
the general public much cares for unpredictabilaity in its favored
narratives or for psychological complexity in the characters who
people them. After all, it is generally not terribly difficult to
anticipate the conclusion of most popular novels or television
dramas. Nor is complex "character development" exactly the
247
strength of, say, John Grisham's novels.
Although eminently predictable and populated by stick-figure
characters, such narratives maintain the attention of millions of
readers and viewers every day. This simply could not occur if much
particularity of character or uncertainty of result were necessary
to make a story compelling for most audiences, as Gallie and
Nussbaum imply. If stories must capture the popular imagination
before they can foster social solidarity, the most simplistic of
supra note 206, at 24.
247 See Michiko Kakutani, ChasingAmbulances Before Dreams, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28,
246 GALLIE,

1995, at C33 (reviewingJOHN GRIsHAM, THE RAINMAKER (1995), and commenting on
"the leadenness of Mr. Grisham's prose, the banality of his characters and the
shocking predictability of his story").
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narratives have little trouble in doing so. The problem, for present
purposes, is precisely that trials for administrative massacre typically
lack the simplicity of plot, character, and d6nouement that most
popular narratives involve-and seem to require for their very
popularity.
Eichmann's character traits alone have evoked thousands of
pages of scholarly commentary, much of it confessedly perplexed,
beginning with Arendt's observations of his trial. Moreover, the
panoramic sweep of the events at issue precludes the defendant
from continuously occupying center stage. Arendt stated the
problem succinctly:
A show trial needs even more urgently than an ordinary trial a
limited and well-defined outline of what was done and how it was
done. In the center of the trial can only be the one who did-in
this respect, he is like the hero in the play .... No one knew this
better than the presiding judge, before whose eyes the trial began
to degenerate into a bloody show .... "24
The discursive account of how criminal trials contribute to social
solidarity can more easily accommodate the complexity of character
and uncertainty of result that make for great literature, according
to Gallie and Nussbaum. 249 These very complexities and uncertainties become the object of day-to-day curiosity and concern, the
subject of private discussion and public debate, consistent with the
ideal of discursive democracy. The question, however, is whether
such lengthy and complex tales can sustain the public's interest at
all, or for very long, that is, whether Durkheimian desires for moral
certainty and narrative closure will assert themselves prematurely.
The record here is quite mixed, allowing little empirical basis for
250
generalization.

24 5

ARENDT, supra note 18, at 9; see also Jackson, supra note 239, at 29 (describing an empirical study ofjuror receptivity to competing accounts which found that
"as structural ambiguities in stories increased, credibility decreased, and vice
versa").
249 I here reject any conventional, pejorative distinction between high art and
low. As Young observes, monuments of commemoration, which are often
"[u]nabashedly figurative, heroic, and referential" to some historical reality,
must necessarily flout contemporary standards of aesthetic sophistication. JAMES E.
YOUNG, THE TEXTURE OF MEMORY: HOLOCAUST MEMORIALS AND MEANING

(1993).
o See infra text accompanying notes 443-59.
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Are Liberal Stories Boring?
By nature, many nonliberals suspect, liberal stories (and, by
implication, liberal lives) must be boring. This is due to the
procedural scrupulousness with which liberal law protects the rights
of the villain, against whom the audience's collective conscience
could otherwise be unrestrainedly loosed. 2 1 If liberal stories carry
any dramatic power, it may be precisely because of their understatement, because ofjudicial aversion to self-conscious dramaturgy. To
some extent, at least, it is the very absence of declamatory histrionics that makes such stories compelling, when recounted in their
quiet, impersonal way by judicial opinions. 25 2 But, compelling to
whom, one must ask? To liberal jurisprudents alone?
The criminal law may present .a dramatic persona of either
majesty or sobriety. Uncertainty between the two, over how ustice
should project its public image, has long informed our assumptions
about the proper rhetorical style of legal argument and opinionwriting. It has even informed debates about the law's proper
architectural style. Hence the recurrent vacillation, in the design of
courthouses, over "whether authority should be displayed with
splendor"-to inspire awe and obedience, at risk of seeming
dissimulated with a
insensitivity to the misery of the accused-"or
3
self-disciplined and severe austerity."25
On one hand, a cold, nondescript courtroom may not maximally
summon up the law's potential majesty. So too, a highly selfrestrained style of legal storytelling may make poor theatre. 25 4 It
A recent argument to this effect is offered by FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF
HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN 288-89, 312 (1992). But see RICHARD E. FLATHMAN,
21

WILLFUL LIBERALISM: VOLUNTARISM AND INDIVIDUALITY IN POLITICAL THEORY AND

PRACTICE (1992) (arguing for a more spirited, creative ideal of liberal personhood);
NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, ANOTHER LIBERALISM: ROMANTICISM AND THE RECONSTRUC-

TION OF LIBERAL THOUGHT (1987) (same).
12

On the impersonal character of legal authority in modern western society, see

MAX WEBER ON LAw IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 301-21 (Max Rheinstein ed., Edward

Shils & Max Rheinstein trans., 1967).
25 KATHERINE F. TAYLOR, IN THE THEATER OF CRIMINALJUSTICE: THE PALAIS DE

JUSTICE IN SECOND EMPIRE PARIS 94 (1993). Taylor observes how, according to the
"splendor" school of 19th-century French architects, "the rich ambiance of the
courtroom inspires the desire to fuse with the society that the courtroom represents,
and so unites the diverse constituencies in the courtroom in social solidarity." Id. at
102. Taylor rightly notes the Durkheimian premises of this architectural strategy. See
id. On representations ofjustice in sculpture and portraiture, see Dennis E. Curtis
&Judith Resnik, Images ofJustice, 96 YALE LJ. 1727, 1729-31 (1987).
21 See Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights
Litigators, 104 YALE L.J. 763, 766 (1995) (observing the rhetorically pallid character
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may thus fail to evoke the retributive sentiments that Durkheim
considered central to the solidarity-enhancing function of criminal
law. On the other hand, an austere courthouse deprives the state
of its theatrical advantage, its ritual power to define symbolically the
proceedings within. Such a courtroom therefore more easily
facilitates an equal exchange of views between the public's prosecutor and the accused. This is more compatible with the discursive
ideal. The businesslike atmosphere of the modern courthouse is
also more consistent with the unpretentious spirit of a commercial
republic, whose members are held together largely in Durkheimian
recognition of their economic interdependence and by a Rawlsian
"overlapping consensus" concerning basic constitutional struc2 55

ture.

Lacking the majesty of traditional rituals of state power,
however, liberal-legal stories may become dull. 5 Experience of
prosecutions for administrative massacre suggests, in particular, that
liberal-legal stories are likely to dwell on what many listeners regard
as meaningless minutiae. 5 7 Novelist Rebecca West, covering the
first "historic" Nuremberg trial for The New Yorker, found it
insufferably tedious. 5 Her reaction was not uncommon. As one
reporter notes,

of plaintiffs' pleadings even in civil rights suits alleging the most egregious-and
potentially dramatic acts-of misconduct).

2" See Rawls, supra note 116.
2- A distinguished novelist highlights this possibility in his fictional account of the
prosecution of a deposed communist dictator in an unidentified Balkan country.
Three young adults are watching the televised trial. One wishes to leave. The
following exchange ensues:
"No, I want to watch. We've got to."
"We've got to. It's our history."

"But it's BORING."
"History often is when it happens. Then it becomes interesting later."
"You're such a philosopher, Vera. And a tyrant."
BARNES, supra note 100, at 100.
27 Even prosecutor Taylor conceded, regarding the first Nuremberg trial: "As

month after month passed ... [the] press and public lost interest in the case as a
'spectacle.'" He immediately adds, significantly, that "thejudicial foundations of the
trial were strengthened by this very fact." Telford Taylor, The NurembergWar Crimes
Trials, INT'L CONCILIATION PAPERS, Apr. 1949, at 243, 262.
' See Rebecca West, ExtraordinaryExile, NEW YORKER, Sept. 7, 1946, at 34, 34;
see also JOSEPH E. PERSICO, NUREMBERG: INFAMY ON TRIAL 203 (1994) ("The papers
back home were no longer giving heavy daily play to a trial that, no matter how
sensational the evidence, had already gone on for six weeks. Reporters had begun
scrambling for fresh angles.").
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It was the largest crime in history, and it promised the greatest
courtroom spectacle.... [But] [w]ith their cheap suits and hungry
faces, these undistinguished men did not look like the
archcriminals of the age.
What ensued was an excruciatingly long and complex trial that
failed to mesmerize a distracted world. Its mass of evidence
created boredom, mixed occasionally with an abject horror before
Its finale, 10 messy
which ordinary justice seemed helpless ....
hangings and a surreptitious suicide, was less than majestic. Its
... who
one legacy seemed to be the celebrity of Albert Speer
2 59
escaped death with gestures of ambiguous atonement.
In orchestrating such a trial there may be some trade-off
between the goals of didactic spectacle and adherence to liberal
principle, as I have suggested thus far. Yet one should not preclude
the possibility that the trial may fail in both respects. Nuremberg
(and, even more, the Tokyo trial) appear to have been both boring
and illiberal at once, on many accounts. One is thus led to question
whether it was really the principled commitment of such proceedings to liberalism that made them fail as social drama, any more
than a principled commitment to dullness could have made them
liberal. The dramaturgical decisions that made them dull do not
seem to be ones that made the proceedings any more consistent
with liberal legality. At the very least, no one has even begun to
demonstrate such a connection. There is nothing necessarily
illiberal for courts and prosecutors to give a little thought to props
and dcor, mise-en-sc~ne and pacing of action, character develop2 60
ment and narrative framing, stage and audience.
Hannah Arendt's dismay at Eichmann's "banality" betrayed a
disappointment that the defendant, in refusing "to play the villain,"
failed to provide the dramatic tension for which she had hoped.
The prosecutor, in his preoccupation with painting a larger tableau,
failed to keep his dramatispersonae at center stage.
When a politically resonant ritual is called for, it seems that
lawyers often make poor performers. One historian even argues

that medieval Italy's reliance on lawyers for its historical records and
"myths of origin," rather than on the superior narrative skills of
clerics and chroniclers (common elsewhere in medieval Europe)
259 Ross, supra note 179, at 37.
2
60 See JOHN R. BROWN, EFFECTIVE THEATRE: A STUDY WITH DOCUMENTATION
(1969); GEORGE MCCALMON & CHRISTIAN MOE, CREATING HISTORICAL DRAMA: A
GUIDE FOR THE COMMUNITY AND THE INTERESTED INDIVIDUAL (1965).
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seriously undermined the public legitimacy of its kings.2 61 Social
theorists from Weber to Foucault, moreover, contend that as
Western law became ever more rational, formalized, and
demystified, public trials and punishments increasingly lost their
capacity to serve as spectacles, to "enchant" and captivate the public
2 62
imagination by evoking deeply shared moods and sensibilities.
Worse yet, prosecutors may labor under a particularly onerous
burden, relative to defense counsel, in dramatizing their favored
narrative, allowing their adversary more easily to capture the public
eye and imagination. In the Barbie trial, for instance, prosecutors
rightly believed that "an unpaid debt to the dead bound them to the
truth." 26 ' Barbie's defense counsel, "on the other hand was free.
No debt tied him to the past; he was in a position to plant suspense
in the very heart of the ceremony of remembering and to substitute
the delicious thrill of the event"-especially the threat to reveal the
pro-German complicity of currently prominent figures in French
264
public life-"for the meticulous reassessment of the facts."
The upshot was that the press and public, like Finkielkraut
himself, quickly tired of the prosecution and plaintiffs, (the
intervenors, Barbie's surviving victims), due to "the thirty-nine
lawyers whose thirty-nine closing speeches talked the audience into
a stupor" over a nine-day period.2 61 "Instead of making an impression, they made people yawn. Rather than satisfying the
appetite for the new, they rehashed, ad nauseam, the same tired
formulas."2 66 Even scholarly accounts of the Barbie trial by the
most scrupulously liberal commentators have been more deeply
drawn into the mental universe of defense counsel, Jacques Vergbs,
with "his promise of scandal, his steamy reputation, and his
261

See Chris Wickham, Lawyers' Time: History and Memory in Tenth- and EleventhCentuiy Italy, in STUDIES IN MEDIEVAL HISTORY 53, 70 (Henry Mayr-Harting & R.I.
Moore
eds., 1985).
262
See FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 352-57 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright
Mills eds., trans., 1948) (observing the historical trend toward "disenchantment" of
political authority and legal ritual); MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE
BIRTH OF THE PRISON 32-72 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 1979) (1975)
(describing how "the spectacle of the scaffold" was gradually displaced by a more
diffuse system of "carceral" surveillance, whose rituals of social control were less
dramatic).
263 FINKIELKRAUT, supra note 151, at 65.
264 Id.
2 65

Id. at 63.

266

Id. at 65.
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consummate art of mystery," the qualities for which he came to be
"adulated in the media." 267
Hence, boredom as such is by no means the most serious
problem here. The problem is that boredom tends to settle
selectively upon the shoulders of those whose story is most truthful,
most faithful to the past, and most vital to a legal cultivation of
liberal memory. In Barnes's fictional (but entirely plausible, even
compelling) treatment of such a trial,268 the former dictator gets
all the best lines, successfully upstaging and embarrassing the public
prosecutor at key points. In fact, the facility with which this
diversion, this "hijacking," of narrative direction can be decisively
accomplished-once traditional procedural and evidentiary rules are
relaxed (to enable judicial rewriting of the period's official story)-is
the organizing premise of the entire book.
Misfocusing on Minutiae
Judicial assessment of men like Eichmann and Argentine
General Videla often seems to place questions at the center of legal
analysis that, from any other standpoint, would surely be of
marginal concern. Distortions in collective memory of administrative massacre would thus follow if courts were to train public
attention upon such purely professional concerns. 26 9 For instance,
the Argentine prosecutors and judges felt professionally obligated
to occupy themselves for a considerable time with establishing the
27
juntas' liability for such offenses as forgery and property theft.
This was surely a curious and digressive inclusion in a proceeding
267 Id. at 66. Despite his best efforts to elude ensnarement by Verg&s's rhetorical
stratagems, Finkielkraut-a philosophicaljournalist of liberal inspiration-clearly is no
less entranced by Barbie's lawyer, on whom his book largely centers, than he is
repulsed by him. Cf Guyora Binder, RepresentingNazism: Advocacy and Identity at the
Trial ofKlaus Barbie,98 YALE L.J. 1321, 1355-72 (1989) (lavishing enormous attention
on VergZs's defense strategy and its postmodernist implications, and noting, at 1356,
that "Vergs is known for his effective use of the media as a forum for his
controversial clients' views").
21 See BARNES, supra note 100.
69
2 See Henry Rousso, Ce que les historiensretiendrontdes vingt-troisjourniesduprocks,
LIBgRATION, Apr. 20, 1994, at 4-5 (observing that "[t]he Touvier trial was meant to
be an important lesson in history, yet it sometimes got stuck in the quagmire of
infinite details relative to the facts or to judicial definitions, making one lose sight of
the 2general picture" (translation by author)).
11 See Interview with Judge Andr~s D'Alessio, in Buenos Aires, Argentina (Aug.
1987).
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whose drama was presumably to center upon a condemnation of the
unrepentant slaughter of thousands.
In the Nuremberg trial, such misfocus arose because the London
Charter had given jurisdiction to the International Military Tribunal
not for all Nazi crimes against humanity, but only for those
2 1
undertaken in preparation for, and in service of aggressive war. 7
This jurisdictional peculiarity required prosecutors to weave the
Holocaust into a larger story that was primarily about perverted
militarism. Justice Robert H. Jackson (United States Chief Prosecution Counsel) was thus compelled to deny that the extermination of
EuropeanJewry had been, for the defendants, a central end in itself.
In so arguing, Jackson perpetrated what would be recognized a few
years later as a severe historical distortion, bordering on an
obscenity. To maintain his indictment within the Tribunal's
restricted jurisdiction, Jackson was led to argue that
[t]heJews... were used as exemplars of Nazi discipline; and their
persecution eliminated an obstacle to aggressive war. His
reasoning, of course, is question-begging-how can such annihilation be understood as a "measure in preparation for war"?-and
historically suspect. Scholars of the Holocaust have amply
demonstrated how ethnic genocide not only did not serve any
military end, but effected the channeling away of critical resources
from the war effort. Yet the very vulnerabilities of Jackson's
argument highlights his attempts to translate Nazi crimes into an
idiom familiar to the law, and to enlist the evidence of such
27 2
atrocities into an argument about renegade militarism.
Moreover, by indicting the Nuremberg defendants for the
offense of "conspiracy" (to wage aggressive war), Allied prosecutors
appeared to adopt a particular historical interpretation-a "conspiratorial view of history"-one that (by its particular implausibility)
threatened to discredit the trial's potential contribution to collective
memory. 273 In their public statements, prosecutors labored to
explain the meaning of conspiracy in legal doctrine and to distinBOSCH, supra note 164, at 119.
27 Lawrence Douglas, FilmAs Witness: Screening 'Nazi ConcentrationCamps'Before
the Nuremberg Tribunal, 105 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 1995) (manuscript at 60, on file
271 See

with author).
'73 SHKLAR, supra note 83, at 172.
Summarizing the receptive reaction of
American public opinion, Bosch notes that "[p]opular faith in Nuremberg, which at
times espoused a 'devil theory' of history and which hoped that the Tribunal would

be a 'once-and-for-all' antidote to the world's ills, revealed the American propensity
for oversimplifying complex questions of foreign affairs." BOSCH, supra note 164, at
233.
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guish it as a term of art from the more conventional understanding
prevalent among historians and the wider public.
Judging from contemporaneous accounts, such efforts at public
explanation, however conscientious, were largely unsuccessful.274
These efforts also cast the profession in the unappealing position of
appearing to lecture others about the "true" meaning of a concept
that most listeners were quite convinced they already understood.
This discrepancy between lay and legal understandings of conspiracy
worked to discredit the conspiracy indictment and conviction of the
Tokyo defendants even more than those at Nuremberg. 275 Much
of the conduct of the Japanese simply could not be clearly characterized in laymen's terms as a "conspiracy to wage aggressive war,"
considering the complex regional rivalries and balance of power
politics (involving several major powers) preceding the war in the
Pacific.2 7' For many laymen, the idea of conspiracy inevitably
evoked the vision of a small cabal, scheming together in a single
room, plotting out in meticulous detail everything that would later
77

transpire.2

But of course, "[h]istory reveals on its every page the importance of contingencies-accidents, coincidences or other unforeseeable developments," as Gallie observes. 27 ' The legal concept of
conspiracy, in its exceptional "looseness and pliability," 279 fully

274 See
275 For

BOSCH, supra note 164, at 113.
one version of these definitional disparities, see MINEAR, supra note 182,

at 128-33 (asserting that the Tokyo defendants' activities amounted to a legal
conspiracy but not a historical, common-sense conspiracy). On objections to the
Tokyo conspiracy indictment by defense counsel and the dissenting Justices, see
PICCIGALLO, supra note 88, at 22-23, 29-31.
276 Conservative Japanese intellectuals have consistently argued, for instance,
that Japan was forced to fight the United States and Britain after they imposed a
blockade on oil imports. For recent arguments to this effect by Japanese legal
scholars, see C. Hosoya et al., Preface to THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL: AN
INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM 7, 8-9 (C. Hosoya et al. eds., 1986); Kojima Noburu,
Contributionsto Peace, in THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL, supra, at 69, 76-78. See also
PAUL W. SCHROEDER, THE Axis ALLIANCE ANDJAPANEE-AMERICAN RELATIONS: 1941,
at 124, 221-28 (1958) (suggesting that Japan had several legitimate reasons for
entering the Axis Alliance, including a need to end its diplomatic isolation and a
desire to prevent the war in Europe from consuming the Pacific). Justice B.V.A.
R61ing, in dissent, even found such arguments legally compelling. See B.V.A. ROLING,
THE TOKYO TRIAL AND BEYOND: REFLECTIONS OF A PEACEMONGER 85-86 (Antonio
Cassese ed., 1993).
277 On the receptivity of extremist political movements to conspiracy theories of
this sort, see RICHARD HOFSTADTER, The ParanoidStyle in American Politics, in THE
PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 3, 4-6, 35-39 (1965).
28 GALLIE, supra note 206, at 133.
279 GEORGE E. DIX & M. MICHAEL SHARLOT, CRIMINAL LAW:
CASES AND
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acknowledges this fact, conceptually accommodating the need to
disaggregate a lengthy period of activity by many contributors into
a series of interlocking conspiracies, some of which may be
characterized as a "chain," others as a "wheel." Far from a rare and
improbable scenario in human affairs, the legal concept of conspiracy is frequently overinclusive, and consequently unfair to defen2 °
dants, as judges and legal scholars have long acknowledged.
Trials of administrative massacre have introduced still other
distortions into historical understanding and, thereby, into collective
memory. Early historiography of the Holocaust was based largely
on the record assembled by Allied prosecutors. The prosecutors did
not conceal their aspiration to do just that. Executive trial counsel
at Nuremberg, Robert G. Storey, spoke openly of this purpose:
"'the making of a record of the Hitler regime which would withstand the test of history.'"' 21 Wooed by the lawyers in this way, it
is scarcely surprising that the first generation of postwar historians
proved inattentive to the idiosyncratic nature of the law's concerns. 28 2 What came to be known among historians as "the
Nuremberg view" or as "perpetrator history," for instance, focused
almost exclusively on the intentions and ideologies of top leaders,
an emphasis understandably reflected in the record of the legal
28 3
proceedings against them.
The prosecution's preoccupation with the intentional acts of top
figures followed naturally from its desire to convict such figures of
MATERIALS
582 (1987).
2

See, e.g., Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445 (1949) (Jackson, J.,

concurring) (characterizing conspiracy as an "elastic, sprawling and pervasive offense"
that is typically employed when there is insufficient evidence to prosecute for the
substantive offense); Phillip E.Johnson, The Unnecessay Crime of Conspiracy, 61 CAL.
L. REV. 1137, 1141-46 (1973) (arguing that criminal defendants may be unjustly
punished when the conspiracy doctrine is used to expand the scope of the criminal

law).

281ARENDT, supra note 18, at 253.
21 Christopher Browning notes, for

instance, that for early postwar historiography, "[t]he evidentiary base was above all the German documents captured at the end
of the war, which served... the prosecutors at postwar trials. The initial representation of the Holocaust perpetrators was that of criminal minds, infected with racism
and antisemitism, carrying out criminal policies through criminal organizations."
Christopher R. Browning, German Memoy, Judicial Interrogation, and Historical
Reconstruction: Writing PerpetratorHistoiyfrom Postwar Testimony, in PROBING THE
LIMITS OF REPRESENTATION:
NAZISM AND THE "FINAL SOLUTION" 22, 26 (Saul
Friedlander ed., 1992). Browning also observes how the enduring possibility of
criminal indictment influenced the stories told by members of Police Battalion 101
concerning
their participation in one large-scale slaughter ofJews. See id. at 29.
28 5
Id. at 26.
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particular criminal offenses.
But it was neither natural nor
inevitable that historians of the period should have concentrated
their attention to similar effect. Historians followed the lawyers'
lead in this regard not only because the lawyers' documents were
those most readily available, but at least partly because the thenprevalent conception of "the historian as neutral judge"2 4 established a natural affinity between how courts and historians understood their respective callings.
Only years later did historians come to realize how the evidentiary focus of the criminal proceedings had unwittingly skewed their
analysis in favor of what came to be known as the "intentionalist"
interpretation of the period. 285 This focus subtly drew attention
away from institutional dynamics and the "machinery of destruction," particularly the crucial role of minor bureaucrats and
functionaries at all levels of German society. 2 6 This problem

284 PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE "OBJECTIVITY QUESTION" AND THE
AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION 596 (1988). On this view, "[t]he historian's

conclusions are expected to display the standard judicial qualities of balance and
evenhandedness. As with the judiciary, these qualities are guarded by the insulation
of the historical profession from social pressure or political influence, and by the
individual historian avoiding partisanship .... " Id. at 2.
8 Historical debates came to be "fought less by means of scholarly than legalistic
arguments," one historian recently complained. "The highly emotionalized debate
about.., whether a formal order by Hitler for the policy of genocide was necessary
illuminates this tendency .... " Hans Mommsen, Search for the "Lost Histoy"?
Observations on the HistoricalSelf-Evidence of the FederalRepublic, in FOREVER IN THE
SHADOW OF HITLER?, supra note 237, at 101, 108. This was not the first time that the
history of large-scale administrative massacre had been written under the heavy
influence of legal claims against its perpetrators. See Roberto Gonzilez-Echevarria,
The Law of the Letter: Garcilaso'sCommentaries and the Origins of the Latin American
Narrative, 1 YALE J. CRITICISM 107, 108-15 (1987) (observing that several early
histories of the Spanish conquest of America were written in the form of legal
arguments). Uncritical reliance by historians on legal testimony is not confined to
historiography concerning administrative massacre. See ROBERT F. BERKHOFER, JR.,
BEYOND THE GREAT STORY: HISTORY As TEXT AND DISCOURSE 151 (1995) (criticizing
two influential recent books for "purport[ing] to reproduce the popular culture of the
common people" from the legal records of the Inquisition, ignoring the likely effect
of "the Inquisitorial power structure that produced and preserved the words in the
first place" and to whose interrogators the recovered testimony was calculated to
appeal).
286 Browning, supra note 282, at 26-27; see also DAVID BANKIER, THE GERMANS AND
THE FINAL SOLUTION: PUBLIC OPINION UNDER NAZISM 89-100 (1992); CHRISTOPHER
BROWNING, ORDINARY MEN- RESERVE POLICE BATTALION 101 AND THE FINAL
SOLUTION IN POLAND at xvii (1992) (describing the battalion as composed of grass-

roots civilians who became "professional killers"). The Tokyo trial similarly skewed
historical understanding in Japan of the country's wartime wrongdoing in the
direction of "the individualist theory of history," according to scholars, leading to the
neglect of institutional and structural sources requiring more fundamental reform.
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would have been aggravated if judges deliberately tried to make
their stories compelling as monumental didactics, as national
narrative.
After all, "successful narratives often foreground
individual protagonists and antagonists rather than structures,
trends, or social forces," Schudson notes.28 7 Yet since individual
leaders come and go, it is precisely such structures and forces-their
analysis and critique-that should occupy the center stage of public
deliberation in the aftermath of large-scale administrative massacre.
As in Germany, the extent of public collaboration with Nazi
policies has been discovered in France. These discoveries have
compelled a similar reassessment of the initial focus of postwar
French criminal courts on a few top elites. Despite early outbursts
of mass vigilantism, criminal prosecutions in the years immediately
following the War were limited to the most high-ranking Vichy
officials and intellectual defenders of Nazi collaboration. 288 The
decision to confine the scope of legal retribution in this way
reflected the Gaullist story that the French nation had been
28 9
substantially united in opposition to German suzerainty.
A leading French historian proudly proclaims that sophisticated
scholars in his country have, in this century, almost entirely
abandoned the antiquated notion of writing history in the pedagogic
or "epideictic" mode-a history merely concerned with ascribing
praise or blame, rather than tracking long-term social and institutional change. 290 Perhaps it is no coincidence, then, that it took
the work of non-French historians, published decades after the War,
to disprove the Gaullist myth of a nation united in Resistance, to
demonstrate the pervasiveness of collaboration at many levels of
French society. 291 It required two decades of litigation to compel

See Steven T. Benfell, The Construction and Change ofJapanese National Identity
(Sept. 2, 1995) (paper presented, at the American Political Science Association
Conference in Chicago) (on file with author).
2'7 Schudson, supra note 235, at 20.
2
88 See HERBERT R. LOTTMAN, THE PURGE 132-68 (1986); see also DIANE
RUBENSTEIN, WHAT'S LEFT?: THE ECOLE NORMALE SUPARIEURE AND THE RIGHT 13763 (1990) (describing the trials of collaborationist journalists and intellectuals).
289 In his August 25,1944 speech to liberated Paris, De Gaulle proclaimed that the
city had been "'freed by itself, by its own people with the cooperation and support
of the whole of France ... of the eternal France.'" R.J.B. BOSWORTH, EXPLAINING
AusCHwrrz AND HIROSHiMA: HISTORY WRITING AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR, 1945-

1990, at 112 (1993); see also id. at 112-13 (describing "the Gaullist line of the naturally
united French, apart from a few criminals, resisting to a man and a woman").
o See Pierre Nora, Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mimoire, 26
REPRESENTATIONS 7, 11-12 (1989).
29 Browning thus notes, for instance, that "[t]he initial representation of the
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correction of French schoolbooks, so that they would describe the
roundup ofJews for deportation as an entirely French, not German,
92
operation.
Master Narrative by Legal Decree?
The immediate upshot of such historiography, however, was to
discredit the story that early postwar French courts had sought to
tell at De Gaulle's urging: that a handful of collaborationists-Laval,
P6tain, and a few intellectual journalists-had sold out the good and
noble nation. The recently renewed efforts at prosecution of
French war criminals, although still focused on a handful of highranking collaborationists, has been inspired, in part, by these
historical revelations and the pall they cast on early efforts to
protect such individuals from public scrutiny. 293 Such prosecutions have also relied increasingly on historical scholarship and the
expert testimony of professional historians, reversing the earlier
pattern of reliance. 294 In short, the judicial preoccupation with

Holocaust perpetrators was that of criminal minds, infected with racism and antiSemitism, carrying out criminal policies through criminal organizations." Browning,
supra note 282, at 26. For more recent examinations of pervasive collaboration, see
FURET, supra note 97, at 219-20; BERTRAM M. GORDON, COLLABORATIONISM IN
FRANCE DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1980);JOHN F. SWEETS, CHOICES IN VICHY
FRANCE: THE FRENCH UNDER NAZI OCCUPATION (1986). See generally MICHAEL R.
MARRUS & ROBERT 0. PAXTON, VICHY FRANCE AND THEJEWS (1981) (describing how
the French Vichy government "energetically persecutedJews" with policies that were
"usually supported by French public opinion"); ZEEV STERNHELL, NEITHER RIGHT NOR
LEFr: FASCIST IDEOLOGY IN FRANCE (David Maisel trans., 1986) (describing the
penetration of France by fascist ideas); MARCEL OPHOLS, THE SORROW AND THE PITY
(Mireille Johnston trans., 1972) (discussing life in a French city under Nazi
occupation). Such collaboration has only recently received official recognition. See
Marlise Simons, ChiracAffirms France'sGuilt in FateofJews, N.Y. TIME,July 17, 1995,
at Al (quoting French PresidentJacques Chirac officially affirming, for the first time,
that "the criminal folly of the occupiers was seconded by the French, by the French
state"). Paxton and Gordon are American, Marrus is Canadian, Sternhell is Israeli,
and Ophiils is a German Jew. As a legal matter, surviving family members of those
whose property had been seized before their "deportation" may be able to sue the
French state for compensation. The present value of that property is likely to prove
enormous. See id. at A3.
22 See MILLER, supra note 64, at 145 ("'The textbooks are now impeccable,'"
reports Serge Klarsfeld, who spearheaded the litigation, "'[b]ut it was one hell of a
battle.'").
29 On the success of conservative French bishops at harboring Paul Touvier for
over forty years in a series of monasteries while the French state publicly sought his
apprehension and prosecution, see RENA R9MOND ET AL., TOUVIER ET L'EGLISE (1992);
Ted Morgan, The Hidden Henchman, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1994, § 6 (Magazine), at 31.
' See TonyJudt, The Past Is Another Countiy: Myth and Memoy in PostwarEurope,
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identifying and punishing a small subset of culpable elites told a
story that first led historians astray for many years and then enabled
them, upon finding a more fitting focus, to discredit persuasively
the courts' accounts as national narrative.
In focusing on the acts and intentions of these very top elites,
the courts not only missed the macropicture: the story of mass
collaboration and institutional support for administrative brutality.
They also missed the micropicture: the story of the victims-the
human experience of uncomprehending suffering that official
brutality produced. It is that experience which many historians now
seek to recapture and to place at the center of any narrative about
the period. 9 At Nuremberg there was little testimony by surviving victims of the concentration camps and entirely nothing about
their felt experience of life there or its emotional aftermath.
It is this confessedly subjective experience-irrelevant to criminal
law, if not to civil claims-that oral historians have only recently
sought to explore. In this respect, scholars have perceived a need
to overcome what they perceive as a 'legal' concern with the factual
accuracy of personal testimony in order to apprehend its historical
significance. That is, these scholars try to grasp the meaning of the
period's most traumatic events through the continuing memory of
those who lived through its trauma. One such scholar writes:
Testimonies are often labelled as 'subjective' or 'biased' in the
legal proceedings concerning war crimes. The lawyers of war
criminals have asked the most impertinent questions of people
trying to find words for a shattered memory that did not fit into
any language... to describe those days and months in which the
only chance of survival was to forget that there had ever been a
world of goodness, warmth, and beauty ....

The fault is not theirs,

but lies with a certain method of argument on the part of the
lawyers ....
They demand precise statements of facts, and in thisway deny that in the concrete process of remembering, facts are
enmeshed within the stories of a lifetime ....

A lawyer's case is

after all merely another kind of story ....
•.. It is not the task of oral historians to give the kind of
evidence required in a court of law.... [Some historians attempt
Fall 1992, at 83, 98 (noting that early postwar myths of massive resistance
to Nazism unravelled on account of "the work of professional scholars working in
relative obscurity, their conclusions and evidence surfacing into the public realm only
DAEDALUS,

when a particularly egregious case ...
5

caught the headlines").

See LAWRENCE L. LANGER, HOLOCAUST TESTIMONIES:
(1991) (summarizing testimonies of Holocaust survivors).
2
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to uncover] the way in which suffering is remembered and
influences all other memory.... [O]ne is dealing with an effort to
create a new kind of history that cannot be used as legal evidence
since it explicitly records subjective experience.296
Such historians adopt what can fairly be described as a reverential attitude toward the personal "testimony" of their informants,
particularly when testifying about the extreme trauma that modem
history has inflicted upon them. This attitude of sanctity is deeply
at odds with the skeptical, scrutinizing posture of any competent
cross-examiner, such as defense counsel at the trials we are
considering. Not surprisingly, at the Argentine junta trial, witnesssurvivors found themselves facing questions concerning, for
instance, their membership in guerrilla groups, questions identical
to those their abductors had asked them under torture. The
witnesses, of course, found such questions deeply offensive; the
experience of public testimony was thus personally degrading,
rather than empowering. 297
But their experiences here may
simply reveal an inherent limitation of criminal proceedings (that is,
those consistent with liberal ideals of due process) as a vehicle for
fostering reverential public attitudes toward such victims and their
stories and for endowing their narratives with authoritative public
meaning.
A similar problem arose in the case against John
Demjanjuk. As historian Peter Novick observes:
Much of the outrage which greeted the Israeli Supreme Court's
overturning the verdict ... was a result of the Court having based
its decision on its plausible view that, while there was no question
of subjective bad faith [by Demjanjuk's victim-accusers], fifty-yearold memories, however "sacred," were fallible. The decision was
thus, literally, "sacrilege. "298
In sum, contemporary historians, whether focused on impersonal structures of complicity or intimate survivors' sensibilities,
have found that the legal record of Nuremberg and other such
trials, gathered with a view to criminal prosecution, is not particularly useful for current purposes of description or explanation.

' Selma Leydesdorff, A Shattered Silence: The Life Stories of Survivors of theJewish
Proletariat of Amsterdam, in MEMORY AND TOTALITARIANISM 145, 147-48 (Luisa
Passerini ed., 1992).
" See Interview with Renee Epelbaum, President of Madres de la Plaza de Mayo,
Linea Fundadora,in Buenos Aires, Argentina (July 1987).
' Peter Novick, Pseudo-Memory and Dubious "Lessons": The Holocaust in
American Culture 2 (Apr. 1995) (paper presented at the Project for Rhetoric of
Inquiry Symposium, University of Iowa) (on file with author).
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Lawyers and even legal scholars, examining these proceedings many
years later, have been largely deaf to such shifts in historical
sensibilities, lamenting only that Nuremberg has not been taken
more seriously as binding legal precedent. 99 As legal advocates
we are intimately familiar with how to use the historical record to
support a particular interpretation of the law. But we are almost
entirely blind to how our legal interpretations, and the records they
create in a given dispute, may favor-subtly but decisively-one of
the competing historical interpretations of a period.
Lawyers are not the only professionals creating problems for
historical interpretation and public understanding of such events.
Just as the law, with its special preoccupations, can easily lead
historians astray for long periods, so too can it derail journalists,
who infuse misunderstandings directly into collective memory.
When political leaders are acquitted in a criminal proceeding, they
choose (unsurprisingly) to interpret this legal result as a complete
vindication of their story. Their claims to this effect, in turn, are
widely disseminated throughout society by the mass media.
But the failure of a jury to find guilt "beyond a reasonable
doubt" is, in fact, well short of vindication of the defendant's
story."' Insofar as legal standards governing the burden of proof
in criminal proceedings have uncritically infiltrated public deliberation about unrelated matters, the quality of such deliberation is
degraded. This posed a threat to any effort at reading historical
lessons from the Touvier trial, for instance: "if France was 'in the
dock' along with Touvier, France could also be acquitted along with
Touvier, a distinct if disquieting possibility given the fragile legal
30
construct on which his prosecution rested." 1
The collective memory of administrative massacres in several
famous cases has been distorted because the frequent acquittal of
some defendants is mistakenly read as an authoritative endorsement
of the stories the defendants had offered to the court.30 2 Even
' See Steven Fogelson, Note, The NurembergLegacy: An Unfulfilled Promise, 63 S.
CAL. L. REV. 833 (1990).
' See Frederick Schauer, Slightly Guilty, 1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 83, 83.
S01Wexler, supra note 27, at 217; see alsoJennifer Merchant, History, Memory, and

Justice: The Touvier Trial in France, 23 J. CRIM. JUST. 425 (1995).
' For a particularly egregious example of this mistake, see KATE

MILLETr, THE
POLITICS OF CRUELTY: AN ESSAY ON THE LITERATURE OF POLITICAL IMPRISONMENT

230 (1994) (contending that since some of the junta defendants were acquitted of
certain offenses, "the results of the Argentinean trial are deplorable, virtually an
exoneration of the military and all its brutality.... an outcome ... very reassuring
not only for the Argentinean military but for all other military regimes in the
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where the prosecution prevails entirely at final judgment, some
contend that press reports may seem to favor the defense by
inevitably focusing on its scoring of small points, however insignificant to central issues."' 3 Misreading acquittals as historical vindication is one of a larger set of obstacles to the law's effective
influencing of collective memory: because few citizens can be
expected to read the judicial opinion (or to follow closely the
proceedings that produce it), much of any story that the courts
recount about an episode of administrative massacre must be
filtered through the mass media. The media, however, have a short
list of narrative genres-each with conventions of its own-that
simplify and stereotype the story of liberal legality in ways largely
0 4
unconducive to public deliberation and discursive democracy.
The trial of the Argentine juntas offers another telling example
of how the law often focuses on issues ancillary to the larger claims
of history and collective memory. In prosecuting the juntas, the
courts lavished enormous time and attention on the question of
which doctrine of "indirect authorship," among the several
authorized by current law, ought best be invoked to link the acts of
the subordinates to the intentions of the superiors. 30 5 This

region"). It would be difficult to write a sentence about the trial that is more
mistaken in both its general point and all of its details. Still, a distinguished
sociologist manages to do so, observing-in a chapter-length analysis of the dirty war
and its aftermath-that "in Argentina, as elsewhere in Latin America, the military,
when it gave up power, managed to protect itself from retribution." DANIEL CHIROT,
MODERN TYRANTS: THE POWER AND PREVALENCE OF EVIL IN OUR AGE 286 (1994).
Chirot makes no mention of the trials of the junta members or other officers, the
indictment of hundreds more, the successful civil suits, or the purging of many top
generals and admirals.
-o- See Robert A. Kahn, Holocaust Denial Litigation in Canada 19-21 (July 3, 1995)
(paper presented at the Law and Society Association Conference) (on file with
author). Kahn studied the Canadian trial of Ernst Zundel for "Holocaust Denial" and
its treatment by the Canadian press. He concludes: "Even as the revisionists are
proven wrong on point after point, an air of revisionism lingers in the courtroom and
media." Id. at 29. The trial thus "reinforced the idea that a legitimate debate [is]
under way" between Holocaust deniers and their accusers. Id. at 22.
"' For sociological studies of this process, see HERBERTJ. GANS, DECIDING WHAT'S
NEWS: A STUDY OF CBS EVENING NEWS, NBC NIGHTLY NEWS, NEWSWEEK, AND TIME
(1979); GAVE TUCHMAN, MAKING NEWS: A STUDY IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY

(1978).

On how the news media distort the representation of criminal trials, see

PHILIP SCHLESINGER & HOWARD TUMBER, REPORTING CRIME: THE MEDIA POLITICS
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 207-47 (1994); BARBIE ZELIZER, "COVERING THE BODY": THE
KENNEDY ASSASSINATION, THE MEDIA, AND THE SHAPING OF COLLECTIVE MEMORY 49-

98 (1992); David A. Harris, The AppearanceofJustice: Court TV, ConventionalTelevision,
and Public Understanding of the CriminalJustice System, 35 ARz. L. REV. 785, 785
(1993).
"' See Argentina: National Appeals Court (Criminal Division)Judgment on Human
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question proves quite fascinating for legal theorists, and it consequently preoccupied Alfonsfn's advisor-philosophers for a considerable time.' °6
The question was irrelevant, however, in the larger public
debate, since no one seriously questioned that the subordinates'
wrongful acts had been authorized by their superiors. Public
advocates for the disappeared, as well as for military officers, may
have agreed on very little. But they agreed that this central
question, preoccupying the courts, was entirely superfluous to a
historical assessment of the period, and hence to its place within
national memory. Given such disparities between the claims of law
and memory, it did not strike many Argentines as particularly
strange that one of the junta defendants would even announce to
the court that he was prepared to accept "'the judgment of history'"
(that is, of disinterested historians, presumably), but not that of the
tribunal. °7
No less than the right, those on the left, including most of
Argentina's historians and social scientists, found the legal narrative
of the junta trial largely unpersuasive as the basis for memory of the
period. Particularly offensive was the insistence of the Alfonsfn
government and the prosecutors on viewing the dirty war not in
terms of social struggle and its suppression, but as the deprivation
of individual rights, an insistence rightly seen as based upon the
law's liberal premises. For Argentine leftists, who view liberal law
as an. illegitimate expression of class power, the problem with the
government's approach to memory construction
arises from the idea or the experience of political violence as the
chaotic and intractable opposite of law .... [This] opposition of
the order of law and the chaos of violence.., led to the omission
of collective motivation not only of victimizers (national security
doctrine as political program) but of victims as well, who were
Rights Violations By FormerMilitary Leaders (Excerpts), 26 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 317,

327 (1987) [hereinafterJudgment on Human Rights].
" Malamud-Goti has since conceded that this emphasis was misplaced. See
Interview with Jaime Malamud-Goti, in Buenos Aires, Argentina (Aug. 1987).
"o GaltieriEspera elJuicio de Dios y de la Historia,EL DIARIO DELJuicio (Buenos
Aires), Sept. 30, 1985 (translation by author) (quoting Gen. Leopoldo Galtieri).
General Roberto Viola similarly proclaimed during the trial that "the judgment of
history will be highly unfavorable towards the prosecutor's conduct." EL DIARIO DEL
Juicio (Buenos Aires), Oct. 22, 1985 (translation by author). Admiral Emilio Massera
also expressed a willingness to be judged only by history. Emilio Massera, Speech
Delivered at the Chamber of Public Relations, Plaza Hotel, Buenos Aires, Argentina
(Apr. 1978).

544

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 144: 463

defended as individuals whose human rights had been violated
rather than as political activists (a concept that even the prosecu0s
tion refused to contemplate).
The result of the government's approach was that "[t]he collective
nature of the experience, of agency, and of guilt together have
remained obscured and forgotten.... incomprehensible and inut-

terable." 30 9 In short, "[b]ecause they saw the crimes ... as
resulting from the suspension of [the] legal system, [they] were
adamant that their investigations should be understood within a
context of legal concepts and language." 310 The effect was harmful, even perverse: The legal language used to protest terror in
these documents is itself exclusionary: it "collude[s] with the deeds
they 'expose."' 1
In fact, "[t]he goals of the Repression ... found
3 12
law."
the
in
echo
its
For those who shared this view, including many leaders of
human rights groups, the dirty war was defined by social forces of
class oppression-international capitalism and its domestic, military
representatives-battling forces of mass resistance, the guerrillas and
their sympathizers. 13 Both the defendants and the victims were
SJulie Taylor, Body Memories: Aide-Memoires and Collective Amnesia in the Wake
of the Argentine Terror,in BODY POLITICS: DISEASE, DESIRE, AND THE FAMILY 192, 198
(Michael Ryan & Avery Gordon eds., 1994). Taylor's remarks here mirror criticisms
offered by the military defendants themselves and the defense counsel, who similarly
accused the court of ignoring left-wing political activities and sympathies of many of
the disappeared. For a critique (similar to Taylor's) of Italy's courts, in their
treatment of prosecutions of the Red Brigades, see Alessandro Portelli, Oral
Testimony, the Law, and the Making of History: The 'April 7' Murder Trial, HIST.
WORKSHOPJ., Autumn 1985, at 5, 9-11, 15, 31 (1986) (criticizing judicial narratives,
in applying legal concepts of conspiracy, for denigrating and denying mass support
for the Red Brigades among students and workers as a genuine social movement).
...Taylor, supra note 308, at 202. Taylor's argument here will be familiar to
American readers. See STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS,
PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 203-19 (1974) (observing drawbacks of
conceiving organized struggles for social change in terms of individuals' rights).
310 Id. at 193.
sn Id. at 196.
12
3 Id. at 197.
313 See BRYSK, supra note 16, at 139 (observing that the Madres have "adopted an
analysis of human rights that posits a direct relationship between capitalism,
imperialism, and repression, and a stance of implacable opposition to the Radical
government" of Alfonsin). Class analysis of the dirty war is equally common in the
social science literature. See GUILLERMO O'DONNELL, ZY A MI, QUE ME IMPORTA?:
NOTAS SOBRE SOCIABILIDAD Y POLITICA EN ARGENTINA Y BRASIL 20-24 (1984); David
Pion-Berlin, THE IDEOLOGY OF STATE TERROR: ECONOMIC DOCTRINE AND POLITICAL
REPRESSION IN ARGENTINA AND PERU 104 (1989); WILLIAM C. SMITH, AUTHORITARIANISM AND THE CRISIS OF THE ARGENTINE POLITICAL ECONOMY 249 (1991).
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agents of objective historical forces, not mere bearers (or deniers)
of individual civil rights. The national narrative had to be told in
these aggregate terms. One need not accept Taylor's leftist views
here to accept her critique of lawyerly hubris. For many such
leftists, the junta trial would have been more persuasive as law if the
government had not also sought to portray it as the new "official
story"-as collective memory by legal mandate.1 4 By trying to use
the trials to shape collective memory, rather than solely to find the
legal truth and justice, their value-limited, but important-was
undermined.
It was the aspiration to combine matters of legal and historical
judgment-to settle them at once, and by the state, that weakened
the trial's ultimate persuasiveness as either. For the many Argentines of leftist sympathies who, no less than Alfonsin, favored severe
punishment of many military defendants, the junta trial would have
been more compelling had it been staged and publicly defended in
a way that kept its ambitions within more modest bounds. It would
also have been more compelling had liberal law not sought to do
what, for the left, it could not do (that is, offer persuasive social
analysis).
In Praise of Law's 'Superficiality'
The utility of legal rules, particularly in a society deeply divided
over conceptions of justice, is precisely that they often allow
agreement about how to handle a matter (such as punishing
Argentine officers) without requiring agreement on the reasons for
doing so."'5 The criminal law's very "superficiality" in socialhistorical analysis of administrative massacre is thus its cardinal
virtue. To employ it primarily to shape collective historical
memory, then, is to risk depriving ourselves of its more modest,
traditional contribution by discrediting it altogether. Those for
whom the liberal state, newly reestablished, inspired only the most
precarious support-which in Argentina meant both the left and
right-were willing to accord it qualified legitimacy for the essential
314 The government itself, in an official report documenting the disappearances,
found that the National Commission on the Disappeared's "first steps within the
framework of the precise powers laid down for it by the Decree, stimulated
immediate public response in an incredible process of reconstructing public
memory." NUNCA MAS, supra note 16, at 429.
51
s See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely TheorizedAgreements, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1733,

1735-36 (1995).
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tasks of ensuring social order and public provision, but not for the
writing of a liberal "official story" that they could not endorse.
A similar concern with misfocusing of historical attention arose
in the French prosecutions of Klaus Barbie and Paul Touvier, for
different doctrinal reasons. Because the statute of limitations had
expired for all their offenses except crimes against humanity, both
trials focused almost exclusively on their misconduct toward
Jews. 16 But scholars of the period concurred that this had not
been Barbie's or Touvier's principal concern or responsibility. As
Rousso notes, the court's exclusive attention to offenses that were
still chargeable against Barbie and Touvier led to neglecting the fact
that the primary role of the Milice was the battle against the
Resistance:
Memories, which now enjoyed the symbolic support of the law,
began to crystallize .... Judges found themselves forced to write
history and pronounce historical judgment in the historian's place.

In this role they were profoundly uncomfortable, as a glance at the
records of the Fauvisson, Touvier, and Barbie cases makes clear.
The courts in many cases were forced to rely on shaky interpretations of events, and thus the trials unintentionally exacerbated the
existing tension between memory, history, and truth."1 7
Touvier's defense counsel, Jacques Tremolet de Villers, hoped
that the tension between collective memory and the search for legal
truth might work to his client's advantage. Indeed, it had the
desired effect in public debate of pitting spokesmen for the
Resistance, irritated by the trial's curious "misfocus," against
members of the Jewish community."1 ' Touvier's attorney then
sought to discredit the legal proceedings in the public mind by
highlighting this genuine discrepancy between the law's concerns
and history's claims, claims for which most laymen had greater
sympathy. That is, the discrepancy between the law's need for an
.16
See Leila S. Wexler, The Interpretationof the Nuremberg Principlesby the French
Court of Cassation: From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again, 32 COLUM. J. TRANsNAT'L
L. 289, 323-25, 331-33 (1994).
317 Rousso, supra note 26, at 160-61; see also John Dixon, Manipulators of Vichy
Propaganda: A Case Study in Personality, in VICHY FRANCE AND THE RESISTANCE:
CULTURE & IDEOLOGY 41-61 (Roderick Kedward & Roger Austin eds., 1985); Wexler,
supra note 316, at 349. On the role of the Milice, seeJOHN F. SWEETS, THE POLIrICS
OF RESISTANCE IN FRANCE, 1940-1944: A HISTORY OF THE MOUVEMENTS UNIS DE LA
RtSISTANCE 27 (1976).
"' Alain Finkielkraut characterizes the view of many Frenchmen during the Barbie
trial in the following terms: "'Why do the Jews want to monopolize the status of
victim? people say. This is their new greed, they say.'" MILLER, supra note 64, at 117.
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offense with which the defendant could still be charged, on one
hand, and history's concern with the relative importance or
"centrality" of particular motives and events to the period in
question, on the other, became a patent weapon of Touvier's
attorney to discredit the trial tool.
Again, the issue of "centrality" would remain entirely irrelevant
to the law were the law not universally seen in such cases as
necessarily engaged in writing history. The recent French trials
hence struck many Frenchmen as peculiar in their "overemphasis"
upon the Jews, just as the Nuremberg trial has since struck many
historians as equally peculiar in its tendency to minimize the
3 19
predominantly Jewish origins of most of the defendants' victims.
Collective memory in France had come, by this point, to center
on Resistance heroism. A legal proceeding that seemed to minimize
the importance of that movement, and its repression by pro-German
collaborators, was highly unlikely to find a sympathetic national
audience. Here, the collective memory of national resistanceexaggerated by nationalist hubris to be sure-was shrewdly invoked
and opportunistically deployed to weaken public receptivity to
prosecution. The public spotlight was thereby deflected from the
inherent wrongfulness of Barbie's acts.320 The French court was
only able to stir up a hermeneutic hornet's nest, not to shape
decisively a shared interpretation of these acts. The tribunal was
then constrained to "adopt" the least persuasive reading of the acts'
historical significance (that is, Barbie against the Jews), thus
undermining its authority as national storyteller.
If there is a lesson here, it is surely that when collective memory
has already become comfortably entrenched, the law's efforts to
excavate and scrutinize it are only likely to discredit the law and its
professional spokesmen. In the Barbie case, a direct and insurmountable conflict arose between the requirements of historical
truth and those of social solidarity; the law was forced to choose
$19See, e.g., MICHAEL R. MARRUS, THE HOLOCAUST IN HISTORY 4 (1987) (observing
that, in contrast to the Eichmann trial, crimes against the Jews "never assumed a
prominent place" at Nuremberg); LAWRENCE DouGLAS, THE MEMORY OFJUDGMENT
(forthcoming 1996) (manuscript on file with author) (noting "the failure of the
Nuremberg trial [to] adequately... address Nazi genocide [of the Jews]").
.20Barbie was convicted for his role in the deportation of French Jews. See
Judgment of December 20, 1985, Cass. crim., 1986J.C.P. If G, No. 20,655, 113J. DU
DRorr INT'L 127, 127 (1986). But Barbie was publicly known and reproached
primarily for his role in the death of Resistance hero Jean Moulin. See Alice Y.
Kaplan, Introduction to FINKIELKRAUT, supra note 151, at ix, xv-xvi.
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between the two. Gaullists had deliberately constructed postwar
solidarity in France on the basis of a self-flattering myth of united
resistance that the courts, informed by the best recent historiography, could not fail-in compliance with their professional duties and
the liberal moral principles these entailed-to attack and discredit.
The defense could draw upon such historiography no less than
the judges and prosecution. Although Robert Paxton served as a
prosecution witness in the Barbie trial, his scholarship, which
revealed the pervasiveness of collaborationism, 21 offered at least
equal support for the defense in its effort to portray the defendant's
wrongs as enabled by the support of many other now-influential
Frenchmen.
The law's difficulty in "getting its history right" is further
complicated by the fact that historians themselves are certain to
disagree about the relative centrality and significance of particular
individuals and events in the larger tableau of administrative
massacre. "Such irresolution, which no amount of factual information can resolve, allows for a proliferation of possible narrations of
this past," as Friedlander notes regarding the Holocaust.3 22 Just
as the law's requirements necessarily focused on certain aspects of
German and French wartime history over others, so too the more
recent demands within Germany for the restoration of national
identity have tended to displace the acts of Eichmann and judgments against the Nuremberg defendants from historical centrality.
In both cases, the perceived needs of the present came to dominate
interpretation of the past.
Historians have their favored tropes: tragedy, triumph, subordination, resistance to subordination, irony, and so forth.
Scholarly debate often consists of disagreements over which such
master trope best "fits and justifies" the known facts of a given place
and period.3 2 1 Criminal law has its own favored trope:
the
vindication of society's basic norms protecting individuals' rights to
life and liberty against whoever, by his conduct, denies them. Thus,
21See supra note 291.
'2 SAUL FRIEDLANDER, MEMORY, HISTORY, AND THE EXTERMINATION OF THE JEWS

OF EUROPE at ix (1993).

" The terminology of "fit and justify" is that of Ronald Dworkin. DWORKIN,
LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 98, at 239. The meaning of "justify"in the present context,
however, does not imply any approval of the conduct so classified. In this
normatively neutral sense, tojustify is "to confirm or support by... evidence," or "to
adjust to exact shape, size, or position." 8 OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 329, 330 (2d
ed. 1989).
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when law and lawyers consciously aspire to influence collective
memory, they enter into competition with historiography and
historians, who understandably respond by criticizing the law and
defending the centrality of their favored tropes.
Legal Precedent vs. Historical 'Uniqueness'
One particular aspect of historical interpretation has caused the
criminal law considerable embarrassment: whether, and in what
respects, the Holocaust is "unique." Certain scholars of Jewish
history have cared a great deal about establishing the "unprecedent-

ed" character of the Holocaust, resisting its use as an analogy to
lesser crimes. 324 In some such quarters, the very idea of compar-

ing the Holocaust to earlier or subsequent episodes of administrative massacre (for analytical and scholarly purposes) is regarded as
obscene, "an affront to the memory" of the six million. However,
lawyers, including some who have devoted their professional lives
to prosecuting Nazi war criminals,2 will find this notion puzzling to
the point of incomprehensibility.
In fact, the concept of historical incommensurability is almost
uncognizable in legal terms. As lawyers, if we were compelled to
conclude from historical investigation and comparative analysis that

the events judged at Nuremberg were utterly incommensurable, we
would be driven to the corollary conclusion that the legal rules

developed from that experience must be strictly construed; this
approach would make them inapplicable to virtually all subsequent

experiences of administrative massacre, since such experiences are
almost invariably "distinguishable" in significant ways. Those who
s24See Lucy

S. DAWIDOWIcZ, THE HOLOCAUST AND THE HISTORIANS 11-21 (1981).
See, e.g., TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY
122-53 (1970) (comparing war crimes in both World War II and the Vietnam War in
light of international law as developed by the four Geneva Conventions of 1949). For
a defense of such comparisons, for both conceptual and theoretical purposes, see
32

CHARLES S. MAIER, THE UNMASTERABLE PAST: HISTORY, HOLOCAUST, AND GERMAN
NATIONAL IDENTITY 69-71 (1988) ("Comparison is a dual process that scrutinizes two

or more systems to learn what elements they have in common, and what elements
distinguish them. It does not assert identity; it does not deny unique components.").
On how the comparative analysis of genocide arguably illuminates the Holocaust's
distinctiveness, see EDWARD T. LINENTHAL, PRESERVING MEMORY: THE STRUGGLE TO
CREATE AMERICA'S HOLOCAUST MUSEUM 228 (1995) (describing the views of Michael

Berenbaum, Director of the U.S. Holocaust Museum, and stating that the representation of various groups of victims of the Holocaust in the museum "serves as a way to
portray Jewish uniqueness through comparison with various others").
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decry the dangers of comparison presumably do not desire this
result.
Historians and political analysts became increasingly dismayed,
however, that the Nuremberg court would subsume the most
unparalleled features of the defendants' wrongs under longstanding
doctrines in the law of war, reducing the Holocaust merely to one
among several methods employed for the "waging of aggressive
war."
By training and temperament (that is, by deformation
professionel), it seemed, prosecutors and judges were inclined to tell
a tale of continuity, even when the facts before them struck most
3 26
laymen as involving a violent rupture with all prior experience.
After all, courts generally downplay the elements of uniqueness
in the facts before them, subsuming these under more general,
preexisting concepts and precedents, which are extended, if at all,
only in the most modest and guarded ways.12' The problem of
"representing the Holocaust," an event unintelligible through prior
understandings of human conduct, has become a central concern
and an insurmountable obstacle for virtually all serious scholarly
disciplines. 25
The law does not even recognize it as a problem. 329 "Concerned as it must be with precedent, the Court treats
326 This gap between lay and lawyerly perceptions of the Holocaust is an important
but neglected theme in Arendt's classic work on the Eichmann trial. See ARENDT,
supra note 18, at 253-54; see also Douglas, supra note 272 (arguing that "the
extraordinary effort to accommodate the Holocaust to prior conceptions ofjustice
resulted in a failure to see the Holocaust in its full malignity" and attributing this
failure
to the legal concept of precedent).
2
-1
See Richard Wasserstrom, Postscript: Lawyers and Revolution, Address at the
Annual Convention of the National Lawyers Guild (July 6, 1968), in 30 U. PrTT. L.
REV. 125, 129 (1968) ("[Law] seeks to assimilate everything that happens to that which
has happened.... [Tihe lawyers' virtually instinctive intellectual response when he
is confronted with a situation is to look for the respects in which that situation is like
something
that is familiar .. ").
121 See Anton Kaes, Holocaust and the End of Histoy: Postmodern Historiographyin
Cinema, in PROBING THE LiMrrs OF REPRESENTATION, supra note 282, at 206, 207
(noting that "[t]he insistence on the impossibility of adequately comprehending and
describing the final solution has by now become a topos of Holocaust research"
(footnote omitted)).
" In this regard, despite her hyperbolic and overheated prose, Hannah Arendt
remains the most incisive critic of the law's failure.
The Nazi crimes, it seems to me, explode the limits of the law; and that is
precisely what constitutes their monstrousness. For these crimes, no
punishment is severe enough ....
[T]his guilt, in contrast to all criminal
guilt, oversteps and shatters any and all legal systems. That is the reason
why the Nazis in Nuremberg are so smug.

Letter to KarlJaspers,in HANNAH ARENDT KARLJASPERS: CORRESPONDENCE 1926-1969,

at 54 (Lotte Kohler & Hans Saner eds., Robert Kimber & Rita Kimber trans., 1992).
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the Holocaust in precisely the fashion rejected by so many scholarsas just another historical event about which unpopular claims can
330
be made."
The problem has reappeared in recent prosecutions for
"Holocaust denial." Since the early 1960s, the Nuremberg proceedings have been criticized for failing to respect the Holocaust's
specificity as a crime against the Jews."' Partially in response to
that concern, legislation has been adopted in several Western
countries criminalizing "Holocaust denial."" 2 Such statutes are
defended on the ground that the Holocaust's uniqueness warrants
greater encroachment upon freedoms of speech and press than
would be constitutionally acceptable concerning other statements
that are also factually false, but nondefamatory.
This approach seeks to establish the Holocaust's uniqueness by
legal fiat, however. It has thus been criticized as yet another
instance of lawyerly encroachment on historiographical questions
beyond the professional competence of courts. 333 Judges show
themselves understandably uncomfortable about assuming this new
role.
But the response to such unwelcome intrusions has sometimes
been merely to employ legal fiat in service of the opposing claim:
in denying the Holocaust's uniqueness. The 1985 West German
provision thus criminalizes denial not only of the Holocaust, but
also of another massive wrong that the legislators regarded as
"comparable," the Soviet expulsion of German peoples from parts
of Eastern Europe.3 34 The German statute reinstates the earlier
problem: treating the Holocaust as "morally equivalent" to other,
s DOUGLAS, supra note 319.
531 For evidence of this failure, see 5 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE
THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

368-426 (1947), wherein the French

prosecutors, responsible for presenting evidence of war crimes and crimes against
humanity, included no evidence of the annihilation of EuropeanJewry as one of the
Nazis' transgressions. On this omission, see DOUGLAS, supranote 319 (observing that
the Nuremberg Tribunal adopted an "approach that placed the Holocaust on the
margins of the legally relevant").

32 See LIPSTADT, supra note 17, at 219-22 (discussing legislation criminalizing
"incitement to hatred; discrimination; or violence on racial, ethnic, or religious
grounds").
S3 See Letter from Professor Herbert A. Strauss to Professor Eric Stein, in

Correspondence on the "Auschwitz Lie", 87 MICH. L. REV. 1026, 1029 (1989) ("The
'majority opinion' among scientific scholars must be formed in a scientific way, and
every intervention of the judiciary power has to be rejected").
I See Stein, supra note 17, at 307-08.
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lesser wrongs, only now doing so more explicitly.3 3 5 In sum, it has
proven difficult to employ the law in condemning Holocaust denial
without also lending judicial authority to one or the other side of a
legitimate scholarly dispute concerning historical uniqueness.
The difficulty of drafting Holocaust denial laws suggests that law
is likely to discredit itself when it presumes to impose any answer to
an interpretive question over which reasonable historians differ.
After all, in recent decades many historians and social scientists-on
both the right and the left-have come to question and deemphasize
the Holocaust's unique features. 3 6 These scholars have sought to
reassess the idiosyncrasies of that experience, in both its methods
and scope, with a view to situating it within a comprehensive
understanding of the horrors of our century, in light of the several
genocides and many mass atrocities that preceded and followed
it.337
Early legal analysts of the Holocaust defined "crimes against
humanity" as involving ordinary crimes committed for particular
motives."3 8 Underlying this doctrinal move was a normative concern with stripping high-ranking officials of their asserted immunity
under international law, by depicting them as "common criminals"no different in nature from garden variety murderers, despite their
statesmanlike air and plumage. This way of cognizing their conduct,
however, came to be seen as "banalizing" or trivializing the
historically unprecedented features of their wrong.3" Additionally,
jurisprudential efforts to reconceptualize crimes against humanity
See id. at 309-14 (discussing the final compromise in the law's wording).
sAlthough the conservative variants are todaybetter known, there has long been
a leftist version of the thesis that the Holocaust was the outgrowth of trends and
social forces by no means unique to Germany, but latent within all modern capitalist
societies. This thesis was first proposed by the early Frankfurt school, was elaborated
by Hannah Arendt, and now finds many sympathizers among scholars in several
fields. See ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, MODERNITY AND THE HOLOCAUST 9 (1989); ANDREAS
HUYSSEN, TWILIGHT MEMORIES: MARKING TIME IN A CULTURE OF AMNESIA 252

(1995). The affinity between the views of the far right and far left go further. The
early history of Holocaust denial in France, at least, has been persuasively traced by
scholars to the far left of the late 1960s and early 1970s. See Nadine Fresco, Negating
the Dead, in HOLOCAUST REMEMBRANCE, supra note 38, at 190, 192-98 (discussing the
early life and later influence of Paul Rassinier-French author and former concentration camp inmate).
s1 Klaus Barbie's defense counsel,Jacques Verg&s, was to give this argument for
"balance" special salience at Barbie's trial. See infra text accompanying notes 782-91.
sss SeeJacques-Bernard Herzog, Contributiona l'dtudede la definitiondu crimecontre
l'humaniti, 18 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROrr PENAL 155, 168 (1947); Wexler,
supra note 316, at 356-57.
ss9 See Wexler, supra note 316, at 358.
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in more limited ways greatly impeded effective prosecution of their
perpetrators, by introducing doctrinal requirements that are
exceedingly difficult to meet, as the prosecution of Paul Touvier
abundantly revealed. 4
In sum, the criminal law has been perceived as straying beyond
its proper realm, thus embarrassing itself by both denying the
uniqueness of the Holocaust and by later asserting it. From such
mistakes, it is easy to see why many would conclude that courts
ought therefore to stay out of the history game altogether. The
problem with that entreaty, as we shall see, is that courts are
increasingly drawn into deciding historical questions unwittingly in
3 41
ways they cannot entirely escape.
For Historical "Balance," Against
"Moral Equivalence"
The interested public has often found historians' accounts more
persuasive than those of the courts, particularly the Tokyo and
Nuremberg courts. This is primarily because historians are seen to
be more concerned with "balance" in proportioning blame among
all parties, including the courtroom accusers.3 4 2 For the courts,
it mattered little to the validity of criminal proceedings against Axis
leadership that Allied victors had committed vast war crimes of their
own.3 4 Unlike the law of tort, criminal law has virtually no place
340 See id. at 359-62.
-" See infra text accompanying notes 693.706.
42 To be sure, many historians today reject "balance" as a professional ideal,
finding it either impossible or undesirable. See NOVICK, supra note 284, at 264-91,
421-62, 603-05. Public perception of historiography's tasks, however, still largely
cleaves to this traditional ideal, as reflected in the remarks of Galtieri and Massera,
supra note 307.
3 See HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 218-19 (1954) (noting
that in World War II, the laws of war were systematically violated by the participants).
Allied war crimes prominently included the saturation and fire bombing of civilian
population centers such as Dresden, Hamburg, Tokyo, Yokohama, Hiroshima, and
Nagasaki without discriminating between military and non-combatant targets. As one
noted historian summarizes the data, the death toll of Japanese civilians from
bombings of 66 cities was approximately 400,000. American military deaths in all of
WWII were about 300,000. SeeJOHN W. DOWER, WAR WrrHOUT MERCY: RACE AND
POWER IN THE PACIFIC WAR 295-300 (1986). On Soviet war crimes, see ALLEN PAUL,
KATY&: THE UNTOLD STORY OF STALIN'S POLISH MASSACRE 103-17 (1991). If the
Nuremberg trials produced poor historiography, this was due only partly to liberal
law's inherent limitations. Surely more important was the fact that "for fifty years,
the largest single participant in [the] war imposed a policy of almost total historical
selectivity, while the other victors basked in the illusion of their own impartiality."
Norman Davies, The Misunderstood Victory in Europe, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May 25, 1995,
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for "comparative fault," 344 no doctrinal device for mitigating the
wrongdoing or culpability of the accused in light of that of the
accuser.
For the public, however, particularly in postwarJapan and West
Germany, and among conservative Argentines, it mattered greatly in
gauging the legitimacy of the trials that they seemed tendentiously
selective, aimed at focusing memory in partisan ways. It mattered
for such listeners that the defendants in all these episodes of
administrative massacre had constituted only a single side to a twoor multi-sided conflict, one in which other parties had similarly
committed unlawful acts on a large scale. This unsavory feature of
the Nuremberg judgment has undermined its authority in the minds
of many, weakening its normative weight. When Nuremberg's
relevance to the dirty war as legal precedent was pointed out to him,
for instance, one Argentine general observed: "Yes, but if the
Germans had won the war, the trials would have been held not at
Nuremberg, but in Virginia. " 34' He was surely right.
Tu quoque is the conceptual peg on which this moral intuition is
usually hung, but as a legal argument its scope is exceedingly narrow.3 46 Kirchheimer describes its logic:
Against the inherent assertion of moral superiority, of the radical
difference between the contemptible doings of those in the dock
at 7, 11. In a spirit of Allied comity, "[flew historians were willing to ask if the
country which played the major role in winning the war against Hitler might also have
played a part in causing it." Id. at 10.
344See WAYNE R. LAFAVE &AUSTIN W. ScoTTJR., CRIMINAL LAW 14 (2d ed. 1986)
(stating that in criminal law "the contributory negligence of the victim is no defense");
Alon Harel, Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law: The Case for a Criminal Law
Principleof Comparative Fault, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1184 (1994) (advocating a role
for comparative fault within the criminal law).
Nino Conference, supra note 47 (remarks ofJudge Andrds D'Alessio).
346 For a sweeping rejection of the tu quoque defense at Nuremberg, see 13 TRIAL
OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 521
(1948) ("We are not trying whether any other powers have committed breaches of
international law ... we are trying whether these defendants have."). The court
nevertheless accepted much of the defense sub rosa where Allied activities were
virtually identical to Axis illegalities, as in the common use of 'unlimited' submarine
warfare. See OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, POLITICALJUSTICE: THE USE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE
FOR POLITICAL ENDS 338 (1961). Judicial deliberation about tu quoque issues was

explicit, but only recently acknowledged publicly. See ROLING, supra note 276, at 60.
Although a plaintiff must have "clean hands" for a civil suit in equity, there has never
been any analogous requirement for the party alleging criminal harm. The
prevalence of comparable misconduct by non-defendants is legally relevant only to
establishing prevailing international custom and the consistency of the defendant's
conduct with such custom.
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and the visions, intentions, and record of the new master, the
defendants will resort to tu quoque tactics.
...
[This] implies more an argument addressed to the public at
large and the future historian than a legal defense. In asserting that
an accident of history rather than an inherent quality of those who
govern determines who should sit in judgment and who should be
the defendant, it tries from the
outset to devaluate the meaning
s4 7
and import of the judgment.

In so doing, it tries for too much. As an affirmative defense,
such an argument aims to be fully exculpatory. But tu quoque
evidence might be deployed more convincingly in mitigating a
sentence. It closely resembles "character evidence" in this regard.
To the extent thatJapanese aggression throughout Asia, for instance,
could be convincingly viewed as partially a defensive response to a
still-pervasive Western imperialism there34 8 -to which the testimonyof professional historians would be indispensable-this would
testify to the non-malicious character of Japanese actions and of
those who directed them. With such questions, the law does not
insist on any bright lines, as between guilt and innocence.
A second form of balance displayed by historiography, particularly good biography, that legal judgments generally lack is a
rounded assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the leading
characters. In criminal law, to be sure, evidence of good character
is admissible by the defense in mitigation of sanction, and even to
establish reasonable doubt regarding liability.3 49 It may not be
used, however, to argue that the defendant's character is so virtuous
as to warrant his complete exemption from liability on this ground
alone, if he has culpably committed the wrongful act of which he is
accused. But these legal rules prove particularly troubling for
defendants who, like Marshall P6tain, had been national heroes for
many years3 50 before (very late in life) disgracing themselves by
complicity in administrative massacre. The delimited relevance the
law accords to character evidence also deprives legal judgments of
KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 346, at 336-37 (emphasis added).
Justice R61ing, in dissent, found this argument partially persuasive. See ROLING,
supra note 276, at 889.
In American law, for instance, the defendant may introduce evidence of good
character to establish that his mental state was not what the prosecution alleges it to
have been, and even to establish a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant is
the type of person capable of committing the wrongful act. See FED. R. EVID. 404.
347

5

s 0 See STEPHEN RYAN, P9TAIN THE SOLDIER (1969).
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historical balance when the defendant can plausibly claim, in the
court of public opinion, to have done much good in the very course
of perpetrating his offense.
P6tain again provides a telling example:
Every time [prosecutor] Mornet cited a concession granted to the

Germans, Ptain's lawyers could cite a concession wrung from
them. For every pro-Axis public act the lawyers could show a proAllied private one. The testimony bogged down into a balancing
of profit and loss-exactly the chosen terrain of the defense

51

The law can easily discredit its judgments, when proclaiming these
as monumental didactics, by relegating such defensive efforts at
historical balancing beyond its framing of the story. Surely, such
evidence is relevant to any effort to portray P6tain, for example, as
35 2
the story's unscrupulous villain, pure and simple.
A third form of concern about historical balance, also unacknowledged by criminal law, arises from the fact that citizens of
aggressor nations suffer in many ways from their wartime losses and

the deprivations of defeat, often exacerbated by victors' misconduct.
They therefore have an affinity for portrayals of the preceding

events as a "tragedy,"353 as a story of good people and evil acts on
both sides, rather than a simpler tale of noble victims (their
enemies) and nefarious victimizers (themselves).

54

As applied,

s51 PETER NOVICK, THE RESISTANCE VERSUS VICHY: THE PURGE OF COLLABORATORS IN LIBERATED FRANCE 176 (1968). Since Pdtain's offenses had resulted in death
for many victims, his counsel could not claim that Ptain's "pro-Allied" actions legally
"justified" his collaborationist actions as a "lesser evil." On the longstanding
exception to the lesser evil defense for actions causing death, see FLETCHER, supra
note 19, at 787-89.
352 On the transformation of P6tain from hero to traitor, see HERBERT R.
LOT-MAN, PATAIN: HERO OR TRAITOR, THE UNTOLD STORY (1985).
151 Moral philosophers generally understand a tragic situation as one in which an
individual, when contemplating action, faces conflicting claims of right that are
binding upon him, that is, not based upon some misunderstanding of his situation or
his moral duties. See BERNARD WILLIAMS, Ethical Consistency, in PROBLEMS OF THE
SELF: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1956-1972, at 166, 166 (1973). Many wars arise from
situations in which all or most parties have some legitimate claims of right. Wars and
the administrative massacres to which they often give rise also routinely present
soldiers with such moral dilemmas, as through superior orders requiring commission
of such unlawful acts. See MARK J. OSIEL, OBEYING ORDERS (forthcoming 1996)
(manuscript, on file with author).
" See MINEAR, supranote 182, at x ("'We need to rethink the causes of the Pacific
war from what can only be described as a tragic view, one which takes no comfort in
scapegoats and offers no sanctuary for private or national claims of moral righteousness ... .'" (alteration in original) (quoting historian John W. Hall on the Tokyo
trial)).
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criminal law tends to dichotomize the participants in just this way.
It thereby conceals many pertinent moral complexities, denying the
genuinely tragic dimension of these events, 355 a dimension that
lingers prominently in the memory of many survivors.
A fourth source of concern about historical balance involves the
psychodynamics of reconciliation between antagonists-whether
individuals, partisan groups, or nation-states. When considering
apology, one generally seeks forgiveness from the party who has
been harmed. The process is interactive. For instance, when an
aged Japanese veteran recently sought to atone for his role in an
especially vicious torture of a British officer, the latter saw fit (in
fact, felt morally obliged) to come forward to accept the apology.356 Only when apology succeeds in eliciting forgiveness does
reconciliation occur. Such reconciliation is often a precondition to
3 57
restoring relations of trust and interdependence.
Negotiating this reconciliation can prove highly complex, since
often each party will have valid grievances against the other. In
such circumstances, apology is easiest when it is reciprocated, that
is, when X can acknowledge its wrongs against Y as Y acknowledges

" Only the vanquished tend to recognize this moral complexity and the
consequent need for historical balance. This is the element of truth in the
condemnation of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials as "victors'justice." Among the
victors, the general public characteristically resists any effort to infuse such balance
into collective memory. It is only professional historians who sometimes favor it. An
example of this phenomenon is the recently failed effort by American historians to
redress the perceived imbalance in public memory of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki
bombings. The historians' attempts to depict those events in a way suggesting some
moral complexity in the Smithsonian exhibition commemorating the 50th anniversary
of the Second World War's end was successfully opposed by organizations of war
veterans. See David E. Sanger, ColoringHistoiy Our Way, N.Y. TIMEs,July 2, 1995, § 6
(Magazine), at 30, 31 ("'The veterans want the exhibit to stop when the doors to the
bomb bay opened. And that's where the Japanese want it to begin.'" (quoting a
Smithsonian official, concerning the Enola Gay controversy)); The Histoly That Tripped
over Memoty, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1995, at E5 (noting that critics claimed that the
exhibit was a revisionist insult to the American soldiers who fought in the Pacific); see
also Nicholas D. KristofJapan's Plansfor a Museum on War Mired in Controversy, N.Y.
TIMES, May 21, 1995, at A4 (describing the similar disputes in Japan itself over

whether to include material on its soldiers' extensive atrocities).
s The British officer, Eric Lomax, recounts the story in THE RAILWAY MAN: A
POW's SEAING AccouNT OF WAR, BRUTALITY, AND FORGIVENESS (1995).

""Japan's failure to apologize for its enslavement ofAsian comfort women is thus
often seen as an obstacle to better relations with its Asian neighbors. See e.g., Lawyers
Urge Government to Compensate "Comfort Women", JAPAN POL'Y & POL., Jan. 30, 1995,
availablein LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File ("'Japan cannot build an honorable
position in the international community without resolving the issue .... '" (quoting
Koken Tsuchiya, Chairman, Japanese Federation of Bar Associations)).
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its against X. Reciprocity is particularly fitting where the adversaries have become "mutually implicated in each other's... vices."358
This is often true of war, as each side escalates its wrongdoing in
retaliation for the enemy's wrongs, real or imagined. 5 9 It is not
surprising, then, that even the Montonero leader, Mario Firmenich,
was impelled to apologize this spring for the crimes of his guerrillas
(two decades after the fact), immediately following a comparable
apology by Army Chief Martin Baiza (for the military's crimes
against guerrillas and others in the dirty war).3 60 Among antagonists who must go on living together in the same society, a judicial
narrative perceived as "balanced"-in recognizing valid claims and
wrongdoing on both sides-is best suited to facilitate reconciliation
and reconstruction of social solidarity.
There is nothing in either the substance or process of criminal
law, however, to facilitate such narrative balance and to help set in
motion a process of reciprocal conciliation. On the contrary, the
criminal law sets up a bright line between the parties, labeling one
as victim, the other as wrongdoer.161 It encourages attitudes in
the former of righteous indignation, attitudes that the latter
inevitably view in turn as self-righteous selectivity.
Moral and legal theory do little better in this regard than legal
doctrine.
They are preoccupied with notions of excuse and
justification. In the present cases, however, the wrongs done by X
to Y neither excuse nor justify those done by Y to X.16 2 The
bombing of Nagasaki does not excuse orjustify the Rape of Nanjing,

3-8

DONALD W. SHRIVER, JR., AN ETHIC FOR ENEMIES: FORGIVENESS IN POLITICS

74 (1995).
..In authorizing "reprisal" for war crimes, the law of armed conflict may
aggravate this problem, as commentators have long noted. See, e.g., PAUL CHRISTOPHER, THE ETHICS OF WAR AND PEACE: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL AND MORAL
A MORAL
ISSUES 189-99 (1994); MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS:

ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 207-22 (1977).
ss See Autocritica a medias de Firmenich, CLARIN (Buenos Aires), May 3, 1995, at 1.
s' Private law at least allows the possibility of a counterclaim by the defendant.
But a compulsory counterclaim must arise out of the same transaction as that on
which the plaintiff's claim is based. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13. This presents a major
obstacle when the events to be linked in this way by a single legal story cover vast
expanses of time and space. One would be hard-pressed to say, for instance, that
Japanese aggression on the Asian continent during the early 1930s was part of the
same "transaction" or event as the United States' bombing of Nagasaki in 1945.
" Moral theory has had virtually nothing to say about the element of mutual
wrongdoing in many situations fitting for apology, and (by implication) forgiveness.
Leading studies of forgiveness have little to say about reciprocity, while studies of
reciprocity lack any discussion of forgiveness. See LAWRENCE C. BECKER, RECIPROCITY
(1986); JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY (1990).
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as all sensible people readily acknowledge. But this fact does not,
in the minds of many Americans and Japanese, exhaust the possible
range of moral links between the two events or their perpetrators.
If legal doctrine and theory dismiss such widespread moral
intuitions as misguided, the result is merely to limit the law's
potential contribution to international reconciliation.
Consider in this light, the reaction of many Japanese to the
American reluctance, as in the recent Smithsonian controversy, to
debate openly the legality and moral defensibility of our use of
nuclear weapons at the end of World War II. This reluctance "has
fueled the self-righteousness of Japanese apologists for the Pacific
War," observes one Asia specialist. "If Americans refuse to question
their war record, they ask, then why should Japanese risk the
reputation of Japanese soldiers by questioning tl.eirs?" ss3
In the aftermath of large-scale violence, the essential task of
statesmanship often consists precisely in putting forth a formulation
of national identity (or international community, as in the Marshall
Plan) that allows former enemies to live together under a common
regime, a compelling narrative that restrains the powerful temptations toward an interminable cycle of recrimination and reprisal
over the past. That is certainly how Abraham Lincoln, at least,
understood his responsibilities in the aftermath of the Civil
3 64

War.

Elaine Scarry observes:
[O]nce those final labels [winner and loser] are designated and the
war is over, it will cease to matter how the casualties ... were
distributed .... [For] these verbal constructions will tend to be
replaced by one in which the casualties ... collectively substanti56s

Ian Buruma, The War Over the Bomb, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 21, 1995, at 26,

29. For instance, the head of the Japanese Veterans Association, Masao Horie,
observed: "'At the 50th anniversary of the Dresden firebombing,... I didn't hear the
Allies apologizing. And the U.S. dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki
and killed huge numbers of innocent Japanese people, and never apologized for
this.'" Nicholas D. Kristof, Why Japan Hasn't Said That Word, N.Y. TIMES, May 7,
1995, at E3.
" See John G. Randall, Introduction to JONATHAN T. DORRIS, PARDON AND
AMNESTY UNDER LINCOLN AND JOHNSON: THE RESTORATION OF THE CONFEDERATES

TO THE RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES, 1861-1898, at xiii, xiv-xxi (1953). In the interests of

national reconciliation, Presidents Lincoln andJohnson both favored leniency toward
those guilty of treason and sedition. In December 1863 Lincoln proclaimed an
amnesty for most who had taken up arms against the Union, provided they take an
oath of future allegiance to it. In 1868, Andrew Johnson extended the terms of
amnesty, making it unconditional and universal in scope. See id.
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ate, or are perceived as the cost of, a single outcome: ... "The
young America was maimed by the slavery of which it was
necessary to rid itself violently: 534,000 died in the Civil War."
Thus a Southern boy who may have believed himself to be risking
and inflicting wounds for a feudal system of agriculture, and until
the end of the war will have suffered much hardship and finally
death for those beliefs, will once the war is over have died in
substantiation of the disappearance of that feudal system and the
racial inequality on which it depended. 65
This process of redescription does not happen automatically or
effortlessly, however, as Scarry seems to imply. Lincoln's pardons
and amnesties of confederate soldiers, and even leaders, offered a
legal device that helped later generations to retell the story of the
war to one another in a conciliatory fashion: a narrative in which
even the losers die for a just cause, and thereby rejoin the society
of the winners. The story is extended to a later point of conclusion,
from which the war's immediate outcome becomes almost irrelevant
to collective memory.
Where to Begin the Story? Where to End?
The primary way defendants have sought to introduce greater
balance into proceedings for administrative massacre has been to
enlarge the temporal "frame" relevant to legal judgment (beyond
that proposed by the prosecution), so that the narrative encompasses events both earlier and later in time. They have often
stressed the arbitrariness and indefensibility of the spatiotemporal borders established by courts, at the prosecution's behest. In
this critique, they could easily draw theoretical sustenance today
from postmodernists, who rightly observe that always there is
"another story 'waiting to be told' just beyond the confines of 'the
end.' . . . [T]he sequence of real events goes on: that's what it is
to be 'real.'" 6 The choice of where to begin the story and where

s6s ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN:

THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE

WORLD 116-17 (1985). Zerubavel observes a similar process of mythic redescription
in contemporary Israel regarding heroes who died in unsuccessful military campaigns,
such as the Masada defenders and Bar Kokhba. "The display of readiness to sacrifice
one's life for the nation is thus glorified as a supreme patriotic value that diminishes
the significance of the outcome." ZERUBAVEL, supra note 69, at 221.
'" Louis 0. Mink, Eveuyman His or Her Own Annalist, in ON NARRATIVE 233, 238
(W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1981) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Hayden White); see also
ZERUBAVEL, supra note 69, at 221 (noting how selecting the points at which a story
will begin and end "reveals how simple construction of boundaries confers a minimal
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to end it often determines who will play the villain, who the
victim.
Defendants in the Tokyo trial, for instance, sought to tell a tale
that began not with Pearl Harbor, but with America's Lend-Lease
policy and the blockade on Japan's lifeline of oil imports. 6 The
story would begin not with the Japanese invasion of China, but
earlier, with the Western colonialism throughout Asia thatJapanese
forces sought to displace. From within that narrative frame, Japan's
conduct could be described as a "war of aggression" only through
the grossest of historical oversimplification.
Just as the story would have a different beginning, it would have
a different ending. It would end somewhat later than the prosecution preferred, not with Allied victory at Okinawa, but with the
nuclear destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, at a time when all
but the final, minor details ofJapanese surrender had been resolved
s8
through negotiation.
Similarly, German historians now seek to enlarge the narrative
framing of combat on the Eastern front, depicting the brutal
methods of German forces as the first phase of Western resistance
to what would soon prove to be Soviet imperialism into Eastern and
Central Europe, resistance that bought the West essential time for
regrouping.369 Had the Nuremberg trial been held a few years
fictive structure and meaning on an otherwise meaningless time flow").
"7 See supra note 276.
"6See AKIRA IRUyE, POWER AND CULTURE: THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN WAR, 1941-

1945, at 263-65 (1981). A wider spatiotemporal framing would not entirely have
worked to mitigative effect, however. Prosecutors could easily have employed it to
tell the story ofJapan's enslavement of many thousands of women throughout its
Asian empire into compulsory prostitution, for the entertainment of Japanese
soldiers. See GEORGE HICKS, THE COMFORT WOMEN: SEX SLAVES OF THE JAPANESE
IMPERIAL FORCES (1994). Writes oneJapanese historian, "[t]he perfect opportunity
for such reflection came during the postwar Allied occupation, but it was lost.
Regrettably, at the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal the voice of the Asian peoples who
had suffered was not heard sufficiently." Yoshiaki Yoshimi,Japan Battles Its Memories,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1992, at A23.
" This historical argument (introduced by Ernst Nolte, The Past That Will Not
Pass: A Speech That Could Be Written but Not Delivered, in FOREVER IN THE SHADOW OF
HTLER?, supra note 237, at 18 and ANDREAS HILLGRUBER, ZWEIERLEI UNTERGANG:
DIE ZERSCHLAGUNG DES DEVTSCHEN REICHES UND DAS ENDE DES EUROPAISCHEN
JUDENTUMS (1986)), with its implicit criticism of the story told by the Nuremberg

court, has in turn been adopted by conservative German politicians. See, for
example, the recent letter signed by over 300 leading German conservatives, arguing
that what ought to be commemorated on May 8 is not the Allied victory, but rather
the Soviet "'expulsion by terror, oppression in the East, and the partition of our
country.'" Nader Mousavizadeh, States of Denial, NEW REPUBLIC,June 19, 1995, at 40,
42 (book review) (quoting the letter titled Against Forgetting in the Frankfurter
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later than it was, defense counsel would likely have sought to make
just such an argument. Notice, moreover, that these proffered
enlargements of the legal-historical frame would not require that the
court undertake the large leaps across time and space of the sort
later employed in the defense of Klaus Barbie.370 The upshot,
then, is that the defendants' right to a fair hearing in such trials has
often been compromised not only by indulgent relaxation of
evidentiary rules (including legal relevance and hearsay) in favor of
the prosecution, but also by hyperstringent enforcement of such
evidentiary rules against the defense.
In viewing the criminal trial as a simplistic "morality play,"
Durkheim did not perceive how certain forms of criminality, such
as large-scale administrative massacre, often cannot fairly be
characterized as pitting the forces of unequivocal good against those
of unequivocal evil. If courts could find a way to tell the tale as a
genuine tragedy, alternately eliciting a measure of sympathy and
antipathy for each side, dramatic tension would be enhanced,
evoking more attention from the public. Such sustained attention
would help stimulate the public discussion and collective soulsearching that is the primary contribution of criminal prosecution
to social solidarity at such times, according to the discursive theory
71
offered here.3
In the Argentine junta trial, the defendants' accusation of
historical imbalance entailed the insistence that their conduct be
viewed as an intelligible response, however excessive with the
benefit of hindsight, to the genuine threat to public order presented
by the leftist guerrilla movements. The temporal frame adopted by
the court discredited the entire proceeding, in the view of the
officer corps and most civilian conservatives, by not extending
sufficiently backward in time to before the 1976 coup d'6tat 7 2

Allgemeine Zeitung). The authors add that "'a view of history that ignores or represses
this reality, or that compares it to other realities, cannot be the basis for the selfunderstanding of a confident people.'" Id.
- See infra text accompanying notes 782-91.
-71 See supra notes 99-135 and accompanying text.
37 See HoRAcIo LYNCH & ENRIQUE DEL CARRILL, DEFINrrIVAMENTE-NUNCA MAs:
LA OTRA CARA DEL INFORME CONADEP (1985). By contrast, the United Nations
"Truth Commission" on El Salvador was expressly chartered to examine illegal
violence by both the military and the FMLN, a fact that contributed to wider public
acceptance of its conclusions, according to Thomas Buergenthal, one of its members.
See Thomas Buergenthal, The United Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador, 27
VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 497, 528 (1994). The Chilean truth commission adopted a
similar approach. Despite the current preference of many new democracies for such
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The Alfonsfn government and its prosecutors were well aware of
this danger and consciously sought to guard against it, periodically
reminding through their public statements, and even in closing
arguments at trial, that leaders of the leftist guerrilla groups were
being simultaneously prosecuted as well, for many of the same
37 3
offenses.
This narrative frame quickly acquired the label of "The Doctrine
of the Two Demons": that the country had been destroyed by
similar extremisms of left and right, both equally hostile to
liberalism and the rule of law, the rhetorical banner of the new
democratic government. As a matter of dramaturgical strategy, this
narrative was calculated to avoid giving offense either to military
officers, who had escaped substantial involvement in the dirty war,
or to surviving supporters of the guerrilla,who had already endured
considerable suffering by illegal detainment, torture, and loss of
family members through disappearance.3 74 Thus, the doctrine of
the two demons and the legal strategy it entailed were selected "to
provide an adequate frame to reprocess memory without increasing
the chasms that separated Argentine society," as one social scientist
3 75

observes.

But although this framing of the story made for "good law," in
that it was entirely consistent with existing doctrine, it made for
"poor history" in the eyes of those many people, mostly on the left,
who felt it necessary-as a matter of historical balance-to stress the
much greater measure of harm inflicted by the officer corps on
Argentine society, in service of aspirations far less noble than those
37 6
of the guerrilla
In Argentina, as earlier in Japan and West Germany, the
battle of interpretations between prosecution lawyers and spokes-

commissions over criminal trials, commissions do not escape the controversy created
by the question of how widely to define the scope of their inquiries. Activists in the
human rights community, for instance, often challenge the inclusion of material
concerning criminal conduct by leftist guerrillas, whose cause they consider morejust.
See, e.g., Jorge Mera, Chile: Truth and Justice Under the Democratic Government, in
IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 171, 174-75

(Naomi Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995) (noting that "[h]uman rights arise historically as
demands to limit state power and are now a limit on state sovereignty").
" See Executive Decree No. 157/83 (ordering the trial of suspected leaders of the
Montonero guerilla movement).
374 See VERBITSKY, supra note 136, at 57-66.
" Perelli, supra note 29, at 48.
...
See Interviews with human rights leaders, in Buenos Aires, Argentina (Aug.
1987).
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men for "historical balance" was fought out in the elite press. Its
wider influence beyond the upper middle classes cannot be
presumed."' Historiography has often had no more influence
than judicial proceedings in influencing non-elite memory of many
such events, as historians themselves readily admit."' "The Enola
Gay is flying solo on the Mall in Washington," an American
journalist wryly observes, "without any serious examination of
whether the bomb was needed to force Japan to surrender, a
question that is debated more seriously today [by scholars], and
with more compelling evidence, than at any time in postwar
79
"

history. 3
Like lawyers, professional historians must take a skeptical

attitude toward the veracity of all sources. But popular memory of
a community's catastrophes is often demonstrably inaccurate, even

concerning fundamental facts of record.

It is precisely these

persistent deviations between the memories of those who were
directly affected by such events and the later conclusions of elite
professionals-both lawyers and historians-that have become a
central focus of much current field work and reflection among
3 80
scholars of collective memory.

'77 We should recall, in this regard, the finding of survey researchers that while
over half of Americans knew who presided over "The People's Court," fewer than
10% knew that the ChiefJustice of the Supreme Court was William Rehnquist. Can

TV Rescue Rehnquistfrom Obscurity?, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), June 28, 1989, at 64.
378 See KEITH THOMAS, THE PERCEPTION OF THE PAST IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND
24 (1983); YOSEF H. YERUSHALMI, ZAKHOR: JEWISH HISTORY ANDJEWISH MEMORY 1415 (1982). The recurrent resistance of popular memory to elite efforts at shaping it
is examined infra text accompanying notes 624-28.
379 Sanger, supra note 355, at 30.
Sanger alludes especially to the recent
scholarship of Barton Bernstein, Gar Alperowitz, Rufus Miles,Jr., andJohn R. Skates.
Moreover, the text initially proposed by the Smithsonian historians for the 50th
anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima exhibit was not at all unsympathetic to
President Truman; after weighing the arguments for and against his decision, it
concludes that 'the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki... played a crucial role in
ending the Pacific War quickly." JUDGMENT AT THE SMITHSONIAN: THE BOMBING OF
HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI 117 (Philip Nobile ed., 1995).
sm See, e.g., FENTRESS & WICKHAM, supra note 49, at 91 (contending that
"inaccurate memories ... shed a more unmediated light on social memory than
accurate ones do: they are not, so to speak, polluted by 'real' past events");
ALESSANDRO PORTELLI, THE DEATH OF LUIGI TRASTULLI AND OTHER STORIES: FORM
AND MEANING IN ORAL HISTORY 2 (1991) (noting that "'wrong' tales.., allow us to
recognize the interests of the tellers"). For an Argentine study of this phenomenon,
see Lindsay DuBois, Contradictory Memories of Dictatorship in Argentina 4-5 (Dec.
1, 1994) (paper presented at the American Anthropological Association Conference)
(on file with author) (noting how electoral supporters of former military officer Aldo
Rico sometimes misremember the human rights abuses of the dirty war, 1975-1980,
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On occasion, prosecutors of administrative massacre have felt
obliged to tailor their legal approaches in light of what they
thought would make a more persuasive story, on account of popular
understandings of the period. Most notably, the chief American
prosecutor at Tokyo, Joseph Keenan, was ordered not to indict
Emperor Hirohito.3 81 Prosecutors also encouraged some witnesses
to mention the Emperor's role and presence at key meetings as little
as possible, if at all."8 2 The Occupation authorities, and General
MacArthur in particular, 3 were convinced that the Japanese
public, although willing to blame the Emperor's underlings, would
not tolerate the punishment and consequent dethronement of
Hirohito himself. Public understanding of recent history thus set
serious limits on the choice of legal strategy, compromising the
84
moral and legal integrity of the proceedings in crucial ways
These compromises also ensured that the "Tokyo Trial version
of history," as it came to be derisively known, would ultimately be
rejected-not only in Japan, but in much of the West as well.3 15 It
would be rejected not merely as morally and legally suspect, 38 6 but
simply as poor historiography, on account of its unpersuasive and
obviously opportunistic exclusion of a central character. 387 It is
one thing to acknowledge that prosecutors have a legitimate range
as having occurred during the prior military regime, that is, 1966-1973).
38' See MINEAR, supra note 182, at 111 n.74.
's See id. at 113-14.
a" See DOUGLAS MACARTHUR, REMINISCENCES 287-88 (1964) (noting MacArthur's
fear that guerrilla warfare would break out if the Emperor were indicted, and that
many thousands of U.S. troops would be needed to enforce the Allied Occupation);
see also MINEAR,supra note 182, at 110-17 (analyzing the decision not to prosecute the
Emperor as political, rather than based on the legal merits).
msOn the much-belated explosion of debate and conflict over Hirohito's wartime
role, in the months preceding and immediately following his death, see generally
NORMA FIELD, IN THE REALM OF A DYING EMPEROR (1991).

m See Kojima Noboru, Contribution to Peace, in THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL,
supra note 276, at 69, 78, 109. See generally MINEAR, supra note 182 (presenting a
widely disseminated example of this rejection of the Toyko Trial's version of history).
" 6 See MINEAR, supra note 182, at 117 (quoting the dissenting opinion ofJustice
Henri Bernard, who argued that the Emperor's absence "was certainly detrimental to
the defense of the accused").
Is Perhaps the trial's greatest distortion (by understatement) ofJapan's war crimes
involved not its refusal to examine Hirohito's share of responsibility, but its exclusion
of all evidence concerningJapan's extensive use of prisoners of war for bacteriological
weapons experimentation. The U.S. apparently sought to preserve the secrecy of
these experiments to learn their results and to keep them from the Soviets, according
to some accounts. See B.V.A. R61ing, Introductionto THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL,
supra note 276, at 15, 18.

566

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 144:463

of dramaturgical discretion; it is quite another for them to attempt
a staging of Hamlet without the prince. The very effort to trim the
legal proceedings in line with popular prejudice thus proved counterproductive, ultimately undermining the precarious legitimacy that
such compromise had aimed to secure for the trials. Thus, criminal
trials can fail to influence collective memory both when they adhere
to the internal requirements of legal doctrine, ignoring popular
understandings at odds with these requirements (the Barbie
example), and conversely, when such trials depart from the law's own
logic, deferring to such prejudices (the Hirohito example).
In the final analysis, neither historians nor legal advocates
approach the past disinterestedly. While both bring contemporary
concerns to bear upon their investigations, neither considers it
defensible to ignore evidence disconfirming the story one initially
wished to tell. Thus, despite the differences highlighted here, there
are important similarities in how law and historiography approach
the past. Legal advocates have always known that their inquiries
were not disinterested; most historians have recognized this only
recently.38
The very idea that the past has an integrity of its own, that it can
be studied "for its own sake" and on the terms of its long-deceased
denizens, that its interpretation should not be harnessed exclusively
to present concerns, is a peculiarly modern notion, dating only from
the late eighteenth century.8 9 As professional commitment to
that preoccupation has waned in the last two decades, the overlapping "moralizing" concerns of law and historiography have become
ever more apparent. These emergent similarities make it more
difficult to denouncejudicial forays into national historical narrative
as either a betrayal of internal professional scruple or an external
encroachment on alien terrain.
The Durkheimian account of law's service to social solidarity

encounters greater difficulty than the discursive in coping with the
' The long history of rear-guard action in resistance to this recognition is well
told by NOVICK, supra note 284, at 38-39, 260-74, 295-301, 513-21. For an early
statement of this view, see CARL L. BECKER, EVERYMAN His OwN HISTORIAN 253-54
(1935) (arguing that "[n]either the value nor the dignity of history need suffer by
regarding it as.. .an unstable pattern of remembered things redesigned and newly
colored to suit the convenience of those who make use of it").
389See JANET COLEMAN, ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL MEMORIES:

STUDIES IN THE

RECONSTRUCTION OF THE PAST 276, 291, 324 (1992); THOMAS, supra note 378, at 1.
For a recent effort to rehabilitate the ancient view, see MICHAEL OAKESHOTr, Presen4
Future, and Past, in ON HISTORY AND OTHER ESSAYS 1, 7-19 (1988).
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recurrent tension between the favored stories of lawyers, on one
side, and historians or other interested parties, on the other. This
is because the Durkheimian view presumes that only one story-the
evocation of shared indignation for unambiguous breach of moral
principles universally agreed upon-is compatible with social
solidarity."s
The discursive conception, by contrast, makes no
such assumption. It acknowledges that a plurality of interpretations
may coexist within a pluralistic society, one whose members do not
agree about the nature of justice, and that such disagreement will
inevitably extend to the meaning of the country's recent horrors.
On this account, courts may legitimately tailor the stories they
tell in order to persuade skeptical publics of the merits of liberal
morality, but may not exclude incompatible stories from public
hearing. Prosecutors and judges can strive to make the liberal story
about these events more persuasive than its alternatives, but cannot
suppress them. In fact, the discursive view requires the effective
public presentation of counter-narratives in order to have any
chance of refuting them where they are inconsistent with the liberal
one.3 91 Other stories, such as those advanced by historians of
various persuasions, have an entirely legitimate place within the
public discussion of a liberal society. Law's proper contribution to
social solidarity must be conceived in a manner consistent with this
fact.
C. LegalJudgment As Precedent and Analogy
This danger is the corollary of the preceding. Just as it is
wrong to yoke a society's understanding of its history tightly to
present needs (for legal judgment), it is also wrong to address a
society's present problems by exclusive reference to the lessons of
its history, that is, to a privileged reading of its past. There are
opposing perils here. At one extreme lies the view, defended in
legal thought by Savigny, that the study of history provides not
"'merely a collection of examples but rather the sole path to the
9 2
true knowledge of our own condition.'""
Nothing ever changes
so drastically as to prevent the past from "rendering perennial its

390 See supra text accompanying notes 55-74, 87-98.
911See

supra text accompanying notes 107-44.

92

3 REINHART KOSELLECK, FUTURES PAST: ON THE SEMANTICS OF HISTORICAL TIME

38 (Keith Tribe trans., 1985).(quoting FRIEDRICH K. VON SAVIGNY, I ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
GESCHICHTLICHE WISSENSCHAFT 4 (1815)).

568

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 144: 463

store of experience.""'3 At the other extreme lies the view of
history, including legal history, "as a burden man has to shoulder
and of whose dead weight the living can or even must get rid of in
their march into the future."9 4 Modern technology and society
change too dramatically, in this view, for history (including the
history of legal judgments upon it) to offer meaningful prescriptions
for present predicaments.
Criminal trials for administrative massacre can contribute,
paradoxically, to errors of both sorts, at both ends of the continuum
governing the past's pertinence to the present. Among victims of
such horrific experiences, memories have often provided resonant
39 5
analogies for the analysis of more current controversies.
Sympathetic others often will be inclined to accord considerable
authority to such victims as natural spokesmen for the lessons of
this momentous experience. "[T]he recall of past evil [is] a critical
source of empowerment," Hacking observes.3 96
But precisely
because the past becomes so powerful a metaphor in present
debate, it can be abused in various ways. Its "proper" interpretation-to which legal judgments may contribute-tends to be invoked
as an all-purpose touchstone, purporting to offer answers to all
future questions, however far afield.
It might be said that this is one form of historical distortion that
criminal prosecution can introduce into collective memory, and this
point is thus a refinement of the preceding. But what was at issue
before was only historical understanding as such, the societal
interest in preserving the past's integrity within our representations

" Id. at 23 (attributing this view to Cicero and most other Hellenistic thinkers).
HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE: SIX EXERCISES IN POLITICAL
THOUGHT 10 (1961). Arendt does not defend this view.
...To be sure, it is only the most vocal minority of surviving victims who generally
assert a broad reading of the public lessons to be learned from their experiences.
Langer's study of memory among Holocaust survivors reports, for instance, that the
vast majority conclude that their personal experience is almost entirely insusceptible
to description, that it confirms no moral theories, and that it offers no models for
heroic emulation or redemption. Langer thus argues that most reflections on the
Holocaust, in searching for its lessons, provide only false solace. See LANGER, supra
note 295, at 162-205.
11 HACKING, supranote 48, at 213. One might add that to have no memory is to
lack an essential feature of personhood, on many accounts. On neurological
disorders resulting in extreme memory loss, see generally PHILIPJ. HILTS, MEMORY'S
39

GHOST:

THE STRANGE TALE OF MR. M. AND THE NATURE OF MEMORY (1995)

(describing a famous patient who, through a surgical mistake, lost all prior memory
and all capacity for subsequent memory, but who now has recurrent dreams in which
he is a surgeon).
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of it. What is at stake here, by contrast, is how such historical
representations influence present policy, for better or worse, that is,
how a past experience of administrative massacre, and our legal
judgments upon it, should guide future politics. Broadly speaking,
the dispute is about "the different ways of integrating the experience of the past into the texture of contemporary life.""'7
The more narrowly the experience is read for its "precedential
value," the more authority we accord its immediate victims to speak
to us in its name. But the power this accords them sometimes
proves intoxicating. As they begin to read the precedent more
broadly, their right to assume its mantle, to speak with the special
authority it affords-rather than simply with their own voices, as
coequal citizens-is rightly called into question.
This presents the mobilized victim-survivor with a dilemma of
political strategy. At one extreme, she can preserve her monopoly
over the collective memory only by reading its relevance so narrowly
as to make its lessons inapplicable to even the most similar events
(for example, another nearby episode of administrative massacre).
At the other extreme, the victim-turned-activist can extrapolate the
lessons of the events that caused her suffering into such universal
terms as to make them applicable to innumerable public controversies. This can be done, however, only at the cost of abandoning any
plausible claim to monopoly over the invocation of the event from
which these lessons are allegedly derived.
Too often, a sense of dej vu-and the hope of refighting old
battles with more successful results than the first time aroundunwittingly substitutes for critical analysis of current predicaments.
In several societies, this has proven a recurrent pathology in the
aftermath of administrative massacre. To label it a pathology, of
course, is not to deny the need for sympathetic understanding
toward those permanently haunted by such events, those suffering
its symptoms.
They resemble the central character in Jorge Luis Borges' wellknown story, Funes, the Memorious, who can remember everything he
has perceived."' Like Funes, we may become incapacitated for
rational deliberation and principled action by a surfeit of memory.
"[W]hat Funes has gained in memory," writes one Borges scholar,
3g STEPHEN BANN, THE INVENTIONS OF HISTORY: ESSAYS ON THE REPRESENTATION

OF THE PAST 101 (1990).
"S SeeJORGEL. BORGES, Funes,theMemorious,in FICCIONES 107 (Anthony Kerrigan
ed., 1962).
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the wealth and resonance of narrative details, he lacks any "capacity
40 0
to organize these into categories" or relate them to principles.
"And because his mind is always vividly recollecting to the level of
pathology ... Funes can barely sleep." 40 1 In short, lurid details of
lived experience-no matter how moving and memorable the
resulting stories-offer no guidance unless one can extract general
principles facilitating conceptualization and comparison between
40 2
past and present events.
Extrapolated to the level of nation-states, the lesson is clear:
overburdened by the weight of a catastrophic recent history, we are
sometimes better off to forget. Nietzsche was surely right that "life
in any true sense is impossible without forgetfulness ....

[W]e

must know the right time to forget as well as the right time to
remember, and instinctively see when it is necessary to feel historically and when unhistorically." 4°
This problem-the inability to
forget, when forgetting is entirely appropriate-is, in a sense, the
obverse of that dwelled upon by the psychohistorians: the repression or denial of memory, so that what is repressed later "returns"

through "acting-out. "404 Obsession with memory can be as perilous as its repression, anamnesia as problematic as amnesia. "Hys-

s9 GENE H. BELL-VILLADA, BORGES AND HIS FICTION: A GUIDE TO HIS MIND AND
ART 97 (1981). This author diagnoses Funes's ailment as "a deep-seated incapacity

for thinking in terms of general ideas." Id. at 101. Montaigne similarly remarked
that "excellent memories are prone to be joined to feeble judgments." MICHEL DE
MONTAIGNE, THE COMPLETE WORKS OF MONTAIGNE 22 (Donald M. Frame trans.,
Stanford Univ. Press 1958) (1580).
4
BELL-VILLADA, supra note 399, at 97.
401 Id. at 97-98; see also NAOMI LINDSTROM, JORGE LUIS BORGES: A STUDY OF THE
SHORT FICTION 41 (1990) (observing that "[t]he main issue examined in []Funes...
is ... the need to organize knowledge in the mind by means ofjudicious omission
and the selective concentration of attention").
4' The best known versions of this process within current liberal theory are
Dworkin on "law as integrity" and Rawls on "reflective equilibrium." See DWORKIN,
LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 98, at 225-75; RAWLS, supra note 192, at 48-51.
403 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE USE AND ABUSE OF HISTORY 7-8 (Adrian Collins
trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1957) (1874).
4 The major works in this tradition, as applied to repressed memory of statesponsored brutality, are those of LACAPRA, supranote 156; ALEXANDER MITSCHERLICH
& MARGARETE MITSCHERLICH, THE INABILITY TO MOURN: PRINCIPLES OF COLLECTIVE
BEHAVIOR (Beverley R. Placzek trans., 1975); SANTNER, supra note 156. See also Eric
L. Santner, Histoty Beyond the Pleasure Principle: Some Thoughts on the Representation
of Trauma, in PROBING THE LIMITS OF REPRESENTATION, supra note 282, at 143, 150

(noting that "one can acknowledge thefact of an event, that is, that it happened, and
yet continue to disavow the traumatizing itpact of the same event").
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terics," Breuer and Freud noted, "suffer mainly from reminiscences." 40 5 One recent author states the dilemma with particular
poignancy:
Pain can sear the human memory in two crippling ways: with
forgetfulness of the past or imprisonment in it. The mind that
insulates the traumatic past from conscious memory plants a live
bomb in the depths of the psyche-it takes no great grasp of
psychiatry to know that. But the mind that fixes on pain risks
getting trapped in it. Too horrible to remember, too horrible to
forget: down either path lies little health for the human sufferers
40 6
of great evil.
Criminal law can contribute to either mistake:
as much
through the premature closure of a universal amnesty, as
through interminable proceedings aimed at rooting out every
whiff of collaborative impropriety. With so much talk in Argentina
about the twin dangers of "wallowing in the past" and "forgetting,"
it is scarcely surprising that Funes himself now makes periodic
appearance in Argentine discussions of the dirty war and its
memory. 40 7 As one Argentine historian rightly cautions:
405
JOSEF BREUER & SIGMUND FREUD, STUDIES ON HYSTERIA 7 (James Strachey et
al. trans., 1955). Primo Levi, who made a successful international literary career out
of his inability to forget his time in Auschwitz, nevertheless experienced this
mnemonic hypertrophy as a form of illness, one which may have proven fatal (he
committed suicide in 1988). Levi notes:
[I]t has been observed by psychologists that the survivors of traumatic
events are divided into two well-defined groups: those who repress
their past en bloc, and those whose memory of the offense persists, as
though carved in stone, prevailing over all previous or subsequent
experiences. Now, not by choice but by nature, I belong to the second
group. Of my two years of life outside the law I have not forgotten a single
thing.
PRiMo LEVI, MOMENTS OF REPRIEVE 10-11 (Ruth Feldman trans., 1986).
406 SHRIVER, supra note 358, at 119. Eric Stein formulates the dilemma in the
terms of recent conservative German historians concerning the need for national selfconfidence:
To allow the sense of responsibility to vanish from the collective memory
would distort history and would harbor the danger of new excesses. [But]
[t]o make people wallow in nightmares of guilt so as to impair the selfconfidence of the young and their positive view of the future might bring
about a destructive backlash against democratic institutions. The problem
is one of a delicate balance; there is perhaps a modest role for law and the
courts in helping to maintain it.
Stein, supra note 17, at 321-22.
407
See Eduardo Rabossi, Algunas Reflexidnes, a Modo de Prdlogo, in USOS DEL
OLVIDO: COMUNICACIONES AL COLOQUIO DE ROYAUMONT 7, 10 (Yosef H. Yerushalmi
et al. eds., 1989); Tarnopolsky, supra note 155, at A19 (noting the coincidence that
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[T]he notion that terrible and extraordinary events are particularly
fecund in historical lessons derives from a conception of history
that expects to find it charged with meaning, like a good melo[But history] has little to teach us about the meaning
drama ....
of terror, apart from the obvious fact that it has been used many
times before in the nation's crusades, and [our recent experience
of] terror has little to teach us about our older history, except to
record yet again that we generally prefer to forget all about it
408

Like the Bourbons, we are unlikely to learn anything from such
a past, on this account, even if we forget nothing of it. Like U.S.
foreign policymakers in the mid-1960s, we may find that the
seemingly straightforward lessons of World War II leave us
conceptually ill-equipped for coping with the ensuing age-one of
colonial insurrection, in which virtually all the rules of the
geopolitical game were changed. 40 9 Those who remember the past
receive no guarantee that it shall not be repeated, to them or by
"If
them, Santayana's famous platitude notwithstanding. 4 10
anything.., too sharp a sense of one's own victimization can easily
lead to a compensatory urge to tyrannize over others, and those
convinced of their unique victimhood are quite likely to prove
tyrants both to themselves and to others if given a chance," one
author has recently observed. n
Law Against Apocalyptic History
The notion of in extremis veritas, that the most essential truthsof broadest import and relevance-are discovered only through the
most extreme tests at the darkest times, is surely "an unexamined

the judge who recently awarded a $3 million judgment to the one surviving family
member of one of the disappeared shares the name of Borges's fictional character,
Funes, for whom, she writes "the burden of memory becomes his torment and
undoing, as it has been Argentina's").
"'
Halperin, supra note 220, at 94.
4
09 See YUEN FOONG KHONG, ANALOGIES AT WAR:

KOREA, MUNICH, DIEN BIEN

PHU, AND THE VIETNAM DECISIONS OF 1965, at 209-50 (1992).

410 Santayana observed: "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned
to repeat it." 1 GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON 12 (1905).
411 BERNSTEIN, supra note 203, at 88.
Bernstein is specifically referring
to particular demands by minority groups for changes in university curricula and to
the statements offered by black U.C. Berkeley students who bragged of participating
in the Los Angeles riots following the state-court acquittal of Rodney King's
assailants.
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and deeply false commonplace." 412
the Holocaust:

As Peter Novick suggests of

Lessons for dealing with the sort of issues that confront us in
ordinary life, public or private, are not likely to be found, I would
think, in this most extraordinary of events. But mine is obviously
a minority view: Holocaust education, "confrontation" with the
Holocaust, most recently, via viewing Schindler's List, is presented
as a promising way of addressing a staggering array of social
ilIs.41 3
This is an inherent danger, I would add, of excessive reliance on
storytelling, on the moral intuitions a poignant well-told story will
arouse, at the expense of more careful, precise analysis.
If criminal prosecutions inevitably become the focus and forum
for such lesson-mongering, they may simply be a nistake, a
misguided expenditure of great effort, energy, and emotion.
Judicial judgments possess a feature that makes them particularly
vulnerable to abuse in this fashion:- they do not merely pass
judgment upon the past, but articulate social norms in ways
designed to be binding upon the future. They authoritatively
establish and reformulate the norms by which present activity is to
proceed. For that reason, judicial judgments lend force to anyone
who can persuasively invoke them-albeit by broad analogy-within
the larger forum of political debate, interpreting them in support
of a particular position on current controversies.
On the other hand, the law's preoccupation with precedent
forces even the most extreme injustices, the most radical evil, to be
apprehended in terms of something that has gone before, and hence
to be approached in a willfully "prosaic" way. This is normally seen
as a vice by critics of liberal law, who view lawyers as plodding
dullards, insistent on forcing every historical novelty into the
414
Procrustean bed of professional tradition.
But this lawyerly disposition can also be a virtue, 415 discourag42

" Id. at 94. For instance, novelist Ernesto Sibato, in the prologue to the official
report of the Argentine "truth commission," proclaims that "[g]reat catastrophes are
always instructive." NUNCA MAS, supra note 16, at 6.
4' Novick, supra note 298, at 13.
414 See ARENDT, supra note 18, at 276-79, 287-96.
41S An eloquent, even poetic, defense of such prosaics is offered by BERNSTEIN,
supra note 203, at 120-22. See generally DAVID G. ROSKIES, AGAINST THE APOCALYPSE:
RESPONSES TO CATASTROPHE IN MODERNJEWISH CULTURE (1984) (showing howJewish
writers and artists have reworked traditional genres and materials-prophetic, gnostic,
cultic, and mystical-to represent historical catastrophe since the destruction of the
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ing unduly apocalyptic interpretations of the past and extravagant
readings of its relevance to quotidian questions. Criminal proceedings might actually serve as a useful counterweight to the pervasive
tendency of political actors, especially partisan intellectuals, to
exaggerate the scope of the "lessons" to be gleaned from such an
"historic" experience, and to read the precedential value of those
lessons far too capaciously.
When partisans invoke a legal precedent-"the lessons of
Nuremberg," for instance-in political debate, they rarely confine
their exhortations to an explication of the judicial record itself. But
judges invite such expansive readings of their opinions when, in the
interests of collective memory and monumental didactics, they
admit evidence, or engage in fact-finding, beyond the scope of what
is strictly necessary to apply the law. In short, judicial efforts at
writing administrative massacre into the national narrative necessarily lend themselves to the most wide-ranging of later utilizations.
The terrible episode and the courts' judgments upon it begin to
"hover over" the most diverse of subsequent events and controversies, in ways that threaten to escalate the most routine disputes
among reasonable people into apocalyptic conflagrations and holy
wars.
The scope of history's teachings from such an episode, like those
of a leading case and its judicial opinion,4 16 must be treated as
Discursive
subject to a range of legitimate disagreement. 4 17
democracy requires that people be able to engage in a civil
exchange of competing views about just what should be learned by
whom from such a national experience. This fails to occur either
when the victims claim a monopoly over the meaning of the event,
brooking no disagreement over its interpretation and the reach of
its relevance, or when partially complicit parties treat the legal
Second Temple).
416 A classic statement of the omnipresent availability of both broad and narrow
readings of a legal precedent is presented by KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE

66-69 (1951).
Whatever their weaknesses in other respects, poststructuralist histories
(beginning with Foucault's) at least never risk exaggerating the legitimate claims of
the past upon the present. But they skirt this danger only by succumbing to a version
of its opposite. All prior claims to truth are viewed, instead, as mere expressions of
indefensible power; all alleged discoveries and resulting knowledge about the nature
of "man" are dismissed as reflecting only the particular configuration of professional
and disciplinary interests prevalent during specific historical periods, viewed as
entirely discontinuous with our own.
BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY
417
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condemnation of others as irrelevant to a moral assessment of their
own conduct during the period.
For an example of the first of these problems, consider the
following pronouncement. Israeli President Menachem Begin told
his Cabinet, on the eve of war in Lebanon: "'You know what I have
done and what we have all done to prevent war and loss of life. But
such is our fate in Israel. There is no way other than to fight
selflessly. Believe me, the alternative is Treblinka.' 4 i s To this use
of collective memory, an Israeli philosopher responds:
Such a commemoration enforces the hawkish psychology of
paranoia corrected by aggression.... It is also handy for relaxing
the moral demands made on [ourselves] .... [t]his is a politically
suicidal use of memory, that forgetfulness would better serve the
national interest than [such] fatalism.... The memory of the
Holocaust should be banished from political discourse. For the
memory of such a nightmare is deranging. A political system
cannot sanely function with Auschwitz as one of its central terms.
If there are political lessons to be learned from the Holocaust, let
419
the criminals ponder them, not the victims.
In short, if collective memory of national tragedy will be invoked
only for divisive, aggressive, or fatalistic purposes, it is better to
forget, to institute an informal "gag rule" making such invocations
420
taboo in debate of current policy.
Begin's words, as Halbertal interprets them, reflect a disposition
toward partisan use of the past that has had a partial analogue in
postwar France, where this disposition has come to be called rdsistantialisme.421 This is the belief that wartime resistance to the
418 Halbertal, supra note 169, at 46.
419

Id.; see also LACAPRA, supra note 156, at 63 (observing that "the Holocaust may
serve as 'symbolic capital' or as a pretext for self-serving monumentalization").
Novick elaborates:
Where once it was said that the life of Jews would be a "light unto the
nations"-the bearer of universal lessons-now it is said to be the "darkness
unto the nations" of the death ofJews that carries universal lessons. There
is a good deal of confusion, and sometimes acrimonious dispute, over what
these lessons are, but that has in no way diminished confidence that the
lessons are urgent.
Novick, supra note 298, at 9.
420 Begin's statement is also objectionable, from a religious perspective, in that it
places the dead in the service of the living, viewing their memory not as intrinsically
worthy of reverence, but worthy primarily in terms of its current utility. See ALAIN
FINKIELKRAUT, THE IMAGINARYJEW 54 (1994).
421See Rousso, supra note 26, at 28-30, 59.

A similar phenomenon has recently
emerged in Eastern Europe. One journalist observes:
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Nazis displayed the superior moral insight and courage of its
participants in a way that authorizes them thereafter to speak for
the nation with great moral authority on virtually any national
controversy. In more sympathetic terms, it is the disposition to
trust, and sometimes defer to, the conscience of those who
displayed this virtue when it was most needed by the nation and
42 2
most lacking in its officials.
But in claiming to have spoken for the nation in its time of trial,
such people could not very well acknowledge that most of the
nation did not actually stand behind them in support. The French
and Italian Communist Parties, for instance, "had no objection to
exaggerating the resistance record of the mass of the French or
Italians, so long as they could themselves inherit the benefits of this
illusion at the voting booth and in the national memory."423
The implication of risistantialismeis that active resistance to the
unequivocal evil of state-sponsored mass murder provides the
touchstone by which many later controversies may be understood
and judged. This assumption, as Rousso observes, encouraged the
making of many strained and faulty analogies between present and
prior problems throughout postwar French history. 24 It also
fostered simplistic "interventions" by the most prominent French
intellectuals, invoking their rdsistantialistecredentials, in genuinely
complicated matters of public policy on which they had little
knowledge or, for that matter, moral sense. 425 Like Begin's
invocation of Treblinka to explain and justify the invasion of

The struggle to define the past is one of the most important ways eastern
Europeans compete for control of the present. These [competing] myths
about the past are being constantly rewritten to fit the current political
debate. Indeed, many political parties define themselves entirely in terms
of the past: "We were the dissidents!" or "Trust us to be toughest on the
Communists!" At times these claims are true. Often they merely reflect a
very human forgetfulness of one's own complicity.
ROSENBERG, supra note 160, at xiv-xv.
" Consider, for instance, the following 1943 editorial from Combat: "'On the
morrow of the Liberation, France will pose this question to each of her sons: what
did you do during the years of shame and misery? And it is on the basis of their
answer.., that she will choose those who will have the honor of representing her.'"
NOVICK, supra note 351, at 36 (citation omitted).
4
.Judt, supra note 294, at 91.
424 See Rousso, supra note 26, at 28-30.
42 On the history of such intellectual interventions, see generally TONYJUDT, PAST
IMPERFECT: FRENCH INTELLECTUALS, 1944-1956 (1992). For German analogues, see
CONTENDING WITH HITLER: VARIETIES OF GERMAN RESISTANCE IN THE THIRD REICH
(David C. Large ed., 1991).
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Lebanon, this too was an abuse of collective memory. If public
prosecutions of French collaborators were not employed to such
didactic ends, this was only because elite complicity had been so
extensive as largely to foreclose their political possibility, until all
but a handful of potential defendants had expired.42 6 The French
courts thus deserve no credit for not allowing the law's abuse by
rgsistantialisme.
Debts to the Dead: A Dangerous Metaphor
In Argentina, there has been a similar and equally powerful
tendency to view the dirty war, that is, its "proper understanding,"
as a moral guidepost to present and future controversies of the
most disparate kind. This is especially true of Ms. Hebe de
Bonafini, president of Las Madres de Plaza d; Mayo. In her public
pronouncements, she does not hesitate to invoke the disappeared,
and the political causes for which her sons agitated, in service of
controversies as far-afield as wage disputes between labor and
427
management, and questions of foreign economic policy.
Memory of the dirty war became, for such family members of
the disappeared, a bloody shirt to be waved at every possible
opportunity, to gain the moral high ground in political arguments
of all sorts. Their profound suffering was taken (by themselves, if
not generally by their opponents) to reflect the greater profundity
of their moral and political insight, to confer not only spiritual
strength, but also an ethical advantage in debate-an asserted
superiority that, of course, did not at all follow from the fact of
their greater suffering.
Family members of the disappeared were widely recognized as
national spokesmen for human rights concerns, to be sure. For this
reason, their leaders were understandably tempted to enhance their
influence by turning virtually every political controversy into one
"about human rights." The broader the reading given the dirty war
426

See ROBERT

0.

PAXTON, VICHY FRANCE: OLD GUARD AND NEW ORDER 1940-

1944, at 332-46, 381-83 (1972) (describing the extensiveness of complicity among
several
sectors of French society).
4
27

See ALEJANDRO DIAGO, HEBE: MEMORIA Y ESPERANZA (1988).

For a balanced

assessment of Ms. Bonafini's leadership, superior to the already vast hagiographic
literature, see MARIFRAN CARLSON, EVIL IN THE SOUTHERN CONE: INTERVIEWS WITH
THE SURVIVORS AND WITNESSES OF THE ARGENTINE DIRTY WAR (forthcoming 1996).

See also BRYSK, supra note 16, at 73 (quoting Hebe de Bonafini in her objection to
forensic exhumation techniques: "'We reject exhumations, because we want to know
who the murderers are-we already know who the murdered are'").
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as precedent, binding on the present, the greater the political power
of those who could plausibly claim to invoke its memory. It is
scarcely surprising, then, that other political contenders would seek
to ally themselves with such groups, in hopes of benefiting from the
considerable resonance the Madres and other human rights
organizations enjoyed within Argentine politics in the mid-1980s.
In this way, the Madres became closely allied with leftist political
4 28
parties, who sought to use them for their own ends.
These are highly sensitive matters, so it is important to be
precise about what is objectionable here. There would have been
nothing untoward had the Madres merely chosen to take up the
particular political causes for which their loved ones had fought on
the grounds that those causes were justified.4 21 What is objectionable about invocations of the disappeared in contemporary
Argentine debate is the implication that the country owes a moral
debt to the victims and their families that can be repaid not by
mourning, nor even by prosecution of the perpetrators, but only in
deference to the beliefs of those who were murdered in the
country's name. It was problematic enough to demand that the law
punish all culpable parties. As Bernstein notes, "because it is so
dismissive of temporal development and historical context, any

ideology that endows victimhood with a singular authority to make
claims upon others who were not themselves the agents of the injury
430
strikes [us] as morally incoherent."
428

See BRYSK, supra note 16, at 123-27, 129; EMILIO F. MIGNONE, DERECHOS

HUMANOS Y SOCIEDAD: EL CASO ARGENTINO 97-124 (1991). Such affiliations
provoked a split within the Madres, and the formation of a subgroup (the Fundadores)
which opposes what it regards as overbroad invocations of the dirty war's lessons.
Each group marches separately, every Thursday, in the Plaza de Mayo. The chief
organization of human rights lawyers, Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales, was even
infiltrated by active guerrilla groups. See BRYSK, supra note 16, at 118-21. One
prominent lawyer-activist, for instance, was among the participants in a 1989 attack
on the La Tablada garrison, during which several draftees and noncommissioned
officers were killed. See id.
"' Publications by the Madres and related groups often adopt this line. Deborah
Norden provides several examples. See Deborah L. Norden, Between Coups and
Consolidation: Military Rebellion in Post-Authoritarian Argentina (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California (Berkeley)). As Norden notes, "the
radical factions of the Madres and Familiares injured their own credibility, by
simultaneously portraying the disappeared as innocent victims of a cruel and
unwarranted repression, and as heroes fighting for ajust cause," a cause they often
describe as "'the defeat of imperialism.'" Id. at 182.
430 BERNSTEIN, supra note 203, at 93.
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Promiscuous use of collective memory in contemporary
Argentina is not confined to the left, however. Sympathizers of the
officer corps, for instance, soon founded an organization, FAMUS,
to commemorate soldiers killed by leftist guerrillas in the 1970s.411
It holds religious masses in the soldiers' honor every month,
officiated by sympathetic clergy. Speeches follow. In the mid1980s, these speeches invariably denounced Alfonsin, the "liberals,"
"social democrats," "the Jews" behind him, and the "pornographic
democracy" established by the new civilian administration." 2 The
organization, its creators explained, was
founded because of the increasing loss of memory by Argentine
society concerning those who died in its defense. We have been
moved by fear that the sacrifice of our loved ones' lives will be
forgotten. We found this organization with the aim of permanently commemorating those who valiantly confronted subversive
terrorism ....
We also dedicate ourselves to the indefatigable
defense of the moral, spiritual, and political values for which they
gave their lives. 433
Its goal, in short, is collective memory. Specifically, the goal is
to restore a form of social solidarity in which shared remembrance
and celebration of the victorious war against leftist terrorism would
provide the common core of value-consensus. Until Menem's
pardons, the ritual life of the organization focused on its denunciations of Alfonsin's military prosecutions.4 " 4 The liberalism of
the law thus became the symbolic centerpiece of its demonology.
The continuing influence of "subversion" within the country's
educational and cultural elite was also frequently decried at such
43 5
gatherings.
The enduring subversion in these quarters was thought to be
responsible for historical distortions of the dirty war disseminated
by the courts, public schools, and mass media, who defamed those
killed in the war against it. They claimed that war must continue
unabated in order to honor their name, and to foster national
memory of the cause they served. The institution of the "blood
feud," after all, is based on the all-consuming memory of a grievance originating in the distant past, that is, based on an inability to

4s See

4

FAMUS, OPERACION INDEPENDENCIA (1988).
Elon, Letterfrom Argentina, NEW YORKER, July 21, 1986, at 74, 82-83.

1 See Amos

4ss

FAMUS, supra note 431, at acknowledgment page (translation by author).

414 See Elon,
435 See id.

supra note 432, at 82.
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put aside what any reasonable person in a modern liberal society
would prefer to forget. 416 Criminal trials originated largely to put
an end to such processes, not to escalate them.
While some succumb to overbroad readings of precedent, others
often fall victim to the opposite peril: too narrow a reading. This
takes the form of a pervasive tendency toward self-flattering denial
of one's own measure of complicity. 417 Since only a few will ever
be prosecuted, the many who collaborated in myriad ways are
discouraged from any serious self-examination. In fact, they often
prominently join the ranks of the accusers, hurling invective at the
former rulers whose policies they implemented and whose lies they
43 8
chose to believe.
The trials of political and military chieftains are seen merely as
applying legal rules of properly delimited scope to those who have
violated them, rather than as embodying larger principles of liberal
morality pertinent to assessing their own conduct. In short, such
people underestimate the scope of the lessons properly to be
learned from such legal proceedings. The danger here is not that
the audience will prove unreceptive to the courtroom drama, but on
the contrary, that it will prove all too responsive to the unduly
circumscribed character of the narrative frame.
Thus, even when such proceedings succeed in summoning up
the collective conscience, as Durkheim hypothesized, they may do
so only in a way that unduly narrows the public understanding of
the principles thus reinvigorated. This peril was especially apparent
in the French public's receptivity to the conviction of Klaus Barbie
who, as a German, enabled Frenchmen to point the accusatory
finger at others, to evade any confrontation with the historical

41

On blood feuds as quasilegal institutions, see

BLOODTAKING AND PEACEMAKING:

WILLIAM I. MILLER,
FEUD, LAW, AND SOCIETY IN SAGA ICELAND 179-

257 (1990). On the link between revenge and anamnesia (the inability to forget), see
generally Rebecca N. Comay, Redeeming Revenge: Nietzsche, Benjamin, Heideggerand
the Politicsof Memoiy, in NIETZSCHE As POSTMODERNIST 21 (Clayton Koelb ed., 1990).
Argentine sociologist Juan Carlos Torre recently predicted "that Argentine society
would probably never come to terms with the dirty war but would 'continue with this
open wound and carry it around with us for centuries.'" Calvin Sims, Argentina to
Issue New List of Missing in 'Dirty War', N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1995, at A4. On some
of the extremities to which this process now extends, including the adoption ofJewish
names by German gentiles, see Jane Kramer, Letter from Germany: The Politics of
Memoy, NEW YORKER, Aug. 14, 1995, at 48, 49-50.
437 For an example, see EMILIO F. MIGNONE, IGLESIA Y DICTADURA: EL PAPEL DE
LA IGLESIA A LA LUZ DE Sus RELACIONES CON EL R9GIMEN MILITAR (2d ed. 1986)
(detailing
the extensive complicity of the Catholic Church in the dirty war).
4
8 See infra text accompanying note 449.
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reality of French collaboration, and to reinvigorate the Gaullist myth
of national purity.
Even when the defendant was unavoidably French, as in the trial
of Paul Touvier, the French courts eagerly contributed to national
efforts at moral evasion by interpreting the Nuremberg Charter to
require the defendant to have acted in compliance with the orders
of an Axis power.4" 9 Acts motivated by anti-Semitism of purely
French inspiration were thereby excluded from the definition of
"crimes against humanity."44
Touvier was therefore criminally
liable, as a matter of law, only to the extent that he was shown to
have acted under German hegemony. Again, the story was told in
such a way that the Germans became the real culprits, the French
merely their long-suffering agents and grudging instruments.
Reading Precedent Restrictively
Criminal prosecution itself can, paradoxically, facilitate selfdeception through active misreading and misremembering. In
eliciting and focusing the punitive sentiments of the many upon the
very few, criminal trials thus tend not only to distort historical
recollection by the general population, but also to discourage the
discursive deliberation essential to liberal memory and solidarity.
This is particularly apparent in how judicial condemnation of
Germany's leaders at Nuremberg assisted many Central and Eastern
Europeans-even those who had collaborated most extensively with
44 1
Jewish deportations-to view themselves as victims of Nazism.
Ajapanese historian similarly observes that, "[b]y thrusting the full
responsibility onto the few who were executed, the Japanese
effectively absolved themselves of any blame."442 The past can
have little relevance to the present when it is understood as a story
about how the evil few led the innocent many astray.
By declining to discuss official policies of the 1930s and 1940s,
Japan has rendered many of its citizens virtually incapable of
debating the question of when military power may defensibly be
employed. Today, few students will engage in the discussion, on
49
1

See Wexler, supra note 316, at 361-63.

440 Wexler offers an able doctrinal analysis and critique of how this legal

conclusion was reached. See id. at 353-62.
41 SeeJudt, supra note
442

294, at 87.
Yoshimi, supra note 368, at A23.
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account of the pacifist reading of the War predominant among

young Japanese.4 48
This is the wrong variety of societal self-reckoning, for as it has
been observed of collaboration under long-lasting despotic regimes,
"the line usually did not run clearly between Us and Them, but
rather through the heart of each man and woman." 444 Alfonsin's
top legal advisor, Malamud-Goti, now concludes that the danger of
scapegoating a handful of aging elites is almost intrinsic to the
bipolar logic of criminal law, with its insistence on dividing the
world into mutually exclusive categories of people: legally, into
445
guilty and innocent; sociologically, into blamers and blamed.
These binary oppositions were deployed with brilliant casuistry
by political elites in postwar France to minimize the moral questions
raised by pervasive Nazi collaboration. Both De Gaulle and the
metropolitan Resistance demanded prosecution of high-ranking
Vichy officials. 44' To justify such prosecution as consistent with the
law (of treason and sedition) required a finding that P6tain's Third
Republic had been established by unconstitutional means. 447 But
that conclusion entailed a corollary very convenient for collaborators not in the dock. Because the Vichy regime was illegal ab initio,
none of its villainous acts-even those receiving defacto endorsement
by a majority of Frenchmen-could be ascribed to France itself.
Since it had come to power through defects of constitutional
procedure, it could not be said to represent the true will of the
French people.
On such attitudes, see BURUMA, supra note 165, at 92-111.
444 Ash, supra note 162, at 22 (paraphrasing Viiclav Havel).
441

" But in seeing the problem as inherent in law, he explicitly assumes that legal
discourse must retain its formalist contours. In other words, he assumes that even
when courts judge administrative massacre, their deliberation and reasoning may
entertain only such considerations recognized as relevant by positive law, not the
wider range of factors admittedly indispensable to moral and political judgment of
such events. See MALAMUD-GOTI, supra note 103, at 269-70. In this regard, he
displays the jurisprudential commitment to positivist formalism. This commitment
has long been characteristic of Latin American liberals. It is due to their considerable
experience with the "naturalist" jurisprudence of courts during periods of authoritarian rule. See MarkJ. Osiel, Dialogue with Dictators: JudicialResistance in Argentina
and Brazil, 20 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 481, 495 (1995).
4 See LOTrMAN, supra note 288, at 32-43.
447 On the arguments employed by French legal scholars to reach this conclusion,
see NOVICK, supra note 351, at 21-24 (noting the "peculiar constitutional theory,

which was to be thejuridical foundation of the future Provisional Government, and,
pari passu, of the purge").

1995]

ADMINISTRATIVE MASSACRE

Even if this France of innocent purity was a pure abstraction, it
was the law's abstraction, hence highly authoritative when later
invoked in political debate. It was the corollary of legal fictions
thought necessary to convict the Nazis' most obvious henchmen.
The very doctrines employed to ascribe legal responsibility to a few
Frenchmen were thus increasingly employed in moral and political
argument to absolve the rest. For instance, President Franiois
Mitterand's self-serving contention of only last year: "The Republic
had nothing to do with this [Jewish deportation]. I do not believe
France is responsible."44 In this way, the trials themselves played
into the propensity for self-deception, so powerful in the aftermath
of collective catastrophe, by inviting an unduly narrow reading of
their lessons.
The Argentine experience in this connection is similarly
disconcerting. The trial of the Argentine juntas did not, by any
means, put an end to manifestations of willful blindness about the
pervasiveness of public sympathy for despotic rule. The very
effectiveness of the junta trial in influencing present and future
memory of the dirty war induced many Argentines to revise their
prior memory of the period in more flattering terms. In the mid1980s (shortly after public revelation of massive disappearances),
Argentine sociologist Guillermo O'Donnell observed, when
revisiting respondents he had interviewed years before during
military rule, that:
[a]ll of them "remembered" what they had told us before in a way
that sharply contrasted with what they had actually told us. They
were wrong, but evidently sincere, as they had been sincere before,
in telling us, in the reinterviews, that they had always strongly
opposed the regime and had never accepted its injunctions. In the
first interviews those respondents had given distressing responses
to our probings concerning the abductions, tortures and murders
that were going on: these were only "rumors" or "exaggerations"
and, at any event, "there must be some reason" why some persons
were so victimized....
... [T]hey had rewritten their memories to fit [the] discovery
[of what they felt they should have believed during the years of
harsh repression]. The sense of continuity of their personal
identity was preserved and, thus, they could look at the past
without conscious guilt or shame[. T]hey... had known little or
nothing of those atrocities....
441 Simons, supra note

291, at A3.
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... This, at least, preserved them.., for the moment when it
eventually would become not too dangerous to "know" and, thus,
to become indignant about what had happened.... [Through
selective memory they imagined] that they had "always" been
opposed to the regime .... 449

It is scarcely surprising, then, that the military juntas felt they
had been betrayed by a convenient failure in collective memory
concerning the public connivance the juntas had once enjoyed. In
his closing statement to the court, Admiral Massera thus bitterly
denounced the "fickleness" of Argentina's memory, a charge that
O'Donnell's research painfully substantiates.4 50
When a mass
circulation newspaper in Buenos Aires first printed notice of
numerous disappearances (tentatively testing the waters, in 1978),
thousands of readers canceled their subscriptions.4 5 '
Discursive deliberation cannot get off the ground if people
simply "tune out" messages they don't wish to hear. O'Donnell
provides a reminder that "identification with the aggressor and
blaming the victim," and their origins in rationalization and
cognitive dissonance, were identified long ago in studies of Nazi
Germany. 452
He might have added that the self-congratulatory
revisionism that often follows, which his interviewees display,
bespeaks a recurrent feature of transitions from authoritarianism to
democracy.
The French case is notorious in this regard:
a
substantial portion of the adult wartime survivors "remember"
453
having assisted the Resistance in significant ways.

44 Guillermo O'Donnell, On the Fruitful Convergences of Hirschman's Exit, Voice,
and Loyalty and Shifting Involvements: Reflections from the Recent Argentine
Experience, in DEVELOPMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND THE ART OF TRESPASSING: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN 249, 264-65 (Alejandro Foxley et al. eds., 1986).

Malamud-Goti makes a similar observation regarding public enthusiasm for thejunta
trial: "Only in the sense of stifling a widely shared guilt, shame and anguish in
the common knowledge that it was the same disappeared who we ought to censure
did blame contribute to ... social solidarity." MALAMUD-GOTI, supra note 103, at
259-60.
4
' See O'Donnell, supra note 449, at 264.
451 See Vezzetti, supra note 80, at 5. The news article appeared in mid-1978.
452 See O'Donnell, supra note 449, at 264. He is presumably alluding to the
influential study by MrTsCHERLICH & MrrSCHERLICH, supra note 404, at 1-67, which
sought to show that many Germans had managed to block out any memory of having
glorified Hitler.
41- See Stanley Hoffman, Foreword to RousSo, supra note 26, at vii, vii-viii.
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Overcoming Willful Blindness
The only way in which trials for administrative massacre
have thus far been able to overcome such thick layers of willful
blindness, as manifested by O'Donnell's interviewees, is by selfconscious use of powerful dramatical devices, particularly film. The
quintessential case of its use was at Nuremberg, where Allied
prosecutors showed "German Concentration Camps" to the
Tribunal.4 54 The film ends with footage of a bulldozer pushing
enormous mounds of human bodies into a mass grave at BergenBelsen. When the court adjourned for the day at the completion of
the showing, several of the defendants were seen stifling tears. 55
One scholar observes,
whatever evasions and duplicities permitted a person to sweep the
camps from his or her frame of vision cannot survive contact with
the world captured on [this] film.... [It] does not simply instruct
or produce visual knowledge of atrocity; rather, it overwhelms
one's senses, creating an irrefutable imprint upon the mind, a
trauma of sight.... The corpses force their memory upon the
coward's mind.4 56
Where the perpetrators still hold considerable power, however,
as did the Argentine military during the junta trial, prosecutorial
stagecraft is more likely to work by understatement, by more subtle
appeals to conscience, than by such efforts to overpower the senses
and defense mechanisms. Although many mass graves had been
uncovered in Argentina by the time of the junta trial, no such
cinematic images were employed to elicit support for the junta trial.
Such images had earlier been selectively broadcast as part of the
"Truth Commission" report. However, they were preceded by
remarks from Alfonsfn's conservative Interior Minister, who situated
the military's crimes in the context of the guerrilla violence. 5 7
Although Alfonsfn allowed state television to broadcast the junta
trial, he insisted that coverage be confined to photographic images
454 See 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL, supra note 346, at 104, 121, 431-33, 536 (originally shown at

Nuremberg, 1945-1946).
4s See ANN TUSA &JOHN TUSA, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL 160 (1984).
4' Douglas, supra note 272 (manuscript at 49). The same film was also shown at
the 45
Eichmann
trial.
7 See
BRYSK, supra note 16, at 71.
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and exclude the harrowing oral testimony. 5 Nino confides that
4 59
this was for fear of aggravating military tempers.
Propensities for faulty analogy and self-deception, for overbroad
and overly narrow readings of the precedent, pose problems for
liberal law that are intertwined. On one hand, if the law contents
itself with a narrow notion of responsibility, punishing only a small
portion of culpable parties, it reinforces the powerful inclination of
many others toward self-deception, that is, against any enduring
recognition of their own, genuine moral failures and what might be
learned from them.
On the other hand, if the law endorses a very broad reading of
these moral failures and of their attendant lessons, it will necessarily
be asked to accomplish things far beyond its power-and will then
be condemned for failing to achieve them. Legal proceedings
cannot, for instance, convict an entire society, unmask the international economic system allegedly responsible for the dirty war, or
bring back the dead-all longstanding and continuing demands of
460
Las Madres de Plaza de Mayo and their political sympathizers.
Criminal law cannot further social solidarity if the story it tells
exculpates most of the morally culpable parties-either through
political prudence or because they are "culpable" in ways that liberal
jurisprudence does not recognize. That story-ofa few "bad apples"
leading the innocent nation astray-will be persuasively attacked by
good journalists, historians, and social scientists (like O'Donnell
effectively does) as incomplete, as concealing more extensive
complicities, to which its judicial narrators become accessories after
46 1

the fact.

But the alternative narrative is no less problematic. The law
cannot hope to further social solidarity if its story promises a
"happy ending"-by punishing all responsible parties, however
numerous-that it cannot deliver. The law cannot provide anything
but the most morally compromised narrative because what is most
urgently desired by those seeking a complete accounting (such as
the Madres), is a thorough condemnation of all those sharing any
responsibility for the atrocities-plus a publicly enforced recollection
of the enduring "debts" to victims and their families thus incurred.
41 See Interviews with Argentine Presidential Legal Advisors, in Buenos Aires,
Argentina
(Aug. 1985).
4 59
4

See NINO, supra note 30.

1

See BRYSK, supra note 16, at 124-25.

461 See O'Donnell, supra note 449, at 263-65.
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The courts' credibility in telling a national story, one that will
powerfully shape collective memory, is thus alternately threatened
by the narrowness or breadth of the narrative framing. The broader
narrative framing is politically imprudent, to the point of imperiling
the new democratic regime were a court to try telling it. The
narrower framing, however, is politically unpersuasive because it
must rely upon distinctions in degrees of culpability likely to be
publicly perceived as logically weak or morally indefensible.
Between the broader and narrower story lines, there may be no
stable middle ground for courts to occupy.
In seeking to influence collective memory of administrative
massacre, then, judges and prosecutors need to be able publicly to
acknowledge and explain the law's limits and potentialities, even as
they go about performing their more fundamental tasks. More
readily than the Durkheimian view, the discursive conception of
law's service to social solidarity can confront the differing views
about the scope of the law's legitimate aims in such circumstances.
It can also confront the recalcitrant reality of enduring disagreement, in the aftermath of administrative massacre, over how broadly
the lessons of the country's recent horrors should be interpreted.
The discursive conception, after all, allows for solidarity despite
continuing disagreement about such things as whether the precedent established by the recent past and binding upon the present is
fairly applicable to any particular question of public policy that may
arise in the future.
It bears mention, in conclusion, that uncritical over-reliance on
the purported "lessons of history" is a danger against which the
most influential versions of liberalism, such as Kant's, have always
been well-guarded.4 62 The notion of a hypothetical social contract, for instance, forces one to start afresh, stripped of historical
grievances and prejudices, to reason from a moral point of view,
without appeal to prior status as (victimizing) power or (powerless)
victim.
462

46 3

(Norman K. Smith trans.,
1964) ("Nothing is more reprehensible than to derive the laws prescribingwhat ought
to be done from what is done, or to impose upon them the limits by which the latter is
circumscribed."); see also WILuAM A. GALSTON, KANT AND THE PROBLEM OF HISTORY
36-37 (1975) (contending that Kant, in contrast to much Greek classical thought,
"denies that experience can serve as a guide"); LARMORE, supra note 193, at 1-5
(observing Kant's inconsistent views on the usefulness of examples in moral
reasoning).
"" If anything, liberal moral philosophy almost certainly undervalues what can be
See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 313
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D. Breaking with the Past, Through Guilt and Repentance
There is a fourth source of skepticism about the extent to which
criminal prosecution of administrative massacre can contribute to
collective memory. Is it possible, whether by legal judgment or other
means, to construct group identity upon shared recollection of
moral failure?
We know that a group can create a myth of refounding, a
complete break with the past, that does not entail any recognition
of responsibility for its wrongs, that is, of the good reasons it might
have for wishing to break with its past in the first place. The
German Democratic Republic provides the clearest case. Communist leaders there consistently affirmed, in thousands of speeches
and declarations over forty-five years, that their citizens bore no
responsibility for Nazism or the Holocaust; these had resulted from
fascism and capitalism, with which the East had decisively broken
after the War. 4" They claimed that the new state, in fact, had
been founded by a victorious antifascist and anticapitalist movement, which had cleared the country of the reactionary elements
465
(that is, big business) responsible for past horrors.
Disingenuous denials of this sort have been distressingly
common in many societies. The legal act of creating a new
sovereign entity, where none had before existed, only contributes to
the delusion that the past has no claim upon the present. A
superficial legal rupture substitutes for a serious moral reckoning.
We also know that collective memory can be based on catastrophe; the role of the Holocaust in Israeli national identity makes that
clear. 46 6 In fact, it has been quite common for national groups to
foster internal cohesion among members by the authoritative telling
of stories-sometimes fanciful, often accurate-about the many
injustices done to its ancestors by other nations. The "notion of
having been victimized by the Germans," notes one leading

acquired from historical experience and its study, such as the virtue of seasoned
judgment. For an unusually explicit attempt to employ historiography to this end, see
generally RICHARD E. NEUSTADT & ERNEST R. MAY, THINKING IN TIME: THE USES OF
HISTORY FOR DECISION-MAKERS (1990).

4 See Frank Trommler, The Creation of Histoiy and the Refusal of the Past in the
GermanDemocratic Republic, in COPING WITH THE PAST: GERMANY AND AUSTRIA AFTER
1945, at 79, 86-87 (Kathy Harms et al. eds., 1990).
41 Only in its final years did East German leaders begin to acknowledge, in part,
the responsibility of their people for past injustices. See id. at 79.
' This is a central theme in both FRIEDLANDER, supra note 322, at 113-14, and
SEGEV, supra note 34, at 223-26.
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Europeanist, "became an absolutely indispensable staple of the
collective memories of most postwar European peoples, even those
significant in number who have in fact benefited from Germany's
power and presence during the Nazi era. " "' As a result, "victimization by the Germans developed into an essential pillar of the
468
'foundation myth' in these societies."
If criminal prosecution has not often been used to advance this
narrative purpose, this is only because it has usually proven
impossible to acquire jurisdiction over (that is, get one's hands on)
the alleged culprits. But resentment over the wrongs inflicted on
one's nation has often, nonetheless, been a fertile source of
collective self-definition, and self-assertion. 69 Shared memory of
the humiliation represented by the Versailles Treaty was evoked
with notorious success by Hitler himself, to resurrect German
identity in the aftermath of the First World War.47 0 Again, a legal
document became the focal point for a national myth of origin, here
one of refounding and reconstruction.
We know, moreover, that national identity can be constructed
on the basis of stories about the moral failings of a society's
founders. This is true even when these founders appear otherwise
heroic, even superhuman. After all, in ancient Greece, tragic
dramas for theatre were written about real events in the remembered past.
[T]he tragic dramatists of the Greek city-states were ... concerned
with reconstituting the history of their forefathers as tragic myth.
Prometheus and lo, and later Oedipus and Antigone, belong to an
antiquity which fifth-century Greeks could recognize as part of a
sacrificial struggle for their own collective identity. They are
47
legendary figures. '
17 Andrei S. Markovitz & Simon Reich, The Contemporary Power of Memory:
The Dilemmas of German Foreign Policy (Sept. 3, 1995) (paper presented at the
Annual Convention of the American Political Science Association).
463 Id.
411 On the central role of resentment in nationalist movements, see LIAH

GREENFELD,
NATIoNALIsM: FIVE ROADS TO MODERNITY
47

15-17, 222-28 (1992).

o See Erich Matthias, The Influence of the Versailles Treaty on the Internal
Development of the Weimar Republic, in GERMAN DEMOCRACY AND THE TRIUMPH OF
HITLER: ESSAYS IN RECENT GERMAN HISTORY 13, 22 (Anthony Nicholls & Erich
Matthias eds., 1971). For evidence in the autobiographies of Nazi activists, see
generally PETER H. MERKL, POLITICAL VIOLENCE UNDER THE SWASTIKA: 581 EARLY
NAzis
(1975).
47
, JOHN ORR, TRAGIC DRAMA AND MODERN SOCIETY: A SOCIOLOGY OF DRAMATIC
FORM FROM 1880 TO THE PRESENT at xiii (2d ed. 1989).
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The life history of such figures, imprinted in collective memory, can
function to forge identity and form character in mere mortals,
partly because the personal frailties of a given founder-his "tragic
flaw," in Aristotle's terms-often entail a one-sided exaggeration of
a virtue; his life history thus usefully instructs us, his successors, in
the merits of moderation and in the continuous need for critical
self-assessment even when-perhaps especially when-acting pursuant
to our most deeply held ideals and commitments.
What is much less clear, however, is whether national identity
can be constructed on the basis of shared acceptance of responsibility for wrongs one's own nation has done to others. Is it true, as
some lament,47 2 that memory of one's own grievances against
others is the only kind that can provide the mnemonic basis of
collective identity? Surely it can be no accident that such founding
myths almost invariably offer highly flattering accounts of the
nation's early accomplishments and the virtues displayed by its
founders. On most recountings, America's myth of origin does not
exactly give pride of place to the genocide of the Native American,
" 47
except perhaps if rendered as "subdu[ing] savages. 3
We are hardly alone in this type of omission. The writing and
telling of most national myths of origin entail acts of compulsory
"forgetfulness," notes Derrida,4 74 because the creation of most
nation-states has entailed acts of violent dispossession. What must
be forgotten in this process is not only the dispossession itself, but
also the notions of right, often embodied in customary law, on
which prior claims of possession and entitlement were based.
A nation's myths of its origins establish a "cult of continuity,"
one historian observes: "The greater the origins, the more they
magnified our greatness. Through the past we are venerated above
all ourselves."4 75 Providing such stories with a legal imprimatur,
47 See Novick, supra note 298.

"' Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES.

J.

1,8.
41 SeeJacques Derrida, Force of Law: The "MysticalFoundationof Authority" (Mary
Quaintance trans.), in DECONSTRUCTION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 3, 47
(Drucilla Cornell et al. eds., 1992); see also Ernest Renan, What Is a Nation?, in NATION
AND NARRATION 8, 11 (Homi K. Bhabha ed., 1990) (contending that to create and
unite a nation, such as France, requires inducing its members to "forget" the savage

conflicts, as between Protestants and Catholics in the 16th century, that have long
divided them). On the exclusionary aspects of leading cases establishing American
national identity, see PRISCILLA WALD, CONSTITUTING AMERICANS:
ANXIETY AND NARRATIVE FORM 22-37 (1995).

"' Nora, supra note 290, at 16.
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as by official holidays for their commemoration, grants them special
authority and solidarity-enhancing impact. To employ such an
occasion, like the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution, for serious
self-criticism of a society's foundational legal commitments is likely
to be regarded as ill-considered and inappropriate during such a
festive occasion, even by those otherwise sympathetic to the
substance of such criticism, as Justice Marshall learned.""6 What
has been here described as historical "balance," a nuanced judgment
of our collective strengths and weaknesses in relation to others, is
precisely what is least welcome at such moments."7
Professional historiography, to be sure, now explicitly distinguishes itself from popular memory on the basis of its more selfcritical capacities and on its willingness to turn a skeptical gaze
upon the self-congratulatory memory of the society that sponsors it
478
and upon the more celebratory accounts of earlier historians.
Even so, history textbooks for school children are self-consciously
aimed at constructing collective memory, and have almost everywhere been notoriously silent about the less glorious acts of the
famous dead. 7 ' A recent study of how Western and Eastern
4"6 Many editorialists criticized Marshall for his choice of timing, while sharing

much of his substantive view. See William B. Reynolds, Forthe Record, WASH. POST,
June 11, 1987, at A22;Jack Valenti, Despite Slavery, a Constitution That Built a Nation,
N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1987, at A27; Edwin M. Yoder Jr., That 'Defective' Constitution:
The Alternative Was a Lot Worse, WASH. POST, May 14, 1987, at A25.
"' More precisely, the sort of balance that is sought is aimed exclusively at
mitigating one's own wrongs, rather than a disinterested and impartial assessment.
Hence, the statement of Masao Horie, head of the Japanese Veterans Association, in
response to demands for a parliamentary apology for the country's war crimes: "'At
the 50th anniversary of the Dresden firebombing, in which many people died, I didn't
hear the Allies apologizing'.... 'And the U.S. dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki and killed huge numbers of innocent Japanese people, and never
apologized for this.'" Kristof, supra note 363, at E3. On August 14, 1995, for the
first time since the end of the war, theJapanese Prime Minister, "expressed 'heartfelt
apology,'" admitting that "Japan had 'through its colonial rule and invasion, caused
tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to
those of Asian nations.'" Sheryl WuDunn,Japanese Apology for War Is Welcomed and
Criticized, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1995, at A3 (quoting Prime Minister Tomiichi
Murayama). The Prime Minister rejected the possibility of compensating Japan's
victims, however, stating that such questions had been resolved by treaty with Asian
neighbors long ago. See id.
"¢See Nora, supra note 290, at 9 ("At the heart of history is a critical discourse
that is antithetical to spontaneous memory. History is perpetually suspicious of
memory."); see also YERUSHALMI, supra note 378, at 14-15 ("Even in the Bible ...
historiography is but one expression of the awareness that history is meaningful and
of the need to remember, and neither meaning nor memory ultimately depends upon
it.").
Until recently German textbooks in public schools exhibited "scant interest in
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Europeans remember the Holocaust, in textbooks and other media,
concludes: "In every country, every culture I explored, irrespective
of national character or political ideology . .. self-deception has
usually triumphed over self-revelation." 8 °
One may thus reasonably "wonder whether a national identity
can be built on guilt and repentance, bereft of the ordinary pride of
other nations.""' Opinion surveys suggest that many Germans
and Americans are "sick and tired of having to remember" 82 Nazi
crimes against the Jews, prompting one author to observe that:
Most human minds grow weary of negatives. They can absorb only
so much repetition of truths that are unwelcome from the
beginning. And this psychological reaction suggests that the
victims of any vast suffering should worry over the tactics as well as
483
the morality of their public protests against forgetfulness.

Whether criminal prosecution is an effective tactic toward this
end thus becomes an inescapable question. As Sheldon Wolin
observes, "a society which insisted upon periodically reviewing great
historical wrongs it had committed would probably invite all the
' 48 4
familiar metaphors about 'obsessively picking at its own scabs."'

the broader circles of complicity involved in murdering millions of men, women, and
children." Walter F. Renn, FederalRepublic of Germany: GermansJews,and Genocide,
in THE TREATMENT OF THE HOLOCAUST IN TEXTBOOKS: THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY, ISRAEL, AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 128, 128 (Randolph L.
Braham ed., 1987). Recent U.S. efforts to implement uniform "History Standards,"
with their modest efforts to qualify an otherwise celebratory account of American
history with reminders of slavery and Indian genocide, have been widely rejected. See
John Fonte, Flawed Histoiy StandardsMust Go, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1995, at D12. The
detention ofJapanese-Americans during the Second World War did not appear in
high school history textbooks until the 1980s. See Ruble S. Watson, Making Secret
Histories: Memoiy and Mourning in Post-Mao China, in MEMORY, HISTORY, AND
OPPOSITION, supra note 191, at 65, 67.
41 MILLER, supra note 64, at 279; see also HERBERT HIRSCH, GENOCIDE AND THE
POLITICS OF MEMORY 28 (1995) ("Most nations attempt to avoid honest selfrecognition, especially when their past behavior may be viewed as less than morally
justifiable.").
41' Francis Fukuyama, The War of All Against All, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1994, § 7
(Book Reviews), at 7 (reviewing MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, BLOOD AND BELONGING (1994)).
German historian Hans-Peter Schwarz proposes a corollary: "'When national
consciousness is replaced by consciousness of guilt, patriotism is programmed to
degenerate into defeatist pacifism.'" JORGEN HABERMAS, ClosingRemarks,inTHE NEW
CONSERVATISM: CULTURAL CRITICISM AND THE HISTORIANS' DEBATE 241, 247
(Shierry W. Nicholsen ed., trans., 1989).
482 SHRIVER, supra note 358, at 103.
4Id. (emphasis added).
484 SHELDON S. WOLIN, Injustice and Collective Memory, in THE PRESENCE OF THE
PAST 32, 34 (1989). Wolin is describing and criticizing the views of the French
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Perhaps a national culture can "keep its shape," as Mary Douglas has
written, only by inducing members "to forget experiences incompatible with its righteous image, and... bring[] to their minds events

which sustain the view...

that is complimentary to itself." 48 5

To be sure, this view may unduly hypostatize a nation's culture,
endowing it with a powerful instinct of self-preservation that

protects its essence from criticism and reform by its very carriers.
Even so, the "screen memory" that, according to Freud,48 helps
individuals suppress painful experiences from conscious memory
may have an analogue in the process by which historical events
enter into (or are filtered from) the memory of an entire society and
4 87
the national identity of its members.
Perhaps. But we should be reluctant to accept any such easy

isomorphism, such direct parallelism between the workings of
individual memory (over personal trauma) and collective memory

(of national trauma). As James Young wisely warns:
If memory of an event is repressed by an individual who lacks the
context-either emotional or epistemological-to assimilate it, that
is one thing. But to suggest that a society "represses" memory
because it is not in its interest to remember, or because it is
ashamed of its memory, is to lose sight of the many other social
4 88
and political forces underpinning national memory.

nationalist Ernest Renan for arguing that "a society can ill afford to reexamine
collectively a special class of political events [here, Catholic persecution of the
Huguenots] in which the members of society feel tainted by a kind of corporate
complicity
in an act of injustice done in their name." Id.
4
85 MARY DOUGLAS, How INSTITUTIONS THINK 112 (1986).

41 See Sigmund Freud, Screen Memories, in 3 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE
COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 303 (James Strachey et al. eds.,

1962). Elsewhere, Freud quotes Nietzsche approvingly on the mental process involved
here: "'I have done that,' says my Memory. 'I could not have done that,' says my
Pride, and remains inexorable. Finally, my memory yields." SIGMUND FREUD, THE
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LIFE 153 (1914).
487 For a representative statement of this view, see, for example, Gluck, supranote
235, at 76 (noting that often today "[s]tudents of memory describe how individuals
construct and reconstruct their memories in much the same way as nations do their
histories, creating what Borges called a 'fictitious past'").
488 YOUNG, supra note 249, at xi (focusing on the architecture, artistry, and official
rituals of Holocaust commemoration). Psychoanalytic concepts, like "aftereffect" or
"return of the repressed," may have some limited heuristic value here, if the
metaphorical nature of their usage is acknowledged. Alas, this generally is not the
case. The psychoanalytic concepts are simply transposed from the individual to the
society with minimal attention to this radical shift in the level of analysis. See e.g.,
SANTNER, supra note 156, at 4 (discussing the inability of Germans to remember the
past and blaming "the remarkably efficient deployment of a set of defense
mechanisms"); Steven Ungar, Vichy As a Paradigmof Contested Memoy, in SCANDAL
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Limits of the Memory Metaphor
Individual memory works in ways different from collective
memory. For instance, reliance on written and computer records
makes it easier for individuals to forget things, in the knowledge
that they can always "look it up." But such records enormously
expand the capacity of a national society for preserving memory of
AND AFTEREFFECT 1,

2 (1995) (suggesting that France's postwar "obsession" with the
Vichy period is a Freudian "aftereffect," or nachtrdglichkeit, of its failure to "work
through" the moral issues raised by extensive French collaboration in Nazi rule and
Jewish deportation). Their periodic denigration of the "economic miracle" (and, by
implication, the capitalism that produced it) as diversions from the more sober
business of societal self-scrutiny in the wake of administrative massacre, is purely
rhetorical. See SANTNER, supra note 156, at 4; Ungar, supra, at 2. Neither of these
authors identifies any analytical or causal connection between market institutions, on
one hand, and societal "repression" of unpleasant historical memories, on the other.
The much greater force with which memories of genocide have been officially
repressed in Communist societies further belies any such inherent connection
between capitalism and memory repression. For a contrast between Communist Party
efforts in East Germany to suppress memory of the Holocaust and West German
efforts to foster memory of that experience, see JEFFREY HERF, DIVIDED MEMORY:
THE NAZI PAST IN THE Two GERMANIES (forthcoming 1996).
Social psychology suggests, moreover, that a measure of economic security,
afforded by a society's prosperity, may be necessary before most people will be
inclined to examine complex normative issues of personal responsibility, such as those
raised by episodes of administrative massacre. See generally ABRAHAM H. MASLOW,
MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY (1970) (positing a hierarchy of human needs,
beginning with food and shelter, ending in "self-actualization").
Other historians of equally leftist tilt frequently assert that national decline and
economic stagnation,such as that of postwar Britain, discourage a serious and critical
engagement of collective memory with past injustices. For a survey of such views
among British socialist historians, see Keith Thomas, Retrochic, LONDON REV. BOOKS,
Apr. 20, 1995, at 7, 7-8 (reviewing RAPHAEL SAMUEL, THEATRES OF MEMORY VOL. I:
PAST AND PRESENT IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURE (1995)).

Still others of similar political orientation defend a position very much at odds
with the first view above; they contend that Germany's seemingly sincere remorse
about its war guilt is a capitalist ploy, calculated to smooth the way for current
international commerce, to ensure the success of German exports. For this view, see
Jonathan Boyarin, Space, Time, and the PoliticsofMemoty, in REMAPPING MEMORY, supra
note 29, at 1, 12-13; Lothar Baier, Les binifices de la mauvaiseconscience, 68 LE GENRE
HUMAIN 211 (1988). But if guilt and repentance were compelled by the "needs" of
German capitalism, it is surely puzzling thatJapanese political leaders and institutions
have proven so reluctant for so long to accept any such responsibility, despite
persistent demands for it by trading partners throughout Asia (who are clearly
reluctant to become heavily dependent on a neighbor who shares so little of their
collective conscience). See TAKASHI INOGUCHI, JAPAN'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
109-11, 133-36, 142-47 (1991).
In any event, those who do not share the antipathy of these several authors for
market society will be tempted to ask: Which is it? Does capitalism encourage or
discourage acceptance of responsibility for war guilt?
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its past. Embarrassing documents have a way of turning up 't the
most 'inopportune' times, in response to the most adamant public
denials of what they proceed irrefutably to establish, such as the
recently uncovered documents demonstrating the Japanese
government's wartime decision to enslave Asian women as prostitutes for its soldiers.48 9
On account of such differences, the capacity of a society to
induce criticism of its culture and institutions may well be greater
in many ways than the individual capacity for fundamental selfcriticism and identity transformation. A particular prosecution for
administrative massacre might fail to induce much moral selfscrutiny among its perpetrators and their sympathizers, while
nevertheless inducing considerable scrutiny-among young people
and an emergent political leadership-regarding the institutional
sources of collective responsibility for that horrendous event.
Conversely, when a society prudently decides not to pursue all
those complicit in a large-scale administrative massacre, this
decision should not be diagnosed as merely a case of Alzheimer's
disease writ large. Individual memory can be effectively worked
upon without an immediate issuance into concomitant institutional
change. Argentina may not have redesigned its political institutions
in light of the "lessons" offered by its courts when convicting
military officers, but the country currently has the highest per capita
concentration of psychiatrists of any society.
When a criminal trial for administrative massacre becomes a
massive public spectacle, it can serve as one powerful means to this
end by stimulating debate about the morality of the defendants'
conduct and the nature of the institutions they controlled. That has
sometimes been precisely the result of prosecutions for administrative massacre, perhaps its most salubrious result-albeit one
uncognizable in doctrinal terms. The central question thus
becomes: How can the criminal law be most effectively deployed,
through the dramaturgical choices of prosecutors and judges, to
foster national soul-searching of this sort-or more precisely, to
stimulate the deliberative criticism of a society's political culture and
4 9 The documents were discovered in the library ofJapan's Self-Defense Agency

by historian Yoshiaki Yoshimia, who was prompted (by watching a government
spokesman's denials on television) to remember having seen such documents years
before. Yoshiaki thereby produced the documentary "smoking gun," requiring
Japan's Prime Minister to apologize for the "error." See Margaret Scott, Making the
RisingSun Blush, FAR E. ECON. REV., Mar. 30, 1995, at 50,50 (reviewing HICKS, supra

note 368).
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institutions by its members? In this regard, a major obstacle to this
national self-examination is not only the complex psychology of
repression and "denial," but simply the number of culpable
individuals who remain alive-and fearful of the law's response.
Still, psychoanalytic studies of postwar Germans have even
contended that societal self-analysis, however difficult to induce, is
essential to restoring a nation's mental health and social solidarity
in the aftermath of administrative massacre. "A very considerable
expenditure of psychic energy is needed to maintain th[e] separation of acceptable and unacceptable memories," the Mitscherlichs
argued.49 Writing in the early 1970s, they contended:
What censorship has excluded from German consciousness for
nearly three decades as a memory too painful to bear may at any
time return unbidden from the past; it has not been "mastered";
it does not belong to a past that has been grappled with and
understood. The work of mourning can be accomplished only
when one knows what one has to sever oneself from.... And,
without [a meaningful relation to the past], the old ideals, which
in National Socialism led to the fatal turn taken by German
history, will continue to operate within the unconscious 9 1
This problem-the "unmastered past"-is faced not only by those
who led the nation into disaster, but by those who followed them as
well.
If Germans had to live with the unvarnished memory of their Nazi
past-even if their personal share in that past was merely in being
obedient, fatalistic, or enthusiastically passive-their ego could not
easily integrate it with their present way of life. Insistence upon
historical accuracy in tackling that area of Germany's past would
very quickly reveal that the murder of millions of helpless people
depended on innumerable guilty decisions and actions on the part
of individuals, and that the blame can by no means be shifted onto
superiors... with such self-evident ease as we Germans at present
assume.

492

490 MrrSCHERLICH & MrrSCHERLICH, supra note 404, at 16. One should acknowledge, moreover, that not only perpetrators and bystanders, but even the surviving
victims of state-sponsored brutality often wish to forget their most horrific
experiences. This suggests that the mechanisms inducing such "forgetting" may
operate independently of any "bad faith" on the individual's part. See AHARON
APPELFELD, BEYOND DESPAIR 50-54, 72-74 (1995) (describing the author's efforts to

hold off traumatic wartime memory by immersing himself in frenetic activity for
several years upon leaving Europe).
491

4

9

MITSCHERLICH & MITSCHERLICH, supra note 404, at 66.

Id. at 20-21.
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Even the children of such obedient servants often suffer from their
parents' repression of memory, on some acc'ounts."' If there is
any truth to such analysis, it would follow that thorough self-scrutiny
would be especially desirable, for both the individuals involved and
for society at large, in the aftermath of administrative massacre. If
criminal prosecutions could be tailored to foster that end-in forcing
unpleasant subjects onto the agenda of discussion and offering
compelling narrative accounts of shared experience-so much the
better.49 4
Theorists of widely variant persuasions distinguish Western
modernity from other cultures precisely on the basis of our
willingness continuously to attack and revise our intellectual
foundations, to question even those commitments seemingly
"constitutive" of our collective identities. 495 The capacity for
critical self-scrutiny of the most thorough sort, to admit that "we
were wrong," then, is not altogether foreign to us. In fact, it is
clearly a source of pride and self-confidence in those invoking this
cultural capacity to distinguish the West from the rest. To tell a
49

3 SeeJILLIAN BECKER, HITLER'S CHILDREN: THE STORY OF THE BAADER-MEINHOF
TERRORIST GANG 15 (1989); ANTON KAES, FROM HITLER TO HEIMAT: THE RETURN
OF HISTORY As FILM 24 (1989). Kocka offers a more cautious statement of possible
relationships: "Without understanding these deficits [that is, parental repression and
avoidance of their collaboration] we cannot understand the acuteness of the protest
movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s." Jfirgen Kocka, Hitler Should Not Be
Repressed By Stalin and Pol Pot: On the Attempts of German Historiansto Relativize the
Enormity of the Nazi Crimes, in FOREVER IN THE SHADOW OF HITLER?, supra note 237,
at 85, 86.
44 Those who commented on the Nuremberg trial at the time sometimes acknowledged this possibility. See Robert L. Birmingham, Note, The War Crimes Trial: A
Second Look, 24 U. Prrr. L. REV. 132, 137 (1962) (noting that "[p]sychologically
healthy expression of grief and anger may be obtained through ajudicial proceeding
such as the Nuremberg trials").
4" The view that certain attachments, as to one's ethnoreligious group, are
constitutive of the self, and hence ineliminable for purposes of moral reflection, is a
central tenet of all nontrivial versions of communitarianism. For opposing views of
the self and cultural identity in Western society (as infinitely revisable), see, for
example, ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 36-39 (1987)
(observing that the first thing one learns about non-Western cultures, upon any
serious study of them, is their virtually uniform hostility to civilizations other than
their own, that is, their ethnocentrism, and their view of their culture's foundational
premises as sacred and immune from serious criticism). According to Derrida,
postmodernism reflects the West's abandonment of its self-understanding as
occupying the center of the world, a self-understanding common among other
civilizations. SeeJACQUES DERRIDA, MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY 209-19 (Alan Bass trans.,
1982); see also ROBERT YOUNG, WHITE MYTHOLOGIES: WRITING HISTORY AND THE
WEST 19-20 (1990) (parsing Derrida on this point).
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liberal story about the history of a society that has inflicted largescale administrative massacre is necessarily to tell a story of rupture
and remaking, a story about its efforts to break with what is most
reprehensible in its past.
To break with the past-assuming responsibility for its wrongs
and a duty to remember them-requires a choice, an exercise of
moral autonomy. For communitarians of both left and right,
however, such choice is impossible or undesirable.
We are
necessarily "thrown into" a social world that provides us with
constitutive and irrevocable identities, in ways to which the liberal
ideal of autonomy is simply deaf. This, if you will, is the alternative
hypothesis, against which the comparative history of legal efforts at
collective reconstitution must be assessed.
Useful Myths, Discomforting Truths
Those seeking to construct a liberal mythology for their society
necessarily labor under a special burden: their myth must be
truthful, not merely pleasant. To be truthful, such a story must
"correspond" to known facts of political history, not merely
"cohere" with other authoritative narratives.4 96 Truthful stories
about the origins of most nation-states, however, cannot be entirely
flattering, and so are unlikely to be solidarity-enhancing. For
communitarians, by contrast, the societal value of stories does not
turn on their truth; what matters is the significance that such stories
have for their tellers and listeners, the meanings derived from these
stories for collective identity and direction. In a certain sense, such
stories are true: they are true as part of the self-definition of the
497
community.
A liberal will thus be troubled .by the following story in a way
that a communitarian will not. France's state television refused for
a decade to show Marcel Ophfils' The Sorrow and the Pity, documenting extensive French collaboration in Jewish deportation.4 98 When
it was finally shown, it was denounced by a prominent senator,
himself an ex-member of the Resistance, as "'destroying myths of

4' On the difference between correspondence and coherence in theories of truth,
see 4ALAN
R. WHITE, TRuTH 102-21 (1970).
9
" See Allan Mcgill, Memory, Identity, and Questions of Evidence 11 (June 23,
1995) (paper presented at the Project on Rhetoric of Inquiry Symposium, University
of Iowa) (on file with author).
498 See supra note 291.
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which the French still have need.' 499
A philosopher adds,
"'[w]hat you must understand is that our myths were positive. They
enabled France to recoup and rebuild.'"5"'
Such statements-judging myths by their political usefulness,
regardless of their truth-necessarily give pause to good liberals,
reawakening our doubts about the very idea of national mythmaking
in a liberal society. They suggest that to be effective for social
solidarity, a national myth must necessarily exclude the story of
wrongs the nation has done to others. They suggest that a solidarity-enhancing story cannot be about how the nation has acknowledged these wrongs, redressed them, and kept memory of both the
wrongs and their redress firmly in its collective consciousness.
If this kind of collective memory is impossible to achieve,
practically speaking, then liberalism had best return to its initial
Cartesian, hard-core Enlightenment position: that there is no place
for national mythology in a truly liberal society, that the notion of
liberal memory is an oxymoron, that what should hold us together
is simply economic interdependence and shared commitment to
abstract principles of liberal morality, however imperfectly these
have been embodied in our history.
Hence our characteristic ambivalence, our "underlying uneasiness," as Kammen puts it:
On one hand there is the proof-seeking and critical view of myth
as inaccurate or even distorted history. On the other there is an
approving notion of socially cohesive legends or stories rich in
symbolic meaning, comprised of incidents and characters who are
larger than life, regardless of whether they are heroes or villains. 501
To help effect a needed break with the past, the law can be
employed in very different ways.
At times, a constitutional
convention is an especially fitting device toward this end. At other
times, nothing so radical is required. It is simply necessary to take
seriously the "law on the books"-particularly the criminal code-as
never before: holding former chiefs of state to long-valid legal rules
that they flouted indiscriminately, with confidence of impunity. In
asking whether law can help to place guilt and repentance at the
center of collective memory, postwar Germany and Japan provide
491 BoswoRTH, supra note 289, at 111 (quoting an unnamed senator).
"00

MILLER, supra note 64, at 141 (quoting Alain Finkielkraut).

'01 KAMMEN, MYSTIC CHORDS, supra note 52, at 481.
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the major tests. Each offers conclusions somewhat at odds with the
other. This difference could be summarized by saying that,
although the territory of both nations was occupied by the victors,
the national mind was successfully 'occupied' much more in the
02
Federal Republic than in Japan.
In Japan, the U.S. bombing of Hiroshima is commemorated, by
several much-visited shrines, as a war crime of unprecedented
proportions. It has had an enormous impact on Japanese selfunderstanding, by all accounts.
Because of the centrality of
Hiroshima to Japanese memory of the period, it has become
"virtually impossible," notes one Asia scholar, "to recall that Japan
had been waging a war of aggression prior to Hiroshima and
Nagasaki.""' In contrast, the impact on national memory of the
Yamashita and Tokyo War Crimes Trials-widely broadcast to the
population-has been virtually nil,5" 4 until very recently. Leading
Liberal Democratic politicians still continue publicly to deny
Japanese culpability for the "Rape of Nanjing" and forJapan's many
other atrocities against prisoners of war and noncombatants
throughout Asia.5" 5 The remains of defendants convicted of (and
'C2 This slightly oversimplifies the matter, since serious reassessment by Germans
of their nation's wartime misconduct began only some 17 years after the War, that
is, with the trials of the Auschwitz guards. Still, it is fair to say, with one recent
historian, that "the paradigm shift ... occurring in all the other combatant societies,

has never happened in Japan." BOSWORTH, supra note 289, at 186.
503 FIELD, supra note 384, at 45.
' See, e.g., BURUMA, supranote 165, at 60-66, 161-66 (noting the frequent derisory
references by contemporaryJapanese to "the Tokyo Trial View of History," and that
"the trial left them with an attitude of cynicism and resentment"); HOSOYA ET AL.,
supra note 276, at 194 (noting that "the legal consciousness of the Tokyo trial has not
taken root among the Japanese people"); see also Onuma Yasuaki, Beyond Victors'
Justice, 11 JAPAN ECHO 63, 71 (1984) (observing that the majority of the Japanese
people regarded the Tokyo trial "as an event completely divorced from their own
lives"). On the ignorance still prevalent among Japanese youth concerning the
country's war crimes, see Gluck, supranote 235, at 90 (noting that since young people
had received "such minimal instruction in the subject ... they could not be accused
of forgetting what they had never been adequately taught"); A. Minhee Lee, War and
Memory, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1995, at A22 (observing that "youngJapanese... have
little or no idea of the aggression and cruelty that was manifested in the generations
before them").
" On the systematic nature of battlefield atrocities by Japanese troops, see
MEIRION HARRIES & SUSIE HARRIES, SOLDIERS OF THE SUN: THE RISE AND FALL OF

THE IMPERIALJAPANESE ARMY 475-84 (1991). On recent denials of such events by
political leaders, see BURUMA, supra note 165, at 122;James Sterngold, At Tokyo Shrine
to War Dead, a Ritual Persists Despite All, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1994, at A8; James
SterngoldJapan Official Forced to Quit overRemark, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1994, at A5.
On continuing denials by Japanese law professors, see the remarks of Takigawa
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executed for) war crimes at the Tokyo trial are housed in official
06
shrines.
Why did the numerous postwar trials ofJapan's military leaders
for war crimes. 7 have so little effect on collective memory of the
war and atrocities these leaders authorized? There are several
possibilities here. First, it might be said that the Japanese, however
extensive their war crimes, had not perpetrated anything like the
Holocaust, that is, had not sought or accomplished the extermination of an entire ethnoreligious group of their own citizens, and so
had much less to repent or remember.
Perhaps, but there was still plenty to atone for, had the full
record been placed before the Tokyo court. It was not. Much of
the most egregious Japanese misconduct, such as biological
warfare, 50 8 vivisection of POWs," 9 and the sexual enslavement
of the comfort women,5 10 was deliberately excluded from the story
Had the legal narrative
the prosecution was allowed to tell.5"
encompassed this much wider range of war crimes, and been staged
to maximize sympathy for its victims (such as the comfort women,
whose marital prospects after the War became nil), the impact on
Japanese opinion might have been greater, might have resembled
that of the Auschwitz trials.
We should not be too quick to attribute Japan's failings, for this
reason among others, to any cultural predisposition toward "shame"
SeijirS, one of the defense counsel at the Tokyo trial, in THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES
TRIAL, supra note 276, at 58.
r'6 See GAvAN DAWS, PRISONERS OF THE JAPANESE: POWS OF WORLD WAR II IN
THE PACIFIC 375 (1994).
0 The most comprehensive description of these proceedings is offered by
PICCIGALLO, supra note 88.
5 8

' See SHELDON H. HARRIS, FACTORIES OF DEATH: JAPANESE BIOLOGICAL
WARFARE 1932-45 AND THE AMERICAN COVER-UP (1994); PETER WILLIAMS & DAVID
WALLACE, UNIT 731: JAPAN'S SECRET BIOLOGICAL WARFARE IN WORLD WAR I1 (1989).
.': See DAWS, supra note 506, at 360 (concluding that by war's end more than onequarter of the original 140,000 white Allied prisoners injapanese custody were dead);
Nicholas D. KristofJapan Confronting Gruesome War Atrocity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17,
1995, at Al (describing medical experimentation by Japanese army physicians on
prisoners, involving deliberate exposure to plague, anthrax, and vivisection).
510 Between 100,000 and 200,000 women were involved. See HICKS, supra note
368, at 19. On their recent damage claims, still pending, against the Japanese state,
see Yvonne P. Hsu, "Comfort Women"from Korea: Japan'sWorld War If Sex Slaves and
the Legitimacy of Their Claimsfor Reparations, 2 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 97 (1993);
Karen Parker & Jennifer F. Chew, Compensationfor Japan's World War II War-Rape
Victims, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 497 (1994);Janet L. Tongsuthi, "Comfort
Women"of World War II, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S LJ. 413 (1994).
5n See ROLING, supra note 276, at 48.
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over "guilt," as some have done. 12 A more thoughtful orchestration of the Tokyo trial could well have elicited a more sympathetic
response.
For although the Japanese public remains largely
unpersuaded by the conviction of its leaders for "waging aggressive
war" against the Western Allies, the public has grown highly
sympathetic to the plight suffered by the fellow Asians whom their
leaders colonized, brutalized, impressed (into involuntary military
Had the Tokyo trial focused not on
service), and enslaved.513
Japanese wrongs inflicted on those who dropped atom bombs on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but rather on the industrial rape of the
Asian comfort women, or on the human vivisection of Filipino
POWs, the trial's impact on Japanese collective memory would likely
have been quite different.
The Allied decision to exclude Emperor Hirohito from prosecution was a particularly significant dramaturgical decision in this
regard, in ways that have become apparent only following his recent
death.
Indeed, the decision unwittingly impeded the sort of
searching self-examination of national morality and identity that war
crimes trials successfully induced in West Germany. The "Tokyo
Trial View of History," as progressive Japanese intellectuals
derisively label it, became widely accepted by theJapanese populace.
This is because the historical narrative promoted by the trial pinned
the blame for the country's misconduct exclusively on the recklessness of its military leaders-not on the people themselves or the
Emperor they revered.514 An historian observes:
If the villains were clear, so were the victims: not the victims of
Japanese aggression but the Japanese people themselves, who, it
Th[is]
was said, "were embroiled" in the war by their leaders ....
stance was confirmed by both the popular past, in which the
people appeared as helpless before the state, and by personal

invokes this familiar distinction in connection withJapan after the war.
See BURUMA, supra note 165, at 116.
3 An opinion survey in 1994- suggested, for instance, that nearly three quarters
of the Japanese population felt that their government had not adequately compensated the Asian peoples subjugated by Japan's prewar and wartime empire. See
Nicholas D. Kristof, Many inJapan Oppose Apology to Asiansfor War, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
6, 1995, at Ag.
514 This view was immediately embraced by postwar textbooks in Japanese public
schools. See Carol Gluck, The Idea of Shjwa, in SHOWA: THEJAPAN OF HIROHrrO 1,
13 (Carol Gluck & Stephen R. Graubard eds., 1992); see also SABUR6 IENAGA,JAPAN'S
512Buruma

LAST WAR: WORLD WAR II AND THEJAPANESE, 1931-1945, at 250 (1979) (noting that

books published soon after the war are "full of pacifist sentiment and disdain for
militarism").
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memory, which viscerally recalled helplessness and suffering.
Thus, the stark narrative of culpability produced by the "War
Crimes Trial view of history" in the immediate aftermath of war
survived the nearly half-century since. 515
She adds, "[h]ad things truly been that simple, and inevitable,
the burdens of Showa history would be light indeed."5 16 The trial's
favored narrative "had disadvantages since it froze the condemnation of the war into orthodoxy at a stage when the division of
villains and victims seemed starkly clear."517 In consequence, "the
Japanese remember the war, not the system that engendered it,"51
nor their participation in that system. At the epicenter of that
system was the Emperor.
Because the Emperor was worshipped as divine, to hold him
responsible for war crimes would have been to allow mere humansforeigners at that-to treat him as if he were a politician like any
other. This would have been to deny his divinity and the infallibility
that it entailed.5 19 When the person is not fully distinguished
from his "office, " 520 to judge the conduct of the present occupant
is necessarily to judge the institution itself. It would also have been
to hold responsible the people who worshipped him for failing to
question his political judgment when it proved profoundly mis515 Gluck, supra note 235, at 83; see also Buruma, supra note 363, at 31 (arguing
that MacArthur's decision not to prosecute Hirohito "had serious consequences, for

so long as the Emperor, in whose name the war had been waged, could not be held
accountable, the question of war guilt would remain fuzzy in Japan, and a source of
friction between Japan and its former enemies").
516 Gluck, supra note 514, at 12. "Sh6wa" refers to the period of Hirohito's rule.
Gluck notes that recent Japanese historiography suggests that:
[T]he responsibility for war lies far more broadly in society than was earlier
believed, or hoped.... [V]ast numbers of ordinary people were entwined
in the complex mesh of war .... Even those who did not actively march
or collaborate are now judged as participants. It takes both states and

societies-which is to say the individuals who comprise them-to make a total
war.
Id. at 13.

517
Id. at 12-13 (noting that this narrative "contributed to the emphasis on what
the Japanese
people suffered at the hands of the villains in the docket").
8
Id. at 13.
519

See KYOKO INOUE, MACARTHUR'SJAPANESE CONSTITUTION: A LINGUISTIC AND
CULTURAL STUDY OF ITS MAKING 220 (1991); Kosuke Koyama, ForgivenessandPolitics:
JapaneseExperience, in BREAD AND BREATH: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SAMUEL RAYAN,

S.J. 520
139, 145-46 (T.K. John ed., 1991).

See MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 330

(A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., 1947) (discussing the centrality of this
distinction to modern, legal-rational authority).
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guided.52 1 To criticize him was thus to criticize them, that is, their
"constitutive," foundational beliefs, and to require profound selfcriticism at the level of national identity. That was unlikely
to succeed, according to Occupation authorities, particularly
MacArthur.52 2 In fact, it was likely to provoke mass resistance
to Occupation authorities and their other, less controversial
52
policies. 3
In any event, the Book of Military Rules informed Japanese
soldiers that "'the command you receive from your superior officer
5 24
is the command you receive from the emperor himself.'
According to this principle, if it was wrong for soldiers to obey their
orders, then it was wrong for the Emperor-by way of his servantsto have issued them. But that was literally inconceivable, since there
was, in principle, no independent standard from which to evaluate
the moral or legal defensibility of the Emperor's conduct.12' The
people supported the "Emperor system," and the Emperor supported (what international law would later categorize as) a war of
aggression, involving many war crimes by imperial servants.
Thus, to exclude the Emperor from criminal liability was also
implicitly to exclude the Japanese people at large from moral
responsibility, although the precise connection was by no means
clear in the minds of Occupation decision-makers or prosecutors.5 26 Shriver states it succinctly: "A political culture that has
121 This was what General Douglas MacArthur had in mind when, in contemplating
alternative postwar fates for Hirohito, he declared that, "[t]he problem basically is
theological." Koyama, supra note 519, at 143.
" On the internal policy debates in this regard, see Robert E. Ward, Presurrender

Planning. Treatment of the Emperor and Constitutional Changes, in DEMOCRATIZING
JAPAN:

THE ALLIED OCCUPATION

1, 3-18 (Robert E. Ward & Sakamoto Yoshikazu

eds., 1987).
523

See id. at 15.

524

Koyama, supra note 519, at 158.
The most influential study of imperial ideology observes that:

52"

[The Emperor]... is the centre of all authority and the fountainhead of all
virtue, occupying the apical position in a hierarchy ....
... In such a scheme, where everything is based on the idea of an
absolute central entity, there is no room for a concept like international law,
which is equally binding on all nations.

MASAO MARUYAMA, THOUGHT AND BEHAVIOR IN MODERN JAPANESE POLITICS

19, 20-

21 (Ivan Morris ed., 1963). Maruyama also notes that "[w]hat determined the
everyday morality ofJapan's rulers was neither an abstract consciousness of legality
nor an internal sense of right and wrong, nor again any concept of serving the public;
it was a feeling of being close to the concrete entity known as the Emperor." Id. at
13. 5 2 6
See INOUE, supra note 519, at 160-220 (discussing how American lawyers and
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long been accustomed to accord unimpeachable and exclusive
authority to an Emperor will not generate among citizens much
conversation over questions like: 'Is it right or wrong? Who is
responsible? What shall we do to change the course of the
nation?' 52
The responsibility of the Japanese people could not be candidly
examined until it was possible candidly to examine that of their
Emperor. That was judged politically imprudent in the extreme.
And because of his longstanding and continuing symbolic centrality
to the political system, examination of Hirohito's wartime role did
not become possible until his death.
Proustian Justice: The Trial As Aide-Mimoire
Beginning at the point of Hirohito's death, however, a veritable
floodgate of personal memory and public discussion has opened in
ways that few had anticipated.52
A robust discussion of the
constitutional reformers misunderstood the Emperor's role within the Japanese
political system and his centrality to its legitimacy among the public).
527 SHRIVER, supra note 358, at 135-36. Well aware that any such summary
statement inevitably oversimplifies a complex range of differences between cultures,
Shriver quickly adds, "[these questions are rare enough in the conversational culture
of the West, and they can virtually disappear in wartime. But they do have roots in
Western angles of vision." Id. at 136; see also BURUMA, supra note 165, at 116-17, 29497 (favoringa religious and cultural explanation of prevailingJapanese attitudes). On
the far-reaching ramifications of differences between Japanese and American
conceptions of moral responsibility, see generally V. LEE HAMILTON & JOSEPH
SANDERS, EvERYDAYJUSTICE: RESPONSIBILITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN JAPAN AND THE

UNITED STATES (1992). Such culturalist accounts, however, cannot explain the
unresponsiveness ofJapanese courts to meritorious legal arguments, that is, to the
valid legal claims of plaintiffs who have overcome whatever cultural burdens they
labored under before recognizing and asserting their rights. SeeJ. MARK RAMSEYER
& FRANCES M. ROSENBLUTH, JAPAN'S POLITICAL MARKETPLACE 2-3, 161-66 (1993)
(arguing that it is not national culture, but executive and legislative control over the
judiciary, which explains the latter's unresponsiveness to legal claims by unpopular
minorities).
2
1 1 See Carol Cluck, Foreword to DAIKICHI IROKAWA, THE AGE OF HIROHITO: IN
SEARCH OF MODERN JAPAN at vii, vii (Mikiso Hane & John K. Urda trans., 1995)

(noting of the robust public debate following the Emperor's death that "[i]t was as if
a dam had broken on thoughts long held but seldom spoken"); see also Kristof, supra
note 509, at Al, A12 (noting that "[h]alf a century after the end of the war, a rush of
books, documentaries and exhibitions are unlocking the past and helping arouse
interest in Japan in the atrocities committed by some ofJapan's most distinguished
doctors" including those who became president of theJapanese Medical Association,
head of the Japan Olympic Committee, and the Governor of Tokyo). On recent
revelations and public responses, see SHRIVER, supra note 358, at 136-39 (noting the
prominent role of the Socialist Party, including its first Prime Minister, and Christian
leaders in raising the possibility ofan official apology and putting this question on the
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country's war guilt has now definitely begun, and the courts quickly
became a favored forum toward that end. Civil courts, not the
criminal law, have provided the primary vehicle to date. They have
succeeded, at least, in stimulating precisely the kind of discursive
deliberation and civil disagreement here proposed as the necessary
foundation of liberal memory and solidarity. Japanese historians
have repeatedly sued their government, for instance, to compel
more forthright treatment of the country's war crimes in its school
textbooks.
Even when their efforts have failed to gain judicial endorsement, 529 they have succeeded in eliciting media coverage, and in
putting this uncomfortable issue at least peripherally on the public
agenda."'
The damage claims recently brought by comfort
women, forced to serve as prostitutes for Japanese soldiers at the
front, enjoy enormous public support within Japan."
In June
1995, the lower house of Parliament finally approved a resolution
of "remorse" for Japanese conduct in World War 11.532

parliamentary agenda); Gluck, supra note 235, at 90 ("The issue of Hirohito's war
responsibility occasioned open debate, and polls and letters made it clear that
significant numbers ofJapanese agreed that the emperor bore some responsibility for
the war, although they had seldom before said so in public."); id. at 77 ("[T]he
standard of acceptable public utterance of personal memories altered, as it seemed
to become possible to say things aloud that one had privately felt for years."). Recent
Japanese scholarship supports the conclusion that Hirohito's role in war-related
decisions was often considerable. See IROKAWA, supra note 528, at xv (concluding that
"the emperor [was] the person most responsible for the war").
" On the mixed results of this litigation, see LAWRENCE W. BEER, FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION INJAPAN: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LAW, POLrncs, AND SOCIETY 264-70
(1984). In the last two years, in response to complaints by Japan's Asian neighbors,
several new textbooks have nonetheless been introduced offering more accurate
accounts ofJapan's war crimes and the litigation by victims to which such conduct has
recently given rise. SeeJapanese Textbooks Cany War Damage CompensationIssues,Japan
Econ. Newswire, May 13, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, JEN File (quoting
one author as saying that he was surprised the Education Ministry did not ask him to
cut or rewrite several sections dealing with compensation demands from war victims).
530 See BEER, supranote 529, at 273 (observing "the increasingly uninhibited media
presentation of opposite viewpoints in films and TV programs" resulting from the
textbook controversies); Saburo Ienaga, The Glorificationof War in JapaneseEducation,
18 INT'L SECURITY 113, 115 (1994) (noting that this litigation "has served as a focal
point for a continuing debate overJapan's role in the war.., and the willingness of
its government and its people to examine that role and that conduct").
...A 1994 opinion survey found that by a 4 to 1 margin Japanese voters believe
that their government "has not adequately compensated the people of countriesJapan
invaded or colonized." Krigtof, supra note 513, at A9. However, some 5 million
signatures were gathered for a petition opposing a parliamentary resolution of
apology. See id.
...The resolution's language was highly qualified, however, and cannot be
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In other civil litigation reaching the Japanese Supreme Court,
the widow of a postwar military officer sought to prevent the
inclusion of her husband's name on a Shinto shrine honoring the
country's war dead."- The plaintiff, Mrs. Nakaya Yasuko, belongs
to a Christian denomination whose current leadership had recently
acknowledged the church's responsibilities for having supported the
War." 4 This public acknowledgment prompted Mrs. Nakaya to
object to the "deification" of her husband in a shrine praising the
conduct of Japan's wartime soldiers. 3 5 In a proceeding lasting
fifteen years, the trial and first appellate courts accepted her
contention that the shrine, the construction of which was publicly
funded, violated the establishment clause of Japan's Constitution,
which mandates the separation of church and state." 6
In public discussions, Mrs. Nakaya explained that she did not
wish to see future mothers and wives deceived by the state into
supporting participation by their loved ones in aggressive wars and
war crimes. 5 "v With considerable media attention trained upon
them, the courts became the forum in which a struggle was waged
for control of memory, that is, over the use of Mr. Nakaya's memory
in service of conflicting accounts of the country's conduct during
the Pacific war.
In a second trial, also widely publicized by the press, an
Okinawan businessman was prosecuted for desecrating the Japanese
flag. 53 8 He was protesting the government's recent insistence that
the flag be raised at every public occasion. 3 9 Okinawans had
refrained from so doing for many years following the war, not
wishing to identify with a state whose army had been responsible (in
the battle of Okinawa) for the murder of hundreds of civilian
considered a genuine "apology" in the Western sense, according to language

specialists. See Nicholas D. Kristof, Why a Nation of Apologizers Makes One Large
Exception, N.Y. TIMES,June 12, 1995, at Al, A4. Moreover, only 230 members in the
511-member chamber voted for the resolution; the rest boycotted or voted against.

See id. at Al.
'ss See Judgment of June 1, 1988, Saikosai [Supreme Court], 42 Minshi 277

(Japan).

514 See FIELD, supra note 384, at 121-22.

515 See id. at 121-24.

5
Japan's Supreme Court ultimately rejected this view on the grounds that the
Veterans' Associations, not the state itself, had established the shrine, and that Mrs.

Nakaya suffered no "coercion" as a result of inclusion of her husband's name. See id.
at 141.
537 See id. at 124.
538 See id. at 44-45.
59
1 See id. at 52-53.
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noncombatants.54
The state's prosecution of Chibana Sh6ichi,
particularly Shbichi's eloquent defense of his views and act, elicited
an unprecedented public debate in Okinawa, where the atrocities
during that final retreat (before advancing American troops) had
remained unacknowledged.54 1 Collective memory of these events
has, in consequence of this legal proceeding, been significantly
revised.
The Mayor of Nagasaki, Motoshima Hitoshi, finally broke the
taboo on public discussion of the Emperor's responsibilities for the
War. 542 In response, he was attacked and nearly killed by far-right
gangs. 54' But his pronouncement also elicited enormous public
sympathy, expressed in many letters endorsing his remarks and
praising his courage. 4 4 A group of citizens formed an organization to support him. They declared:
"As citizens of a nation that imposed immeasurable terror and
misery upon the people of Asia in the last war, we believe, in

order to gain the trust of the people of the world in international
society, that we must reflect with humility on our history of
aggression and promote free and wide-ranging debate on the
emperor system and the emperor's responsibility for the war. This
is because a democratic society must not tolerate taboos of any
545
kind."
In addition to accepting national responsibility for wartime
misconduct, this formulation squarely casts the issue in terms of the
centrality of open discussion of controversial views (that is, civil
dissensus) within a liberal democratic society. Here, the Mayor's
supporters invoked the law-constitutional freedom of expression-

54

See id. at 53-56. Gluck notes:

Public memory in postwar Okinawa was vigorous and vivid, and the tales it
told... constructed a history with a different political meaning [than on the
main Islands]. Subjugated by the Satsuma domain during Tokugawa,
Okinawa's ...

people were ...

made victims twice over, once of the

Japanese imperial army, who massacred the allegedly inferior Okinawans as
spies, and once of the fighting in one of the bloodiest battles of the Pacific
War.
GLUCK, supra note 235, at 88. This battle occurred after the inevitability of defeat
had become apparent, and some Okinawan civilians wished to surrender. See FIELD,
supra note 384, at 56-58.
51 See FIELD, supra note 384, at 53-66.
52 See id. at 178-79.
1- See id. at 179-93.
54 See id. at 200-20.
545
Id. at 233-34 (citation omitted).
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not to impose their own favored account of collective memory (nor
to oppose that of others), but to open up a public sphere for less
constrained debate about what such memory should involve. The
declaration also accepts the need for placing a collective recognition
of wartime guilt and repentance at the center of collective memory,
if not quite at the center of national identity.
Even more than these recent Japanese developments, the
postwar German experience belies the pessimism voiced by so many
theorists, quoted above, about the capacity to make repentance
from a society's historical wrongs the basis of its shared memory. 4 On the fortieth anniversary of World War I's termination,
for instance, Federal President Richard von Weizsficker explicitly
affirmed, in a well-received speech, that "the Germans' need to
continue the discussion of individual moral guilt and to accept
history as the basis of national identity and lasting German
54 7
responsibility."
Opinion surveys suggest that initial German response to the
trials of major war criminals was quite positive5 48 and that interest
was high,5 49 although both declined over time. 550 The surveys
also suggest that only from the Nuremberg trial did a substantial
majority of Germans learn about the existence of concentration
camps. 55 Nearly a quarter of Germans became aware of the
extermination of the Jews in this way. 52 Yet only when the first
postwar generation reached adulthood in the mid-1960s was the
Holocaust reexamined.and discussed in great depth.

46

See supra notes 483-85.
Lutz R. Reuter, Politicaland Moral Culture in West Germany: FourDecades of
DemocraticReorganizationand Vergangenheitsauseinandersetzung, in COPING WITH THE
'7

PAST: GERMANY AND AuSTRIA AFrER 1945, at 155, 179 (Kathy Harms et al. eds.,
1990) (citing Federal President Richard von Weizsficker, Speech Given on the 40th
Anniversary of WWII and the Nazi Tyranny (Bonn, May 8, 1985)).
548 See PUBLIC OPINION IN SEMISOVEREIGN GERMANY: THE HICOG SURVEYS, 19491955, at 10 (AnnaJ. Merritt & Richard L. Merritt eds., 1980).
59 See PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY: THE OMGUS SURVEYS, 1945-1949,
at 35 (AnnaJ. Merritt & Richard L. Merritt eds., 1970) (reporting that nearly 80% of
German respondents in the American zone indicated that they had read newspaper
articles about the trial).
550 See THOMAS A. SCHWARTZ, AMERICA'S GERMANY: JOHN J. MCCLOY AND THE

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 159 (1991); Claudia Koonz, Between Memory and
Oblivion: ConcentrationCamps in GermanMemory, in COMMEMORATIONS: THE POLIrICS
OF NATIONAL IDENTITY 258, 262 (John R. Gillis ed., 1994).
" See Koonz, supra note 550, at 262.
552 See id.
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Law's Role in "Mastering the Past"
The law played a significant role in the process of "mastering
the past." The 1964 prosecution of the Auschwitz guards, and of
similar Majdanek officials between 1975 and 1981 for crimes against
humanity, captured the imagination of millions of young Germans
553
as virtually nothing about the country's past had done before.
"The effect upon the public consciousness was devastating," writes
The Auschwitz
Gordon Craig, "and has not diminished."55 4
prosecution, concurs Ian Buruma, "was the one history lesson...
that stuck."555 The foreign attention focused on these trials was
no less consequential, for they prompted the 1964 French enactment removing the statute of limitations for crimes against
humanity, a change that would permit the prosecution of Barbie
56
and Touvier over two decades later.
German public awareness, these trials effected a symbolic severing of ties to the past.55 7 They evoked and articulated pervasive sentiments of indignation and reprobation, in a
way that criminal prosecutions can do with particular efficacy.
Through this experience, writes one historian, "Germans constructed a new identity based on a fresh start [and] a clean break with the
past.... [T]hey forged a new.., identity based on a rejection of
In

'"5 See Hannah Arendt,

Introductionto BERND NAUMANN, AuScHwrrz: A REPORT

ON THE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ROBERT LUDWIG MULKA AND OTHERS BEFORE THE
COURT AT FRANKFURT at xi, xi (1966); Aleksander Lasik, PostwarProsecution of the
Auschwitz SS, in ANATOMY OF THE AusCHwITz DEATH CAMP 588 (Yisrael Gutman &

Michael Berenbaum eds., 1994).
" Gordon Craig, An Inability to Mourn, N.Y. REV. BOOKs,July 14, 1994, at 43,44
(reviewing BURUMA, supra note 165). On the considerable attention given by the
German mass media to the 50th anniversary of the Allied liberation of Auschwitz, see
Stephen Kinzer, Confronting the Past, Germans Now Don't Flinch, N.Y. TIMES, May 1,
1995, at Al, A10; Stephen Kinzer, Germans Reflect on Meaning of Auschwitz, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 28, 1995, at L5.
-'' BURUMA, supra note 165, at 149. Traveling in mid-1991, Buruma observed,
"[the German war was not only remembered on television, on the radio, in
community halls, schools, and museums; it was actively worked on, labored,
rehearsed. One sometimes got the impression.., that German memory was like a
massive tongue seeking out, over and over, a sore tooth." Id. at 8. One should also
note the striking contrast between the German Bishops' recent and incredibly blunt
recognition of Catholic responsibility for the Holocaust and the refusal of the Polish
Bishops to sign the declaration. On the deficiencies of Polish memory in this regard,
see IRWIN-ZARECKA, supranote 122, at 18, 37-38,48, 77-78, 92-93, 120, 142-43 (1994).
" See Judt, supra note 294, at 97.
117 These trials became a means by which Germany's "present is to be separated
from what preceded it by an act of unequivocal demarcation." PAUL CONNERTON,
How SOCIETIES REMEMBER 7 (1989).
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Nazism.""'8 The memory of judgment by the international community continues to weigh heavily upon the making of German foreign
policy in particular, according to specialists in that field.55 9 The
lesson would seem to be, pace Mary Douglas,5 6 that a nation can
be united and guided not only in the collective memory of its
triumphs, but also in shared expiation for its wrongs, in the
common commitment neither to forget nor repeat the injustices its
predecessors have inflicted on their neighbors. Habermas offers a
ringing defense of this conclusion, while alluding to legal concepts
of continuity and judgment:
Can one become the legal successor to the German Reich and
continue the traditions of German culture without taking on
historical liability for the form of life in which Auschwitz was
possible? Is there any way to bear the liability for the context in
which such crimes originated ... other than through remembrance, practiced in solidarity, of what cannot be made good,
other than through a reflexive, scrutinizing attitude toward one's
own identity-forming traditions?56'
Such invocation of legal language as relevant to historical
assessment drew particularly acerbic reproach from Habermas's
opponents, who accused him, for instance, of "mak[ing] himself
solicitor general of the kingdom of morality in the province of
history," and assigning historiographical matters to a "special court,
5 62
to which the accused must be extradited."
What Habermas describes as "a reflexive, scrutinizing attitude
toward one's own identity-forming traditions" was embraced by
President Alfonsin as a central objective of the junta trial and, in
558 Koonz, supra note 550, at 262. Even those who think adoption of this new
German identity has been a mistake widely concede that it has, in fact, become

pervasively established. See e.g., Christian Meier, Condemningand Comprehending,in
FOREVER IN THE SHADOW OF HITLER?, supra note 237, at 24, 24 (observing "an

identity that has entered our self-comprehension and our imagination and that
expresses itself in grief and shame").

9
..
See Thomas Banchoff, The Past in the Present: Historical Memory and German
National Security Policy (Sept. 2, 1995) (paper presented at the American Political
Science Association Conference); Thomas Berger, The Contemporary Power of
Memory: The Dilemmas for German Foreign Policy (Sept. 2, 1995) (same); Andrei
Markovitz, Historical Memory and the Sources of German Power (Sept. 2, 1995)

(same).
*o See DOUGLAS, supra note 485.
56
JORGEN HABERMAS, On the Public Use of History, in THE NEW

supra note 481, at 229, 236.

CONSERVATISM,

162 Helmut Fleischer, The Morality of History: On the Dispute About the Past That
Will Not Pass, in FOREVER IN THE SHADOW OF HITLER?, supra note 237, at 80, 83.
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fact, of his administration. Attending the trial, Owen Fiss would
thus herald it as "an exercise in self-examination," revealing "the
nobility of a great nation, prepared to judge itself."5 61 In a
country where public discourse often harkens back to grander days
of national prosperity, Alfonsfn chose instead to distance himself
altogether from the country's past. He portrayed its earlier history
not as a golden age and guidepost from which recent leaders had
strayed, but as a tale of chronic failure, a story of continuing
recrudescence of illiberal vices, displayed not only by elites but by
significant segments of society at large: "intolerance of dissent,"
"inability to compromise," "violence as the preferred response to
adversaries," "a conception of social order as requiring the suppression of all conflict," and "authoritarianism as the natural mode of
interaction between leaders and led."5'
This was a crucial component of the story that Alfonsin wanted
the courts to tell, and was clearly reflected in the judgment against
the juntas. 5 In his most important public address, the President
announced:
In December 1983 we initiate for the first time an effort at
democratization based on the recognition that the key to the past
authoritarian regimes lay less in their intrinsic power, than in the
possibilities they had of establishing themselves in a political
culture generally inclined to accept such authoritarian regimes.
For us, to defend and consolidate democracy means to fight
not only against the objective anti-democratic forces, but also
against the widespread subjective receptivity of many to such
forces, a disposition that has provided the basis of their objective
power ....
...

5 66
[A] new stage in our history has begun.

This address was rightly seen at the time as representing a sea
change in the country's presidential discourse. 67 Its novelty consisted in its insistence that the source of Argentina's problems lay
in its "political culture," as the President put it, rather than in the
intervention of foreign states, the constraints of the international
Nino Conference, supra note 47 (remarks of Owen Fiss) (also describing the
trial as "a people inquiring into what they had done to each other").
Alfonsin, supra note 79, at 20-22 (translation by author).
5 See Judgment on Human Rights, supra note 305, at 327-28.

Alfonsin, supra note 79, at 22, 39 (translation by author).
5 See the several responses, later published as a book, along with the speech
itself, in ALFONSfN: DiscuRsos SOBRE EL DISCURSO, supra note 79.
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capitalist system, or the conspiracies of a corrupt national oligarchy.
Only a few would be prosecuted criminally, but virtually all should
accept moral responsibility for having permitted, and often
encouraged, the defendants' seizures of power. It was no coincidence that the speech was drafted by Carlos Nino, the liberal legal
theorist who had traveled widely and shared none of the prevailing
68
nationalist enthusiasms of Argentina's intellectuals.
The Evanescence of Guilty Memory
For several years, at least, it seemed as if criminal prosecution
in Argentina-its ethical evocations in the public mind-would play
a major role in revising national identity on the basis of a complete
break with the past, through a reconstitution of the country's
political culture on liberal terms, much as occurred in West
Germany.
But Argentines ultimately proved reluctant to travel very far
down this road. Public support for punishment of even the most
unrepentant torturers soon waned, as more pressing problems
arose. 69 Only a few years thereafter, state-sponsored torture and
murder-now by police, of common criminals-was applauded by
57
many Argentines, including those in prominent public office.
Perhaps least persuasive to conservatives was the President's
insistence on the need for a redefinition of national identity, a
concept long central to Argentine rightists. Nino himself would
later describe their worldview as positing a
National Being [that] does not evolve with the history of the country;
its structure is not dependent on the Constituci6n, which is seen
"sA related matter must be broached with some delicacy. It is pertinent in this
regard that both Nino and Malamud-Goti werejewish. Argentine nationalism-both
its Peronist and Integralist varieties-has always been, and largely remains, deeply

hostile toward Judaism and the Jews. See generally ROBERT WEISBROT, THE JEws OF
ARGENTINA (1979) (documenting the history of the Jews in Argentina from the time
of the Spanish Inquisition to the rise of Per6n). On the myriad forms of nationalist
thought among Argentine intellectuals, see ENRIQUE ZULETA ALVAREZ, EL
NACIONALisMo ARGENTINO (1975).
u9 See ROSENDO FRAGA, LA CUESTI6N MILITAR: 1987-1989, at 137 (1990) (sum-

marizing opinion survey data reflecting the Argentine public's lack of strong interest
in human rights issues during the late 1980s). Two former military officers, notorious
for their prominent role in the dirty war and later uprisings, even ran for public
office, receiving many votes. One was elected governor of a major province. See
Bussi Vuelve a GobernarlaProvinciade
Tucumdn, CLARIN (Buenos Aires), Int'l Ed.,June
27-July 3, 1995, at 1, 3.
570 See MALAMUD-GOTI, supra note 103 (manuscript at 197-206).

614

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 144: 463

as a mere instrument; nor is its will expressed through the
democratic process .... [T]he military defended the sacrifice of
innocent individuals ...

as a necessary means for preserving th[is]

National Being."7 '
Even one of the principal architects of the trials would ultimately
conclude that, rather than stimulating serious moral deliberation or
self-scrutiny, the prosecutions of military officers had fostered
public embrace of a simplistic division between the guilty and the
innocent.

57 2

West Germans, too, proved to have second thoughts about their
willingness to base national identity on a complete repudiation of
their country's past. In the 1980s the country witnessed, in the socalled "historians' debate," a wrenching reassessment of whether the
Holocaust ought properly to remain at the center of the nation's
self-understanding, even its understanding of German society during
the Third Reich.17 ' The considerable public appeal of the new
interpretations, to judge from responses in the elite press, lay in its
assertions of continuity over time and space, its rejection of any
need for a total break from the past.
First, German atrocities had not been unique or uniquely
horrible. They may have been inspired by early Soviet "experiments" with the Gulag, it was argued, a system that ultimately
171 Carlos S. Nino, The Duty to Punish PastAbuses of Human Rights Put into Context:
The Case of Argentina, 100 YALE L.J. 2619, 2633 (1991) (emphasis added).
s7 See MALAMUD-GOTI, supra note 103 (manuscript at 256-64). It is wrong to
suggest, as do some poststructuralists, that the category structure of law necessarily
reflects (and requires) a binary opposition regarding guilt. See RUBENSTEIN, supra
note 288, at 158 (suggesting that, in French postwar trials of collaborationists "the use
of the binary opposition is to contain guilt to at least one easily delineated segment
of the population that can be purged symbolically"). Perelli similarly concludes that
the junta trial "failed socially and culturally, as it did not enable people to work out
their own experiences of paralyzing terror, repressed guilt, and projection." Carina
Perelli, Settling Accounts with Blood Memoy: The Case ofArgentina, 59 SOC. RES. 415,
418 (1992).
573 See generally RICHARD EVANS, IN HITLER'S SHADOW OF HITLER: WEST GERMAN
HISTORIANS AND THE ATrEMPT TO ESCAPE FROM THE NAZI PAST (1989) (discussing the
West German historians' debate over how the Holocaust should be remembered).
My account of the debate aims only to show its relevance to the social theoretical
concerns of the present essay. Those concerns, distinct from those of both sides to
the dispute, do not warrant or require endorsement of either. My sympathies are
with Habermas and his defenders. But the social theoretical questions examined here
require acknowledging the difficulties that have been encountered by efforts to use
criminal law for constructing national identity (in ArgentinaJapan, and Germany) on
the basis of collective guilt. In so doing, I concede the significance and inescapability
of the neorevisionists' concerns, if not their conclusions.
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caused suffering on a greater scale.1 4 Subsequent genocides
throughout Africa and Asia similarly called into question the longstanding view that the Germans had committed a crime incommensurable with any other, one for which they needed forever to atone,
even as other nations mimicked German wrongs without apology.
The German experience of administrative massacre, in other words,
was not entirely discontinuous with that of other societies, before
or since.
Second, until the War began to take its toll, Germans were
relatively content with their government. Their economy grew
rapidly under Hitler, significantly improving their standard of living.
Hence the unofficial memory of these years, quietly preserved by
those who lived through them, was considerably more favorable
than, and tacitly at odds with, the memory of Nazi rule officially
cultivated during the Occupation and thereafter. 75 In fact,
German society between the wars displayed trends and trajectories,
on all major economic and social indicators, quite similar to those
of other West European societies.
In other words, there was considerable socioeconomic continuity
both between the Nazi and post-Nazi years within Germany, as well
as between German and other Western societies of the interwar
period. Insofar as impressive development under Nazi rule had
partly contributed to the later postwar economic miracle, 576 there
was no need for any complete break with the past as the basis of
national identity, or national pride. 7
"I See Nolte,supranote 237, at 12-14 (suggesting that the Holocaust "was the fearborne reaction to the acts of annihilation that took place during the Russian
Revolution"); Nolte, supra note 369, at 22 (arguing that the Holocaust was inspired
by the Gulag).
s5 See FRIEDLANDER, supra note 322, at 88-92.
" Assertions such as this one were particularly offensive to many since they
seemed to deny, as Habermas puts it, the "complex connections between the
criminality and the dubious normality of everyday life under Nazism, between
destruction and vital productivity, between a devastating systematic perspective and
an intimate, local perspective." Jfirgen Habermas, A Kind of Settlement of Damages:
The Apologetic Tendencies in German History Writing, in FOREVER INTHE SHADOW OF
HITLER?,
supra note 237, at 34, 41.
5
7 Several participants in the historians' debate have observed an alleged trend
toward restoring some measure of national "pride" among Germans, a pride
incompatible with the "Nuremberg Trial view of history." See, e.g., Hanno Helbling,
A Searching Image of the Past: What Is Expectedfrom German History Books, in FOREVER
INTHE SHADOW OF HITLER?, supra note 237, at 98, 99 (noting the desire by some for
instruction in "a German history that does not have to be read as a prehistory of
National Socialism"); Meier, supra note 558, at 26 (noting that in 1983 the
parliamentary leader of the Christian Democratic Union had suggested "that the
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As in Argentina, the dispute evolved from one between
advocates of memory and those of oblivion into a dispute between
competing versions of collective memory, conflicting narratives of
the nation's past. What is significant for present purposes is not the
new scholarly "discoveries" as such, but the apparent receptivity to
them, and hence their likely impact on memory.7 8 This was a
later generation of Germans, both the historians and their public
audience, people with no personal complicity. Hence it is impossible to attribute their attitudinal shift purely to self-exculpatory
apologetics.
We are thus forced to consider the possibility, as Edmund Burke
long ago argued (and as communitarians like Charles Taylor and
Alasdair MacIntyre seek to remind us), that many people are
emotionally constituted in ways that require a sense of connectedness to their country's more distant past, a feeling of continuity with
forebears-however puzzling and perverse many of us liberal
theorists may find this. 7 9 On this account, great events in legal
history can be, and often are, woven into the larger story, but
seamlessly (in the common law fashion), without ripping apart the
rest of the social fabric.
It follows that trials for administrative massacre, however
spectacular their public staging, cannot easily transform collective
memory, because they involve both a radical break with well-settled
interpretations of the nation's past-hard enough for many wellmeaning citizens-as well as acceptance of some responsibility by
many who have themselves suffered genuine deprivation during, or
as a result of, the country's recent calamities. To expect this is to
expect a great deal.
The new doubts about any need for a complete break with the
past, for a national identity founded at "zero hour" upon only the

Germans should finally 'step out of Hitler's shadow'"). Injuly 1985,Japan's Prime
Minister similarly contended that the "'nation must move from shame to glory'" in
order to establish a national identity. Koyama, supra note 519, at 160. He blamed
its failure in this regard on "'a view of history influenced by the results of the Far
Eastern War Criminal Tribunal.'" Id.
58 See Alan Cowell, TeachingNazi Past to German Youth, N.Y. TIME,June 9, 1995,
at A12 (quoting several high school youths, expressing such complaints as, "[y]ou
can't say: 'I'm proud to be a German.' Beethoven was a German, too, but everything
now is seen through the Second World War").
..Halbwachs viewed collective memory in just such Burkean terms: "The
collective memory is a record of resemblances and, naturally, is convinced that the
group remains the same... ,whereas what has changed are the group's relations or
contacts with other groups .... " HALBWACHS, supra note 217, at 86.
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Nuremberg principles and "constitutional patriotism," take the form
of an explicitly communitarian theory of collective memory, in the
arguments of revisionist historians. Habermas aptly summarizes
their claim:
Without the memory of this national history [preceding 1933] ....
a positive self-image cannot be created. Without a collective
identity, the forces of social integration decline. The lamented
"loss of history" is even said to contribute to the weakness of
the political system's legitimation ....

This is used to justify the

compensatory "creation of meaning" through which historiography
is to provide for those uprooted by the process of moderniza0
tion.

58

This notion that a stable identity-personal and national-rests
on an awareness of continuity with a beloved past, whose noteworthy achievements are preserved in collective memory, is entirely
consistent with Halbwachs's original theory of collective memory
and with the Durkheimian conception of mechanical solidarity that

it presupposed.

Halbwachs claimed that collective memory

necessarily "immobilizes time. " "'
Hence his very limited and
conservative view of commemoration as "reviv[ing] the deep
traditions of a community that might otherwise be modified over

time, as impressions of the past grow vague ....
By enhancing the
structure of mnemonic imagery, commemoration lends clarity and
stability to collective memory."8 2 If this were generally true, such
0 HABERMAS, supra note 561, at 235. For an American version of the view that
Habermas refutes, see BELLAH ET AL., supra note 216, at 152-53.
581 "Every group... immobilizes time in its own way and imposes on its members
the illusion that, in a given duration of a constantly changing world, certain zones
have acquired a relative stability and balance in which nothing essential is altered."
HALBWACHS, supra note 217, at 126. An ethnography of French peasants similarly
highlights the fundamental conservatism of collective memory in traditional societies:
The collective memory ... constantly tends to seek permanence, to recreate what is indestructible and so ensure its own survival. It is as if the
community needed to lean on its own unchanged past, where the ups and
downs of History and the vagaries of modern life disappear ....
The
present.., is reconstituted by reference to the past-a stable, lasting and
well-ordered period, a time outside the reach of Time.
ZONABEND, supra note 49, at 138-39.
52 Patrick H. Hutton, Collective Memoy and Collective Mentalities: The HalbwachsAriik Connection, 15 HIST. REFLECTIONS 311, 315 (1988) (parsing HALBWACHS, supra
note 217). This view of official commemoration is firmly rejected by contemporary
creators and scholars of contemporary public monuments. See YOUNG, supra note
249, at 14-17 (praising an approach to public monuments that "may save our icons of
remembrance from hardening into idols of remembrance" (footnote omitted)).
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memory could never extend to a collective agreement to break
decisively with the society's past, unless perhaps this meant
returning to some long-lost golden age.
But Halbwachs's claim is not an iron law, and the Israeli
experience offers a telling exception. After 1948, national identity
initially developed not through memory of victimization by others,
but through rejection of features within Judaism and Jewish secular
culture itself thought to have made European Jews especially
vulnerable to such victimization. Few if any efforts at the construction of national identity have been so self-critical, before or
since. 583 If there were to be a radical break with the past, it was
to entail a break with what being Jewish had meant to the Jews.
Specifically, it was to mean a repudiation of millennia of ingratiation of hostile majorities at whose sufferance they existed. It was
therefore to mean a sovereign state. The reconstitution of national
identity was also to mean an unapologetic attitude toward the
exercise of military power in self-defense 8 4 and a corresponding
reassessment of the relative importance of mental and manual labor.
But this attempted redefinition ofJewish identity on the basis of
historical rupture-induced by law, in significant part-made it very
difficult for the new Israeli-born generation to sympathize with its
predecessor, that is, with the many thousands of Holocaust survivors
still among them. The Eichmann trial, with its deliberate emphasis
on how little the victims could do and how they had resisted
nonetheless, 58 5 was intentionally designed to restore a sense of
continuity with the past, to extend collective memory in this
regard.58

511There was ample precedent for this, however, in the Old Testament's appeal
to remember the past, given that "many... biblical narratives seem almost calculated
to deflate the national pride" and are by no means "actuated by the normal.., desire
to preserve heroic national deeds from oblivion." YERUSHALMI, supranote 378, at 11.
On the repercussions of this transformation for the identity of many American
Jews, see generally PAUL BREINES, TOUGH JEWS: POLITICAL FANTASIES AND THE
MORAL DILEMMA OF AMERICAN JEWRY (1990). See also Barry Schwartz et al., The
Recovery of Masada: A Study in Collective Memory, 27 SOC. Q. 147, 151 (1986)
(observing thatJewish interest in the Masada story arose only with the rise of Zionism
in this century, as it came to symbolize military valor, national resolution, and
heroism against high odds).
58 See SEGEV, supra note 34, at 348. The opinion of the district court mentions
this resistance several times in the first paragraph alone. See Attorney-Gen. of Israel
v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 18-19 (Isr. Dist. Ct. 1961).
'5 See SEGEV, supra note 34, at 348.
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The trial's dramatic focus, in other words, derived from a
conscious executive decision to rebuild historical links that,
although initially repudiated, were now recognized as crucial to
solidarity between generations."' At the same time, the trial was
designed to suggest a new relationship between the Jews and their
persecutors: its pedagogic value for Ben-Gurion lay, one scholar
suggests, in its capacity to provide "a people that had not experienced sovereignty and was as yet unused to it, the feeling of power
and independence that the judicial process imparted."5 88
Liberal Memory As "Constitutional Patriotism"
Perhaps it is only liberal philosophers and liberal social
theorists, like Emile Durkheim, Carlos Nino, and the later
Habermas, who find it easy to imagine basing their nation's identity
entirely on universal values, shared by many others, rather than on
memorable experiences uniquely "ours." 89 But this is an oversimplification of what they actually sought, which was something less
abstract: to condemn the past by legal judgment, to be sure, but
also to etch into collective consciousness the memory of that very
act of condemnation-including the spectacular courtroom events,
at Nuremberg and Buenos Aires, by which it was achieved.
Still, it may be, as communitarian theorists imply, that only
those already too thoroughly deracinated, feeling little solidarity
with fellow nationals, can find firm identity and direction in "critical morality," that is, in the abstract principles for which liberal
theorists consider themselves (not coincidentally) the preeminent spokesmen.-"' It is noteworthy in this connection that the
17

The Eichmann trial also convinced American and European Jews that the

Holocaust-until then a matter central to Jewish memory, "but not paraded before a
general public"-might realistically be made central to international memory. The
trial, combined with victory in the Six-Day War shortly thereafter, "created a new
openness and pride amongJews about theirJewishness." Schudson, supra note 235.
5 Keren, supra note 35, at 49.
9 Habermas developed his views on this subject in the context of the so-called
"Historians' Debate." See JORGEN HABERMAS, Historical Consciousness and PostTraditional Identity: The Federal Republic's Orientation to the West, in THE NEw
CONSERVATISM, supra note 481, at 249, 249-67; HABERMAS, supra note 561, at 229-40.
" An example of such an approach is Habermas's notion of "constitutional
patriotism," according to which social solidarity and national identity are to derive
directly from the citizen's articulate commitment to moral principles embodied in a
liberal constitution, such as that of contemporary Germany. See HABERMAS, supra
note 589, at 262-66. The approach adopted in the present Article views social
solidarity arising more circuitously, from the "civilizing process" of disagreement
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speeches drafted by Nino for Alfonsin virtually never invoked the
names of Argentina's national heroes, as presidential discourse-in
Argentina, as elsewhere-customarily does. The evidence presented
here suggests that an effort-by criminal trials, in conjunction with
other means-to rewrite a society's myth of origin in a manner
condemning much of its historic past from the standpoint of
universal principles shared by other societies, is indeed difficult, but
not impossible.
If the reconstruction of collective memory sought by Nino (for
Argentina) and Habermas (for Germany) is possible, surely it cannot
be accomplished, in any event, through the "quick fix" of criminal
trials, however riveting their gruesome details, however profound
their momentary impact on opinion surveys.
In their most
optimistic moments, Alfonsin and his advisor-philosophers hoped
that the epiphanic impact of the trial, with its revelations of
rampant official lawlessness and the scale of the resulting suffering,
would instill a deep and abiding recognition that official respect for
individual moral rights was an imperative that could "never again"
be compromised.5 91 In this, they expected too much. Even the
most compelling story, dramatizing the redemption of the disappeared and the resurrection of liberal morality, could not in itself
achieve that objective, surely not if predicated on such a thoroughgoing self-criticism.
But despite efforts by Peronist opponents to portray them as
political naifs, President Alfonsfn and his legal advisors were always
prudent enough to set certain limits on their Kantian universalism
and on their hopes of instilling it in their countrymen. They
refrained, for instance, from indicting thejuntas under international
law for "crimes against humanity," although all doctrinal requirements for such an indictment would have been met. They rightly
feared that any such reliance on international law would only
further stir the passions of Argentine nationalism.' 92 For this
substantial segment of public opinion, the Nuremberg precedent
represented not the triumph of international human rights, but
merely the revenge of theJews. Again, legal strategy was consciously tailored to make the government's favored story more compelling

(over such things as the meaning and application of criminal law), channelled by
procedural restraints.
"' See Interviews with Argentine Presidential Advisors, in Buenos Aires, Argentina
(Aug. 1985).
" See Interview withJacobo Timerman, in Buenos Aires, Argentina (Aug. 1987).
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to skeptical publics, to influence collective memory in more
persuasive and perduring ways.
Let us now briefly compare the cases. They differ from and
resemble one another in several ways. Did criminal prosecution
work to unite citizens in community by evoking shared sentiments
of indignation or, contrariwise, did it only further divide society
into mutually suspicious subgroups, each adopting the moral
universe and favored narrative of prosecution or defense? In
Argentina, the effect was ultimately quite divisive, with family and
friends often bitterly at odds over whether "forgetting" was
necessary for (or incompatible with) the restoration of democracy
and solidarity.5 9
The narrative fostered by Alfonsfn's courts
failed to win anything close to universal public endorsement for
very long, being rejected by both right and left. In this respect, the
social impact of criminal prosecution resembled the divisiveness
occasioned by the Dreyfus trial.
By contrast, the West German andJapanese experiences display
the potentially unifying effect of criminal prosecution on collective
memory and social solidarity, but in very different ways. Neither
experience, moreover, is entirely consistent with Durkheim's
argument. In the Federal Republic since the mid-1960s, criminal
trials powerfully united young Germans in repudiation of the
complicity of their parents' generation, a complicity represented by
the "ordinary men" (camp guards and mid-level officials) finally in
the dock. In Japan, by contrast, the Tokyo and other war crimes
trials were widely rejected for their lack of moral "balance," their
refusal to frame the story of Japanese "aggression" in the wider
context of superpower rivalry in the Pacific (a context permitting
Japanese behavior to be characterized as partially defensive), or to
weigh the defendants' authorization of war crimes (against POWs
and noncombatants) in relation to analogous Allied crimes (bombing of Japan's civilian population centers).
These trials, in short, united the Japanese populace in substantial rejection of the story they sought to tell,5 94 much as the

"' Stories were common, for instance, of courting couples quarreling upon the
discovery that one's views on a question were not shared by the other. For a public

incident of such discord, see Calvin Sims, National Nightmare Returns to Argentine
Consciousness, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 5, 1995, at Al.
" It is nonetheless true, as already noted, that certain aspects of the courts'
historical narrative ultimately became all too persuasive to manyJapanese, insofar as
it exempted them (and the Emperor they worshipped) from any trace of culpability.
See supra text accompanying notes 513-19.
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Nuremberg proceedings failed to influence German adults in the
same years. The unity achieved among Germans by prosecutions (in
the 1960s and 1970s) differed from that achieved among the
Japanese not only over whether such trials were defensible.
Another difference was equally crucial: the story around which
Germans reached consensus was factually accurate, whereas that
adopted by the Japanese-frozen in the 1940s, unraveling only at
Hirohito's death-was not.
The Argentine andJapanese experiences resemble each other in
one disquieting way. In both societies, criminal trials exercised
considerable appeal for many citizens for the "wrong" reasons.
Many Argentines favored prosecution of the juntas not because they
had murdered thousands of citizens in the dirty war, but only5
59
because they had lost the recent Malvinas/Falklands war.
Similarly, many Japanese were all too happy to see their country's
military leadership punished, on account of imprudently involving
the country in a costly war it could not win.
Far less persuasive to Japanese citizens, however, were the legal
arguments for prosecutions of the extensive war crimes and crimes
against humanity perpetrated in their name during that conflict. In
both Japan and Argentina, prosecutors were well-aware that the
public's antipathy toward the defendants, however superficially
consistent with their own, arose from very different concerns-even
as prosecutors sought to utilize such public sentiment in support of
the law's purposes. This strategy involved a risky gamble, as
Argentine prosecutors learned to their painful chagrin, for it was
unlikely to work for very long in a society deeply divided and
politically unstable. 9
The Argentine trials resembled the post-Nuremberg German
ones in an important way that distinguishes them both from the
Japanese experience. The Tokyo and Nuremberg trials (as well as
other Allied-sponsored war crimes trials throughout Asia and
Europe) involved foreigners prosecuting nationals for violations of
international law. This approach proved largely unsuccessful in
evoking the moral sentiments of nationals in support of the

5' Fiascos in strategic and logistical planning caused the collapse of the military
regime. This permitted the restoration of civilian rulers (who initiated the criminal
proceedings). See ANDRtS FONTANA, FUERZAS ARMADAS, PARTIDOS POLfTICOS Y
TRANSICI6N A LA DEMOCRACIA EN LA ARGENTINA (1984).
" On the depth of social and political conflicts plaguing Argentiria since the
1930s, see generally CARLOS H. WAISMAN, REVERSAL OF DEVELOPMENT IN ARGENTINA
(1991).
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proceedings. By contrast, the prosecutions of Argentina's military
rulers, like those of the Auschwitz guards and Majdanek officials,
involved nationals. prosecuting other nationals for violations of
domestic law. This approach proved considerably more effective in
generating moral consensus (and mechanical solidarity), especially
in the Federal Republic, but also among the substantial majority of
Argentines (over ninety percent) who strongly endorsed the junta
5 97
trial.
In cases involving large-scale administrative massacre, the
Durkheimian account of criminal law's contribution to social
solidarity has much greater difficulty than the discursive in handling
the muddiness of the moral and legal line between accusers and
accused. This is because Durkheim saw solidarity arising out of the
shared indignation of the innocent many toward the guilty few. But
where many thousands bear some culpability for the harm at issue,
this premise is invalid. "Coming to terms" with administrative
massacre requires some means by which society at large can
collectively acknowledge its guilt, collectively repenting its wrongs.
Only when the law is conceived as a forum for public dialogue
can it accommodate the possibility (and societal need) for periodic
reversal of roles between accuser and accused, for the accusatory
finger to be pointed in both directions. This is particularly apt in
situations, such as the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, where accuser
and accused, in an escalating cycle of criminality, have become, to
98
some extent, "mutually implicated in each other's ... vices."
The objective, as in much modernist theatre, is a "fractured
reciprocity whereby beholder and beheld reverse positions in a way
599
that renders a steady position of spectatorship impossible."
Only the discursive conception of law's function will allow us to
apprehend and appreciate the kind of solidarity that can emerge
through such exchanges.

597 The greater efficacy of national versus international law in this context
confirms Walzer's view that "internal" criticism, based on a society's own moral
norms, is almost always more persuasive to citizens than "external" criticism based on
universal moral standards, discovered by "prophets" and delivered "from the
mountaintop." MICHAEL WALZER, INTERPRETATION AND SOCIAL CRriTIsM 36-66

(1987).
'5s SHRIVER,

supra note 358, at 74.

599 BARBARA FREEDMAN, STAGING THE GAZE: POSTMODERNISM, PSYCHOANALYSIS,
AND SHAKESPEAREAN COMEDY 1 (1991).

624

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 144:463

E. ConstructingMemory with Legal Blueprints?
[Memory is... a very importantfactor in struggle ....

[Iff

one controls people's memory, one controls their dynamism....
It's vital to have possession of this memory, to control it, administer it, tell it what it must contain.
Michel Foucault60 °
Although Foucault is surely engaged here in willful hyperbole,
it is true that myths of origin (and the collective memory they
establish) do not bring themselves into being. "[S]tates of origin are
conceived as extraordinary only when someone is motivated to point
them out and define them as such," writes another sociologist."'
"The sanctification of social beginnings must be induced and
sustained .... ,602 Hence official "truth commissions," established
in the aftermath of administrative massacre, sometimes specifically
recommend measures "'to preserve the memory of the victims [so
as to] promote a culture of mutual respect and observance of
human rights. ' "0
This is a tall order. Foucault's aphorism, for instance, is surely
offered less as a sociological proposition than as a political provocation, less in exhortation than incantation. That no one could
mistakenly take his aphorism literally is itself significant and worthy
of some reflection.
The political repercussions of the Dreyfus trial dominated
French politics for over half a century.0 4 Since then, at least, it
has been clear that criminal prosecutions can contribute significantly to collective memory of major events in a nation's history and
that collective memory of such proceedings can thereby significantly
effect national identity. Much less clear, however, is whether any of

o Film and PopularMemoty: An Interview with Michel Foucault, 11 RADICAL PHIL.
24, 25 (1975) (citation omitted).
"0 Barry Schwartz, The Social Context of Commemoration: A Study in Collective
Memory,
61 SOC. FORCES 374, 376 (1982) (parsing a statement by Halbwachs).
602
Id.
"0Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Overview to IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 372, at 147, 158 (quoting Commission for the
Historical Clarification of the Human Rights Violations and Violent Acts That Have
Caused Suffering to the Guatemalan People); see also Taylor, supra note 308, at 196
(observing that the Argentine military "trials were a public and explicit strategy to
conclude one historical period and begin another with a decision concerning how to
remember").
04
See KEDWARD, supra note 97, at 111-12; Benjamin Martin, Political Justice in
France: The Dreyfus Affair and After (Sept. 2, 1994) (paper presented at the
American Political Science Association Conference) (on file with author).
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these effects may be achieved deliberately. This is a fifth reason to
doubt whether societies can intentionally employ the law to
influence collective memory of administrative massacre. It may be
that collective memory is essentially a by-product-and so too the
social solidarity it promotes.
There are certain mental and social states, as Elster observes,
that "can only come about as the by-product of actions undertaken
for other ends. They can never, that is, be brought about intelligently or intentionally, because the very attempt to do so precludes
the state one is trying to bring about."" 5 This is not to deny "the
widespread tendency to erect into goals for political action effects
that can only be by-products." 0 6 It is only to say that such efforts
are doomed to fail. We do not normally legislate what the members
of a society ought to remember, after all, although the memory of
administrative massacre is a notable exception to this general
rule.

60 7

Memory seems to have a mind of its own, as suggested by its
frequent verbal invocation as an independent actor or agent. One
reads, for instance, that "[m]emory selects from the flux of images
of the past those that best fit its present needs." 608 Even if memory need not "immobilize time," as Halbwachs thought, perhaps its
very dynamism and flux work in slippery ways that elude selfconscious control, including control by liberal elites nominally in
charge of an illiberal society, as was the case in Argentina. Hence,
Schudson is right to insist on "the incompleteness of this hegemonic
5

6° JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY 43

(1983). There is a fallacy, Elster notes, in "searching for the things that recede before

the hand that reaches out for them." Id. at 107. Within the class of "states that are
essentially by-products," reside phenomena so diverse as sleep, class-consciousness,
benevolence, magnificence, the contribution ofjury participation to civic education,
and self-respect. See id. at 43-45, 71-77, 96, 100.
6w Id. at 44.

' Fifteen U.S. states, including California, New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and
Florida, have legislation mandating or strongly recommending instruction concerning

the Holocaust in their public schools. See U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, State
Requirements and Holocaust Studies (July 7,1995). Significantly, though, the Illinois

mandate became the focus of aggressive parental opposition, charging that a small
minority was attempting to "'manipulate our children for their political and national
purposes.'" LIPSTADT, supra note 17, at 15 (quoting a letter from Safet M. Sarich to
Winnetka educators (May 1991)).
E' Hutton, supra note 582, at 314 (emphasis added). Hutton further contends
that "memory colonizes the past by obliging it to conform to present conceptions.
It is a process not of retrieval but of reconfiguration." Id.
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process and the social mechanisms that keep it incomplete" in liberal
societies. 0 9
The very act of ordering someone to forget an experience, for
instance, necessarily reminds him of the very experience that he
must forget-or more precisely-remember to forget. This paradox
is inherent in any "official campaign[s] of coercive forgetting,"6 1
such as those regularly employed by "state socialist" regimes.
Hence, the law may compel teachers not to offer instruction on
certain events. But it can do so only by periodically reminding large
numbers of them (in terms calculated to ensure their enduring
recollection) of what it is, exactly, that is so important for them not
to share with their charges.
The "official rewriting of history" in which such regimes engage
highlights, unwittingly, the rulers' self-perception that their
legitimacy hangs precariously on public acceptance of a particular
historical interpretation, conspicuously inconsistent with others
recently foisted upon the public with equal vehemence. 611 (Unfortunately, a pleasing paradox cannot be allowed the last word here:
there are vast expanses of the globe where authoritarian states have
been all too successful for long periods in inducing collective
61
forgetting of the administrative massacres they have inflicted.) 1
A converse problem with official orchestration of memory arises
in modern liberal societies for the opposite reason: because
historical understanding plays so little a role in the claims of their
rulers to legitimate authority. Official efforts at memory construction by modern liberal societies have hence struck several observers

' SCHUDSON, supranote 236, at 209 (emphasis added). He elsewhere notes: "In
liberal societies and in a porous international system where it is difficult or impossible
to curtain one population from the next, instrumentalization [of collective memory]
is more often attempted than achieved." Schudson, supra note 235.
610 On such practices in the former Soviet Union, see Watson, supra note 191, at
17-19. On similar practices in China, see Vera Schwarcz, StrangersNo More: Personal
Memory in the Interstices of Public Commemoration, in MEMORY, HISTORY, AND
OPPOSITION, supra note 191, at 45, 55. On Czechoslovakia, see KUNDERA, supra note
3, at 158-59.
611 See, e.g., Ungar, supra note 488, at 18 (observing of leadership succession in
Czechoslovakia that "[n]o longer even a matter of choosing between rival accounts,
it was as if each regime irrupted with its own past fully formed. Of course, this
invented past was neither natural nor neutral, but rather revised by each regime
according to the ambitions on which it grounded its claim to legitimacy").
612 See, e.g., HEDRICK SMITH, THE RUSSIANS 247-48 (1976) (reporting conversations
at an elite Soviet high school with students who, when asked how many people had
died in Stalin's gulag, consistently gave estimates in the low hundreds, rather than in
the millions).

1995]

ADMINISTRATIVE MASSACRE

as hopelessly artificial, incongruously sentimental, even absurd. As
a French historian laments, in modern Western society:
lieux de mimoire are fundamentally remains, the ultimate embodiments of a memorial consciousness that has barely survived in a
historical age that calls out for memory because it has abandoned
it. They make their appearance by virtue of the deritualization of
our world... maintaining by artifice and by will a society deeply
absorbed in its own transformation[,] ... one that inherently
values ... the future over the past. Museums, archives, cemeteries, festivals, anniversaries, treaties, depositions, monuments,
sanctuaries, fraternal orders-these are the boundary stones of
another age, illusions of eternity. It is the nostalgic dimension of
these devotional institutions that makes them seem beleaguered
and cold-they mark the rituals of a society without ritual; ...
signs of distinction and of group membership in a society that...
tends to recognize individuals only as identical and equal.613
Combining this point with the preceding, we might be led to
conclude that memory construction in modern societies is doomed
to failure because historical awareness plays either too insignificant
a role in political legitimacy and social solidarity (in liberal democracies), on one hand, or too important a role in that regard (in
modem totalitarian regimes), on the other.
613 Nora, supra note 290, at 12. Nora's conclusion here embraces the so-called
theory of "mass society." Id. at 7-9. Rejecting that theory, as I do, entails very
different conclusions concerning the possibility of meaningful collective memory
within a modern liberal society. Many now reject the very idea of collective memory,
not because shared memory has been shown to be nonexistent or impossible, but
simply because they regard it as undesirable. In a society divided along socioeconomic or ethnic lines, they imply, the memory of large-scale events-particularly
revolutions and general strikes, of course, but major "national" events more
generally-must necessarily vary for members of different socioeconomic groups, since
such events inevitably impose very different burdens upon each such group.

Halbwach's idea of "collective memory" is currently all the rage in the human
sciences. But its history traces directly to Durkheim, and particularly to Durkheim's

preoccupation with social solidarity through moral consensus. This preoccupation is
not at all shared by contemporary theorists, who focus instead on the centrality of

conflict, domination, and resistance in modern societies. See Randall Collins, The
Durkheimian Tradition in Conflict Sociology, in DURKHEIMIAN SOCIOLOGY: CULTURAL
STUDIES 107, 107 (Jeffrey C. Alexander ed., 1988) (observing that Durkheim's view
of social solidarity has never been as unpopular among sociologists in the seventy
years since his death). Such theorists view the notion of collective memory as possible
only at the level of societal subgroups and desirable only as a political weapon against
the dominant majority. The present Article seeks to preserve the link between
collective memory and social solidarity, while decoupling the latter from Durkheim's

conception of it.
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It would follow that collective memory of administrative
massacre-in either the West or the East-may be necessarily an
unintended consequence, that is, a consequence of something other
than the law's efforts to create it. If so, it would be self-defeating
for prosecutors and judges, through choice among alternative
narrative devices, to aspire to influence such memory directly. In
other words, one might ask, with Eduardo Rabossi, Alfonsin's
Undersecretary of Human Rights, "is it possible to determine
collective remembering or forgetting by official decree?"614 This
question seems immediately to invite a negative answer, but only
because its formulation is too stark and simplified. In fact, there is
much that the law can do to influence collective memory (and hence
to reconstruct some solidarity after administrative massacre) in
powerful ways, I shall suggest.
The Legal Malleability of Collective Memory
One source of skepticism about the law's potential here is the
fact that courts, acting in the immediate aftermath of the events
they judge, lack historical hindsight. Only such hindsight permits
an interpreter to situate events, particularly ones so traumatic and
disorienting to contemporaries, within an enduring frame of
intelligible context, persuasive to future generations. To be sure, no
historical judgment-even one offered centuries after the events-is
immune from periodic revision.
But hindsight confers, at least, a much wider perspective than
contemporaries enjoy. This advantage in perspective facilitates, in
turn, formation of "settled judgments" that persist for long periods
and that often filter, through the press and mass media, into
popular understanding. This is the most to which professional
historians now aspire.
Lacking such a retrospective vantage point, prosecutors and
judges who strive self-consciously for intergenerational didactics are
likely to make embarrassing mistakes, as ensuing examples suggest.6 15 Only when the defendant is apprehended many years
supra note 407, at 7 (emphasis added) (translation by author).
Surely the most controversial recent "revision" of judicial historiography proposed by professional historians, although not examined here, is that of
Ernst Nolte, Andreas Hillgruber, and other German conservatives. These scholars
contend that German military resolve against the Red Army on the Eastern Front,
although condemned at Nurembergas part of the Reich's "wagingof aggressive war,"
must now be seen in retrospect as a crucial first step in the West's defense against
614 Rabossi,
615
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his offense, as with Eichmann or Touvier, is some such hindsight
possible. But even when this passage of time has not compromised
the defendant's due process right to a speedy trial, it will often have
deprived prosecutors-through statutes of limitations-of the
indictments that would let them tell the most accurate and compelling tale, as occurred in the Barbie trial.
In addition, leaders of new democratic regimes generally believe
that they must act very quickly against the perpetrators, while the
latter's powers are at low ebb, having been just recently removed
from office, sometimes in ephemeral disgrace.6 16 This need to act
quickly-before adversaries can regroup and profit from waning
public memory and more recent dissatisfactions with current
rulers-is inconsistent with the need for hindsight, in striving for a
narrative that will be persuasive in the long run.
This problem is compounded by the fact that legal judgments
necessarily aspire to a degree of finality that historians' interpretations do not. A host of legal doctrines-res judicata, collateral
estoppel, stare decisis, doublejeopardy, mandatoryjoinder, statutes
of limitations, and restrictive standards of appellate review-are
designed to prevent courts from reevaluating, again and again,
particular facts and the issues they raise. For most legal disputes,
society's interests in finality are weighty.
The same is not true of historical understanding, or of the
collective memory to which such understanding contributes.
Whereas legal judgment is final, collective memory can be
fickle. 617 One might say, more sympathetically, that collective
memory is necessarily fluid. Prevailing understandings of a given
event will inevitably change as the interpreters' standpoints move
what would prove to be a Soviet invasion of Central Europe. That invasion, the
German scholars add, would almost certainly have occurred much sooner, and hence
have gone much further territorially, but for the persistent valor of German soldiers
in combat. For a discussion of this issue, see OMER BARTOv, HITLER'S ARMY:
SOLDIERS, NAZIS, AND WAR IN THE THIRD REICH 8-9 (1991); MAIER, supra note 325,
at 19-23.
61
6

See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE:

DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE

LATE
61 TWENTIETH CENTURY 231 (1991).

" This is demonstrated, for instance, in the waxing and waning of the reputations
of prominent political figures over time. See GLADYS E. LANG & KURT LANG, ETCHED
IN MEMORY: THE BUILDING AND SURVIVAL OF ARTISTIC REPUTATION 317 (1990); Barry
Schwartz, The Reconstruction of Abraham Lincoln, in COLLECTIVE REMEMBERING 81

(David Middleton & Derek Edwards eds., 1990).
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ever further into the hermeneutic horizon. 618 Subsequent events
require periodic revision of how earlier ones are remembered.6 19
Still later developments alter the concerns that future generations will bring to bear in reexamining the event in question.62
If historical writing does not aspire to finality, then, this is not
because it lacks the law's authoritative imprimatur. It simply faces
powerful obstacles, ones that the law confronts as well. It would
thus be wrong to hope for very much from the law's efforts to stamp
a particular reading of the recent past into collective memory, in
ways likely to long endure.
Because the judgments of courts (when tackling conventional
legal questions) acquire greater fixity than those of historians, it is
that much more embarrassing for judges-and threatening to the
law's legitimacy-when judicial decisions embodying historical
interpretations fail to stand "the test of time."
Because our
expectations of closure are greater, we are more disappointed when
they are frustrated.
Newly discovered information, increased
geopolitical constraints, shifting moral sensibilities among the
public: any or all of these may require "revision" of the court's
allocation of responsibilities, in the form of executive grants of
pardons or clemency to those convicted.
Many pardons were granted in Argentina, as well as in Japan
and Germany, only a few years after the convictions themselves, in
most cases. 21 Because the courts have seemed, in convicting such
618 This terminology is that of Hans-Georg Gadamer. See HANS-GEORG GADAMER,
TRUTH AND METHOD 217, 269, 356 (Garrett Barden &John Cumming eds., Sheed &

Ward Ltd. trans., 2d ed. 1986). This observation does not imply that those who did
not live through an event are necessarily less likely to understand it. In contemporary
France, for instance, surveys suggest that young people have a more accurate
understanding of the extent of French collaboration with the Nazi occupation than

do their elders. See SOFRES Survey, LIBtRATION, Jan. 9-12, 1986.
619See, e.g., Rousso, supra note 26, at 10-11 (noting how historical memory of the
Vichy period in France continued to change depending on what was at stake at a
particular moment).
620 Postmodernists have no special claim of priority to this insight. See GADAMER,
supra note 618; LUCY M. SALMON, WHY Is HISTORY REWRrIrEN? 99-100 (1929); Carl
N. Degler, Why Historians Change Their Minds, 45 PAC. HIST. REv. 167, 174 (1976).

Once condemned as a vice, the "intrusion" of the historian's own concerns is now
more often seen not merely as inevitable, but even as potentially a virtue. Hence

Nora contends, for instance, that today "a new type of historian emerges who, unlike
his precursors, is ready to confess the intimate relation he maintains to his subject.
Better still, he is ready to proclaim it, deepen it, make of it not the obstacle but the
means of his understanding." Nora, supra note 290, at 18.
621 See DAWS, supra note 506, at 373 (noting that, due to commutations and
clemency, the longest sentence actually served by anyJapanese war criminal was less
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defendants, to blame them for their country's recent calamities, a
pardon will inevitably be interpreted (as it was in these three
societies) not so much as a professional reconsideration of the legal
merits of the case, but rather as a political repudiation of a judicial
foray into historiography and national narrative. Yet what had
made a criminal proceeding so appealing in the first place as "a
genre of public discourse," as a forum for memory-practice, was
"the key element of symbolic closure provided by the trial's
verdict."

622

In its ephemeral flux, collective memory more closely resembles
historiography than legal judgment. Neither memory nor history
has any strong interest in finality. Neither possesses any institutional mechanisms for attaching itself, over long periods, to any stable
resting point. Recent generations of historians, including legal
historians, do not presume to provide "the judgment of history."
They uniformly disavow such aspirations as hubristic. To claim that
one has written "the definitive account" of a period or personage
would today be to invite not merely immediate revision, but
outright ridicule. Like historical writing, collective memory does
not preserve any single, dispositive account of what happened, still
less of its meaning. What is remembered evolves with the changing
interests and ideals of whoever is doing the remembering, as
62 3
scholars in several fields have shown.
In interpreting episodes of administrative massacre, judges are
more like journalists in this regard than like historians. Journalists
must content themselves with uncovering the basic facts and
offering them a quick gloss. Historians seek, by contrast, to fit such
facts into a larger interpretive framework, encompassing preceding
and subsequent events. Later events inevitably alter the meaning of
than 13 years and that by the end of 1958 all war criminals were free). The
emergence of the Cold War was the decisive consideration in West Germany and
Japan. See FRANK M. BUSCHER, THE U.S. WAR CRIMES TRIAL PROGRAM IN GERMANY,

1946-1955, at 118-19, 143, 150 (1989); IENAGA, supra note 514, at 255; Sakamoto
Yoshikazu, The International Context of the Occupation of Japan, in DEMOCRATIZING
JAPAN: THE ALLIED OCCUPATION, supra note 522, at 42, 61. In Argentina, the
electoral losses of Alfonsin's Radical Party largely accounted for his successor's
pardons of the militaryjuntas and other convicted officers. See Argentina: Presidential
Pardons, in 3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH
FORMER REGIMES 528, 528-32 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995) (reprinting Argentine
Presidential Decrees 1002/89 and 2741/90).
622 Hariman, supra note 109, at 1-2.
62
3 See BECKER, supra note 388, at 242; MOSES FINLEY, THE USE AND ABUSE OF
HISTORY 31-33 (1975).

632

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 144:463

prior ones, disclosing certain features of the historical landscape as
far more significant than they appeared to participants at the time,
others far less. Judges, like journalists, would have to be outstandingly prescient-in ways their jobs do not conventionally require-if
their interpretations are to have an enduring effect on collective
memory, in the face of the future's inevitable revision and reassessment. It would be wrong to expect courts, in the immediate
aftermath of national trauma, to achieve in this regard what neither
the most thoughtful journalism nor the best historical scholarship
can expect to accomplish.
But where historians fear to tread, political leaders often enterand blunder about-quite intrepidly, sometimes employing the law
and courts to their ends. After all, political leaders often seek to
create, as a prominent French historian notes, "nonevents that are
immediately charged with heavy symbolic meaning and that, at the
moment of their occurrence, seem like anticipated commemorations
of themselves; contemporary history, by means of the media, has
624
seen a proliferation of stillborn attempts to create such events."
Vernacular Memory vs. the "Official Story"
Consider several examples of such failed attempts to "lawyer"
history (or, more generously, at historiographic lawyering), while the
ashes of administrative massacre were still warm. Allied prosecutors
at the Tokyo War Crimes trials, for instance, deliberately refrained
from indicting Emperor Hirohito-who retained enormous prestige
and public approval-in order to make the prosecution of lesser
625
officials more legitimate in the eyes of the Japanese public.
Despite this tactical concession to public opinion, the tactic failed,
as the trials won little popular support. MacArthur was content,
however, to purchase grudging acquiescence, since he feared the
alternative to be mass resistance.
Elsewhere, the "vernacular memory" of major events has often
proven quite different from, and largely resistant to direct influence
624 Nora, supra note 290, at 13; see also DAYAN & KATZ, supra note 13, at 68-73
(describing what might be called a "pathology" of media events caused by media
broadcasters' broad and subjective decision-making power over what events are
selected for full broadcast coverage).
625 See BURUMA, supra note 165, at 176. Witnesses were even instructed to
"'include the fact that Hirohito was only a benign presence when military actions or
programs were discussed at meetings that, by protocol, he had to attend.'" Id. at 175
(quoting Aristides George Lazarus, defense counsel of one of the generals on trial).
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by, the public commemorations of such events orchestrated by state
elites. 626 An ethnography of one blue-collar neighborhood in
Buenos Aires, for example, finds that vernacular memory of the
dirty war differs from "the official story," promulgated by Alfonsin's
courts, in several ways: "[M]ost remember orderliness and lack of
crime as positive characteristics of the military period, often at the
same time as they disapprove of the human rights violations
....
"627 Alfonsin's chief legal advisor ultimately reached an even
more pessimistic conclusion: that the courts' judgments proved
irrelevant to the citizenry's view of its recent political history. This
verdict shows that despite the theoretical claim that a judicial
determination will establish an authoritative truth, in Argentina
judicial decisions lack authoritativeness both in establishing the
facts brought to trial and in evaluating these facts. Thus, controversies about what should have been done about past human rights
violations continue unabated,
with no hope that any arbiter will
6 28
bring them to an end.
Malamud-Goti's suggestion here that the courts' judgments on
the dirty war had no effect on collective memory, however, proved
unduly pessimistic. Even the military leadership would ultimately
acknowledge the judicial narrative as authoritative. In April 1995,
the head of each of the Argentine armed services finally admitted
the responsibility of his respective branch for gross illegality in the
626 Vernacular memory is oral, while legal judgments and elite historiography are

written. The dynamics of written and oral communication are so different that this
alone may explain much of the distortion when a story is translated from the first
medium into the second. See WALTER J. ONG, ORALITY AND LITERACY: THE
TECHNOLOGIZING OF THE WORD 69, 74, 105 (1982); see also MONA OZOUF, FESTIVALS
IN THE FRENCH REvOLUTION 102-05 (1988) (observing how officially staged festivals
in France commemorating revolutionary events often escaped police control,
becoming violent or carnivalesque); David Cressy, NationalMemoty in Early Modem
England, in COMMEMORATIONS, supra note 550, at 61, 71 (explaining how by the end
of the 17th century, popular memory in England differed substantially from the
national commemorations created by the political elite).
627 Lindsay DuBois, Popular Memory in Practice and Theory: Reflections on a
History Workshop in Argentina 2 (Mar. 1994) (paper presented at the Latin American
Studies Association Conference) (on file with author); see also Elizabeth Jelin, The
Politics of Memoiy: The Human Rights Movement and the Constructionof Democracy in
Argentina, 21 LATIN AM. PERSP. 38, 39-46 (1994) (emphasizing the role of memory of
political movement militants in curbing contemporary and future human rights
violations).
"2 Jaime Malamud-Coti, PunishingHuman Rights Abuses in FledglingDemocracies:
The Case of Argentina, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTs IN INTERNATIONAL LAw AND
PRACTICE, supra note 372, at 160, 164.
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dirty war. In his public statement to that effect, Admiral Enrique
Molina Pico (Navy Chief of Staff) commented:
Human justice is imperfect, because it is based on incomplete
truth. Nevertheless, the firm and clear judgment of the Supreme
Court has established the legal truth by which we abide. That
judgment clarifies and makes an accounting of the methods
employed-methods denied at the time and until the presentmethods that today, in another step toward reconciliation, we
admit recognizing.629
The Court's judgment, in short, had finally been accepted-at least
for its statement of facts, as a point of departure for further
discussion between soldiers and civilians over the meaning and
memory of these events.6 s °
Efforts to induce collective forgetting may fail in the same ways
as efforts to induce collective remembering. In pardoning convicted
officers and later praising their "war against subversion," 31 for
example, Alfonsfn's successor, President Carlos Saul Menem, sought
self-consciously to diminish memory of the state's criminality during
the 1970s. Yet, as Halperin reminds:
Today when General Videla takes a stroll in the evening, his
neighbors cross the street to avoid sharing the sidewalk with him,
and this is less a political statement than a reflection of the horror
he inspires. It is true that this is small consolation for his victims,
and that many of his neighbors' horror is strictly retrospective
... [E]ven so, this kind of reaction has no equivalent in
Argentine history since the fall of Rosas [an early dictator] and
has important political consequences, first among them, the
incredible loss of political clout of the army, that allows [Finance
Minister Domingo] Cavallo to be as stingy with officers' salaries as
with those of the rest of government, and to privatize or close at
will army factories and enterprises, and to abolish the draft

629 Enrique Molina Pico, CLARIN (Buenos Aires), Int'l Ed., May 2-8, 1995, at 7, 7
(translation by author). Molina acknowledged, moreover, that social reconciliation
regarding the dirty war could not be expected shortly, on the simple basis of such
confessions by military leadership. See id.
"" In fact, in recent months it has become "hard to find active-duty Argentine
officers who identify themselves with the repressive military of the dirty war ....
[E]xperts say that civilian control of the military is stronger today than ever in
Argentine history." Argentina's Enlightened Chief of Staff, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1995,
at A30.
61
Menem Expelledfrom Human Rights Groupfor Defending State Terrorism, LATIN
AM. NEWS UPDATE, Jan. 1995, at 28, 28.
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These are no small achievements in a society as thoroughly
dominated by military power as was Argentina in the preceding halfcentury. They suggest the continuing impact of the criminal
convictions on collective memory. This shared revulsion toward
convicted junta members and the attendant ostracism they suffer in
their daily life bespeaks a reinvigoration of the social solidarity,
founded on liberal morality, that Durkheim longed for, and for
which Alfonsin's legal advisors had hoped.
In modern France, persistent efforts by liberal lawyers and
officials often failed to influence shared memory of the country's
postrevolutionary past. In fact, right-wing nationalism has often
expressly sought to distinguish the pays r6el from the pays ligal, the
"True France" of the people from that officially controlled by
republican legal authorities. 6 s The virtues of the former have
been consistently celebrated by nationalist conservatives precisely
for their immunity from the liberalizing influence of the pays ligal,
and the secular, cosmopolitan elites who staffed it. 634 But the
essential logic of the distinction is politically neutral. In fact, it
closely resembles that drawn by "progressive" legal realists in the
U.S. between the "law on the books" (bad) and the "law in action"
(good).
Social division in modern France was thus rhetorically formulated in terms of a war between those for whom the national
62 Letter from Tulio Halperin Donghi to Author (Feb. 3, 1995). (Halperin is one
of Latin America's most distinguished historians.) Alfonsin also reduced the
military's budget by over 50% and curtailed staffing considerably at all levels. See
Andrds Fontana, La Polftica Militar en un Contexto de Transici6n (Mar. 1990) (paper

presented at the Shell Center for Human Rights, Yale University) (on file with
author). Menem was even able to privatize several public enterprises long controlled
by the military, sell off large real estate holdings of the armed forces, and terminate
their participation in the Condor II missile development project.
The Madres have continued their weekly marches in the Plaza de Mayo,

maintaining the issue of the disappeared in the public spotlight. Their "occupation
of the main public space of Buenos Aires acquired the force of a ritual of countermemory." ROWE & SCHELLING, supra note 22, at 228.
6" This distinction, dating from the Orleanist monarchy, was resurrected in the
1930s by Charles Maurras. See HERMAN LEBOViCS, TRUE FRANCE: THE WARS OVER

1900-1945, at 136-38 (1992). Ernst Nolte's invocation of the
German pays riel in the "Historians' Debate" is thus particularly ominous, given the
term's prior, consistently anti-Dreyfusard (hence anti-Semitic) usage. See Nolte, supra
note 369, at 19.
CULTURAL IDENTrrY,

634 See LEBOVICS, supra note 633, at 137.
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identity of France was defined by its law and those for whom it was
defined by enduring predispositions and prejudices particularly
insusceptible to legal "tampering." Conservative historians were
therefore drawn to early (that is, prerevolutionary) French law
because they viewed it, unlike its degenerate modem variant, as
growing naturally and spontaneously from the customs of the
French people, reflecting their inalterable essence. 63 5 These
conflicting views of the relation of law to national identity in France
took conspicuous expression in its painting, sculpture, and
architecture.6 36
The postwar German experience is pertinent as well. Until the
late 1940s, American occupation authorities engaged in considerable publicity efforts, including frequent radio broadcasts of the
Nuremberg proceedings, to induce the German people to accept
responsibility for the wrongs of the Nazi state. That initial effort,
admittedly reliant on some rather heavy-handed methods, clearly
failed. 6 7 To establish new models of heroic virtue, many speeches
were given commemorating the resistance movement and the
personal sacrifices made by its leaders. 638 Yet much German
opinion continued to view the wartime resistance negatively, even
as treasonous. 39 The Nuremberg trials greatly influenced nonGerman memory of German crimes, to be sure. This influence was
carefully and self-consciously cultivated by the U.S. government, for
635 See Keith M. Baker, Memory and Practice: Politics and the Representation of the
Past in Eighteenth-CentutyFrance, REPRESENTATIONS, Summer 1985, at 134, 134. See
generally DONALD R. KELLEY, HISTORIANS AND THE LAW IN POSTREVOLUTIONARY
FRANCE (1984) (arguing that French societal struggles over the "proper" way of
viewing French history are encapsulated in the disputes over legal philosophy in
postrevolutionary France). On similar currents in British legal and political thought,
seeJ.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW 275-80 (2d

ed. 1987).
See generally JONATHAN P. RIBNER, BROKEN TABLETS: THE CULT OF THE LAW

IN FRENCH ART FROM DAVID TO DELACROIX (1993) (tracing the evolution of legal
imagery in French art from the late 18th century to the middle of the 19th century).
637 Koonz provides several examples. See Koonz, supra note 550, at 261-62; RON
ROBIN, THE BARBED-WIRE COLLEGE: REEDUCATING GERMAN POWS IN THE UNITED
STATES DURING WORLD WAR II (1995); JAMES F. TENT, MISSION ON THE RHINE:
REEDUCATION AND DENAZIFICATION IN AMERICAN-OCCUPIED GERMANY 117, 275, 287

(1982).
"' See David C. Large, Uses of the Past: The Anti-Nazi ResistanceLegacy in the Federal
Republic of Germany, in CONTENDING WITH HITLER, supra note 425, at 163, 164.
Theodor Adorno described this attitude as "the rancor against re-education."
Theodor W. Adorno, What Does Coming to Terms with the Past Mean?, in BITBURG IN
MORAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 157, at 114, 116.
639 See Large, supra note 638, at 166.
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public and elite opinion regarding the desirability of such trials was
at first highly equivocal. This effort was quite successful.6 0
Even here, however, the ultimate effect on collective memory in
the U.S. (and elsewhere) was distinct from that desired. Allied
prosecutors, like the Tribunal itself, heavily concentrated on
establishing the criminality of German acts involved in "waging
aggressive war." Prosecutors and judges clearly expected that
international punishment of such acts to be the central legacy of the
trials, and of their professional labors. Today, after hundreds more
aggressive wars, we understand the legacy of Nuremberg quite
differently. It is almost universally remembered, both among the
literate public and international lawyers, for its contribution to the
criminalization of "crimes against humanity."4 1 Hence, even
when law succeeds in intentionally influencing collective memory of
administrative massacre, it often does so in unintended ways.
The Andean highlands offer a second example of the law's
unintended effects on the collective memory: here, on the memory
of an indigenous people, the Cumbal Indians of Colombia and
Ecuador. 2 In conquering the region, Spanish explorers were
responsible for many massacres of these Indians. But indigenous
memory now focuses instead on Spain's more positive, legal legacy:
its legislation endowing indigenous communities with rights over
designated lands. 3 The Spanish intended this legislation primarily
to reduce the territory controlled by Cumbales, that is, to legalize
the Spanish conquest and the seizure of native lands.6 4 The
legislation achieved this imperial objective, of course.
But in the process, it also entitled the Indians to far more
territory than subsequent generations of Spanish and mestizo
inhabitants would wish to acknowledge. This colonial legislation,
later adopted as binding by the independent state of Colombia,
became the basis for several decades of litigation by Indians against
"' As Bosch suggests, "the State Department conducted an active program of
informing and molding public opinion to favor legal procedures .... [T]he people
who were not in favor of or were not interested in the trial method ... changed their

positions completely." BOSCH, supra note 164, at 116; see also id. at 21-39 (illustrating
various methods by which this alteration of public opinion came about).
64 I am indebted to Jeffrey Herf for this observation.
6

This analysis is drawn from JOANNE

RAPPAPORT, THE POLITICS OF MEMORY:

NATIVE HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION IN THE COLOMBIAN ANDES (1990) [hereinafter
RAPPAPORT, POLITICS] and JOANNE RAPPAPORT, CUMBE REBORN: AN ANDEAN

ETHNOGRAPHY OF HISTORY (1994) [hereinafter RAPPAPORT, CUMBE].
645
See RAPPAPORT, CUMBE, supra note 642, at 5.
644 See id. at 2-4.
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territorial encroachment by more powerful, non-Indian farmers. 5
The tangled history of this litigation has become the centerpiece of
64
native storytelling in the region. 6
In fact, it has become the focal point of group identity,
according to ethnographies of the area.647 This is because the
Cumbales, who no longer speak their ancestral Pasto language and
who have assimilated other Western ways, must reassert Indian
identity-through continuity of lineage with those whose lands were
6 48
wrongly seized-in order to establish a right to reclaim them.
Recounted in ritual gatherings, the legal history of this struggle, by
individual family claimants and local Indian leadership, has even
become the narrative support for renewed political militancy by the
Cumbales against the Colombian state and its majority mestizo
population. 9 In taking up colonial law to help their people, the
Cumbales had first sought only the economic and "material" goal of
regaining their lands.
After many decades of such efforts, however, this litigation had
significantly strengthened the authority of local governing councils,
responsible for allocating regained (and collectively owned) lands,
thereby also strengthening the identification of individual members
with the governing institutions of the group, through which such
new resources are distributed. 50 Such are the puzzling twists and
perplexing turns of the law's impact on collective memory.
But it may be that the Spanish conquistadors, like the
Nuremberg prosecutors-in venturing onto uncharted legal
territory-were merely shortsighted, that they could in principle have
better anticipated the long-term legacy of their efforts. It may not
therefore be a necessary truth that all such efforts must fail, as
"I See id.; see also RAPPAPORT, POLITIcS,

pertinent cases).
64 See RAPPAPORT,

CUMBE,

supra note 642, at 198-202 (citing

supra note 642, at 7 (reporting that "many of the

stories I heard.., are couched in the language ofjurisprudence or are organized as

though they constituted evidence for legal briefs").
647 See id. at 26 ("In effect, the European construction of the other, as it is
interpreted in law, is basic to an indigenous definition of self.").
648 See RAPPAPORT, POLrICs, supra note 642, at 185 (noting that "oral tradition is
restricted by Indian legislation, which defines the means by which native communities

can legitimize their identity"). For a similar story of how long-ignored legal rights,
and the lands to which they may offer title, prompted a reconstruction of collective
memory and identity among Native Americans in the U.S., seeJAMES CLIFFORD, THE
PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE: TWENTIETH-CENTURY ETHNOGRAPHY, LITERATURE, AND

ART 277 (1988).
69 See RAPPAPORT, CUMBE, supra note 642, at 7.
650 See id. at 10-11.
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Elster's thesis implies. 651 As legal experience (and scholarly
reflection upon it) gather over time, it may become possible at some
point to say which legal maneuvers work in influencing collective
memory and which do not. After all, courts have only recently
learned the extent to which individual memory can be influenced
(and distorted) by therapeutic suggestion, 652 in ways posing
enormous problems for legal fact-finding. 65 3 Memory, we have
learned, can present itself as having been innocently "repressed"
from within, when in fact it has been insinuated (sometimes
insidiously) from without.
Successful Legal Stagecraft
There is reason to believe that similar fabrication at the societal
level is equally possible. Here, of course, the law is more likely to
be the perpetrator of distortion than its victim. Nonetheless, recent
studies of collective memory have discovered many instances of
successful efforts by officers of the law to influence collective
memory in precisely the manner intended.6 54 Within Western
Europe, for instance, collective memory of the Holocaust is weakest
and least accurate, to judge from opinion surveys and textbook
treatments, in precisely those societies that did not conduct any (or
any numerically significant) postwar trials of collaborators, that is,
655
in Austria, Poland, Italy, and the Netherlands.
651 See supra note 605.
62 See generally RICHARD

OFSHE

& ETHAN

WATTERS, MAKING MONSTERS:

FALSE

MEMORIES, PSYCHOTHERAPY, AND SEXUAL HYSTERIA (1994) (arguing that psychothera-

pists can unintentionally implant false memories into their patients' minds). An
influential early study is found in Ernest G. Schachtel, On Memoty and Childhood
Amnesia, PSYCHIATRY, Feb. 1947, at 1.
653 See Cynthia Bowman & Elizabeth Mertz, A Dangerous Direction: Legal
Intervention in Sexual Abuse Survivor Therapy, 109 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming Jan.
1996).
654 On the enduring impact of prosecution upon collective memory in Greece, for
instance, see Neil J. Kritz, The Dilemmas of TransitionalJustice, in 1 TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE, supra note 621, at xix, xxii (observing that "nearly twenty years after the
conviction of junta leaders who had overseen the torture of hundreds, plans to
release them from prison still prompted huge protests").
655See MILLER, supra note 64, at 72-73, 111, 153, 210, 285-86 (suggesting that the
trials of quislings elsewhere in Europe, however divisive they may have been, at least
clearly revealed, and inscribed in memory, the extent of collaboration to a greater
degree than in these four countries). Such legal revelations had considerable
influence on the memory of younger generations, especially in West Germany,
according to many accounts. See e.g., Judt, supra note 294, at 96 (observing a
relationship between how certain European societies portrayed themselves in the
postwar period entirely as victims of German wrongdoing and the fact that their
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Traditions, we learn, have often been "invented," including legal
traditions. 656 Innovations, in other words, have regularly been
presented-surreptitiously but successfully-as a legacy of time

immemorial. Common law is especially receptive to this practice;
even the most radical innovations, after all, have often been
couched as part of a seamless web of evolving doctrine. 657 Legal

actual "experience with Fascism was left largely unrecorded in public discussion").
On Dutch exaggeration of their wartime resistance to Nazi occupation, see GERHARD
HIRSCHFELD, NAZI RULE AND DUTCH COLLABORATION: THE NETHERLANDS UNDER
GERMAN OCCUPATION, 1940-1945 (1988); MILLER, supra note 64, at 111; Peter Hayes,
A Historian Confronts Denial, in THE NETHERLANDS AND NAZI GENOCIDE 521, 522 (G.
Jan Colijn & Marcia Littell eds., 1992); Leydesdorff, supra note 296, at 161-62.
Austria offers the extreme, limiting case in this regard. See RICHARD BASSETT,
WALDHEIM AND AUSTRIA 79-80, 137-38, 158 (1988). Although there were massive
purges of public employees and Nazi sympathizers (nearly 500,000 people) in Austria,
there were no public proceedings and hence no deliberative airing of issues. Those
who were purged were never ostracized. In fact, they were soon pardoned and fully

rehabilitated. See Frederick C. Engelmann, How AustriaHas Coped with Two Dictatorial
Legacies, in FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY, supra note 242, at 135, 143-47. On
the paucity and political insignificance of postwar trials in Italy, see ROY P.
DOMENICO, ITALIAN FASCISTS ON TRIAL, 1943-1948, at 90-91 (1991); Giuseppe Di
Palma, Italy: Is There a Legacy and Is It Fascist?,in FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY, supra note 242, at 107, 116-22. On the limitations of Polish memory regarding
national complicity in the Holocaust, see IRWIN-ZARECKA, supra note 122, at 77-78,
92-93; SHOAH (Les Films Aleph & Historia Films 1985). On the greater accuracy of
school textbooks in countries where trials were held, etching the proceedings into
collective memory, see HIRSCH, supra note 480, at 28.
"" See Eric Hobsbawm, Mass-ProducingTraditions: Europe, 1870-1914, in THE
INVENTION OF TRADITION 263,263-65 (Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger eds., 1983)
(characterizing late-19th-century Europe as a period of particularly fervent efforts to
construct national monuments, rituals, and traditions in hopes of overcoming the
profound social conflict generated by industrialization). To be sure, elite efforts to
invent traditions and impose them upon populations often fail, and Hobsbawm's
influential analysis tells us virtually nothing about when or why such efforts only
intermittently succeed. On such recurrent failures, and the resilience of vernacular
memory that they entail, see SAMUEL, supra note 488, at 17 (1994). Durkheim's
preoccupation with solidarity and how it might be reconstructed in modern society
was itself an expression of this prevalent concern among 19th-century cultural elites.
See Burke,
supra note 54, at 6.
657
See REINHARD BENDIX, MAX WEBER: AN INTELLECTUAL PORTRAIT 331 (1960)
("'As a matter of principle it is out of the question to create new laws which deviate
from historical norms. However, new rights are created in fact, but only by way of
"recognizing" them as having been valid "from time immemorial."'" (quoting MAX
WEBER, STAATSSOZIOLOGIE 101 (1956))). The legal history of product liability
provides a well-known modern illustration of how such unacknowledged, incremental
evolution can add up to a veritable revolution. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,
111 N.E. 1050, 1055 (1916); see also MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE
COMMON LAw 58-61,132-33 (1988) (explaining how Cardozo, inMacPherson,changed
product liability law by altering the substance but not the form of existing law). On
the place of surreptitious invention within legal tradition, see Clanchy, supra note 167,
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change can often be disguised as continuity, as the preservation or
elaboration of practices existing since time immemorial.
In Tudor-Stuart England, collective memory was willfully
"shaped by those leaders and preachers who invested particular
parts of their history with special meaning," writes an historian
of the period.65
Even in predominantly peasant societies, the
historical beliefs of the general public, although not always
highly responsive to legal suasion, "are not the pure water of
oral tradition, springing unpolluted from the font of popular
memory," and have even been shown to originate in "high" or
learned literature.65 9 The much-vaunted immunity of popular
memory from elite manipulation has been shown to be largely a
populist shibboleth.66
Although political elites, in particular, often invoke legal history
to legitimate their social position and political claims,661 elites
have not monopolized this practice. In the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, for instance, British yeomen couched their
opposition to private enclosure of common pasture in terms of the
eternal birthrights of freeborn Englishmen at common law.662
Legal doctrines of usufruct proved potent weapons for the poor,
since they grounded claims of enforceable right on longstanding
memory of social practice, memory as ancient as the commonalty
itself. In legal systems heavily reliant on customary law (generally
at 172 (observing how French, German, and British legal historians have "all

emphasized the flexibility and relative newness of customary law," particularly its
ability to conceal innovation).
" Cressy, supra note 626, at 71.
659 THOMAS, supra note 378, at 7; see also FENTRESS & WICKHAM, supra note 49, at

103-07 (tracing local Brazilian folklore to European epics); GEARY, supra note 22, at
12 (noting the role of politics and historians in shaping both collective memory and
historical beliefs).
o The most persuasive evidence of resourceful resistance to official efforts at

memory construction are to be found in totalitarian regimes, where the costs of
harboring "counter-memory" are greatest. See Geoffrey A. Hosking, Memory in a
TotalitarianSociety: The Case of the Soviet Union, in MEMORY: HISTORY, CULTURE AND
THE MIND, supra note 54, at 115, 121-22; Watson, supra note 191, at 13.
661On the framers' deliberate effort to encourage public reverence for the U.S.
Constitution, see MICHAEL LIENESCH, NEW ORDER OF THE AGES: TIME, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 164-83

(1988).
662
See E.P. THOMPSON, CUSTOMS IN COMMON 97-184 (1991); see also WILLIAM
SEWELL, WORK AND REVOLUTION IN FRANCE: THE LANGUAGE OF LABOR FROM THE

OLD REGIME TO 1848, at 38-39, 194-95 (1978) (discussing the popular use of medieval
corporate legal idiom for formulating political demands in early modern and 19thcentury Europe).
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unwritten), collective memory of customary practices becomes
particularly central to legal argument.6 6
This invocation of collective memory to interpret and defend
current claims often leads to considerable historical distortion. As
one sympathetic scholar concedes, villagers "collectively created a
remembered village and a remembered economy that serve as an effective
ideological backdrop against which to deplore the present.... That
they do not dwell upon other, less favorable, features of the old
order is hardly surprising, for those features do not contribute to
6 4
the argument they wish to make today." 6
If "the people" themselves sometimes drop the ball, sympathetic
scholars often seek to pick it up and run with it themselves. Hence
some self-declared "radical historians" have come to view their
vocation as preserving the memory of labor's struggle to organize
and legalize union activity, in hopes that the "lessons of the good
fight" will not die with those who fought it. 665 Such historians
aspire to revive a collective memory of working class struggle that
the working class itself has largely forgotten. Their avowed aim is,
in part, to enable future workers to recognize their "own" past in
that of the socioeconomic group or category to which the radical
historian seeks to ascribe them. The nonnarrative character of such
historiography, however, makes it singularly inapt for political
mythmaking and collective memory, since the "stories" it tells are
generally statistical.
Deliberate efforts to cultivate memory date from the Greeks,
who devised the art of "mnemotechnics" for impressing places
and images on memory. 666 These techniques, passed on to the

663 See BERNARD LEWIS, HISTORY: REMEMBERED, RECOVERED, INVENTED 66 (1975)

(noting that in some preliterate societies mental recollection was vital in determining
"immemorial rights and privileges").
'64JAMES

C. SCOTT, WEAPONS OF THE WEAK:

EVERYDAY FORMS OF PEASANT

RESISTANCE 178-79 (1985). Scott refers here specifically to the legal claims of
Malaysian peasants, but his point is of more general relevance. See id. at 180.
6" See PORTELLI, supra note 380, at 1-27; Marianne Debouzy, In Search of WorkingClass Memoy, in BETWEEN MEMORY AND HISTORY, supra note 235, at 261, 264-74;
Michael H. Frisch, Towards a People's History: The Memory of Histoy, RADICAL HIST.
REV., Fall 1981, at 9, 10. For criticism, see FRANCOIS FURET, INTERPRETING THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION 4-10 (Elborg Forster trans., 1981) (accusing radical historians
of endowing obscure, short-lived sects with excessive historical importance in order
to establish links between the French revolution, conceived as a myth of national

origin, and the partisan preoccupations of such historians).
666 See FRANCES A. YATES, THE ART OF MEMORY 1-4 (1966).

On medieval

preservation of these methods, see generally MARY CARRUTHERS, THE BOOK OF
MEMORY: A STUDY OF MEMORY IN MEDIEVAL CULTURE (1990) (discussing medieval
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Romans and in common use among Roman lawyers, 667 were
crucial for cultural transmission before the advent of the printing
press and the growth of mass literacy.6 6
Although today these
methods strike us as terribly artificial, they were understood as
essential in preserving cultural inheritances across generations in
preliterate societies."' Their widespread use was predicated on
the idea that the content of our memories-individual and sharedneed not be left to chance, and that a society's survival could be
furthered by its official adoption of practices by which members
periodically remind one another of its greatest achievements and
the moral principles they embody. In traditional societies, after all,
members feel a powerful moral duty to remember their shared past.
In ancient Greece, memory was literally a god (Mnemosyne),
the
67 0
mother of the Muses, hence the source of imagination.
These facts suggest that to contemplate the "intelligent and
intentional" creation of collective memory is not oxymoronic. The
memory of sentiment, no less of places and images, can be willfully
induced by an aide-mimoire, as Proust famously suggested. 67' The
law might serve, perhaps through annual commemoration of its
conviction of official mass murderers, much like Proust's petit

madeleine.
preservation of memory); GEARY, supranote 22, at 20-21 (describing some tools used
in the preservation of medieval memory). On the transmission of these methods to
the non-Western world, seeJONATHAN D. SPENCE, THE MEMORY PALACE OF MATTEO

RiccI 4 (1984).
7 See FENTRESS & WICKHAM, supra note 49, at 11; see also 1 LAws OF EARLY
ICELANID 187-88 (Andrew Dennis et al. trans., 1980) (noting how medieval Icelandic
lawspeakers were to commit their entire law code to memory).
" For a fictional examination of mnemotechnic transmission of subversive
knowledge-Western literary classics-in a postliterate dystopia, prohibiting their
publication, see RAY BRADBURY, FAHRENHEIT 451 (1953).
669 See CLANCHY, supra note 54, at 172-77, 297 (observing of illuminated
manuscripts painted by medieval monks, that "the schoolmen were trained to make
physical objects create graphic images in the memory to which they attached their
abstract
ideas").
670
See ROBERT E. BELL, WOMEN OF CLASSICAL MYTHOLOGY:

A BIOGRAPHICAL

DICTIONARY 310 (1991).
671 See generally MARCEL PROUST, SWANN'S WAY (1928) (describing a method of
inducing sentimental memory). For Proust, an initially involuntary memory, followed
by intense voluntary mental effort, could induce the recollection of the individual's
prior emotional experience. For the law, an initially voluntary effort (criminal
prosecution, periodically commemorated thereafter) would be necessary to induce,
in time, the involuntary and spontaneous recollection by a society's members of
their-or their ancestors'-prior emotional experience (of shock at the discovery of
administrative massacre and of the indignation first felt, individually and collectively
toward responsible parties).
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Some success stories: Israel's secular, socialist founders, in
search of a unifying narrative for the new nation, self-consciously
sought to make the ancient Masada defenders (who killed themselves as the Roman army lay siege to the beleaguered city) into
central figures of national mythology for the modern state. To
attain this pivotal place in collective memory, however, the story had
to be recharacterized in terms of political martyrdom, for suicide
remains contrary to Jewish law. Religious law carried great weight
with the substantial population of Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox
Jews, whose numbers in Israel have increased significantly in recent
years. Only an authoritative legal judgment on the matter enabled
the Masada story to become universally accepted as part of the
national narrative, as a story whose meaning could be shared.6 72
In the Eichmann trial, Hausner's and Ben-Gurion's dramaturgical decisions were highly effective in enhancing sabra sympathy
for Holocaust victims, a matter on which prevailing sentiment had
hitherto been quite ambivalent.67
Reshaping the young nation's
identity was a conscious goal, and the trial was staged with that goal
directly in mind. Perhaps judges within a new democracy, in Latin
America or Eastern Europe, could help enhance respect for the rule
of law by means more expeditious than simply conducting themselves judiciously. If so, it was entirely reasonable for Argentine
legal officials to infer that, during a transition from authoritarianism
to democracy, renewed appreciation of the "rule of law" might be
deliberately cultivated among the public. This would not merely be
done indirectly, by ensuring that judicial officials soberly displayed
its perennial virtues, but more directly, by dramatically affirming the
law's principles through the theatrical spectacle of a trial, shrewdly
staged to maximal effect.
The Rise of International Memory
Between the Nuremberg trials and those in Buenos Aires,
experience and observations had accumulated concerning the
impact of criminal prosecution on collective memory of administrative massacre in various places, from Athens to Jerusalem.6 74 A
672See ZERUBAVEL, supra note 69, at 203-07.
673 See SEGEV, supra note 34, at 327-30, 338-39,

342; Sidra D. Ezrahi, Revisioning
the Past: The ChangingLegacy of the Holocaust in Hebrew Literature,SALMAGUNDI, Fall
1985-Winter 1986, at 245, 260-61.
674 On the prosecution and conviction of Greek colonels for seizure of power, see
generally AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, TORTURE IN GREECE:

THE FIRST TORTURERS'
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process of political learning had occurred; most efforts at prosecution were now preceded by intensive study of preceding ones. In
fact, national memory of prior efforts had become international
memory, through networks of informal assistance from lawyeractivists, legal scholars, and nongovernmental human rights
organizations throughout the world.675
Alfonsin's advisors were easily able to consult a considerable
literature on the Eichmann trial, for instance, and even borrowed
(from one analysis of the Israeli judgment) the legal theory of
"indirect authorship" used to convict the juntas.67 6 In short, as
international experience began to accumulate from prior prosecutions of administrative massacre, it became possible to begin
discerning "what had worked" in influencing collective memory, and
why.
President Alfonsin and his advisors could thus imagine accomplishing, with the junta prosecution, something akin to what BenGurion had achieved-in impact on national self-understanding-with
the conviction of Adolf Eichmann, or that accomplished by
Chancellors Adenauer, Brandt, and Schmidt through conviction of
the Auschwitz guards and Majdanek officials. In all these cases,
government prosecutors-with executive prompting and tutelagewere highly self-aware about crafting the proceedings in a fashion
calculated to produce maximum impact on collective memory. To
this end, they accentuated certain facts and issues while
deemphasizing others-entirely apart from their strictly jurisprudential significance. The resulting decisions have rightly been described
as no less "dramaturgical" than doctrinal.6 77 More precisely, legal
doctrine established only the broadest boundaries within which
TRIAL 1975 (1977). On the assimilation of that story into the institutional memory
of the human rights community, see Margaret Popkin & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Truth
AsJustice: Investigatory Commissions in Latin America, LAW & SOC. INQUIRY, Winter
1995, at 79,79-116 (employing experience gained through other investigations to the
truth commissions employed in Chile, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala).
67" On the advent and expansion of these international networks, see Kathryn
Sikkink, The Power of PrincipledIdeas: Human Rights Policies in the United States and
Western Europe, in IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY: BELIEFS, INSTITUTIONS, AND POLITICAL

CHANGE 139, 153-54 (Judith Goldstein & Robert 0. Keohane eds., 1993).
6
The borrowed analysis was that of German legal theorist Klaus Roxin. See
Claus Roxin, Sobre la Autorfa y Participaci6nen el Derecho Penal, in PROBLEMAS
ACTUALES
DE LAS CIENCIAS PENALES Y LA FILOSOFIA DEL DERECHO 55 (1970).
6
" See SEGEV, supranote 34, at 336 (describing Hausner's preparations for trial as
"a production far more elaborate than what was necessary to convict Aldolf Eichmann
in court").
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prosecutors were relatively free to choose their narrative focus in
light of dramaturgical criteria.
Alfonsin and his legal advisors, for instance, privately participated in drafting charges against military officers.67 8 They also
engaged in ex parte discussions with members of the court engaged
in trying the juntas, discussions that included the political implications of alternative doctrinal options.67 '
Ben-Gurion similarly
interceded, with equal secretiveness, in the prosecutorial decisions
concerning the Eichmann trial. 68 °
Witnesses in the Argentine junta trial, moreover, were selected
not for their eloquence or the severity of their suffering (as Hausner
did in the Eichmann trial),68 ' but for their regional and social
diversity. 82 The goal was to emphasize the breadth of victim
class, the fact that repression extended to all provinces and
socioeconomic groups. The intended message in this regard, never
publicly articulated, was that the dirty war had not been directed
primarily at the upper-middle-class university students who chiefly
populated the leftist guerrilla movements and fellow-traveling circles
of the period.
Rather, the target had been Argentina itself, in all its breadth
and diversity. Irrespective of its accuracy (which I do not wish to
question), the latter version undoubtedly made for a more receptive
audience, especially in the hinterlands, and hence a more felicitous
form of collective memory. In a word, it made a better story. In
sum, while the law and its spokesmen cannot simply declare what
collective memory of administrative massacre shall be, they can
683
significantly influence such memory in subtle and decisive ways.
The real question at present is not whether collective memory
of national history can be constructed, but whether it ever cannot.
Ever since the early 1930s, social psychologists have shown that
"remembering appears to be far more decisively an affair of
678See Interviews with Confidential Sources, in Buenos Aires, Argentina (Summers
1985679and 1987).
Id.
68o See SECEV, supra note 34, at 336, 338, 346.
681See id. at 339.

' See Interview with Luis Moreno Ocampo, Argentine Assistant Prosecutor, in
Buenos Aires, Argentina (Aug. 1987).
' Michael Kammen reaches a similar conclusion, regarding the Declaration of
Independence and the American Revolution. Kammen asserts that the development
of "collective memory and myth-making ... is partially inadvertent and partially
intentional, societal as well as individual in its application, often implicit rather than
explicit in its articulation." KAMMEN, supra note 7, at 211.
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construction rather than one of mere reproduction." 6 4 We have
become conscious, in short, that someone must choose-omitting,
combining, rearranging the details of the past in an active way-the
stories by which we develop our collective memory and define our
national identity. We suspect that shared stories about "our
common past" have been influenced by the self-interest of the
tellers. And we have learned, with Hayden White, that:
the historian arranges... events in the chronicle into a hierarchy
of significance by assigning events different functions as story
elements in such a way as to disclose the formal coherence of a
whole set of events considered as a comprehensible process ....
[T]he very claim to have discerned some kind of formal coherence
in the historical record brings with it theories of the nature of the
historical world ... which have ideological implications .... 685
Despite White's insinuations here, this process of ideological
construction need not be illegitimate, nor necessarily accomplished
by sleight of hand. In aspiring to infuse liberal memory, judges may
justifiably construe the record of administrative massacre to tell a
compelling story vindicating the preeminent liberal virtue: respect
for the moral rights of individuals.
The fact that collective memory can be methodically manufactured stands at odds with the orthodox Durkheimian view of law's
service to social solidarity, 611 in a way that is not the case with the
discursive account. To be sure, Durkheim saw the primary purpose
of sociology itself as self-consciously establishing a sort of civic
religion, thereby providing the solidarity once created by shared
religious commitments. But he viewed the criminal law as already
embodying a common morality that was spontaneously summoned
up, willy-nilly and unwittingly, by any effort of prosecutors to
enforce it-without a thought to self-conscious theatrical strategy.

684 BARTLETT, supra note 50, at 205.
HAYDEN WHITE, METAHISTORY: THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION IN NINETEENTHCENTURY EUROPE 7, 21 (1973); see also Louis 0. MINK, HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING

22-23 (Brian Fay et al. eds., 1987) (noting that there are infinitely many ordering
relations among true statements); Roland Barthes, The Discourse of Histoty, in 3
COMPARATIVE CRITIcIsM: A YEARBOOK 3, 15-16 (1981) (noting that the structure in
Herodotus, by itself, refers to a "certain philosophy of history").
6m6
See DURKHEIM, supra note 55, at 128, 80 (contending that "states of [collective]
conscience are strong only in so far as they are permanent" and that the collective
conscience "does not change with each generation, but, on the contrary, it connects
successive generations with one another").
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In contrast, the discursive view admits the limited scope of any
such shared morality and the need for prosecutors to be attentive
to these limits when seeking to foster collective memory of such
divisive events as administrative massacre. The discursive account,
in other words, acknowledges that shared moral sentiments in such
circumstances cannot be presumed to arise spontaneously, that they
must be consciously cultivated through strategic decisions about
how the public spectacle might be most compellingly staged.
Many sociologists (of more scientific disposition than the
author) would insist, at this point, on going beyond the anecdotes
of success and failure to ask a more systematic question: Under
what conditions do deliberate legal efforts at memory cultivation
work, and under what conditions do they collapse? In a more
lawyerly idiom, one would ask: What distinguishesthe Eichmann and
Auschwitz trials from the Tokyo trials-either in prosecutorial
strategy or in environing circumstances-that explains their highly
differential impact on collective memory and national identity in
Israel, Germany, and Japan?
In my view, the vicissitudes of memory formation simply have
not yet been studied sufficiently in particular cases to permit
persuasive generalization here. It is possible, nevertheless, to
identify at least one key factor impeding the success of any such
effort: the fact that the public spotlight is trained so brightly upon
participants in such proceedings makes it very difficult for prosecutors and judges to conceal-and to insulate from incisive criticism by
defense counsel-their effort to frame the legal narrative in light of
the public's anticipated response to alternative tropes and story
lines.
F. Making Public Memory, Publicly
What remains uncertain is whether public memory can be
fashioned publicly, by criminal trial or other means. Even if memory
can (to considerable degree) be willfully created, must the fact of its
fabrication be obscured from public view in order for such
fashioning to be effective? Must prosecutorial decisions about the
dramatic staging of a trial for administrative massacre be kept
"backstage," in Goffman's terms, 687 never acknowledged in public,

687 See ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE

(1973).
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for fear of being charged with partisan "manipulation" or with
breaching the judicial ethic of impartiality?
In constructing collective memory, can legal officials explain
what they are trying to do while doing it? In such an enterprise, may
they lay their cards on the table, or must they necessarily play the
game with mirrors? There is reason to fear that any effort to push
"on-stage" certain strategic and dramaturgical decisions by courts or
prosecutors would only set in motion a self-defeating process:
further decisions would still need to be made-inevitably, backstageabout how to produce those parts of the proceeding now being
added to the on-stage production, that is, about how to make them
seem as if they were really "behind the scenes." Such a process
could lead to an infinite regress, ensuring that the most important
decisions about how the tale will be told always remain under firm
688
control and shrouded in secrecy.

After all, no one is ultimately deceived by directorial efforts to
create the appearance of total spontaneity and improvisation
through such devices as a "play within a play," a "play within a
film,""' or a "film within a film"6 90 any more than by a "painting
within a painting."6 9 Although audiences were first shocked and
disarmed by such devices, viewers now quickly recognize them as
artifices, as involving only the simulation of spontaneity. 69 2 In
fact, we now know that the successful use of such devices always
results from meticulous stagecraft and dramatic calculation. So too,
with scripted colloquy, disguised as genuine legislative debate. The
same proves true of strategic courtroom displays of "refreshing
candor."
The problem can be succinctly stated in syllogistic form:
1. In cases of administrative massacre, with the world's eyes
trained upon them, prosecutors and judges are inevitably under'" For one examination of this general problem, see DEAN MACCANNELL, THE
TOURIST: A NEW THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 91-107 (1976) (observing that as
more of native culture is put on display for tourists, the more important to natives

become those practices and beliefs to which tourists are denied access). Theorists of
cinhna vftiti similarly observe that the most important truths often recede from
cinematic view the closer one seems to come to capturing them.
89 For a recent example, see VANYA ON 42NID STREET (Sony Pictures Classics 1994)

(directed by Louis Malle, from a David Mamet play and Anton Chekhov's Uncle
Vanya).
690 For a recent illustration, see, for example, INTERVISTA (Castle Hill Productions
1987) (directed by Federico Fellini).
' An example is Diego Velazquez's Las Meninas, painted in 1656.
61 See Eco, supra note 159, at 110-11.
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stood to be engaged in "writing history" and influencing collective
memory, whether or not they so intend.
2. Writing history is now understood as necessarily involving a
choice between alternative interpretive framings, a fact that endows
historiography with a similarity to fiction and mythmaking.
3. Thus courts, when engaged in writing the history of administrative massacre, must be understood as involved in mythmaking
and partially fictive storytelling. To this end, their narratives-like
those of the best contemporary historians-ought to be selfdisruptive, periodically reminding readers that the persuasive
coherence they seamlessly present is an illusion, secured only by
compliance with disciplinary conventions that must themselves be
693
made transparent and subject to critical scrutiny.
After all, judges are not the only people engaged in mythmaking
and storytelling about these events, the events they presume
authoritatively to judge. We are therefore inexorably led to ask: on
what basis might their favored narratives legitimately acquire the
authoritative status of collective memory, a status to which-in
proclaiming a trial's "educational value," for example-they clearly
aspire and sometimes successfully enjoy for long periods? To
disclose the fictive or mythical element of adjudication in such
cases-that is, to disclose them publicly and directly-would risk
stripping courts of their traditional and generally accepted claim to
be authoritative finders of fact and appliers of society's central
norms. The present section of this Article examines that perilous
possibility.
Recognizing the social construction of collective me'mory does
not threaten judicial legitimacy to the extent that might first appear,
given a proper understanding of the traditional task of liberal
courts:
to reformulate continually the community's historical
commitments (as reflected in its past political decisions) in their
best light, as they bear on contemporary problems at hand. In
short, leading legal theory already acknowledges an element of
69 For a particularly extreme example of such self-disruptive strategies of
historical representation, see SIMON SCHAMA, DEAD CERTAINTIES: UNWARRANTED
SPECULATIONS 321-26 (1991). For recent programmatic statement, see BERKHOFER,
supra note 285, at 282-83 (arguing that "any new historical textualization must show
how it goes about achieving its representation at the same time as it represents the
past as history ... [and] must include multiple viewpoints in addition to ... the
author's.., in genuine dialogue").
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"social construction" ineradicably present in the very nature of legal
interpretation within a liberal community. 94 Even more than the preceding sources of skepticism, this
one must be approached only by way of informed speculation, that
is, through speculation informed by such hints and traces (disclosed
by participants in these "historic" trials) about how these proceedings were "emplotted." Such revelations invariably disclose a
troubling pattern: that the contours of criminal prosecution were
consciously but secretly tailored in light of perceived public
sensibilities, in ways not at all cognizable within doctrinal or
jurisprudential terms.
General MacArthur's disclosure regarding his decision to oppose
indictment of Hirohito exemplifies this pattern. Despite considerable pressure from members of Congress and American opinion to
indict Hirohito, MacArthur based his decision on his fears that such
prosecution would evoke mass unrest and organized Japanese
resistance to Allied Occupation.
Calculations of an equally
prudential sort inspired Alfonsin's legal advisors, prosecutors, and
judges in many ways, requiring them to maintain an acute sensitivity
to perceived shifts in the military's mood as indictments burgeoned
in number and the military trials proceeded. 9 5
Had MacArthur or Allied prosecutors in Tokyo honestly
explained the reasons for their exclusion of the Emperor they would
have made a mockery of the trial, discrediting it altogether. One
can imagine the public reaction to a candid statement of American
policy such as the following: "'[a]ny attempt to persuade the
emperor to participate in his own 'debunking' should be made in
...

a manner ...

unknown to the Japanese people and.., give no
696

suggestion of compulsion.'"
Alfonsin's decision to curtail prosecution of military officers on
account of their demonstrated restiveness would similarly have been
impossible if its rationale had been publicly acknowledged. 97 The
President thus felt compelled, in announcing an amnesty barring
further indictments, to insist publicly that the decision had been in
694 See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 98, at 228-37.
611 See Interviews with Confidential Sources, supra note 678.

696 Ward, supra note 522, at 14 (quoting language from a critical in-house
document codifying United States policy).
617 On the considerable backstage wrangling over this and related decisions, see
NINO,supranote 30 (acknowledging direct presidential intercession to encourage the
court, while drafting its opinion in thejunta trial, to set limits on future prosecutions
ofjunior officers not directly involved in atrocities).
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no way influenced by the several military uprisings that immediately
preceded it. Although unconvincing to all informed observers, this
proclamation proved to be less embarrassing and delegitimating in
effect than the more candid alternative.
The resemblance of law to theater is again inescapable here, but
in ways rather less flattering than in preceding sections. An
effective dramatic performance traditionally camouflages the fact
that it is a performance, for otherwise we would never be drawn
into the story. 98 The actors implicitly deny that they are actors,

that they are playing roles-specifically, that these roles are fictivein order to be persuasive to us. Moreover, in a highly publicized
trial, even more than in a theatrical production, the audience surely
would not be as powerfully moved to endorse the drama's ultimate
conclusion-and remember its moral implications-if listeners were
continuously reminded, at every turning point in the story, of other
equally plausible paths that its characters, authors, and directors
chose not to follow.6 99 A semiotician thus observes that when
"theatrical performances, requir[e] appreciation of staging, acting,
costumes, or sets, [they] draw the attention from the story space to
the stage space, and break the spell of referentiality." °°
Keeping Legal Stagecraft "Backstage"
In order to grip us and draw us into its world, a legal-historical
narrative need not represent itself as predetermined by fate,
denying the contingent choices of human agency. 70 1 But for
prosecutors and judges publicly to attempt to influence collective
memory is to acknowledge the impact upon such memory of
political power, which is not equally shared and often illegitimate in
698

SeeJOHN DRYDEN, Of Heroic Plays: An

Essay,

in 1 ESSAYS OFJOHN DRYDEN 148,

154-55 (W.P. Ker ed., 1961); J.L. Styan, The Mystey of the Play Experience: Quince's
Questions, in PERFORMING TEXTs 9, 13 (Michael Issacharoff & Robin F. Jones eds.,

1988).

69 Such reminders, however, are commonplace in 20th-century theater. The

classic work in this regard is Luigi Pirandello, Six Charactersin Search of an Author, in
THREE PLAYS 3 (Edward Storer trans., 1934), in which the characters converse with
the 7author, the actors with the audience, and the audience with the author.
00JEAN ALTER, A SOCIOSEMIOTIC THEORY OF THEATRE 71 (1990) (emphasis
omitted).
701On the problems with representing collective catastrophes, like the Holocaust,
as the only possible outcome of preceding historical events, see BERNSTEIN, supranote

203, at 95-119 (arguing for the superiority in historical fiction and historiography of
'sideshadowing"-identification of unrealized possibilities available to historical
actors-over foreshadowing of what actually transpired).
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the eyes of some. Admitting the influence of power and selfinterest upon how a story is being told undermines its persuasiveness, its asserted claim to represent impartial truth, its "truth-effect"
in postmodern idiom. It was sheer power, after all, that permitted
the Allies to narrow the narrative frame of the Tokyo and Nuremberg trials, excluding the substantial record of war crimes by the
accusers as legally irrelevant. And it was precisely the recognition
of this power, of how it thus shaped the story, that led to the
lingering charge that the trials were no more than "victors'justice."
Of course, all competent litigators privately acknowledge the
inexpungibly rhetorical, even fictive, element in their work: the
client's story can be told in many ways (for example, with alternative
witnesses, lines of questioning, material evidence, and so forth), and
the attorney must evaluate the relative risks of each. Yet, when
arguing in court, every competent litigator will also "make every
effort to disguise the fact that this story is his creation and to
present it, instead, as a simple revelation of the objective truth."0 2
We might entertain the possibility, at least, that modern judgeslike modernist novelists, dramatists, and painters-might revise their
self-conception to acknowledge the performative aspect of their
work within the work itself, without undermining the defensibility
of their entire enterprise in the process. The scaffolding might, in
other words, be left in place-as in some avant-garde architecture.
After all, whereas war memorials were long secretly designed by
elites, today the form that they should take is routinely debated in
society at large and in the local communities that often sponsor and
house them.7 0 3 Inserting the storyteller into the legal story-the
prosecutor and judge as self-conscious narrators of liberal memory
and democratization-may at first appear an impertinence, of a
piece with the "self-referentiality" (often a euphemism for selfabsorption) of much modern art. But the practice might better be
viewed as an expression of modesty, of a willingness to step down
from the pedestal of omniscience.
71

Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 VA. L. REV.

1545,
1559 (1990) (reflecting on 12 years experience as a litigator).
703
See GEORGE L. MOSSE, FALLEN SOLDIERS:

RESHAPING THE MEMORY OF THE

WORLD WARS 220-21 (1990) (describing the debate in Britain over whether war
memorials should take the "liturgical" form of national shrines, in which only
commemoration is encouraged, or rather the "utilitarian" form of parks and gardens,
focused as much on pleasure for the living as honoring the dead);JAY WINTER, SITES
OF MEMORY, SITES OF MOURNING: THE GREAT WAR IN EUROPEAN CULTURAL HISTORY

(1995).
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Yet, modernist art, unlike legal professionalism (or contemporary communitarianism), almost entirely repudiates the aim of
telling a coherent tale-one with an intelligible beginning, middle,
and end, and with clear "moral lessons" for its audience. In fact,
for modernist culture such aims represent the height of
philistinism.7 04
Modernist novelists and painters relish their
embrace of an antithetical objective:
disrupting the illusory
appearanceof coherence and integrity already at the heart of what
they see as the "bourgeois perception" of personality and society. 711 Surely, the legal theory of a liberal society should be
reluctant to adopt such a self-subverting stance. As Dworkin notes,
even in "hard cases," where any interpretation of the parties'
respective rights and duties will be controversial, lawyers argue (and
judges defend their conclusions) as if only one result were ultimately
70 6
possible at the end of the day.
To admit the equal availability of alternative answers to crucially
important legal questions has been considered, by liberals and
"critical" skeptics alike, as inconsistent with "the rule of law." By its
nature, the law-or so it has been generally thought-can only tell
one true story about who is right in a given dispute, can lend its
,authority to only one of the competing narratives about what
happened and about what, legally speaking, it "meant." For
example, the legal narrative favored by the Argentine juntas-that
they were employing necessarily unconventional methods in fighting
a just war against an unconventional enemy-is squarely incompatible with the story put forth by Alfonsin's prosecutors-that no state
of war existed and that the defendants ordered the murder of
thousands of innocent people, without justification or excuse.
Yet lawyers and legal theorists readily acknowledge that the
same set of facts, undisputed by either side, can often be conceptualized for legal purposes in several alternative ways, all of these
70 When once asked by an interviewer "whether your films have a beginning, a
middle, and an end," avant-garde directorJean-Luc Godard responded, "Yes, but not

necessarily in that order." MARTINJAY, THE DIALECTICAL IMAGINATION: A HISTORY
OF THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL AND THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH, 1923-1950, at

176 (1973).
705 See GERALD GRAFF, LITERATURE AGAINST ITSELF: LITERARY IDEAS IN MODERN

SOCIETY 63-102 (1979); DONALD M. LOWE, HISTORY OF BOURGEOIS PERCEPTION 17-33
(1982); ROBERTO M. UNGER, PASSION: AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY 33-34, 297 (1984).
706 See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 98, at 82-90. This

proposition has been called "the right answer thesis." Dworkin retreated from it
slightly in a later work. See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 98, at 90-96.
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consistent with existing doctrine."' ° A single, harmful act may
implicate both civil and criminal law-state, federal, and international. A major crime may encompass several "lesser included
offenses."7"'
For instance, the "same act" of violence by an
Argentine officer against a civilian might be legally cognizable as
attempted murder, battery, aggravated assault, deprivation of civil
rights, a "crime against humanity," or even genocide, on some
accounts.0 9 Prosecutors have to choose between such alternative
conceptualizations of the wrong, on the basis of considerations not
governed by law.
Prosecutors can use the same set of facts to tell very different
legal stories-all of them inculpatory, albeit in different ways and to
varying degree. Hence arise the need for prosecutorial choice and
the possibility that such choice might significantly be influenced by
dramaturgical considerations of the sort discussed here.
The central issue-the existence of prosecutorial discretion
concerning the charging decision-is by no means unique to
administrative massacre and routinely arises in other contexts. In
fact, a considerable literature now exists on the question of how
prosecutorial discretion, given its inescapability, ought to be
exercised responsibly. 710 Contemporary legal thought now fully
appreciates that those drafting the provisions of criminal law cannot
carve up nature at the joints: particular offenses, each with its
required elements, are ultimately no more than verbal constructions
capturing only certain aspects of a larger tableau of actions and
events momentarily under the law's gaze. 711 Various offenses
707

See STEVENJ. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 48-

53 (1985).
7'8 SeeJames Vorenberg, Decent Restraintof ProsecutorialPower, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1521, 1524-32 (1981); see also United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123-25 (1979)
(finding constitutional a statute permitting prosecutors to elect between two offenses,

carrying greatly different sanctions, but prohibiting the same conduct).
"' Each of these offenses requires a different mental state: the same act may be
prompted by the intent to destroy an ethnoreligious group, which the immediate
victim represents in the perpetrator's mind, or simply the individual victim as such,
regardless of her ethnoreligious membership. Available evidence in these cases often
permits either or both of these characterizations of the defendants' mens rea.
710 See,

e.g., Vorenberg, supra note 708, at 1560-73 (proposing a principled system

of prosecutorial discretion).
7" The theoretical foundation for this conclusion lies in the influential work of
Ferdinand de Saussure. See F. DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS 76

(Charles Bally & Albert Sechehaye eds., Roy Harris trans., 1983) (showing that a
verbal "signifier" is necessarily arbitrary since the link between it and the "signified"
reality it seeks to represent is purely a matter of convention, as revealed by how each
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simply place different aspects of this background into the foreground. Inevitably, the "same" set of events, particularly those
involving the coordinated activities of many people over a long
period, can be conceptualized in alternative ways. Just as a given
historical episode can be recounted through a wide range of literary
genres and tropes (from epic tragedy to light ironic farce), so too is
the same large-scale wrongdoing often legally cognizable by several
alternative offenses, criminal and civil.
We can only hope that, in the interests of due process (that is,
the avoidance of retroactivity), at least some of our existing legal
concepts prove to have captured the morally pertinent features of
historically novel forms of wrongdoing, such as those examined
here. But virtually no one seriously thinks that, in recognizing the
existence of prosecutorial discretion in matters of charging, the
conceptual world of liberal law has collapsed.7 12
Positivist historians may once have believed that their job was to
unearth and articulate the true meaning already immanent within
historical events. Such people were therefore embarrassed to
discover that they were, in fact, imposing conceptual frames that
"endow[] a particular sequence with moral closure." 7" But the
inexpungibly moral element in storytelling has never been lost upon
criminal lawyers, whether arguing for the prosecution or defense.
The question has been, by contrast, what the moral of the story
should be and whether the legal concepts available for telling it
In
accurately capture the full range of moral complexities.
particular, is it a story of radical evil-one that should elicit from us
only sentiments of indignation-or is it a story of tragic choices and
inescapable moral dilemmas, a narrative trope evoking more
complex and nonjudgmental sentiments?
particular language divides in different ways the verbally expressible world).
712 For a theoretical defense of how our law deals with one key example of "the
redescription problem," as it is generally called, see Michael S. Moore, ForeseeingHarm
Opaquely, in ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAw 125 (Stephen Shute et al. eds.,
1993).
71 Mink, supra note 366, at 238. The embarrassment also arose from the moral
skepticism of many such scholars; their suspicion that conclusions about "whatjustice
demands," for instance, were merely arbitrary expressions of personal preference or
political power. On a "realist" or even "constructivist" conception of morality,
however, there is nothing embarrassing about our having to judge historical events
and their perpetrators by moral (and legal) ideas not "immanent" in the historical
process or shared by historical actors themselves, but grounded only on reasoned
reflection. See Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Preface to ESSAYS ON MORAL REALISM at ix,
ix-x (Geoffrey Sayre-McCord ed., 1988).
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The point here is entirely compatible with the central concerns
of postmodernism: with preserving an awareness that many
differing stories-all of them offering at least part of the truth-may
be told with the same set of brute facts. Its infuriating excesses
notwithstanding, postmodernism has at least made us "more aware
that there are alternative ways of truth telling, and that we are
therefore responsible for the forms we use to tell our truths."714
Criminal law will be useful for telling some of these stories, tort law
(in private actions against torturers, for instance) for telling others.
Nonlegal narratives will be necessary to capture still further aspects
of any complex political experience. Liberals would part company
with postmodernists only in insisting that the law's alternative
stories, those receiving authoritative endorsement, not have wildly
different "morals."
Acknowledging Legal Artifice
The narrative indeterminacy reflected in the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion differs substantially from legal indeterminacy of the conventional sort, which arises only after the allegations
have been formulated, the authorities examined, the legal questions
focused, the strengths and weaknesses of alternative answers
assessed. Acknowledging publicly the availability of what we might
call "narrative indeterminacy" would not undermine the law's
legitimacy in the same way as acknowledging the equal availability
of alternative "right answers" to the same legal question.
In choosing among alternative defendants and indictments,
prosecutors of administrative massacre faced only the less troublesome of these two types of indeterminacy. To admit the existence
of narrative indeterminacy-regarding what the story should be
about, how its contours should be framed (and which legal questions will thus be asked)-presents no inherent threat to the court's
legitimacy, just as the now-widespread acknowledgment of narrative
indeterminacy among historians is recognized to present no
inherent threat to the legitimacy of their endeavors.
It is entirely possible to imagine prosecutors publicly explaining
such choices while making them, at least where they are not
restricting the scope of prosecution in capitulation to the raw power
of potential defendants. Thus far, however, prosecutors have
'4 RICHARD H. BROWN, SOCIETY As TEXT: ESSAYS ON RHETORIC, REASON, AND
REALITY 3 (1987).
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sought to justify the way they exercised such narrative discretion
only many years after the events at issue." 5 To be sure, all this

would make the ultimate persuasiveness of the strictly legal storyconviction of particular parties for particular offenses by means of
particular testimony--turn explicitly on the persuasiveness of the
larger historical frame that underpins it.
But that is already, inevitably, the case, as the legacy of the trials
examined here makes abundantly clear. Argentine conservatives,
for instance, would never accept the legitimacy of the junta trialhowever scrupulous the courts in applying the Alfonsfn
government's chosen offenses against its chosen defendants-as long
as these prosecutorial decisions derived from a larger narrative

frame that such conservatives could never endorse (that is, denial of
pervasive subversion and unconventional war).

This is why the

choice of narrative frame must itself be publicly acknowledged and
defended. Otherwise, the real issues will never be joined, and the
courtroom adversaries will talk past one another, in a "dialogue" of
the deaf.
Ideally, liberal memory could be cultivated in a manner
consistent with the Kantian "publicity principle.""'6 That principle
holds that officials act wrongfully when they adopt policies that they
717
could not persuasively defend before interested publics. If true,
this principle would seem to require that if the performative
possibilities of trials for administrative massacre cannot be publicly

acknowledged without delegitimating the proceedings, then these
715For one such long-belated disclosure, see generally TELFORD TAYLOR, THE

ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR (1992) (explaining how
the indictment-drafting committees at Nuremberg decided which individuals should
be named
as defendants).
716
See IMMANUEL KANT, EternalPeace, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT 425, 518-25
(CarlJ. Friedrich ed., 1993); see also RAWLS, supra note 192, at 133, 177-82 ("The
point of the publicity condition is to have the parties evaluate conceptions ofjustice
as publicly acknowledged and fully effective moral constitutions of social life.").
717For recent skepticism in this regard within liberal theory, see ROBERT GOODIN,
MOTIVATING POLITICAL MORALITY 124-49 (1992); David Luban, The PublicityPrinciple,
in THE THEORY OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN (Robert Goodin & Geoffrey Brennan eds.,
forthcoming 1995). The principle is most plausibly interpreted, in any event, as
requiring the possibility of public justification regarding theory choice, that is, the
general principles on the basis of which more particular policies will be chosen, rather
than the details of particular policies themselves. This is Rawls's view. See RAWLS,
supra note 192, at 175-82, 454-57; see also Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MIcH. L.
REV. 296, 302-03 (1990) (stating that while the notion of "publicity" is a good one,

judges should have their own views about judging).
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possibilities should be eschewed, their potential for deliberate
shaping of collective memory left unrealized.
The problem with this response, however, is that Pandora's box
is already open. We know, from the historians and anthropologists
examined here, that there have been many successful efforts at
constructing collective memory. We also know something about
how this has been done, and that the law has often provided a
potent set of symbolic tools to that end. As a result, it is now
impossible for collective memory to develop altogether naively,
spontaneously, unreflectively, without self-consciousness. Writes
one Argentine intellectual, "[m]emory results only from an active
reworking of 'what happened' and 'what is recalled about it."' 71
What at first seems the purest font of mnemonic authenticity-say,
a death camp survivor's personal testimony, of the sort on which
war crimes tribunals routinely rely-turns out with disturbing
frequency to have been unconsciously influenced, as Primo Levi
observed, by "information gained from later readings or the stories
719
of others."
Today a prosecutorial decision not to employ the full dramatic
potential of a criminal trial (as we have come to recognize that
potential), so as to avoid the appearance of manipulation, has
necessarily become a partly strategic maneuver, taken in light of
perceived preconditions for the legitimacy of the proceedings,
particularly in skeptical quarters. A prosecutorial decision to
minimize public scrutiny of a legal proceeding, a decision not to
make it memorable-perhaps to avoid antagonizing still-powerful
military officers-could no longer be taken in innocence of this very
implication.
Even if one managed somehow to miss the implication oneself,
one's critics would be certain to point it out. This occurred, for
instance, when human rights activists in Argentina, and their
supporters among legal scholars, publicly identified the innumerable
ways in which even Alfonsin's initial plans for military prosecutions
(that is, before organized opposition arose from military ranks)
stopped well short of what the law allowed, and may even have
718 Vezzetti, supra note 80, at 3 (emphasis added).
7 19

PRIMO LEVI, THE DROWNED AND THE SAVED 19 (Raymond Rosenthal trans.,
1988). Such unintentional reformulation of memory is sometimes more selfconscious, although still without guile. To refresh their memory of traditional

practices in preparation for interviews by anthropologists, Cherokee chiefs have been
known to "bone up" through books by earlier anthropologists. See DAVID
LOWENTHAL, THE PAST IS A FOREIGN CouNTRY 207 (1985).
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required.72 In short, the telling of legal stories about administrative massacre necessarily confronts the modern condition, in the
sense that modernity is, as Clifford writes, "a state of being in
culture while looking at culture, a form of personal and collective
self-fashioning."7 21 In other words, memory-practice, as it is now
sometimes called, 722 has become at once transparent and selfconscious (in both the positive and negative senses of the latter
term).
We have become acutely aware, moreover, that the fashioning
of national identity through cultivation of collective memory is
almost inevitably conflictual. Historians remind us that "whenever
memory is invoked we should be asking ourselves: by whom ...
72
against what?"
Argentina, in particular, has "never agreed on its guiding fictions." 72 4 It has even been called, by V.S. Naipaul, a society "without a history, still only with annals." 75 Such erudite distinctions
are not merely the preoccupation of poststructuralist theoreticians.7 26 At his trial, defendant Emilio Massera invoked the

"0 Particularly incisive in this regard is MARCELO A.
SANCINETTI, DERECHOS
HUMANOS EN LA ARGENTINA POSTDICTATORIAL (1988). Such scholar-activists stress,

for instance, that under Argentine law prosecutors have no discretion to refrain from
indicting potential defendants against whom evidence has been gathered that is
sufficient tojustify such indictment. Alfonsin's chief legal advisor acknowledges this.
See Jaime Malamud-Goti, Human Rights Abuses in FledglingDemocracies: The Role of
Discretion, in TRANSITION 'TO, DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE
JUDICIARY 225, 236 (Irwin P. Stotzky ed., 1993) (ascribing this commitment to the
"full-blooded retributiv[ism]" of the Argentine legal system). For an accessible
summary of the legal approach that was favored by the human rights community, see
Emilio Mignone et al., Dictatorshipon Trial: Prosecutionof Human Rights Violations in
Argentina, 10 YALEJ. INT'L L. 118 (1984).
721
" JAMES CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE 9 (1988). Law's problem here
is not unique to law, of course. See WALTER T. ANDERSON, REALITY ISN'T WHAT IT
USED TO BE 4 (1990) ("We do not know how to live in a world of socially constructed
realities, yet we find it increasingly difficult to live in anything else.").
' SeeJohn Gillis, Memory and Identity: The History of a Relationship,in COMMEMORATIONS: THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY, supra note 550, at 3, 16.
"s Natalie Z. Davis & Randolph Starn, Introduction to Memory and Counter-Memoy,
26 REPRESENTATIONS 1, 2 (1989); see also Charles Tilly, Afterward: PoliticalMemories
in Time and Space, in REMAPPING MEMORY, supra note 29, at 241, 253 (noting that
today "we see the contestation that surrounds every effort to create, define, or impose
a common memory-to form a coherent discourse about the origins of a people, the
source of citizens' rights, the lessons of previous challenges").
724 NICOLAS SHUMWAY, THE INVENTION OF ARGENTINA 299 (1991).
V.S. NAIPAUL, THE RETURN OF EVA PERON 151 (1980).
7 6
See, e.g., Mink, supra note 366, at 233 (distinguishing the annalist from the
historian on the basis of the former's lack of"a principle for assigning importance or
significance to events ... [and] a notion of a social system for whose survival or
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distinction between discovering and declaring brute facts, on one
hand, and integrating them into a persuasive national narrative, on
the other. He proclaimed: "My critics may have the chronicle, but
history belongs to me, and that is where the final verdict will be
decided." 2 '
The lack of shared sense of a common past-of collective
memory, in sociological shorthand-is what makes possible claims of
this sort, and precludes their casual dismissal. A Durkheimian focus
on criminal law's capacity to invigorate existing consensus on basic
morality reaches its limits in such circumstances. For as Gillis
observes, "[m]odern memory was born ...

from an intense

awareness of the conflicting representations of the past and the
effort of each group to make its version the basis of national
identity."728

Competing Views of Collective Memory: Liberal,
Communitarian, and Postmodern
Trials for administrative massacre have become one prominent
field on which such interpretive conflict over the constitution of
national identity and the meaning of national history takes place.
Such conflict, based on rival memories of painful recent events,
increasingly means that it is no longer possible to advance a
particular interpretation of national identity in blissful unawareness
of doing so or in the naive belief that one is merely eliciting shared
memory and evoking the collective conscience. Thus, it has now
become moot whether it is desirable for officers of the court to
engage self-consciously in memory construction.
Their own
sophistication in such matters, the advance of cultural self-awareness
in this regard, has made it impossible for them not to do so.
That it has become impossible not to try, however, does not
mean that success is easy. In fact, it has become harder. Despite
loose talk about "the invention of tradition," 72 9 the audience, like
the performers, is increasingly aware that collective memory can be
socially constructed, with legal blueprint in hand. As the public for
such proceedings, we have become suspicious of efforts-by judges,
change some events had more significance than others").
7
EL DIARIO DELJUICIO (Buenos Aires), Oct. 8, 1985, at 25. For a discussion of
Massera's remark, see Marguerite Feitlowitz, Night andFogin Argentina,SALMAGUNDI,

Spring-Summer 1992, at 40, 71.
"2Gillis, supra note 722, at 8.
7

THE INVENTION OF TRADITION,

supra note 656.
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prosecutors, or defense counsel-to shape criminal trials with an eye
to collective memory, for we will have learned that any effort to
organize memory is also an effort at "organized oblivion."73 0 We
periodically remind ourselves, in fear of being "taken in" by her
artfulness, that the teller's reliance on one trope-say, the nation's
rise to greatness-necessarily reflects her tacit rejection of anothersuppression of subgroups and neighbors, perhaps, who got in its
way.
When trying cases of administrative massacre, judges must act
willy-nilly as historians-seeking to tell persuasive stories about largescale events. They thus necessarily confront the obstacles faced by
historians themselves in this enterprise. One such obstacle is that
to the extent we first find a story coherent and compelling, we are
sure to remind ourselves almost immediately that the coherence lies
not "out there" in history itself, but rather in narrative conventions
about how history ought properly to be written and, more generally,
in our assumptions about how the world ought to be apprehended
and rendered intelligible. 71 1 As the audience becomes armed with
this awareness, it turns ever more difficult for historians-and hence
for judges-as-historians-to pass off their preferred narrative of a
recent national catastrophe as definitive, that is, to impart their
professional authority to any particular version of collective
memory.
The problem is not simply that different stories betray different
ideologies, but that we have even become suspicious of stories themselves, that is, of their capacity to capture and impart important
truths. 7 12 Perhaps, as Hayden White contends, the "value attached
to narrativity in the representation of real events arises out of a
desire to have real events display the coherence, integrity, fullness,
and closure of an image of life that is and can only be imaginary."73 8
But such strictures against the hunger for narrative
7I0 Koonz, supra note 550, at 258.
73 See Brian Fay et al., Introduction to MINK, supra note 685, at 1, 22-23.

752 This key insight of postmodernism has yet to penetrate the current legal
scholarship, professedly inspired by postmodernism, that celebrates storytelling (and
its presumptive superiority over analytical argument). See PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE
ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTs (1991); Lynne Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85
MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987).
' WHITE, supra note 23, at 24; see also FRANK KERMODE, THE SENSE OF AN
ENDING: STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF FICTION 64 (1967) ("It is not that we are
connoisseurs of chaos, but that we are surrounded by it, and equipped for coexistence

with it only by our fictive powers.").
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wholeness are better directed at communitarians than at liberals.
Liberal theorists have always been hostile to the notion that public
narratives, those endorsed by the state and its courts, should seek
to satisfy the private longings of its citizens for meaning and
73 4
wholeness, for "coherence, integrity, fullness, and closure."
Thus, despite the postmodernist cast of White's observations, they
are entirely consistent with the longstanding aversion of liberal
theory to official endorsement of any full-bodied conception of the
good life or of the stories by which such a conception will be
imparted and remembered.
Postmodernists like White are thus valuable in disclosing the
dangers of a communitarian conception of collective memory, like
that of Durkheim and the authors of Habits of the Heart.3 5 Such
communitarians insist that, as individuals, we are bereft of direction
and meaningful attachment if we cannot situate our personal
experience within the larger narrative of a community, one that
precedes our birth and will endure beyond our death. If liberal law
cannot help to provide the needed link between individual and
community (as it cannot, they insist), then so much the worse for
the law. Postmodern theorists of history rightly respond that there
are necessarily many stories-consistent with known facts-that can
be told about the history of a given community and the relations
among its subgroups. 6 To insist that one such story be shared by
all members as constitutive of their identity would thus be factually
mistaken and morally indefensible.
That much is consistent with liberal jurisprudence. Where
postmodernists go astray, however, is in their failure to give serious
thought to the question of which such stories belong within the law,
that is, which ought to receive official imprimatur and which, by
contrast, ought to remain private matters about which reasonable
people may differ. 7 7 To acknowledge that there are many accuWHITE, supra note 23, at 24. On liberalism's rejection of this objective, see, for
example, LARMORE, supra note 193, at 45-47, 69-76.
735 See BELLAH ET AL., supra note 216, at 152-55.

1 See e.g., Wachtel, supra note 235, at 307-08 (comparing different methods used
by Eastern European Jews to preserve their collective memory through the
Holocaust); Hayden White, HistoricalPluralism,12 CRrrICAL INQUIRY 480,488 (1986)
(discussing the idea that there are many "plausible" interpretations of historical
events).
"' The failure arises from the consistent refusal of leading postmodernists to
admit the defensibility of any distinction between legitimate and illegitimate power.
[W]e have two schemes for the analysis of power. The contract-oppression
schema, which is the juridical one, and the domination-repression ...
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rate stories that can be told about the Argentine dirty war, for
instance, is not to say that it would be wise for the law to concern
itself with arbitrating between them all-the hopeless quagmire into
which the Barbie trial, under Verg~s's prompting, threatened to
descend.73
There are other, more fitting fora-both public and
private-for the expression of opposing views about such a societywide catastrophe and for the critical questioning of particular
accounts of its meaning.
This conclusion, however, is not shared by postmodernists. One
distinguished anthropologist (of that persuasion) writes of the
official reports and legal judgments against the Argentine military,
for instance, that the
well-intentioned effort to expose the terror... [involved] a mode

of liberal collective remembering [that] preserves the state in that
it monopolizes the public sphere and limits general access to other
kinds of remembering, restricting them to the personal, private

anguish of individual memories or deferring their public expression to another.., less troubled, time. In this way, political order
is preserved and saved from the implications of its own darkest
7 9
episodes of excess. 3
Marcus implies that prosecutors cannot choose certain defendants and indictments, that is, certain narrative framings, in light of
their own political objectives, without doing an injustice to the
"small narratives" of the victims themselves, without forcing these

schema for which the pertinent opposition is not between legitimate and
illegitimate, as in the first schema, but between struggle and submission.
... Right should be viewed, I believe, not in terms of a legitimacy to
be established, but in terms of the methods of subjugation that it instigates.
Michel Foucault, TheJuridicalApparatus,in LEGITIMACY AND THE STATE 201,207,211

(William Connolly ed., 1984).
7 See infra text accompanying notes 783-88.
739 George E.Marcus, The OfficialStoiy: Response toJulie Taylor, in BODY POLITICS,
supra note 308, at 204, 207-08. Marcus's title alludes to the Luis Puenzo film, THE
OFFICIAL STORY (Almi Pictures Inc. 1985), which received the Academy Award for
best foreign film in 1985. The film was so titled in satiric commentary on the
military's public account of disappearances during its rule, described at the time by
skeptical Argentines as "the official story." After the junta trial, Argentine
intellectuals on the left (like Marcus here) began to employ the term in a doubly
ironic sense, to characterize the decision of the courts and the Alfonsin government
to apportion responsibility for the disappearances exclusively to a few top military
brass. See ROWE & SCHELLING, supra note 22, at 228; Halperin, supra note 220, at 7879. In Spanish, the word historia denotes both "story" and "history," and thus
connotes a narrative about both the present and the past.
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little stories (only as footnotes, perhaps) into liberalism's grand
narrative. There will always be other framings, other stories about
the dirty war, that are excluded-marginalized, in current parlanceby an official story of this sort, Marcus insists. Even a liberal story
is "repressive" in this sense, notwithstanding its tolerant veneer.
Marcus is not simply asserting, with the legal realists, that any
private sphere is likely to be a product of legal rules which are
themselves publicly created, and hence susceptible to periodic
modification. Rather, he asserts that the public-private distinction
is inherently repressive, wherever the line is drawn, in that it
necessarily marginalizes whatever is made to fall on the private side
of this line.
At times, to be sure, official efforts to provide an authoritative
account of recent history, even a partly self-critical account, are
indeed intended precisely to suppress the public recounting of
individual narratives that would prove still more critical and
uncomfortable. This was the case, for instance, with the official
acknowledgements of wrongdoing by the chiefs of Argentina's
armed services in April 1995. These admissions were prompted by
a new willingness of retired officers to reveal and publicly discuss
their illegal actions.
It was hoped that such individuals would no longer feel impelled
by conscience to come forward with details about particular
atrocities if the armed services at large were finally to admit that it
had ordered this general type of activity-and had been wrong in so
doing. The individual revelations, increasing in frequency and
drawing much media attention, were proving particularly embarrassing to President Menem (on the eve of his reelection effort),
because it was he who had pardoned the junta members and others
convicted of ordering atrocities.
Menem was quite candid about the relation he hoped
to establish between official acknowledgement of atrocity-in
the aggregate, dispensing with gruesome details-and the containment of more personal (and potentially never-ending) revelations
by particular "dirty warriors" turned loose cannons. A few days
after the official admissions, Menem observed of them, "[if these
had not happened,] we would have continued until eternity with two
out of every three individuals coming forth to make their own
7 40
declarations."
...CLARIN

(Buenos Aires), Int'l Ed., Apr. 25-30, 1995, at 7. Menem's calculation
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Marcus's critique, his concern over premature closure of debate,
is thus well-directed against such policies of Menem, but not against
Nunca Mds or its official authors. 74 1 In that regard, in fact, his
statement must be entirely unpersuasive to anyone committed to a
liberal society.
Without argument, he summarily denies any
meaningful distinction between the proper concerns of the state and
those of civil society, between public and private life. The moral
bankruptcy of the liberal state, on this account, is presumably
demonstrated by the fact that its courts do not provide a forum for
every autobiographical introspection-for every narcissistic meandering.
It may be largely true, as concludes a recent study of collective
memory in the former East Germany, that "[i]f the past could be
worked through, it would happen in smoky pubs and around
kitchen tables." 742 It is also true that as time passes, the kinds of
stories publicly told about an administrative massacre do change,
often focusing less on explaining and judging the "big picture" and
more on sympathetically interpreting the myriad forms of human
experience involved-for small subgroups, or simply for particular
individuals, however idiosyncratic their experience.
Moreover, the courts cannot become aloof to concerns that are
primarily "private." For example, they must remain available for
civil suits by private citizens seeking redress for the wrongs done
them by the state and its torturers, as has been the case in Argentina.74' To this extent, the law must necessarily place its stamp of
approval on the "personal" stories of individual victims, as victims.
By implication, it marginalizes and occludes other stories, such as

here was based on a common pattern in Argentine political history. When military
officers criticize one another in public, this usually reflects disagreement between
organized factions within the corps (each with substantial supporters). When such
an internal dispute goes public, it is because one faction suddenly seeks civilian allies
in its intramilitary rivalries.
741 See NUNCA MAS, supra note 16.
742 ROSENBERG, supra note 160, at 355, 356-94. Rosenberg is referring especially

to a series of personal encounters between a Stasi informer and the colleagues against
whom he informed. She adds, "[t]he state could lend its endorsement to a
nationwide examination of conscience, but the desire had to come from individuals,
as victims confronted their spies and interrogators in more intimate settings." Id. at

355.
"4'Surviving victims of the dirty war have recovered damages from the Argentine
State in a successful effort to enact compensatory legislation. See BRYSK, supra note
16, at 86-87. A November 1994 civil judgment found the federal government and
junta members Emilio Massera and Armando Lambruschini each liable for $1 million
to the children of a desaparecido. See Tarnopolsky, supra note 155, at A19.
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those portraying the "victims" as fallen soldiers in- the struggle
against capitalist imperialism-that is, the story favored by many in
Argentina's human rights organizations.
Criminal law, preoccupied with wrongs to public order at large,
begins to assume a less salient role over time, while private law,
concerned primarily With compensation, waxes more
prominent."'4 But these private stories are consistent with the
larger one told by criminal law-and with the liberal lessons that
such law, in furtherance of discursive solidarity, seeks to stamp
upon collective memory. While the criminal law must necessarily
make one story authoritative,it may also, in so doing, authorize and
thus encourage the telling of other, more personal stories, both
within courts and elsewhere in society. 4 5 That these other stories
must be consistent with the grand narrative of liberal memory,
constructed by criminal courts, is another form of "enabling
constraint."
By limiting the stories that will receive public authorization, the
requirement of consistency enables thousands of victims to tell
stories that, ;without such official encouragement, would never
publicly be told. Lyotard may be right that "a culture that gives
precedence to the narrative form doubtless has no more of a need
for special procedures to authorize its narratives than it has to
remember its past."746 But, such is not the culture we inhabit..
Individuals who seek to inject their personal stories into the
public realm-stories at odds with currently prevailing official
narratives-are free to invoke the law to that end, that is, in a liberal
society. In fact, the criminal law can be surprisingly useful in this
regard. In recent months, for instance, Captain Adolfo Scilingo was
able singlehandedly to reopen Argentine public debate about the
dirty war by going public with his story of obeying orders to throw
dozens of victims to their deaths from a navy helicopter.7 47
Scilingo then pressed criminal charges against the Navy Chief of
14 Cf. Geyer & Hansen, supra note 48, at 178 (arguing that as survivors of the Nazi
years have died off and the state has sought to influence collective memory of the
period through official rituals of remembrance, "German memory-work became less
and less private and individual"). The authors concede, however, that there has been
"a broad and swelling stream of confessional literature," allowing later generations
to preserve and profit from the distinctive memories of particular individuals. Id. at

184.
" I am grateful to Virginia Dominquez for suggesting this distinction.
145, at 22.

746 LYOTARD, supra note

4

See Sims, supra note 1, at A8.
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Staff, Admiral Enrique Molina Pico, for the offense of "concealing
evidence of murder."748 It was Scilingo's official accusation that
forced the Chiefs of Staff to reconsider an issue they thought they
had long since put behind them (with the 1990 pardons and earlier
amnesty statutes). The filing of this legal denunciation ultimately
led to the first official military admission of wrongdoing and
responsibility by all three armed services, in April 1995."4o
While communitarians lament "It]he atomization of a general
memory into a private one,"750 postmodernists instead decry the
opposite danger. Suspicious of all power, they warn against any
desire for an authoritative determination of whose stories are most
accurate, most important, most deserving of official recognition and
collective approval. A flexible, sophisticated liberalism can absorb
the insights and exhortations of both camps.
After all, liberal political theory has always been suspicious of
state power, and so shares the postmodernist distrust of any attempt
to employ the law to impose a comprehensive national story, one
within which every citizen must find personal meaning and his
conception of the good. But liberalism need not entirely dismiss
the communitarian concern with social solidarity as if it were merely
a conservative ploy for suppressing the discordant voices of the
powerless-the postmodernist view. 751 There is a sort of solidarity,
based on and arising from civility in the expression of disagreements, that is wholly consistent with the liberal ideal, I have
suggested.
When called upon to write national history, liberal courts should
not aspire to the anachronistic ideal of a single national story with
a single metaphysical "meaning," within which the lives of all groups
and individuals find their proper place. Liberal courts thus need
not construe their accounts of collective catastrophe as part of some
seamless web of national narrative with which no reasonable person
may differ. The postmodernist accusation that they fail in this
endeavor is misdirected, since the courts have never aspired to
accomplish anything so pretentious.
Criminal law must eventually tell only one version of the story,
and that version will become authoritative, but only for the criminal
74

8 Ratyfic6 Scilingo Sus Denuncias, CLARIN (Buenos Aires), Int'l Ed., Mar. 7-13,
1995, at 8 (translation by author).

74' See id.

7' Nora, supra note 290, at 16.
751 SeeJENNIFER LEHMANN, DECONSTRUCTING DURKHEIM (1993).
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law's limited purposes. The serious question is what those purposes
are, or ought to be, in cases of administrative massacre, given the
somewhat idiosyncratic nature of their contours. Is the criminal law
a good device, for instance, in constructing collective memory at
such times, if not necessarily in accomplishing its more traditional
objectives?
To be sure, the judicial and prosecutorial authors of the story
told by criminal law today will often aspire to the larger ambition of
influencing collective memory as well. But in so doing, they will be
compelled to compete with a multitude of storytellers, offering
conflicting accounts about the same events.
In this regard,
Schudson notes what should perhaps be self-evident, but which each
generation must apparently learn anew and today requires vigorous
rearticulation:
In liberal societies, multiple versions of the past can safely coexist.
An all-powerful monolithic version of the past will not triumph in
a pluralistic society where conflicting views have a good chance of
emerging, finding an audience, and surviving. This is not to say
that dominant views do not exist, simply that-again, in a liberal
society-they are never invulnerable. 52
Consistent with this view, it is important that the judiciary of
Argentina, for instance, be able to invoke liberal principles in both
holding the juntas accountable for their crimes and also in refuting
the larger story they told its citizens for many years about the dirty
war and its moral defensibility.
As the postmodernists rightly suggest (for reasons of their own),
we are not always sure that we want the courts to attempt authoritatively to establish common understanding of a fratricidal history, be
it our own or those of other societies. But this is not because courts
cannot, in principle, do so in a manner consistent with liberalism.
It is only because the commitment to liberal morality is actually so
weak in many quarters. To the extent that many societies retain any
strong collective conscience at all, it is not a liberal one: it is not
based upon mutual respect for the moral autonomy of all persons.
Hence we may rightly doubt whether the ritual powers of courts,
in societies like contemporary Argentina (or Eastern Europe) are
adequate to the task of evoking liberal values in parties with
radically discrepant, and often profoundly illiberal (ethnic, racialist,
or theological) conceptions of "the good" and of national identity.
752 SCHUDSON,

supra note 236, at 208.
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Still, large-scale administrative massacre is not the sort of event in
regard to which we feel comfortable about letting a hundred
interpretive flowers bloom. 753
There is nothing "fascistic,"
Lyotard and the postmodernists notwithstanding, in striving for
some measure of consensus here, even if the law is unlikely to attain
54
it on its own.7
There is something about large-scale administrative massacre that brings out the residual positivist-sometimes deeply
"repressed," as within postmodernist intellectuals 75 5 -in virtually
everyone. 756 Before there is any debate about who is morally
or legally responsible for what, or about which lessons must be
learned to prevent the catastrophe's recurrence, people want to
know "the facts." The banners they proclaim through the streets
might just as well carry the motto of the nineteenth-century
German historian, Leopold von Ranke: to discover the past "as it
really was"-a view today treated as only the object of ridicule
by professional historians. Vocally and vigorously, however, a
newly mobilized citizenry begins to demand the facts as soon as
they are permitted to do so, that is, as soon as the regime that
perpetrated the massacre cedes power to those allowing more open
public discussion of the past. Hence, "[t]he first indispensable
reparation demanded by society after fundamental institutions
had been restored," reports the Argentine National Commission
75" "[I]n the face of these events," Friedlander notes, "we feel the need of some
stable narration; a boundless field of possible discourses raises the issue of limits with
particular stringency." Saul Friedlander, Introduction to PROBING THE LIMITS OF
REPRESENTATION, supra note 282, at 1, 5.
754 See JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE DIFFEREND: PHRASES IN DISPUTE 56-57
(Georges Van Den Abbeele trans., 1988); LYOTARD, supra note 145, at 18-40. For
commentary on Lyotard's characterization in this regard, see Friedlander, supra note
753, at 5 ("The striving for totality and consensus is, in Lyotard's view, the very basis
of the fascist enterprise.").
711 See, e.g., Megill, supra note 497, at 29 (defending the "forensic" or legal
approach to historiography, as "a scientific project aimed at getting atjustified truth
concerning the past," as "more honorable, in its austerity" than various alternatives).
Megill is the author of several sympathetic works on postmodernism. See ALLAN
MEGILL, PROPHETS OF EXTREMITY (1985).
756 By "positivist" in this context I refer not to legal positivism but to positivistic
philosophy of science, specifically to its notion that knowledge derives from empirical
evidence and experience rather than exclusively from a priori categories. It holds, in
short, that there exist facts independent of the observer who claims to discern them
and of the cultural categories through which they are described. Its slogan is
captured in the title of a recent Honduran government report, THE FACTS SPEAK FOR
THEMSELVES:
PRELIMINARY REPORT ON DISAPPEARANCES OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSIONER FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN HONDURAS (1994).
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on the Disappeared, "was to ascertain the truth of what had
happened, to 'face up' to the immediate past and let the country
7 57
judge."
Our most sophisticated theorists today, of course, would counsel
such benighted people that the facts are ultimately unimportant,
because they can always be plausibly interpreted in competing and
inarbitrable ways. Such counsel derives from the idea, most
influentially espoused by Lenin, that historical "facts" are utterly
insignificant until situated within a proper historical understanding,
75 8
that is, within a coherent theory of history, that is, Marxism.
Particularly striking in this regard is Lyotard's observation that those
who deny that the Holocaust occurred cannot be disproven because
they shrewdly shift the terms of debate from the empirical level to
an epistemological or methodological plane, where the question
becomes the nonfactual one of whether anyone who has not himself
been gassed can provide dispositive evidence on what transpired
within these rooms. 759 Such arguments-both by the "revisionists"
themselves and by postmodernists deploying these points to their
own ends-would surely strike most citizens in societies victimized
by administrative massacre as too clever by half, if not simply
obscene.

757 NUNCA MAS, supra note 16, at 428. Similar statements frequently appear
during most democratic transitions. In Romania, for instance, the president of the
Association of Former Political Prisoners, currently an opposition senator, writes:
"'The trial of communism ... pursues restoration of the historic truth, the
recuperation of the memory, of our past, of the sense of social justice' .... 'All we

want is the truth.'" Edwin Rekosh, Romania: A Persistent Culture of Impunity, in
IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 372,

at 129, 139-40, 142 (quoting Constantin Ticu Dumitrescu). The mandate of the
Chilean Truth Commission was "to 'contribute to the overall clarification of the truth
about the worst violations carried out in recent years.'" Mera, supra note 372, at 172
(quoting the official mandate of the Commission on Truth and Reconciliation); see
also SERVICIO PAZ YJUSTICIA, URUGUAY NUNCA MAS: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS,
1972-1985 (Elizabeth Hampsten trans., 1989), reprintedin NuncaMds Report on Human
Rights Violations, 2 TRANsrTONALJUSTICE, supra note 621, at 420 ("The facts do not
only speak, they call out in the midst of an intolerable silence, that is being imposed
on the immediate past. Silence has become a cornerstone-placed in the past by the
dictatorship and in the present by those who believe that it can assure a peaceful
future. But the facts, the victims, are there; they speak or call out to us. There is no
future in pretending to be deaf to what they are saying.").
7
- See V.I. LENIN, MATERIALISM AND EMPIRIO-CRITICISM: CRITICAL COMMENTS ON
A REACTIONARY
PHILOSOPHY (1927).
"9 See LYOTARD, supra note 145, at 27-31.
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Recovery of Memory As a Social Movement
In Argentina, El Salvador, and the former Soviet Empire, much
of the population rises up in support of the view that there is a
bedrock of basic facts-about who did what to how many, when, and
in what fashion-that must be authoritatively established, to provide
the foundation for any legitimate public discussion of these events.

It is not enough that the facts be generally known; they must also be
publicly acknowledged, in Thomas Nagel's distinction. 760 When
crucial facts are concealed, even for many, many years, each new
revelation-often the discovery that a high-ranking perpetrator or
collaborator remains in a prominent position-prompts yet another
public scandal, and a new round of general debate about whether
the country has fully confronted its inner demons, mastered its past.
During democratic transitions, people view the facts-in all their
unmediated pretheoretical innocence-as the surest antidote to the
flatulent rhetoric, glittering slogans, and radiant abstractions of the
authoritarian rulers, recently displaced. 76 1 A salient feature of the
reformist program is a demand that is unabashedly positivist:
"getting the numbers right." Hence the recent demand by leaders
of an Argentine human rights group: "What we want is the military
lists, detailing who kidnapped which person, at what date and for
what reason, where that person was taken, where he was killed and
where he is buried."7 62 Appelfeld states the aim in more lofty
terms: "to rescue the suffering from huge numbers, from dreadful
anonymity, and to restore the person's given name and family name,
back his human form, which was
to give the tortured person
763
snatched away from him."
760 Nagel defines this acknowledgment process as "'what happens and can only
happen to knowledge when it becomes officially sanctioned, when it is made part of
the public cognitive scene.'" LAWRENCE WESCHLER, A MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE:
SETrLING AccouNTs WITH TORTURERS 4 (1990).
761See MILLER, supra note 64, at 287 ("Abstraction is memory's most ardent
enemy. It kills because it encourages distance, and often indifference. We must
remind ourselves that the Holocaust was not six million. It was one, plus one, plus
one.... ."). Many recent truth commissions thus emphasize their mandate to identify
the fate of individual victims. On the Chilean commission's mandate in this regard,
see Mera, supra note 372, at 172.
76 Sims, supra note 436, at Al (describing litigation resulting in a federal court
order requiring the Argentine government to release any records left by the former
military regime that would help identify people who were killed or who had
disappeared).
76s APPELFELD, supra note 490, at 39. He adds: "Man as a number is one of the
horrors of dehumanization," and by using "the language of statistics" we are following
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Public acknowledgment of facts concerning rights abuse is also
intensely valued at such times in redress for suppression of speech.
"For some, ten years or more had gone by in silence and pent-up
anger," reports a member of the United Nations Truth Commission
7
for El Salvador, of the testimony heard from citizens there. 6
"Finally, someone listened to them, and there would be a record of
what they had endured."7 65 Such official records give voice to the
silent. That is precisely what the most distinguished theorists of
postmoderism reject about them. For such records (and the official
efforts to produce them) implicitly "privilege" voice over silence;
they insist on trying to "represent" the unrepresentable: the silence
of the true victims, the murdered dead. 66
This social movement for factual recovery, which often adopts
"correction of collective memory" as an explicit part of its program,
has almost invariably appeared, in one form or another, in the
aftermath of administrative massacre: in Russia, the former Soviet
Bloc societies, El Salvador, Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, and
elsewhere. 67
The state's sympathetic response to this popular
upsurge of demand for the facts can take many forms, from official
"truth commissions," parliamentary inquiries, town meetings,
textbook revisions, and criminal trials to sponsored scholarly inquiry
"the murderers' own well-proven means." Id. at 28.
7" Buergenthal, supra note 372, at 539.
765
Id.
7
66 See READINGS, supra note 146, at 60-62 (discussing Lyotard's and Derrida's
views in this regard). There is an uncomfortable affinity here between the
postmodernist claim that the living cannot speak adequately for the dead and that of
the Holocaust deniers, to the effect that only those who were gassed can speak
adequately about Nazi use of the gas chambers. In fact, many of the dead speak
eloquently for themselves, through their surreptitious diaries of resistance and
resignation, maintained even in recognition of their imminent fate. See Sara
Horowitz, Voices from the Killing Grounds, in HOLOCAUST REMEMBRANCE, supra note

38, at 42,42-58 (describing the secret production and preservation of the Lodz Ghetto
Chronicle and the Oneg Shabbes records of the Warsaw ghetto).
767 For discussion of such demands in these societies, see ROSENBERG, supra note
160, on Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Germany; BOSWORTH, supra note 289, at 159-60,
on the current interest of Russians in scholarship concerning the number of those
killed by Stalin; Burke, supra note 54, at 25, on memory movements in Poland and
Russia, and the importance of secret Soviet Supreme Court archives to their investigations; Priscilla Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions-1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study,
16 HUM. RTS. Q. 597, 611-34 (1994), on recent truth commissions in Africa; Popkin
& Roht-Arriaza, supra note 674, at 79, on truth commissions in El Salvador, Chile,
and Guatemala; Kathleen E. Smith, Destalinization in the Former Soviet Union, in
IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 372,
at 113, 124-25, on mock trials against the Communist Party held in Russian schools,
universities, and other public fora, charging officials with "crimes against humanity."

674

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 144: 463

into newly opened government archives. Within the human rights

community, there is a thoughtful international debate taking place
the relative merits and demerits of these various
concerning
8
7 6

options.

Although criminal courts are by no means the worst forum in
which to conduct such inquiries, they have not been preferred or
privileged. This is entirely appropriate, on account of many of the
problems discussed in this and preceding sections. Moreover,
judicial fact-finding often operates by way of evidentiary presumptions (sometimes irrebuttable), legal fictions, and deliberately

"tilted" allocations of the evidentiary burden, devices ill-suited for
putting the interpretive contestants on a "level playing field." The
resulting perception-among defendants and their many sympathiz-

ers, especially-that "the game is rigged" is unconducive to discursive deliberation, however defensible such doctrinal devices may be
for the limited purpose of ascribing criminal liability.

A second feature of popular sentiment and opinion at such
times, equally embarrassing to postmodernism, is the widespread
insistence that the facts, once established, be officially recognized
as such and recounted by the state. In short, the state must tell an
"official story," encompassing the entire pertinent period, about the

extent and allocations of responsibility. To constitute a story, rather
than merely a chronicle or annals, the official account must include
a complex series of causal assertions about how the conflagration
developed. It must embed these within a normative framework
governing the inclusion and exclusion of particular facts and the
As Hayden White puts it,
connections between them.7 69
"narrativity is a mode of description which transforms events into
historical facts by demonstrating their ability to function as elements
of completed stories."770

To be truly a story, in short, the state's official account
must judge and explain. It must have a "moral," even if the moral
' See, e.g., Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Conclusion: CombatingImpunity, in IMPUNITY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 372, at 281,281-92

(preferring trials over truth commissions, because the former permit victims publicly
to confront their oppressors); Aryeh Neier, What Should Be Done About the Guilty?,
N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 1, 1990, at 32,34 (defending truth commissions over criminal
trials).
711 On how these features distinguish historiography from a mere chronicle or
annals, see MORTON WHITE, FOUNDATIONS OF HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE 222-25 (1966).
770 Hayden White, The Narrativizationof Real Events, in ON NARRATIVE, supra note
366, at 249, 251.
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does not (as it often cannot) extend to a demand for criminal
prosecution of the responsible parties. The state must express
remorse and repentance for the acts of its agents, done in its name.
It must tell a story that delegitimates the prior regime, the claims
made by its leaders and by its contemporary apologists on their
behalf. It must affirm as well-warranted the victims' feelings of
resentment and indignation, for this affirmation is the only way for
society at large to show that it acknowledges and takes seriously
their condition as victims. 7 1 "What contributes to reestablishing
their self-respect," as Nino observed, "is the fact that their suffering is listened to in the trials with respect and sympathy, the true
story receives official sanction, the nature of the atrocities are
publicly and openly discussed, and their perpetrators' acts are
officially condemned."

77 21

The very idea of involving the state in imposing such a single,
moralistic metanarrative is, of course, deeply offensive to
postmodernist sensibilities, which insist that the postmodern
condition is defined precisely by the repudiation of all such grand
narratives-including that of the liberal Enlightenment, with its story
about the triumph of truth and freedom over superstition, ideology,
and intolerance. 7 3 The discourse of moral judgment and legal
condemnation, in this view, is merely one of several conceptual
grids that can plausibly be laid upon the facts. It offers simply one
among several possible "language games" that skilled rhetoricians
can play with such facts.774 When we tire of one, exhausting its
creative or merely disruptive potential, we will switch to another.
Significantly, however, in the aftermath of administrative
massacre, the victims and their families (as well as the substantial
portion of society sympathetic to them) characteristically want just
such a moral-legal story, stamped with the state's imprimatur-and
' See Nino Conference, supra note 47 (remarks of Martin Farrell).
NINO, supra note 30. Nino rightly adds that this justification for punishment
is nonretributive, since any suffering inflicted upon the perpetrators is not designed
to "neutralize" that experience by the victims, see id., a notion that Nino found
"2

unconvincing.
7
See, e.g., BERKHOFER, supra note 285, at 220 ("The good postmodernist prefers
fragmenting, differentiating, specifying, particularizing, deconstituting practices to

deconstruct the spurious unities and reveal the contradictions of social and textual
practices."); LYOTARD, supra note 216, at xxiv, 30, 39, 72-73 (contending that in the
West narrative knowledge has served to legitimate new authorities); WHITE, supranote
23, at 14, 20-25 (arguing that narrativizing always aims at moralizing).
74 See JEAN-FRANCoIs LYOTARD &JEAN-LoUP THABAUD, JUST GAMING 49-61, 93105 (Wlad Godzich trans., 1985).
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brook no other. The victims seek, in short, a new myth of national
refounding, a grand metanarrative of liberal redemption, recounting
an epic of collective destruction and rebirth-by an authoritative
affirmation of their resentment and indignation and a corresponding effort to ostracize the perpetrators.
Telford Taylor, in his opening statement in the Nuremberg
prosecution of Nazi physicians, ably expressed this public yearning
for an authoritative declaration of both facts and their "moral," a
yearning that is especially acute where the normal instruments of
criminal sanction appear inadequate, their purposes mocked.
The mere punishment of the defendants, or even of thousands of
others equally guilty, can never redress the terrible injuries which
the Nazis visited on these unfortunate peoples. For them it is far
more important that these incredible events be established by clear
and public proof, so that no one can ever doubt that they were
fact and not fable; and that this Court... as the voice of humanity, stamp these acts, and
the ideas which engendered them, as
77 5
barbarous and criminal.
It is not necessary or sufficient, in other words, that everyone
feel emboldened to tell his personal story, to seek private catharsis
in unburdening himself of his horror by sharing his memories with
whoever will listen. There is also a powerful and pervasive desire at
such times, to which the new democracies often rightly respond,
that such private accounts be woven together into a larger narrative
about the period as a whole, and etched into collective memory.
The Argentine Commission on the Disappeared thus incorporates in its final report the tales of dozens of particular victims, by
way of lengthy quotations from their personal testimony to the
Commission." 6 This noble effort to do justice both to the private,
"subjective" dimension of the victims' suffering, however statistically
unrepresentative, and to the larger institutional apparatus of
repression responsible for such suffering is perhaps the greatest
strength of Nunca Mds, its textual aid to liberal memory and
777
solidarity.
75 1 TRIALs OF WAR CRiMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS

27

(1946)
776 (opening statement in United States v. Brandt).
See NUNCA MAs, supra note 16, at 12-75.
' Marcus's critique of this document, see Marcus, supra note 739, at 204-08,
shows no awareness of its considerable attention to the "phenomenological"

experience of individual victims, the "local narratives" that postmodernists universally
critique-offered as a sympathetic response to Taylor's

applaud. In fact, Marcus's

critique, see Taylor, supra note 308, at 192-evinces no sign whatsoever of his having
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Still, this very effort creates another dramaturgical dilemma: the
stories most likely to stay in public memory (and so to be selected
by prosecutors and commission members) will be the most extreme.
The most extreme stories are necessarily idiosyncratic. Their
unrepresentativeness thus evokes criticism-entirely plausible, albeit
primarily from the defendants and their sympathizers-that
collective memory has been willfully distorted, historically unbalanced by the state's efforts to influence it. But this is just to say
that there is a place, in orchestrating the prosecutorial script, for
prudent use of understatement, a conventional rhetorical device
with which all competent litigators (like other good storytellers) are
intimately familiar.
Again, courts of law are not necessarily the best forum for this
sort of official narrative, albeit not altogether useless. Korean
former comfort women are beginning to learn, for instance, that
although the law may accord them rights to monetary compensation, there is no legal right to an official apology-in international
law, Japanese law, or anywhere else. There is no legal right, one
might say, to authoritative correction of collective memory. Official
truth commissions, such as the recent Chilean one, may choose to
offer a formal apology on the government's behalf for the acts of its
agents, 77 8 but apology is not the remedy that the law-civil or
criminal-affords for the wrongs suffered.
While the law reviews are already full of creative arguments for
overcoming legal obstacles to damage claims by the comfort
women, 7 9 journalists who interview such plaintiffs in depth report
that what they most passionately desire is simply an official
recognition by the Japanese state of the facts concerning what it did
to them, and an apology for having done so. "I am not interested
read the report itself, which has long been available in English.
Perelli makes an antithetical objection, that "the collective dimension of
repression tend[s] to be lost in this bleak recitation of individual pain and despair.
There [is] no place in this narrative for the common people," who have not been
tortured or detained, but who have been victimized nonetheless by the regime's
"culture of fear." Perelli, supra note 29, at 50. Such conflicting indictments and
exhortations simply suggest that these authors are criticizing the legal system for
failing to solve problems beyond its ken, and that they are thus making unreasonable
demands upon it. Liberal theory owes them an account of why these demands are
unreasonable, an account consistent with its own defense of a role for liberal courts
in constructing collective memory of such events.
'7 See Mera, supra note 372, at 172 (discussing the formal apology issued by

Chilean President Aylwn on behalf of the government for acts of its agents).
m See supra note 510.
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in money," one such woman insists, "because no emotion can be
bought with money. " 710 Some of these women even regard the
idea of money as offensive, as do family members of the disappeared in Argentina, on the grounds that it treats the wrong as
merely civil, rather than criminal in nature. (Serious crime, after
all, has always been thought to offend against public values and
interests
that make it
incommensurable,
hence partially
uncompensable, in monetary terms.)
These women seek compensation from theJapanese government
primarily as a definitive acknowledgement of state responsibility.
Hence their continuing opposition to the government's recent
compromise: a private foundation to help compensate surviving
members of this group, involving no official participation beyond
encouragement of private donations.7 11 What the victims want is
an authoritative narrative, an "official story," as the remedy for the
78 2
wrongs they have endured.
A criminal trial, particularly, is not well-designed for establishing
society-wide consensus over the interpretation of tremendously
controversial events.
Klaus Barbie's defense counsel, Jacques
Verges, was surely correct when he observed:
A trial is an event. It provokes, it creates drama, a spectacle
desired by others, and it is up to us to create the image to our own

o Peter McGill, War Crime Victims Unite to ShameJapan,INDEPENDENT (London),
Jan. 28, 1995, at 6 (quoting Mrs. Son Shindo, age 73), available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File. The organization of Korean former comfort women, as well as
other sympathetic rights organizations, rejected a government proposal for a privately
funded trust, since this proposal did not involve any official recognition of
responsibility and was thus unresponsive to their "demand[] that the historical record
be set straight." Scott, supra note 489, at 50; see also Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Punishmen4
Redress, and Pardon: Theoreticaland PsychologicalApproaches, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS ININTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 372, at 13, 21 (noting the
greater importance of such "symbolic redress" than monetary compensation to many
victims of administrative brutality).
"'1See South Korean GroupSeeks CompensationforrComfort Women, ASIAN POL. NEWS,
Apr. 10,1995, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. The private foundation
has been titled the "Asia Peace and Friendship Fund for Women," a name that in no
way suggests any wrongdoing on the part of theJapanese government. See id. In fact,
a government spokesman expressly described the fund's purpose, at its creation, as
.an expression of sympathy." Many comfort women and their legal advocates
understandably felt that such statements, and the policy they sought tojustify, merely
added further offense to injury. See id.
' To this end, the litigation, in conjunction with diplomatic pressures, has been
useful in eliciting from the Japanese government several tentative steps toward an
official apology, including a personal apology from the Prime Minister while visiting
South Korea.
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liking. And by creating the image, I mean not manipulation but
giving significance to the facts in our possession .... 783
Such a debate could prove quite salubrious for a society at these
times, breaking silence at last on central questions of national
morals. The lessons that Vergbs sought to teach were certain to be
contested: that Barbie's acts paled in comparison to subsequent
a more
atrocities of purely French doing, wrongs that78 warrant
4
memory.
collective
country's
the
in
place
central
Shared memory is unlikely to result from treating the defendant
as a coequal participant in shaping the terms of debate. But such
debate can itself contribute to social solidarity-to discursive
variety-precisely by way of the civil engagements it engenders.
The Barbie trial had been initiated at the strenuous and
persistent prompting of Nazi hunters Serge and Beate Klarsfeld,
who viewed it chiefly as an opportunity to demonstrate publicly (and
sear into France's collective memory) the extent of the nation's
785
voluntary cooperation in the extermination of French Jewry.
Yet under the clever promptings of Vergbs, the French were
ultimately asked to accept responsibility for all of their major
twentieth-century massacres, as in resisting independence movements in Algeria and other former colonies. The special evil of the
Holocaust, and hence the special evil of French collaboration in it,
was thus to be effectively neutralized. 7"6 And it had been that evil
which, in the view of Klarsfeld and many Jews, justified both the
creation of ajewish state and the moral imperative of strong French
support for its survival. 787 By the end of the trial, however,
defense counsel had managed to turn the narrative tables to a
considerable extent, in the judgment of certain observers, 788 irrespective of the strictly legal result-the defendant's conviction.
7

8 JACQUES VERGpS & ]TIENNE BLOCH, LA FACE CACHftE DU PROCtS BARBIE 32-33

(1983) (translation by author).
7 On Verges's legal and political strategy in this regard, see FINKIELKRAUT, supra
note 151, at xxix-xxx; ERNA PARIS, UNHEALED WOUNDS: FRANCE AND THE KLAUS
BARBIE AFFAIR 146 (1985); Binder, supra note 267, at 1355-72.
785 See SERGE KLARSFELD, VICHY-AUSCHWrTZ 8 (1983); PARIS, supra note 784, at

110-29.

71 See FINKIELKRAUT, supra note 151, at 34-44, 52-53; see also id. at 34 (arguing
that VergZs's narrative framing strove to depict "Hitler's racism as [a] symptom[] of

Western racism and imperialism").
78 For this point and for general guidance on postwar French politics, I thank
Professors Rosemarie Scullion and Sarah Farmer.
s See FINKIELKRAUT, supra note 151, at 44, 66.
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A criminal trial-unless it really is a Stalinist show trial-differs
crucially from a theatrical production in that there is no single stage
"director." A serious danger that the courtroom narrative might
suddenly take an unexpected direction at the defendant's persuasive
urging, a direction unfavorable (even deeply embarrassing) to the
prosecution, would surely shake the firm Durkheimian foundations
of the entire endeavor, by preventing the trial from serving its
proper, orderly, preordained, consensus-affirming functions.
But the possibility that the defendant's proffered counternarrative might actually prove at least partly persuasive, at least
briefly convincing, is unthreatening to the discursive account of
law's service to solidarity.7 8 9 In fact, it is precisely the genuine
uncertainty of result that gives a liberal show trial both its normative
legitimacy and the dramatic intensity so conspicuously absent where
conviction on all charges is a foregone conclusion. This feature of
legal storytelling is also consistent with the postmodernist point that
stories can always turn out differently than they do, that their
ending is always uncertain and contestable.
The defendant's efforts to project his own interpretation of
disputed events ensure that such proceedings are as likely to stir
national controversy as to still it. The interpretation favored by
Barbie and Vergbs, after all, could appeal to the considerable selfinterest of many elder Frenchmen, including President Mitterand
himself, 790 in suppressing any close examination of their wartime
activities. Insofar as Verges successfully redirected its narrative
focus, Barbie's trial was not likely to foster much "mechanical
solidarity," the social integration enhanced by punishment of one
whose conduct is universally despised.7 91 After these trials, "'[o]ur
collective memory is a battlefield, a place of combat,'" observes
philosopher Bernard-Henri L6vy.792 But that is not so sorry a
fate-and surely an improvement over forty years of coerced
silence-provided that the ensuing verbal combat adheres to the
discursive equivalent of the law of war.

7s On discursive solidarity, see supra text accompanying notes 99-144.
0 Mitterand worked as a civil servant for the Vichy regime for 18 months. Until
the early 1980s, he maintained a close friendship with Ren6 Bousquet, a former Vichy
police official responsible for organizing the Jewish deportation. Bousquet was
ultimately charged with crimes against humanity. A recent book establishes the
President's close wartime affinities with the far-right. See PIERRE PAAN, UNEJEUNESSE

FRANCAISE 315-22 (1994).
791 See DURKHEIM, supra note 55, at 70-71.

7

MILLER, supra note 64, at 147.
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Loose talk about the need for national storytelling may tend to
conjure up the denizens of some homogeneous enclave-gathered
around the tribal fire-responding together on cue, in laughter and
tears. In modern societies, telling stories that resonate identically
in all quarters is much more problematic. When citizens gather at
all to this end, they are likely to disagree about how the story goes.
Someone is certain to be accused of having "missed the point."
This recalcitrant reality is inevitably reflected as well in legal
storytelling, the narrative of the courtroom-even when all agree
that the tale is a tragedy, that recounts a national failure of the first
order. 9 3 It is wrong to expect the law to provide the nation with
narrative coherence at such times, if "coherence" is understood to
entail stilling argument over "the moral" of the story.
Judicial efforts to tell a persuasive national story, one that
resonates in the personal experience of all who lived through the
period, cannot assume that the audience constitutes a traditional
gemeinschaft.79 4 Even so, judicial efforts at national storytelling are
not inevitably condemned to failure, for neither is modern Western
society a gesellschaft-anagglomeration of lost souls, doomed to find
their personal experience of the period utterly unintelligible and
incommunicable to their fellows.
The least we might fairly expect from courts, at such trying
times, is a stimulus to democratic dialogue between those who wish
us to remember very different things. A courtroom may not be the
optimal place for such a dialogue to occur, still less to be resolved.
But a courtroom is one place where it might fruitfully begin. If its
"' One author observes that this is perhaps the single point of agreement in the
national stock-taking following the dirty war: that Argentina is a "has-been" nation
and that what requires explanation is why its early democratic and economic promise,
prior to 1930, was not later realized. See Perelli, supra note 572, at 415.
79 For communitarian arguments explicitly linking the possibility of meaningful
collective memory to the survival of premodern social structures, and specifically to
Ferdinand Tonnies' social theory, see TERDIMAN, supra note 52, at 44 (noting that
"gemeinschaft is the paradise of memory"). See also EDWARD CASEY, REMEMBERING:
A PHENOMENOLOGICAL STUDY 7 (1987) (arguing that it "is regrettable that reminiscing
as a social practice has faded from style.... In a more leisurely age ... [it] was a
frequent feature of family gatherings and other social settings"); WOLIN, supra note
484, at 32-33 (describing modern Western democracies as forming "an anti-mnemonic
society" that, unlike "mnemonic societies," displays no deference to custom or
tradition). Such communitarian lamentations about the loss of memory through
social change resemble those of 12th-century monks, who decried the spread of
writing for seeming "to kill living eloquence and trust and substitute for them a
mummified semblance [of memory] in the form of a piece of parchment." CLANCHY,
supra note 54, at 296-97.
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initiation is impeded by the jurisprudence of formalism, then we
should doubt the value of this professional orientation at such
times.
The real question, then, is whether modern courts can, by
widening the acceptable scope of legal discourse, effectively
influence collective memory of administrative massacre by telling
liberal stories about it. Whether any of the six skepticisms I have
identified in this Article prove to be insurmountable obstacles to the
law's deliberate influence on collective memory thus depends, in
part, on how we conceive the law itself and the proper social
function of courts.
In the contemporary world, then, collective memory must
inevitably be fabricated in the face of public awareness about its
constructed character. This fact is far more easily accommodated
by the discursive than by the Durkheimian account of law's
contribution to social solidarity. The former stresses the inevitability and salubriousness of the collective soul-searching that often
follows a society's experience of administrative massacre. It also
highlights the courtroom's utility as a forum for vigorous debate
about the meaning of such events and their implications for the
redefinition of national identity.
Public memory can be constructed publicly if the law advances
social solidarity by ventilating and addressing disagreement, rather
than concealing it-by acknowledging and confronting interpretive
controversy, not suppressing it. Durkheim's account, in contrast,
inevitably views any profound disagreement about how criminal law
ought to be applied in such circumstances as reflecting, and perhaps
contributing to, a lack of social solidarity. 79 5 When the courtroom
becomes a forum for expression of deep disagreement about the
meaning of the society's fundamental values, the criminal law
necessarily fails to provide the solidarity that is its primary social
function, on this account.
In sum, if we wish to use prosecutions for administrative
massacre to help enhance the solidarity so essential in the aftermath
of such events, trials should be orchestrated in light of more
adequate understanding of social solidarity itself, that is, of its
795 See W. Paul Vogt, Durkheim's Sociology of Law: Morality and the Cult of
the
Individual,in EMILE DURKHEIM, supra note 68, at 91 (Durkheim "claimed that except
in pathological circumstances 'all ordinary consciences' agree on what is right and
wrong, on the gravity of particular wrongs, and therefore on what ought to be a crime
and what its punishment should be.").
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proper place within a liberal society. In this respect, contemporary
theorists of deliberative democracy offer greater guidance than
Durkheim's sociology of criminal law.
Dramatic Genres for Legal Narrative
Certain literary genres prove better than others in choosing
particular facts-among all chronicled ones-and arranging them into
a national narrative that can effectively foster discursive solidarity
and liberal memory. I have suggested in passing that the stories
that litigants seek to tell in prosecutions of administrative massacre
tend to correspond at least roughly with the genres of the "morality
play" and "tragedy." Prosecutors put forth the former; defense
counsel, the latter. The courtroom drama hence tends to become,
to great extent, a conflict about which such genre best fits and
justifies the facts of recent history. Which genre provides the most
suitable framework for historical interpretation and public understanding of these horrors? Neither of these genres, however, is
particularly congenial for fostering the sort of civil dissensus that
enhances social solidarity of the discursive variety.
Both genres, when well-executed, are too successful in achieving
resolution and closure before the curtain falls, in tying up loose
ends, in leaving no moral "remainder.""9 6 It is this remainder,
however, that provides the impulse for continued discussion and
public deliberation after the end of the proceeding. The genre best
suited to cultivating discursive solidarity in the aftermath of
administrative massacre is therefore the "theater of ideas," I shall
suggest."9 7 The task for the court is to prevent the other genres
and their professional advocates, however persuasive in strictly
doctrinal terms, from altogether overwhelming the judicial role in
shaping liberal memory, a role best served by recourse to this third
dramatic form.
Every literary genre has particular conventions for representing
the world. "The function of genre conventions," writes Jonathan
Culler, "is essentially to establish a contract between writer and
reader so as to make certain relevant expectations operative and
"' I employ here the terminology of Bernard Williams. See WILLIAMS, supra note
353, at 177-79.

71' Although it has many predecessors, this genre largely originates in the dramas
of Henrik Ibsen, George Bernard Shaw, and Bertolt Brecht. Its current leading

representative is Tony Kushner, who has employed its conventions in virtually all of
his plays.
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thus to permit both compliance with and deviation from accepted

modes of intelligibility." 78 Hence, "[t]he use of a given dramatic
form is in some sense a proposal to elicit a given kind of
response." 799 This response involves a measure of sympathy for
certain characters and antipathy toward others-or ambivalence
toward them all.
The purpose of genre-choice in the present context is little
different from "real" theater. This is because of how social life,
particularly in the courtroom, involves no small measure of roleplaying and thus is not entirely discontinuous with theatrical
performance.8 00 This connection implies, for instance, that "when
we describe real-life events as tragic, we emphasize ... [how] the
event in life seems organized in the manner of the tragic form in
drama."8 01
In our attempts at understanding the world, "we
structure real experiences in the same way that tragedy organizes
802
them in drama."
In the morality plays of the early Elizabethan period, the
characters functioned allegorically, representing the various virtues
and vices.80 3 These dramas were "intended to convey a lesson for4
80
the better conduct of life," in the words of one interpreter.
They were "to serve a ritual social purpose," notes another, "to
demonstrate and therefore to verify Christian doctrine."805 The
simplifications of character, piot, and worldview that they involved
theological themes
were considered necessary for rendering learned
806
audience.
illiterate
largely
a
to
accessible

71JONATHAN CULLER, STRUCTURALIST POETICS: STRUCTURALISM, LINGUISTICS AND
THE STUDY OF LITERATURE 147 (1975).
7 ELDER OLSON, TRAGEDY AND THE THEORY OF DRAMA 168 (Wayne State Univ.
Press 1966) (1961).
8oo See GOFFMAN, supra note 687, at xi; Eco, supra note 159, at 113.
801 RICHARD H.

PALMER, TRAGEDY AND TRAGIC THEORY: AN ANALYTICAL GUIDE

9 (1992).
2

M Id.

1o0 See ROBERT POTTER, THE ENGLISH MORALITY PLAY:

ORIGINS, HISTORY AND

INFLUENCE OF A DRAMATIC TRADITION 105-55 (1975); JAMES A. REYNOLDS, REPENTANCE AND RETRIBUTION IN EARLY ENGLISH DRAMA at v (1982) (noting that "[t]he
major characters, through both speech and action, correspond to specific agents of

good and evil in the morality tradition").
" 2J. PAYNE COLLIER, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH

DRAMATIC POETRY TO THE TIME

OF SHAKESPEARE 259 (AMS Press 1970) (1831); see also CLIFFORD DAVIDSON,
VISUALIZING THE MORAL LIFE: MEDIEVAL ICONOGRAPHY AND THE MACRO MORALITY

PLAYS 4-13 (1989) (reiterating and exploring Collier's conclusion).
"In each case we have a ... tangible
805 POTTER, supra note 803, at 16.
substantiation of higher principles. In each case the Truth comes true. In each case
we have a drama... with a positive and reinforcing conclusion." Id.

"0On the central aim of popularizing Christian moral teachings, see DAVID N.
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Morality plays were not mere sermons or theological arguments.
They were "concerned more amply with moving the emotions, not
07
merely with impressing on the mind clear and distinct ideas."
It was this feature that enabled them "to elicit pleasure and/or to
purge passions," to "exert[] an ideological action on the spectators,
reinforcing their common faith." 0 8 This reinforcing of common
faith provides the link to Durkheim's view of criminal prosecution.
After all, prosecution was to serve as a public ritual for awakening
and consolidating the collective conscience, the content of which
increasingly consisted, he believed, of our "common faith" in ideas
809
of respect for individuals and their rights.
Today, however, the weakness of the morality play as a genre for
social drama and mnemonic didactics is relatively clear. It lies in
the polarity of the conclusion: the unequivocal triumph of the
unflinchingly good over the unregenerately evil. One will be
tempted to respond, of course, that in cases of large-scale administrative massacre this proves almost entirely accurate as a rough
characterization, at least, of the central personae-themass murderers
and the murdered-and of their predominant features.
But when complicity in such crimes is widespread throughout a
society, because of diffuse support or connivance enjoyed by the
immediate perpetrators, the simple bipolarity of the morality play
is inadequate. Specifically, its genre conventions offer poor
guidance for a society in need of a deeper and more far-reaching
process of self-reckoning. That need has surely been present in all
of the situations examined here, and is sometimes even widely
acknowledged.
Like modern melodrama, the morality play displays a psychologi81 0
cal structure that is "monopathic," in the words of one scholar.
Since it is based "on the victor-victim polarity, there is no counterfeeling to offset the dominant emotion: the approval of victory
easily expands into the delights of self-congratulation."8 1' This
pattern has been especially conspicuous in the Argentine reaction
BEAUREGARD, VIRTUE'S OWN FEATURE:
SHAKESPEARE AND THE VIRTUE ETHICS
TRADITION 28-29 (1995); DAVID M. BEVINGTON, FROM MANKIND TO MARLOWE:

GROWTH OF STRUCTURE IN THE POPULAR DRAMA OF TUDOR ENGLAND 48-67 (1962).
0 BEAUREGARD, supra note 806, at 29.
s ALTER, supra note 700, at 39.

o See supra text accompanying notes 70-72.

810

See ROBERT B. HEILMAN, TRAGEDY AND MELODRAMA: VERSIONS OF EXPERIENCE

87 (1968).
811Id.
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to the junta prosecution and in Japanese response to the Tokyo
Trial, as we have seen. In morality plays, as in the melodramas of
mass culture, "victory is not tempered with the rigors of cost
accounting, nor defeat with the reckoning of spiritual growth." 1 2
In the wake of administrative massacre, the very success of the
prosecution in eliciting and purging the punitive passions via the
genre conventions of the morality play thus constitutes at once its
deepest failure, that is, its failure as a vehicle for generating
discursive solidarity between current accusers and former sympathizers of the accused. This failure is especially problematic where
the crimes of the accused recently received pervasive sympathy from
the accusers themselves or, more precisely, from a substantial
segment of the public whom the prosecutorial accusers represent.
Where the prosecution aims to change the audience's beliefs
and memories, rather than to confirm existing ones, other genres
are more promising as dramatic vehicles for legal narration of
recent events. Tragedy immediately recommends itself in this
regard. This is not so much because such events are clearly "tragic"
in the lay sense of involving terrible suffering and misfortune.
Rather, a tragic framing of events suggests itself because of the
complexity that this dramatic genre admits in the distribution of
wrongdoing and blame.
The story becomes, instead, one about how good and evil people
are to be found on both sides of the conflict, and about how good
people on each such side were made to suffer by evil people on the
other. This story will tend to implicate the accusers (and those for
whom they speak), depriving them of "clean hands" and weakening
confidence (even self-confidence, at times) in their moral standing
to accuse and to judge.
This effect of tragic drama upon its audience has been noted
and decried at least since Rousseau. He contended (as a recent
commentator observes) that in tragedy
the passions are made more attractive, while virtue becomes the

preserve of special kinds of beings.... Men are softened ... ;
they hear vice, adorned with the charms of poetry, defended in the
mouths of villains; they become accustomed to thinking of the
most terrible crimes and to pity those who commit them ...
812

Id.

...
Allan Bloom, IntroductiontoJEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, POLITICS AND THE ARTS:
LETTER TO M. D'ALEMBERT ON THE THEATRE at xi, xxv (Allan Bloom trans., 1960).
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This softening effect follows directly from an essential feature
of tragedy as a literary genre. A drama scholar thus writes:
While the stresses of melodrama can unite an audience against a
common enemy and a common evil, those of tragedy can be more
painful because they are difficult or impossible to resolve. You
can throw rotten eggs at the villain of melodrama, a gesture
impossible in tragedy, whose villain hides inside your own
14
8

head.

This effect was exactly that sought by Verges, for instance, in
pointing the accusatory finger at France itself, and its postwar
foreign policy in particular: to hide inside the head of the national
audience, disrupting the tranquility of its desired dinouement 15
In seeking to soften up the judgmental passions of an audience, the
idiom of tu quoque offers a congenial device and has hence been
prominent in defense narratives-not only at Nuremberg and Tokyo,
but also in the more recent trials (Buenos Aires, Paris, and Lyon)
examined here.
The question then proves to be whether it is possible to render
the historical narrative more complex in this fashion-as the
intended basis for collective memory-without thereby also undermining the legal result. After all, only the defendants can be
convicted and imprisoned, not "society" at large. A tragic framing
of their clients' conduct and circumstances appeals to defense
counsel precisely because of how it weakens the plausibility and
persuasiveness of such a conclusion to the legal story. The moral
complexity of the tale is brought to the fore-and deployed to
maximal theatrical effect-in hopes of enervating the audience's
initial moral passions, which are often (as in the trials of Barbie and
the Argentine juntas) intensely punitive.
Classical tragedy displays a second drawback, for present
purposes. It ends with the restoration of the cosmic order that has
been disrupted by the characters and events.8 16 This tranquility
serves to "transcend the carnage" with which such plays commonly
end. But this purified state of peacefulness, offered only by grace
of the gods, has been widely and understandably thought to render
such endings unpersuasive to modern audiences-even irrelevant to
14

1 J.L. STYAN, DRAMA, STAGE AND AUDIENCE 72 (1975).
8'5 See supra text accompanying notes 782-88.
816 See PALMER, supra note 801, at 150 (noting that "[t]ragic

theorists persistently
advance the idea of a cosmic order upset by the character's actions but restored at
the play's end").

688

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 144:463

the modern condition, a condition said to be "characterized by
fragmentation rather than by the ever-uniting synthesis." 817
A
dramatic form that "assert[s] ...
the ultimate unity of the moral
order""'8 is surely not well-calculated to stimulate continuing
discussion at the end of the play or proceeding; it is thus poorly
suited to foster discursive solidarity among parties to such a muchneeded discussion.
Rendering the national narrative as tragedy thus overcomes the
weakness of emplotting it as melodramatic morality play. But it
does so only by introducing serious, perhaps insurmountable obstacles to justifying severe punishment for a limited few. A tragic
emplotment is likely to fail, in any event, because its genre conventions require a concession of wrongdoing and an expression of
remorse by the central character-the defendant. Such concessions
have been almost entirely absent in prosecutions of administrative
massacre. The exception of Albert Speer, in this respect, only
serves to reveal the extreme rarity of such a response."' l In short,
the defendant himself generally proves unwilling to assume the
mantle of tragic hero, insofar as this requires disclosing a "tragic
flaw."
The closest that most defendants will come to satisfying this
genre convention is to allege that their acts were determined by
fate, by bad luck-a common theme in classical tragedy.8 20 Hence
the recurrent claim of Eichmann and even higher-ranking Nazi officials, for instance, that they were mere "cogs" in an organizational
machine, one that would have produced identical effects without
them. If their absence would have made no difference, then their

17 MURRAY KRIEGER, THE TRAGIC VISION: VARIATIONS ON A THEME IN LITERARY

INTERPRETATION 6 (1960). An influential argument for this view is espoused in Georg

Lukics, The Sociology of Modern Drama,TUL. DRAMA REV., Summer 1965, at 146 (Lee
Baxandall trans.).
818 KRIEGER, supra note 817, at 6. "The cathartic principle itself, in maintaining
that pity and fear are not merely to be aroused but to be purged, is evidence of the
need in tragedy to have dissonance exploded, leaving only the serenity of harmony
behind." Id. at 3; see also ROBERT BRUSTEIN, THE THEATRE OF REVOLT: AN APPROACH

TO THE MODERN DRAMA 4 (1964) (observing that in the traditional "theatre of
communion," including the works of Sophocles and Shakespeare, "traditional myths
were enacted before an audience of believers against the background ofa shiftingbut
still 1coherent
universe").
9
1 See GrrTA SERENY, ALBERT SPEER: HIS BATTLE WITH TRUTH (1995).
820

See DWIGHT

FURROW, AGAINST THEORY:

CHALLENGES IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 68 (1995).
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presence must be viewed as merely a matter of moral luck, they

imply.
In the interests of discursive engagement between the parties
(and their respective followers), the court must resist the narrative
framings offered by the antagonists, passing judgment only on their
legal arguments. Whatever legal conclusion is ultimately reached on
the merits, the story enacted within the public drama of the

courtroom (and thus infused in collective memory) should be one
that serves the needs of what I have called discursive solidarity. To
this end, the most suitable dramatic genre is surely the "theater of
ideas." 2' Its leading theorists spoke explicitly of the "theater as
tribunal." 22 The affinities this suggests make it defensible to
consider, at least, the merits of the tribunal as theater.
The drama of ideas involves, writes George Bernard Shaw, "the
introduction of the discussion and its development until it so
overspreads and interpenetrates the action that it finally assimilates
it, making play and discussion practically identical." 2 ' The effect
is that
the drama arises through a conflict of unsettled ideals rather
than through vulgar attachments, rapacities, generosities, resentments, ambitions, misunderstandings, oddities and so forth as to
which no moral question is raised. The conflict is not between
clear right and wrong: the villain is as conscientious as the hero,
if not more so: in fact, the question which makes the play
interesting (when it is interesting) is which is the villain and which
24
the hero.
In fact, notes a scholar, "the dramatist may feel so ambivalent
about both sides.., that he refuses to permit either to score a clear
victory."125 Such principled irresolution should not be confused
with mere indecisiveness. Tragedy and melodrama, whatever their
differences, resemble each other in this crucial respect: questions
about "which is the victor and which the vanquished ... are pre-

"' For studies on major exemplars of this tradition, see IDEAS IN THE DRAMA:
SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE ENGLISH INSTITUTE (John

Gassner ed., 1964).

TIMOTHYJ. WILES, THE THEATER EvENT: MODERN THEORIES OF PERFORMANCE
75 (1980) (quoting Erwin Piscator).
823 [GEORGE] BERNARD SHAw, The Quintessence of Ibsenism, in MAJOR CRITICAL
ESSAYS 1, 146 (1932).
'Id. at 139.
Vivian Mercier, FromMyth to Ideas-andBack, in IDEAS INTHE DRAMA, supranote
821, at 42, 46.
8'
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cisely the questions which a drama of orthodoxy cannot afford to
826
leave in doubt."
Bertolt Brecht's "alienation effect" can contribute to this process
of deliberate disruption, because such "[a]lienation allows both
players and audience to deliberate upon the action with full
awareness of how events"-including the events on stage-"are
manipulated." 827 Cross-examination by opposing counsel can be
viewed as a theatrical device in the public drama for ensuring that
the testimony of a given witness, no matter how initially sympathetic, is subjected to such an alienation effect. Brechtian drama,
remarks Roland Barthes, is thus "a theatre that invites, requires
explanation, but does not give it; it is a theatre that provokes
History, but does not reveal it, that poses the acuity of the problem
8 28
... but does not solve it."
The drama of ideas does not involve mere intellectual debate
between embodied representatives of abstract ideas. Emotions play
a key role. These are not the emotions of uncritical sympathy with
some characters and unqualified loathing of others (as in the
melodrama), but rather "'the sense ofjustice, the urge to freedom,
and righteous anger. ' '829 No identifiable hero ("proletarian" or
otherwise) is allowed to monopolize these noble sentiments,
moreover. The dramatic result is to achieve a great degree of moral
complexity without succumbing to the cosmic resolution and
resulting tranquility of classical tragedy.
Surely this is the dramatic form most hospitable to the courtroom, especially when the defendants view their conduct asjust and
honorable and are prepared to defend it publicly as such. By
enforcing the adversarial structure of the proceeding and the
civility-rules governing it, the court can induce the antagonists to
engage each other's historiographical interpretations. If dramatic
catharsis and social connection are to result, they must emerge from
826Id.
827 FREDERICK BURWICK, ILLUSION AND THE DRAMA:

CRITICAL THEORY OF THE

ENLIGHTENMENT AND ROMANTIC ERA 6 (1991); see also WILES, supra note 822, at 86

(describing 'the theatrical reality of Brechtian actors observing and commentingupon
the characters they play before a critical audience which judges rather than
empathizes").
88 ROLAND BARTHES, BRECHT, MARX, ET L'HISTORIE, CAHIERS DE LA COMPAGNIE

MADELEINE RENAUD/JEAN BARRAULT 21, 23 (1957); see also WILES, supra note 822, at

75 (noting that Brecht "left his plays unresolved so that his audience would seek to
solve problems outside the theater, in the world").
'9 WILES, supra note 822, at 76 (quoting Bertolt Brecht).
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this very process of civil dissensus, rather than from any hope of its
immediate resolution by the court.
To orchestrate the trial in this way does not require that we
regard the architects of genocide as "men of ideas," although they
themselves-from Adolf Hitler to Ramon Camps-have often viewed
their lives in just this way. It requires only that we provide them
with the occasion to demonstrate the moral bankruptcy of their
ideas and acts, when publicly subject to critical scrutiny and
examination. To the extent that such defendants altogether fail to
persuade anyone of their crack-pot historical theories, prosecution
of them will easily evoke the righteous indignation of the collective
conscience, much as Durkheim hypothesized. To the extent that the
defendants succeed in remaining persuasive to significant numbers
of fellow citizens, those citizens will at least be drawn into discursive solidarity, through civilized debate, with others whose views
they oppose, debates modeled on those initiated and observed in
court.
The dilemma thus becomes: how to authoritatively resolve the
legal question of the defendants' criminal liability, while expressly
holding open larger questions about collective memory that the
court now admits as legitimately open to debate within the forum
it provides. How can judges, by telling liberal stories in their
opinions, effectively influence collective memory of administrative
massacre, while nonetheless disavowing any professional monopoly
over questions of ultimate meaning? In the present Article, I seek
only to bring this tension more clearly to the surface of our
discussion and to clarify its terms.
III. COLLECTIVE MEMORY IN THE POSTWAR GERMAN ARMY:

A CASE STUDY

Consider, in conclusion, a final example of an effort to use the
law, with some success, to influence shared memory and group
identity in the face of all six obstacles discussed above. It is useful,
in evaluating the preceding argument, to observe the interaction
between these obstacles in a single case. It is also fruitful to observe
how the argument applies beyond the collective memory of an
entire society to that of particular institutions within it."' °
' For a discussion of how formal organizations, certain professions, and
particularly the judiciary develop institutional memory in ways partially independent
of memory formation in society at large, see HALBWACHS, supra note 217, at 160-65.
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I hypothesize that any large institution employing law to
influence the collective memory of its members will confront the
six problems examined above. In most societies, the army is considered an institution with which its members must strongly identify
in order to elicit from them the supreme sacrifices sometimes
expected in its service. Thus, army leadership virtually everywhere employs periodic rituals, commemorating the country's
military successes, to invigorate the collective memory of its soldiers, with a conscious view to inspiring them to comparable future
feats.
To elicit courage, combat cohesion, and self-sacrifice from their
soldiers, armies-in a word-need heroes and the memory of their
accomplishments. How, then, was the West German armed forces,
newly reconstituted after the Second World War, to meet these
universally acknowledged requirements? Gould a coherent narrative
of institutional identity, consistent with liberal principles, be
fashioned under such circumstances? The postwar civilian leadership set out to try."3 ' The problem, in short, was:
The disasters of German history compelled the leaders of the
West German armed forces to examine the past, a demand that
worked against the formation of a tradition free of problems.
Other countries in the twentieth century seemed quite willing
to select the best from their pasts and ignore their failures,
or to idealize their defeats into victories.... [But] any attempt
by the Bundeswehr to interpret its history in perhaps a less
harsh light would be interpreted by its critics as an act of
32
restoration.
This problem established the terms of debate. Was there
anything worth remembering, besides the mistakes of the past?
Could those mistakes themselves become the exclusive basis of the
army's institutional identity? At one extreme were the "re-educators," such as Adenauer's Defense Minister Baudissin, who wanted
to decree "an official image of history,""'3 establishing a new
ideal of the "citizen in uniform" and denying the existence of
831The

ensuing discussion draws from DONALD ABENHEIM, REFORGING THE IRON

CROSS: THE SEARCH FOR TRADITION IN THE WEST GERMAN ARMED FORCES (1988).
For further discussion of the subject, see JAMES DIEHL, THE THANKS OF THE
FATHERLAND:
GERMAN VETERANS AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1993).
3
1 2 ABENHEIM, supra note 831, at 198.
83
Id.
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any distinctively military virtues, exemplified and enshrined in
Germany's military past.
This legal decree was to celebrate as heroes the officers
in the July 20th plot against Hitler and the earlier Prussian tradition of military reformers, who had sought to preserve some
professional independence from political manipulation by civilian leadership. 3 4 The "traditions decree," as it came to be
known, was to refrain from honoring even ordinary soldiers,
innocent of atrocities, who obediently and unquestioningly served
the Nazi state in its aggressive wars.83 5 The decree would
prohibit relations (via veterans' associations) between retired
Wehrmacht officers and active duty officers in the new Bundeswehr. 3 5 It would even prohibit the flags, standards, and traditional pageantry employed during (but also long before) the Third
Reich.83 7
At the other extreme were the conservatives, who viewed the
army's institutional continuity, reinforced by enduring insignia and
intergenerational relations between retired and active-duty officers,
as necessary for organizational solidarity." 8 They doubted the
possibility of "decreeing" collective memory by executive order,
given the inevitable autonomy of custom and tradition from legal
mandate. They questioned the suitability of the July 20th conspirators as models of military morality, in all but the most exceptional
circumstances. They resisted ostracizing either Wehrmacht officers
or enlisted personnel who had served honorably at the front, been
innocent of atrocities and ignorant of the extensive criminality
occurring elsewhere, and so "'took another path of obedience out
of honest conviction. ' "839
From the late 1950s until the mid-1980s, an extensive debate
ensued between the advocates of these two views, both within
civilian leadership (of the Christian Democratic and Social Demo8 40
cratic Parties) and between these civilians and the officer corps.
Several drafts of the traditions decree were widely discussed and
m See id. at 200.
05 See id. at 211.
1"s See id. at 213.

s See id. at 211.
asg
0

14

See id. at 213.

Id. at 190 (quoting Major Schfitz).
See id. at 256-82.
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two versions ultimately issued, in 1965 and 1982.41 How were the
six problems confronted and addressed?
First, although only the highest ranking Wehrmacht officers
were to be prosecuted or purged, 842 the question inevitably arose
of whether to stigmatize in other less stringent ways officers,
noncommissioned officers, and enlisted personnel who were to
remain in service and assume even greater rank under the Federal
Republic's newly formed Bundeswehr. Would these soldiers be
wronged, in any serious sense, if denied public recognition-in the
traditions decree and the ceremonies it would sanction-of their
dutiful service and considerable sacrifice for their country? After
all, as Abenheim observes: "[D]espite the political failings and
crimes of the military leadership, the soldiers of the Wehrmacht had
fought well against terrible odds.
They had mastered their
operational craft on the battlefield and in the staff room, and, until
8 43
the very end, the Wehrmacht retained its cohesion."
Many leaders thought it unfair to deny the loyal service and
sacrifices of these individuals any place in collective memory and
associational life of the army. The 1965 decree sought a compromise: to condemn the Wehrmacht, as an institution, and its
leadership for the role it played in the Nazi state, in traditional war
crimes, and in the "new" international crime of waging aggressive
war, but to exonerate and even praise the courage of the less-aware
rank and file, including intermediate-level officers. 44
The 1982 decree abandoned this compromise. 45 Historical
research in the preceding years made it impossible to sustain any
such distinction between the criminality of the very top leaders and
the innocence of middle and lower ranking officers, now discovered
to have been deeply involved in the slaughter of the Jews.8 46 The
eventual retirement in the 1970s of officers who had served in the
'41See id. at 282. Until this point, I have largely equated the law's likely response
to administrative massacre with criminal prosecution. The legal procedure involved
in the German traditions debate, however, involved an executive order, with
discussion focusing on what its content should be. The significance of this difference
for the law's relative success or failure in influencing collective memory cannot be
examined here.
842 See id. at 39.
4
9 sId. at 293.
14 See id. at 208-12, 279-81.
845See id. at 271-81.
" See, e.g., id. at 275-76 (discussing the research of Manfred Messerschmidt, Chief
Historian of the Military Historical Research Office in Freiburg).
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Wehrmacht and SS facilitated this revision of the decree.8 47
Solidarity within the army, and a salubrious relation between it and
civilian society, now seemed to permit, if not require, a more
unequivocal condemnation of wartime wrongdoing by German
soldiers, without fear of unfairness to those whose reputations and
family names would thereby be besmirched.
Second, concerns about distorting the historical record
continuously infused German debate over the traditions decree.
Historians, serving actively as consultants throughout, were charged
with finding in German military history "individuals and deeds
worthy of emulation" for preservation in the army's collective
memory. 48 Some historians balked at this agenda, asserting that
"it was against the essence of historical scholarship," which must
allow for changing interpretations over time, "to 'decree' an image
of history." 4 ' Certain drafts were similarly condemned as "too
long for a decree and too short as a history.""' In search of
military heroes, the 1965 decree turned to early Prussian reformers
and the July 20th conspirators.8 51
But later research revealed that the Prussian reformers never
accepted the postwar soldierly ideals of "freedom in obedience"
and moral autonomy from superior orders. Historians now claimed
that "[t]here had never been ...

[any] good soldierly traditions

of political thought and responsibility in the German armed
forces." 5 2 Moreover, as historians began to uncover the coparticipation of Wehrmacht units with SS killing squads, and as these
discoveries began to enter into wider political discussion, the initial
decree's distinction between "the guilt of certain individuals and
groups and the enduring integrity of the institution appeared ever
less credible."5 ' Historical learning, first harnessed to provide
evidentiary support for the original decree, thus came to undermine
its legitimacy and proved to be its ultimate undoing. Rather than
7
84
See

id. at 229.
Id. at 265.
s' Id. at 205; see also id. at 197 ("'Historical thinking rightly defends itself against
848

falsifying history for a specific political purpose.'" (quoting historian Gerhard Ritter));
id. at 195 ("'The person who believes in tradition... is ... conservative .... [Hie
imposes his ideas and those of his time on the past .... [But] [h]istory... seeks to

comprehend problems in their own time, neither as symbols nor as spiritual and
moral values. It does not support tradition.. .. '" (quoting historian Meier-Welcker)).
m Id. at 205.
851 See id. at 186.
82
1 Id. at 276.
85
3 Id. at 231.
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authoritatively shaping collective memory, the law had to catch up
with it, and historians' impact upon it.
Third, there was the issue of how broadly to read the lessons of
the July 20th conspiracy as a precedent to guide future generations
of military leaders. These wartime officers, who had plotted Hitler's
death, were still seen by many Germans nearly as traitors. 854 But
young cohorts in the officer corps, especially after 1968, began to
display considerable sympathy for the conspirators and to participate actively in the official ceremonies commemorating their
acts.8 55 More conservative, elder officers continued to hold that
however necessary those acts of rebellion against civilian leadership
may have been, the circumstances that justified them were too
unique and unsusceptible of repetition to warrant elevating the
conspirators, by legal decree, into the archetype of military
morality. 56 Such a move would risk inviting future disobedience
by officers to lawful commands from civilian superiors whose
ideology officers did not share or whose strategic judgment they did
not respect.
These fears were partially confirmed when mutinous French
officers invoked the precedent of the July 20th conspirators to
justify armed resistance to official French policy favoring Algerian
decolonization.857
The question became whether the military
resistance to Hitler, commemoration of which was to be incorporated into the army's institutional memory by decree, provided a faulty
analogy to current predicaments in the postwar world.
Then there was the fourth problem of breaking decisively with
the past through acknowledgment of guilt and repentance. Those
who perceived a strong need for institutional continuity found this
break impossible.
The 1965 traditions decree sought to pay
obeisance to their concerns: "'Tradition is the handing down of the
valid heritage of the past. The maintenance of tradition is a part of
military education.
It opens the way to historical examples,
experiences, and symbols; it should enable the soldier better to
understand and to fulfill his mission today and tomorrow.'"8'
Academics such as Gerhard Ritter remained dissatisfied with this

8" See id. at 213-16. For a discussion of different forms of German resistance
during the Third Reich, see Large, supra note 638.
11 See ABENHEIM, supra note 831, at 192 (observing that the yearly celebration of
the Attentat proved popular among the younger soldiers).
86 See id. at 196.
157 See id. at 193.
' Id. at 208 (citation omitted).
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concession, however, warning that "overemphasis on the negative
aspects of history... posed a threat to the political integration of
the [former Nazi] soldier in society."859 A refusal to honor the
past's great achievements would "'destroy contemporary selfconfidence,'" they complained.6 °
Yet even the 1965 decree, with all its compromises, stressed that
for military memories and traditions properly to endure required
their compatibility with universalistic Western principles, embodied
in constitutional and international law. 8 1 One provision thus
provided that "'the measure for the understanding and maintenance
of tradition is the Basic Law [the Constitution] and the tasks and
duties which it assigns to the Bundeswehr. The Basic Law is the
answer to German history.' 86 2 Another provision stipulated that
"'[t]he duties of the soldier-loyalty, bravery, obedience, [and]
comradeship.., achieve their moral standing in our time by being
bound to the Basic Law. ' "8 3 Such legal commitments marked a
decisive "break with the past " s6 in the self-understanding of the
German officer corps, as one historian notes. He concludes, with
regard to the army's recognition of its war guilt, that its twenty-five
years of internal debate over the traditions decree and its revisions
"represented an attempt among professional soldiers to address the
past in an intelligent and responsible fashion.., further remarkable
because no other major social group in West Germany underwent
86 5
a similar process of historical self-examination."
Fifth, could German leaders realistically hope to shape the
army's collective memory by means of legal decree? Perhaps a highranking officer was right to observe, in half-serious self-deprecation,
"'[o]ne really has to be a German to decree in writing what a
tradition must be." 866 Many participants in the intragovernmental
debate protested that the Defense Ministry ought to allow the
Bundeswehr to form its own traditions without interference from

s9

Id. at 197.

" Id. (quoting Professor Gerhard Ritter).

See id. at 281.
(citation omitted).
' Id. (citation omitted). This language reflected the arguments of people like

1l

12 Id.

Meier-Welcker, a German historian and participant in the official debate, who
contended that "[t]he values of the present must be the sole measure of the spiritual

direction of the Bundeswehr; only they could guide the choice of what was worthy of
tradition." Id. at 196.
8Id.at 281.
86

Id. at 295.

' Id. at 185 (quoting General Gerd Schmfilckle).
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above. 167 From this standpoint, collective memory was (what I
have called, following Elster) a necessarily unintended con8 68
sequence.
But the possibilities and limits of shaping institutional memory
by decree itself became an explicit subissue in the debate among the
politicians, officers, and historians. One side held that "all artificial
attempts to found tradition would inevitably alienate people;
8 69
instead, one should allow tradition to grow of its own accord."
Others responded that this was a false dichotomy, that "'tradition is
neither "grown" in place nor made artificially. Rather it can and
should be guided, awakened, and planted through many sensible
deliberations.'8 s70 Despite the doubts of many, two generations
of German political leaders-in part through the "traditions debate"
itself-proceeded to try.
Sixth, to a considerable extent, the decision regarding how the
law ought to shape collective memory, and hence organizational
solidarity, was made publicly, with full consideration of the views of
the very people whose memories were to be influenced. That there
was a robust debate, over many years, among all interested parties
is perhaps the most striking feature of how the postwar West
German military handled the question of collective memory. This
discussion primarily took the form of a flurry of interagency
memoranda, white papers, and decision memoranda.
But it
exhaustively explored the strengths and weaknesses of virtually every
conceivable answer to the question, and regularly found a forum in
the elite press, if only rarely in the mass media.
Despite the view of some that shared memory and tradition
must-almost by definition-be noncontroversial, a vigorous
controversy nonetheless developed (involving hundreds of highranking officers, party leaders, military lawyers, and historians)
concerning what the content of the army's institutional memory
ought to be and how its memories ought to be symbolized and
commemorated.
This experience suggests, in short, that it is possible to use the
law to influence collective memory about administrative massacre in
the face of all the obstacles examined in this Article.

'6 See, e.g., id. at 269 (referring to the 1979 White Paper in which Defense
Minister Hans Apel contended, "[t]radition... cannot be planned. It has to grow").
" See supra note 605.
819
70 ABENHEIM, supra note 831, at 197 (describing the views of Percy E. Schramm).
1 Id. (quoting Professor Werner Conze).
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CONCLUSION

It remains to be seen whether liberal courts can entirely
reconcile the conflicts between the traditional, delimited functions
of criminal law and the dramaturgical demands of monumental
didactics. But from the prior discussion it should be clear, at least,
that criminal courts have often shaped collective memory of such
national tragedies as administrative massacre, and that prosecutors,
defense counsel, and executive officials have sought to influence
judicial conclusions toward this end, sometimes successfully. Such
successes, and the promise they hold out, ensure both that courts
will continue to be drawn willy-nilly into the process of memory
construction and that we, the audience, will nevertheless be
increasingly wary of the resulting potential for their political
manipulation, injustice to defendants, distortion of the historical
record, and for fostering dangerous delusions of purity and
grandeur. If courts have already been thrown into these bracing
waters, the principal task for liberal sociology and jurisprudence is
to teach them to swim.
In accentuating the negative, in emphasizing the problems
inevitably to be confronted, I mean only to emphasize that the
courts cannot perform so large ajob on their own. In so doing, I
wish to suggest how the many nonlawyers engaged in other media
of memory-practice might target their own contributions more
pointedly toward compensating for the criminal law's particular
weaknesses. In addition, the preceding analysis may help sensitize
prosecutors and judges involved in cases of administrative massacre
to both the perils and promise that such cases present for cultivating liberal memory and solidarity,87 1 to exploit the promise and
confront the perils more directly than they otherwise would do. I
871 See, for example, the pending United Nations proceedings against Bosnian
Serbs and Rwandan Hutus, as well as the current trial in Ethiopia against 44 former
military leaders. All three trials involve indictments for war crimes and crimes against
humanity. See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/
Res/955 (1994) (establishing an international tribunal for prosecuting violators of
international humanitarian law in Rwanda"); S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess.,
3217th mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/Res/827 (1993) (establishing an international tribunal
"for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia");

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT OF ETHIOPIA, THE
SPECIAL PROSECUTION PROCESS OF WAR CRIMINALS AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS

INETHIOPIA (1994) (mandating the establishment of an historical record of the abuses
of the Mengistu regime and bringing those criminally responsible for human rights
violations and/or corruption to justice).
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am acutely aware of having raised far more questions than I have
answered. My modest hope has been to open up consideration of
a question not presently on the agenda of liberal jurisprudence and
to recast some existing issues of sociological theory in a new light.
As a tool for the construction of collective memory of administrative massacre, criminal prosecution has both the strengths and
weaknesses here identified. It does some things rather well, other
things only passably well, and makes an utter hash of still others.
Despite frequent, energetic assertions that the problems are
"inherent" in the law or liberalism,172 that case has nowhere been
made, or even seriously argued. When we examine the actual cases,
those discussed here, the obstacles we encounter are localized,
discrete, historically contingent: this statute of limitations, that
definition of the elements of an offense, the other jurisdictional
quirk.
From all this we should no more conclude that criminal trials
are inevitably insignificant as a font of liberal memory than that they
are uniquely potent instruments toward that end. Discussion of
such trials by both legal scholars and those in the human sciences,
I have suggested, has frequently been characterized by overgeneralization: by exaggerated claims for the pedagogical value of these
proceedings no less than by hyperbolic dismissals. The present
Article has sought to show the need for greater subtlety and
87
discrimination in our judgments here. 3
To cultivate liberal memory in the aftermath of administrative
massacre requires that courts treat easy cases as if they were hard
ones, because legal concepts and doctrines will often have lost their
normal connection to the underlying moral and political issues at
stake. This in turn demands thatjudges allow both prosecutors and
defense counsel to paint with a broader brush (as they have
demonstrably done, in any event), to widen the spatial and temporal
frame of courtroom storytelling in ways that allow litigants to flesh
"7See, e.g., Douglas, supra note 272, at 7 (attributing Nuremberg's failure as
historiography to the doctrine of precedent); Letter from Professor Herbert A.
Strauss to Professor Eric Stein, supra note 333, at 1027 (pointing out the absurdity
of lawyers and judges still applying law handed down from the Nazi period and
arguing that this absurdity is "inherent in legal forms of thinking"); Wood, supra note
27, at 21 (suggesting, on the basis of the Touvier trial, that "the 'limits ofjuridical
logic' impose necessary restrictions on the historical, educative and commemorative
functions of law").
s" Perhaps the modesty of my conclusions in this regard will, at least, temper the
overly ambitious reach of my historical and theoretical purview.
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out their competing interpretations of recent history, and to argue
these before an attentive public.
The result will be to make the prosecution's case, however
strong on strictly doctrinal grounds, more vulnerable to refutation
by contextualizing historical arguments that courts would normally
disregard as legally irrelevant, excluding all evidence proffered in
their support. The side whose story has greater "fit" with existing
rules would no longer win hands-down on that account, for fit must
be weighed against other values, especially those of robust public
8 74
deliberation and memory-practice.
What will be lost by prosecutors in terms of enhanced vulnerability will be gained, many times over, in the judgment's ultimate
persuasiveness as the foundation for collective memory of the
disputed events. This will often mean a slower, more circuitous
route tojudgment, dramaturgically designed as much to raise public
understanding about the underlying morality of criminal law as to
view these particular defendants in its light.
The response to both the Argentine junta members and the
Japanese generals would thus have had to be that: first, even on
their utilitarian assumptions about morality, their respective
reactions to the leftist guerrilla (mass torture of nonguerrillas and
disappearances) and to Western imperialism (Japanese war crimes
throughout Asia) were grossly "disproportionate" to the threat in
question; and second, the criminal law of a liberal society and
international community must, in any event, reject such utilitarian
calculations, when they conflict with the most fundamental moral
rights of persons-to life, liberty, and physical integrity. These
judicial responses would set the terms for the ensuing debate.
A "slam dunk" conviction, summarily condemning the defendants as "radical evil" incarnate,8

75

is certain to shut off the very

dialogue that most needs to be initiated among fiercely hostile
opposing camps of political partisans, ready to renew their geno" My argument here differs from Dworkin's, in which "fit" is devalued against
other objectives when legal rules look very bad from a moral point of view. See
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 98, at 256-57. In my cases, the applicable legal
rules themselves (against murder, for instance) are morally unproblematic. They are
nonetheless traded off against other important values-to justify punishment more
persuasively to more people, and thus to shape collective memory. Fit will be
compromised most clearly regarding legal rules on admissibility of evidence and the
customary scope of fact-finding.
75 This view of the Argentine junta defendants is reflected, for instance, in the
title of Carlos Nino's posthumous book, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL, supra note 30.
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cidal efforts (or avenge those of their more successful adversaries)
at the first opportunity.
The path that I propose could have made military trials not
merely more compelling as public spectacle, but more urgently
demanded by the Argentine public, permitting them to go forward
without the amnesty and pardons. It could also have done more to
educate morally the Argentine populace about the issues dodged
during the dirty war. "Pedagogically-motivated taboos " 876 not only
make for poor historiography, as German revisionist historians
rightly warn, but in the longer run even, paradoxically, for poor
pedagogy. Opening the law at such times to the full range of moral
and historical arguments that we use in real life to govern and judge
our actions would have better served the ends of legal didactics,
social solidarity, and political reform.
Only in this way, by ensuring that all antagonists feel they have
received a fair hearing, can the courts hope to impart a measure of
professional authority-however limited-to theirjudgments, weaving
their strictly legal conclusions into a plausible and relatively
capacious narrative about the country's recent conflagration. To
insist on punctilious judicial adherence to any notion of legal
formalism at such times is to guarantee the failure of courts to
cultivate liberal memory when this objective is vital to successful
democratization.
Because courts do not conventionally have authority to resolve
issues of collective memory and national mythology, conventionalist
accounts of judging would not authorize judges to address them.
This stricture would apply even to passages of an opinion that no
reader would take for anything but dicta and to testimony that no
77
observer would mistake as anything but "general background."
Judicial conventions should be revised accordingly. By simply
applying "the rules laid down," without extended discussion and
defense of the principles on which they rest, formalist approaches
to judicial process shut off the very discussion that is most needed,
when judging the conduct of those who do not share the law's
assumptions.8 78
Formalist judging assumes that widespread
876 FRIEDLANDER,

supra note 322, at 66 (summarizing arguments of the revision-

ists).
" For a discussion of this sort of conventionalism, its close relation to what others
call legal positivism, and its limitations as a conception of the judicial role, see
DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE, supra note 98, at 114-50.
878 Although discursive democratization is ill-served by formalist judging, that
approach has paradoxically produced most laudable results (in judicial resistance to
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societal agreement on fundamentals already exists, when agreement
at such times is conspicuously absent, and when steps toward its
social construction-through reasoned debate and persuasion-are
so imperative. As Sanford Levinson observes, many theories of
punishment "assume[] ... the existence of a single community

organized around a coherent moral code reflected in its criminal
law."879 Because people thus essentially agree about morality, the
courtroom need not become a forum for extended debates about its
nature and demands. Correspondinglyjudges need not examine its
ambiguities when applying the legal rules embodying it to what the
law regards as easy cases.
But whether any such shared moral code exists and whether it
is accurately reflected in the community's criminal law prove to be
highly problematic propositions-by no means to be casually
assumed-in the historical circumstances where large-scale administrative massacre occurs. Even when most people largely agree in
their moral judgments, this "conventional morality" may often be
uncritical, that is, less rationally defensible than the liberal morality
formally embodied in the criminal law applicable to the defendants'
conduct.
Such was very much the case in several of the episodes examined
here, such as the German and Argentine. Levinson's observation
thus suggests a vital link between legal positivism and consensualist
sociology: the latter presupposes a societal agreement on basic
morality that is thought to be reflected in rules of positive law, rules
that should therefore generally be applied in a straightforward,
8 0
syllogistic fashion-the hallmark of formalist judging.
wicked law) during periods of authoritarian rule. See Osiel, supra note 445, at 493-95,
522-26, 533-45.
" Sanford Levinson, Responsibilityfor Crimes of War, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 244,249
n.10 (1973). Levinson is specifically referring to the view of Henry M. Hart,Jr., The
Aims of the CriminalLaw, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 413 (1958).
'sThe philosophy of legal positivism by no means logically entails the judicial
practice of mechanical formalism. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
121-50 (1961) (arguing that, due to "open texture," every legal system contains a large
area in which judges and other officials need to exercise discretion). But as a
practical matter of judicial self-understanding, the close affinity between legal
positivism and formalism is often difficult to disconfirm. See generally Lon L. Fuller,
Positivismand Fidelity to Law-A Reply to ProfessorHart, 71 HARv. L. REV. 630 (1958)
(arguing that a theory of interpretation which focuses on the purposes of rules and
statutes would solve the seeming problem of law's indeterminacy and would enable
positivistic philosophy to achieve its ideal of fidelity to law). Even Fred Schauer, a
leading positivist, concedes that there is plainly an affinity between legal positivism
and rule-based decision-making. See Fred Schauer, Rules and Rule of Law, 14 HARV.
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This link between legal positivism and consensualist sociology
suggests common weaknesses in any effort to employ either
perspective for guiding and assessing the law's response to the
conflictual periods surrounding administrative massacre.
Only
nonformalist conceptions of the judicial role, by encouraging
litigants to examine the law's underlying moral principles and social
policies, allow courts some legitimate latitude to stimulate this
broader process of public deliberation, or to initiate it where
memory remains repressed. At such times, legal analysis can be
confined within narrow, positivistic terms only at the cost of
sacrificing all public persuasiveness and societal resonance.
In short, as an approach to judging, legal formalism tacitly relies
on the conclusions of Durkheimian sociology. To concede the
absence of the moral consensus that Durkheim presupposed is to
concede the limitations of any judicial philosophy that rests upon
his foundations. In the deeply divided societies where administrative massacre occurs, it is too much to hope (in a Durkheimian
spirit) that, through criminal law, judges can easily elicit shared
sentiments of liberal morality in ways that all will endorse.
But it is not too much to hope that courts might make full use
of the public spotlight trained upon them at such times to stimulate
democratic deliberation about the merits and meaning of such
principles. In the ensuing debate, with the recent memory of
official intolerance and repression firmly in everyone's minds,
liberal morality will do very well on its own. That debate can
signally contribute to the special sort of solidarity-through civil
dissensus-to which a modern pluralistic society may properly aspire.
This conclusion is implicit in the more eloquent statement of
Henri Glaeser, the son of one of Touvier's victims, in his remarks
to the French jury. "'My father was not judged by anyone. He
was arrested, thrown five hours later against a wall, and assassinated."' 8 1 The present forum offered a striking contrast, notwithstanding the vigorous controversy within it. "'I am happy to find
myself in front of a court that is democratic, engaged in an
adversarial debate where everyone can speak, anything can be said,
88 2
even by the accused.'"

J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 645, 676 (1991). On the implications of this connection forjudicial
enforcement of wicked law, see generally Osiel, supra note 445.
"51Laurent Greilsamer, Leprocsde PaulTouvierdevantla courd'assisesdes Yvelines:
'mon pre, lu, un ne l'a pas jugi..., LE MONDE, Apr. 10, 1994, at 13 (translated in
Wexler, supra note 27, at 220).
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